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This study is an access to justice analysis of class actions in Ontario from 1992 to 2017, 
with a focus on environmental claims. Its central argument is that the primary policy 
objective of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 of increasing access to justice, a fundamental 
human right, has largely not been fulfilled during this period for environmental claims, 
particularly those involving historical contamination and human health-impairment. This 
is a striking discovery given that environmental class actions were originally posited as 
paradigmatic class actions in Ontario since such actions typically involve negative value 
claims with diffuse harms across vast spatial and temporal contexts with acute power 
imbalances between victims and perpetrators in light of the negligible public enforcement 
of environmental regulations. The findings of this study uncover and explain the gap 
between this traditional perspective and the bleak reality of the floundering of 
environmental class actions in Ontario, with resultant negative implications for the 
capacities of residents to access justice in environmental matters.  
 Departing from the proceduralistic and individualistic emphases of traditional class 
action and access to justice research, this study critically explores Ontario’s class action 
regime for environmental claims by considering various contextual variables that are not 
commonly addressed in the established literature. By examining the exclusionary dynamics 
that operate to impede multilayer access to environmental justice in light of the power, 
production, and social reproduction associated with toxic exposures, this study expands the 
ambit of environmental class actions beyond the traditional confines to the broader political 
economy of pollution. In so doing, this study incorporates descriptive and normative 





integrated approach to evaluating multilayer access to environmental justice in Ontario. 
This contextual approach reveals a more complicated and socially reflective picture of 
environmental class actions than has heretofore been available in extant scholarship. By 
uncovering the exclusionary dynamics of class actions in the political economy of 
pollution, this study provides greater clarity about the type of environmental justice that is 
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INTRODUCTION 
 “Without class actions, the doors of justice remain closed to some plaintiffs, 
however strong their legal claims.”1 
-   Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin 
 
In Canada today, calls for increased access to justice are reaching deafening levels. As the 
Canadian Forum on Civil Justice observed in a 2017 report, Canada is experiencing an 
access to justice “crisis.”2 This precarious situation is occurring during a historical period 
of rising mass environmental harms that has precipitated Canadians to bind together to seek 
legal redress, the forms of which include accountability, monetary compensation, and 
social recognition of loss. Given economic constraints (as well as social and psychological 
barriers), attaining justice for environmental harms often requires collective action. This 
has primarily manifested in the form of class action litigation. It is therefore not surprising 
that class actions have been widely viewed as promoting access to justice in environmental 
matters. In the face of mass environmental harms affecting entire communities and groups 
of similarly situated individuals, class actions are continually posited as beneficial 
instruments for increasing access to justice, a fundamental human right.3 What is 
                                                        
1 Western Canadian Shopping Centres v. Dutton, 2000 S.C.J. 63, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 534 at 28. 
2 Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil & Family Matters, Canadian Access to Justice Initiatives: 
Justice Development Goals Status Report, Ottawa, Canada (2017): 18. See also,  Action Committee on 
Access to Justice in Civil & Family Matters, Colloquium Report, Ottawa, Canada (2014): 12. The Canadian 
Bar Association has similarly observed that the state of access to justice in Canada is ‘abysmal.’ Melina 
Buckley, “Reaching Equal Justice: An Invitation to Envision and Act,” Canadian Bar Association (2013): 
6. 
3 Garry Watson, “Class Actions: The Canadian Experience,” Duke Journal of Comparative and 
International Law 11, no. 2 (2001): 269-89; Janet Walker, “Who’s Afraid of US-style Class Actions?” 
Southwestern Journal of International Law 18, no. 2 (2012): 509-66; Lorne Sossin, “The Justice of Access: 
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surprising, however, is the relative paucity of research that critically examines this 
widespread belief.  
 “The importance of access to justice,” Deborah Hensler has observed, “as a 
fundamental human right which ought to be readily available to all, is clearly a new 
consideration that stimulates fresh thinking about representative or ‘grouped’ 
proceedings.”4 In this context, the paucity of research into the crisis of access to justice is 
disconcerting for scholars and stakeholders in several interrelated fields of inquiry, 
including empirical legal studies, human rights, political economy, environmental and 
public health, and public policy. To evaluate the progress of class actions, scholars have 
generally invoked the three policy objectives enumerated by courts and provincial 
legislatures: judicial economy, access to justice, and behaviour modification. In this 
tripartite division, access to justice has dominated the jurisprudence and commentary as 
the primary policy objective. In point of fact, access to justice was the main policy objective 
of Ontario’s groundbreaking (in common law jurisdictions) Class Proceedings Act, 1992. 
But how has this policy actually manifested? What type of access and what type of justice 
is being increased, and for whom?  
These questions are particularly striking in the context of environmental class 
actions. Environmental claims were originally posited as paradigmatic class actions in 
Ontario for several reasons, including the diffusiveness and collective traits of the harms 
involved, their general characteristics as negative value claims, as well as the negligible 
                                                        
Who Should Have Standing to Challenge the Constitutional Adequacy of Legal Aid?” University of British 
Columbia Law Review 40 (2007): 727-44. 
4 Deborah Hensler, “The Globalization of Class Actions: An Overview,” Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science 622, no. 1 (2009): 7-29.  
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enforcement of environmental regulations by public agencies which has precipitated 
demands for class actions as instruments of social protection. Heather McLeod-Kilmurray 
has further articulated the paradigmatic quality of environmental class actions in light of 
the fact that the class action (a) “reflects the reality of environmental harms as a shared 
problem”; (b) “demonstrates the full scope and extent of the harm”; (c) “strengthens the 
argument for injunctive relief by accurately reflecting the nature and strengths of interests 
to be balanced”; (d) “can result in damages large enough to alter behaviour.” According to 
Kilmurray, this is why “alternative avenues of redress are not adequate replacements for 
the class action, and why class actions can be very useful tools in environmental 
litigation.”5 
As this study explicates, however, the development of Ontario’s class action regime 
betrays this originary promise. Not a single environmental class action has been successful 
at trial on its merits and the overlapping uncertainties and risk exposures involved in 
environmental claims (particularly historical contamination claims) have disfavoured the 
pursuit of environmental class actions and contributed to the production of an anemic class 
action regime dominated by investor rights and securities actions over claims with stronger 
public interests. This study seeks to uncover the dynamics that have facilitated this situation 
and its implications for substantive environmental justice. In so doing, this study poses two 
major overlapping questions, in addition to those posed above: To what extent have class 
actions promoted multilayer access to environmental justice? What are the limitations of 
class actions for environmental justice-seekers? 
                                                        
5 Heather McLeod-Kilmurray, The Process of Judging the Environment: Civil Procedure, Environmental 
Ethics and their Effects on Environmental Law (SJD, University of Toronto, 2007) [unpublished]. 
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By addressing these fundamental questions and situating class actions within their 
broader social, political, and economic context, this dissertation contributes through a 
holistic method in filling a major knowledge gap that scholars have identified but struggled 
to address6; that is, providing a critical analysis of the extent to which class actions have 
increased multilayer access to justice in environmental matters.7 As the Canadian Bar 
Association observed in its Reaching Equal Justice report, “Canada is plagued by a paucity 
of access to justice research.”8 Deborah Hensler has similarly observed this contextual void 
in class action scholarship, noting that “[n]either scholars nor policy-makers typically pay 
much attention to the circumstances that give rise to the mass claims that [class actions] 
address, the cultural values and institutions that shape beliefs about when people and 
businesses should be compensated for losses, the economic arrangements that facilitate or 
                                                        
6 Michael Molavi, “Beyond the Courtroom: Access to Justice, Privatization, and the Future of Class Action 
Research,” Canadian Class Action Review 10, no. 1-2 (2015): 8-31; Matthew Good, “Access to Justice, 
Judicial Economy, and Behaviour Modification: Exploring the Goals of Canadian Class Actions,” Alberta 
Law Review, 47, no. 1 (2009): 185-227; Deborah Hensler, “Developing an Empirical Research Agenda on 
Access to Justice in Class and Mass Actions,” in Accessing Justice: Appraising Class Actions Ten Years 
After Dutton, Hollick & Rumley, ed. Jasminka Kalajdzic (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2011), 49-57. A recent 
edited volume has similarly recognized this contextual void in class action scholarship and provided a 
multi-national overview of factors beyond substantive law and procedural rules, see, Deborah Hensler, 
Christopher Hodges, and Ianika Tzankova, eds., Class Actions in Context: How Culture, Economics and 
Politics Shape Collective Litigation (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2016).  
7 The phrase “access to justice in environmental matters” is derived from the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (UNECE) Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, commonly referred to as the Aarhus Convention, 
given its signing in Aarhus, Denmark on 25 June 1998.  The Aarhus Convention requires signatories to 
develop provisions for information, participation, and litigation in environmental matters for individuals 
and collectives. In this context, ‘access to justice’ applies primarily to litigation rights; in contrast to 
competing concepts of ‘access to justice’ that expand its scope to include information, decision-making, 
and other types of active participation. Canada is a member state of the UNECE, but not a contracting party 
to the Aarhus Convention, although Canada did participate in negotiations of the Convention.  The term 
‘multilayer’ refers to the three layers of interests involved in class actions: individual, collective, and 
public. This term was originally introduced by Stefan Wrbka, Steven Van Uytsel, and Mathias Siems, in 
their edited volume, Collective Actions: Enhancing Access to Justice and Reconciling Multilayer Interests? 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). With this in mind, the phrase multilayer access to justice 
in environmental matters refers to access to justice in the context of class actions involving environmental 
concerns. Moving forward, ‘multilayer access to justice’ is employed as a shorthand to refer to access to 
justice in the context of class actions. 
8 Buckley, “Reaching Equal Justice,” 147.  
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deter litigation and the politics that shape decisions about who will be responsible for 
paying compensation to whom and how much.”9 In fact, the study of class actions from a 
social science perspective has been largely underdeveloped; as one of the foremost global 
scholars in socio-legal studies, Michael McCann, has pointed out, “social scientists have 
devoted very little study to class action litigation” and in light of “the highly political 
character and huge consequences of such litigation, it seems like a ripe area for research 
by social scientists.”10 In this interdisciplinary study, I address this underexplored area and 
contribute to several interrelated fields (identified above) under the aegis of the emerging 
field of critical policy studies.11  
 This introductory chapter starts with a brief overview of the global resurgence of 
access to justice in the early twenty-first century, with a focus on the sub-field of collective 
access to justice in the form of class actions (re: ‘multilayer access to justice’). It then 
identifies the scholarly contribution of this study, further elaborates on the methodology 
and rationale for focusing on environmental class actions, and provides a chapter-by-
chapter outline of this study’s major arguments and sub-arguments.  
 
1. GLOBAL RESURGENCE OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
A global resurgence of access to justice is currently underway. As a central principle of 
civil justice, the concept of access to justice grew in popularity during the height of the 
                                                        
9 Hensler, “Class actions in context,” 387. 
10 Michael McCann, “Litigation and Legal Mobilization,” in Gregory A. Caldeira et al, eds., The Oxford 
Handbook of Law and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009): 536.  
11 Michael Orsini and Miriam Smith, eds., Critical Policy Studies (Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 2007).  
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post-war Keynesian welfare state and its associated frameworks of social provisioning; 
however, with the advent of neo-liberalism, access to justice experienced a sharp 
curtailment from its universalistic premises as a “social right”12 from the early 1980s 
onwards.13 The post-1980 historical conjuncture conceived access to justice more as a 
“social luxury.”14 To the extent that access to justice remained a priority area for public 
policy and academic research during this latter period, it was largely articulated through 
market-oriented strategies and rationalities of economic efficiency and privatization (i.e. 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms) that operated within the budgetary confines 
imposed by neo-liberal governance frameworks and regressive taxation systems. In recent 
years, however, a burgeoning interest in access to justice has resurfaced both domestically 
                                                        
12 Mauro Cappelletti and Bryant Garth, “General Report,” in Access to Justice – A World Survey, eds. 
Cappelletti and Garth (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1978), 9. 
13 Access to justice has remained a staple objective of the Canadian legal community for several decades, 
although recent years have seen an expansion of the scope of the concept beyond legalistic approaches. 
See, for example, Sarah Staszak, No Day in Court: Access to Justice and the Politics of Judicial 
Retrenchment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004); Allan C. Hutchinson, Access to Civil Justice (Toronto: Carswell, 1990); 
British Columbia, Responses to Access to Justice: The Report of the Justice Reform Committee (Victoria: 
Ministry of the Attorney General, 1988); Roderick A. Macdonald, Prospects for Civil Justice (Toronto: 
Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1995); Lord Woolf, Access to Justice: Final Report (London: The 
Stationery Office, 1996); Mary Jane Mossman, “The Charter and Access to Justice in Canada,” in Charting 
the Consequences: The Impact of Charter Rights on Canadian Law and Politics, eds., David Schneiderman 
and Kate Sutherland (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997); William Harnett, Access to Justice: An 
Inquiry Into Legal Aid in Ontario (Toronto: Canadian Bar Association, 1986); Windsor Yearbook Access 
to Justice, “Twentieth Anniversary Special Section,” Windsor Yearbook Access to Justice 19 (2001) 263-
417; Patricia Hughes and Janet E. Mosher, eds., “Access to Justice,” Osgoode Hall Law Journal 46 (2008); 
Ottawa, National Symposium: Expanding Horizons, Rethinking Access to Justice in Canada (Ottawa: 
Department of Justice, 2000); Lisa Addario, Getting A Foot in the Door: Women, Civil Legal Aid and 
Access to Justice (Ottawa: Status of Women Canada, 1998); Micah B. Rankin, “Access to Justice and the 
Institutional Limits of Institutional Courts,” Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 30 (2012): 101-38; 
Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil & Family Matters, Colloquium Report, Canadian Forum on 
Civil Justice 2014. Online: <http://www.cfcjfcjc.org/sites/default/files/docs/2014/ac_colloq-
uium_web_FINAL.pdf>. Elizabeth Chambliss, Renee Newman Knake, and Robert L. Nelson, “What We 
Know and Need to Know About the State of ‘Access to Justice’ Research,” South Carolina Law Review 67 
(2016): 193-201; Jean-Francois Roberge, “‘Sense of Access to Justice’ as a Framework for Civil Procedure 
Justice Reform: An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Settlement Conferences in Quebec (Canada),” 
Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution 17 (2016): 323-361.  
14 Roderick A. Macdonald, “Access to Justice in Canada Today,” in Access to Justice for a New Century: 
The Way Forward, eds., Julia Bass, W.A. Bogart, and Frederick H. Zemans (Toronto: Law Society of 
Upper Canada, 2005), 32.  
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and globally, including the newest wave of access to justice research in Canada which 
moves towards embracing a public-oriented approach that focuses on everyday legal 
problems and the various (economic, social, etc.) costs of justice.15  
In the global order, ‘access to justice’ has emerged as a major focus in the domain 
of law and development.16 It has regularly been invoked by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), and the World Bank, among other global actors. As the UNDP 
observes, the “poor and marginalized are too often denied the ability to seek remedies in a 
fair justice system,”17 which has prompted the UNDP to promote “effective, responsive, 
accessible and fair justice systems as a pillar of democratic governance.”18 Such references 
often appeal to the enshrinement of ‘access to justice’ in the tripartite framework of 
international human rights: (1) Articles 7 and 8 in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR); (2) Articles 2, 8, 14, and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR); (3) Preamble to the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). This enshrinement has precipitated a form of ‘new rights 
advocacy’ popularized in the 1990s and 2000s in which international human rights are 
mobilized by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society actors in 
                                                        
15 Trevor C. W. Farrow, “A New Wave of Access to Justice Reform in Canada,” in In Search of the Ethical 
Lawyer: Stories from the Canadian Legal Profession,” eds., Adam Dodek and Alice Woolley (Toronto: 
University of British Columbia Press, 2016): 164-85. The Canadian Forum on Civil Justice has been a 
leader on this front, see, e.g. Farrow et al, Everyday Legal Problems and the Cost of Justice in Canada: 
Overview Report (2016), online: http://www.cfcj-fcjc.org/sites/default/files/ Everyday%20Legal%20 
Problems%20and%20the%20Cost%20of%20Justice%20in%20Canada%20-%20Overview%20Report.pdf.  
16 See, e.g., Yash Ghai and Jill Cottrell’s recent volume, Marginalized Communities and Access to Justice 
(New York: Routledge, 2010), which examines access to justice initiatives in several developing states, 
including Pakistan, Kenya, South Africa, Cambodia, Colombia, and Peru.  
17 “Access to Justice and Rule of Law,” United Nations Development Programme. Online: 
<http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/democraticgovernance/focus_areas/focus_justice_la
w.html>.  
18 Ibid.  
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furtherance of domestic and foreign developmental goals, with a focus on poverty and 
inequality.19 
Despite proliferating appeals to ‘access to justice’ as a fundamental human right, 
Bryant Garth, a founding scholar in access to justice research alongside Mauro Cappelletti, 
observes that this “international revival of concerns with access to justice [...] emphasiz[es] 
the importance of property rights,”20 as opposed to rights of human security, health, 
education, food, water, labour, or broader protections for the vast range of social 
reproductive activities structuring the maintenance of the species. Recent advancements in 
Canada that seek to reconceptualize access to justice towards a public-oriented approach 
can be viewed as complementary to Garth’s criticism of the international revival. As Trevor 
C. W. Farrow observes, as access to justice scholars, “[w]e need to start seeing our role as 
providers of justice in terms of the real stuff of life: help with addictions, food, housing, 
empowerment, and dignity.”21  
Notably, this predominantly individualistic resurgence of ‘access to justice’ has 
largely neglected collective dimensions, such as the myriad environmental injustices 
associated with resource extraction, industrial manufacturing, biomedical industries, and a 
host of other enterprises affecting entire communities or groups of people. The strong 
possessive individualistic character of this resurgence mainly reinforces the classically 
                                                        
19 Paul J. Nelson and Ellen Dorsey, New Rights Advocacy: Changing Strategies of Development and 
Human Rights NGOs (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008). 
20 Bryant Garth, “Comment: A revival of access to justice research?” in Access to Justice (Sociology of 
Crime, Law and Deviance, 12) ed., Rebecca Sandefur (Bingley, U.K.: Emerald Group Publishing, 2009): 
255-260. Jesse C. Ribot and Nancy Lee Peluso have relatedly attempted to develop a theory of access that 
transcends the emphasis on property relations towards broader societal power relations. See Jesse C. Ribot 
and Nancy Lee Peluso, “A Theory of Access,” Rural Sociology 68, no. 2 (2003): 153-81. 
21 Farrow, “A New Wave in Access to Justice Reform in Canada,” 167. 
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liberal view of human beings as autonomous individuals possessing civil or political rights 
(chiefly rights of private property), as opposed to social, economic, or cultural rights 
possessed by collectives.22 The World Bank’s recent assessment of its juridical 
involvement corroborates this focus on private property rights with its maintenance that 
“[i]ts initial impetus was the pursuit of stable, efficient regimes of civil legal enforcement 
in order to enable investment and growth,”23 and although the vast majority of its juridical 
involvement is directed towards capitalistic enterprises, “a portion” of this promotive 
activity has “sought to improve ‘access to justice,’ complementing the aim of growth 
promotion with a concern for the justice problems of ordinary people.”24 Needless to say, 
the extent to which this secondary objective of the ‘justiciable problems’25 of ordinary 
people serves as a legitimating function in the new constitutionalism of disciplinary neo-
liberalism warrants greater consideration, particularly the ways in which multilayer access 
to environmental justice is incongruous with the World Bank’s primary objectives of 
promoting global trade and facilitating capital accumulation.26 The concept of ‘new 
                                                        
22 The concept of ‘possessive individualism’ and its concomitant critique of classical liberalism is 
articulated in C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
23 Vivek Maru, “Access to Justice and Legal Empowerment: A Review of World Bank Practice (World 
Bank Justice Reform Practice Group, 2009). Online: <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/ 
handle/10986/18102/518430NWP0Acce10Box342050B01PUBLIC1.pdf?sequence=1>.  
24 Ibid.  
25 The terms justiciable problems or justiciable events are defined as “a matter experienced by a respondent 
which raised legal issues, whether or not it was recognized by the respondent as being ‘legal’ and whether 
or not any action taken to deal with the event involved the use of any part of the civil justice system,” in 
Hazel Genn, Paths to Justice: What People Do and Think About Going to Law (Portland, Oregon: Hart 
Publishing, 1999): 12; as quoted by Ab Currie, The Legal Problems of Everyday Life: The Nature, Extent 
and Consequences of Justiciable Problems Experienced by Canadians. Ottawa: Justice Canada. 
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/jsp-sjp/rr07_la1-rr07_aj1/rr07_la1.pdf.  
26 This is primarily informed by Isabella Bakker and Stephen Gill, eds., Power, Production, and Social 
Reproduction (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Stephen Gill and Claire A. Cutler eds., New 
Constitutionalism and World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). Garth similarly 
points out that “the legitimacy of the legal system requires that those who cannot afford legal services 
should be provided access to legal rights and remedies.” Garth, 258. For a trenchant critique of such 
developments, see also Byron M. Sheldrick, “Legal Empowerment, Access to Justice and Poverty 
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constitutionalism of disciplinary neo-liberalism’ has been developed by Stephen Gill that 
can be briefly described as the juridical-political component of neo-liberalism, referring to 
the constitutional institutionalization of neo-liberal principles and policies with the 
immediate effect of insulating these from democratic controls by ‘locking in’ these 
commitments and ‘locking out’ democratic alternatives: “[t]he aim of the new 
constitutionalism is to allow dominant economic forces to be increasingly insulated from 
democratic rule and popular accountability,”27 particularly from “control over crucial 
economic, social and ecological policies.”28 The disciplining aspect of the new 
constitutionalism generally refers to the ways in which public institutions and governments 
are increasingly accountable and disciplined by capital forces and financial markets rather 
than democratic forces (i.e. the will of the demos). 
As it pertains to multilayer access to environmental justice, the new 
constitutionalism of disciplinary neo-liberalism can be viewed (for example) as restraining 
the capacities of states to implement stronger environmental and public health protections, 
facilitating the privatization of regulatory enforcement (Chapter 2), and exacerbating the 
crisis in social reproduction in numerous ways, such as increasing the burdens on 
household workers (labour largely undertaken by women) through the promotion of 
precautionary consumption strategies as well as destabilizing the biological and ecological 
                                                        
Alleviation: Governance Challenges to Linking Legal Structures to Social Change,” Canadian Journal of 
Poverty Law 2, no. 1 (2013): 1-20. 
27 Stephen Gill, “New Constitutionalism, Democratisation and Global Political Economy,” in Pacifica 
Review 10, no. 1 (1998): 23. As Gill observes, a primary issue is the extent to which the new 
constitutionalism of disciplinary neo-liberalism serves to “‘lock in’ commitments to liberalization, whilst 
‘locking out’ popular-democratic and parliamentary forces from control over crucial economic, social and 
ecological policies.” 




basis for social reproduction on a wider scale. This is the broader political economy context 
in which multilayer access to environmental justice is situated in this study.   
 
2. COLLECTIVE DIMENSIONS OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
Although the resurgence of access to justice has predominantly focused on individual 
access to justice (i.e. self-represented litigants), it has become increasingly apparent that 
collective dimensions of access to justice must form an integral part of research 
programmes and policy initiatives moving forward. Societies are not reducible to atomistic 
possessive individuals who require individuated solutions to their justiciable problems—
societies are constituted by social entities whose justiciable problems are often shared 
collectively, such as environmental injustices, which have traditionally been viewed as 
paradigmatic cases for collective claims-making vehicles like class actions.29 
It has by now become axiomatic that the economic externalities and social 
dislocations of advanced capitalist societies require collective forms of (1) accessibility 
promotion and (2) injustice prevention—the dual features of access to justice in the early 
twenty-first century.30  Even classical authors such as Cappelletti pointed out that “modern 
societies are characterized by mass production, mass commerce and consumption, mass 
                                                        
29 This directly contrasts the infamous neo-liberal dictum of Margaret Thatcher: “[T]here is no such thing as 
society. There are individual men and women, and there are families.” Andy McSmith, No Such Thing as 
Society: A History of Britain in the 1980s (London: Constable & Robinson Ltd., 2010), 17. 
30 See, supra note 5. 
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urbanization, and mass labour conflicts,”31 and mass litigation (i.e. class actions) is a 
natural outgrowth of such societal massification: 
[B]ecause of the “massification” phenomena, human actions and relationships assume a 
collective, rather than a merely individual, character; they refer to groups of categories, and 
classes of people, rather than to one or a few individuals alone. Even basic rights and duties 
are no longer exclusively the individual rights […] inspired by natural law concepts, but 
rather meta-individual, collective, “social” rights and duties of associations, communities, 
and classes. This is not to say that individual rights no longer have vital place in our societies; 
rather, it is to suggest that these rights are practically meaningless in today’s setting unless 
accompanied by the social rights necessary to make them effective and really accessible to 
all.32 
Simply put, the collective dynamics of social relations and environmental injustices have 
necessitated forms of collective claims-making in ongoing contestations over social 
protection and the encroachment of market fundamentalism in democratic societies. In this 
context, the modern class action has occupied a distinctive (and politically contested) 
position in both classical approaches to access to justice and its contemporary resurgence. 
The collectivism of class actions and their counterbalancing role in favour of 
vulnerable people against powerful adversaries has precipitated fierce debates over their 
basic legitimacy in individualistic liberal legal systems. Such bifurcated debates have 
typically assumed a strong ideological character in which progressive forces have 
advocated in favour of class actions and conservative forces have opposed their 
institutionalization.33 In Canada, Jacob Zeigler has emphasized such ideological 
                                                        
31 Mauro Cappelletti, “Governmental and Private Advocates for the Public Interest in Civil Litigation: A 
Comparative Study,” in Access to Justice: Promising Institutions, eds., Mauro Cappelletti and John 
Weisner (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1979), 861. 
32 Mauro Cappelletti (1927-2004) as cited by Francisco Valdes; see “Procedure, Policy and Power: Class 
Actions and Social Justice in Historical and Comparative Perspective,” Georgia State University Law 
Review 24, no. 3 (2008): 626-27. See also, Jenny Steele and William H. van Boom, eds., Mass Justice: 
Challenges of Representation and Distribution (Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2011).  
33 Martin Redish has posited that political analyses of class actions have “broken down along ideological 
lines: the political left has reflexively favoured the device and the political right has reflexively opposed it.” 
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contestations, observing that the New Democratic Party has passed class action legislation 
in common law provinces in Ontario, Saskatchewan, British Columbia, and Manitoba, 
following the civil law introduction in Quebec by a government that was “very socially 
minded and generally had an anti-capitalist bias.”34 According to Martin Redish, this 
ideological divide is primarily a consequence of “litigation socialism,” which gestures 
towards the operative function of class actions as “designed to redistribute wealth from 
large concentrations of economic power” to vulnerable people and communities.35 This 
redistributive feature is typically highlighted by hostile critics who challenge the theoretical 
premises of redistributive justice at an ideological level, as well as the validity of achieving 
redistributive justice through class actions. For Redish, the class action is an “island of 
collectivism in a sea of individualized dispute resolution,”36 which effectively serves as a 
“rejection of liberal process-based individualism.”37 This rejection of liberal individualism 
is the “elephant in the room” to the extent that the “inherent collectivism” of class actions 
creates a tension with legal systems premised on liberal principles of individual autonomy 
and identity.38 David Rosenberg similarly opines that class actions “loom as a subversive 
element” and “[f]rom the perspective of the common law tradition of individual justice, 
class actions are a necessary evil, but an evil nonetheless.”39 
                                                        
Martin Redish, “Rethinking the Theory of the Class Action: The Risks and Rewards of Capitalistic 
Socialism in the Litigation Process,” Emory Law Journal  64 (2014): 113.  
34 Jacob Zeigler, “Political Ideology and Class Action Legislation,” in Class Actions in Canada: Cases, 
Notes, and Materials, eds. Janet Walker and Garry Watson (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2014), 43. 
35 Redish, 113. 
36 Martin H. Redish and Clifford W. Berlow, “The Class Action as Political Theory,” online: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1071191>. 
37 Ibid., 80. 
38 Ibid. 
39 David Rosenberg, “Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means,” 
Indiana Law Journal 62 (1987): 561. 
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In contrast to such critiques, proponents of class actions recognize the behemoth of 
civil justice as a “weapon of the people”40 against corporations and governments. For 
example, Wendy Brown has observed that class actions “have long been crucial 
instruments of worker and consumer resistance to discriminatory, deceptive, or fraudulent 
corporate behaviour, from underpaying and overcharging to polluting or violating health 
and safety laws.”41 As Brown observes, class actions are the “primary legal means by which 
consumers or workers band together to fight corporate abuses” and crucial vehicles of 
“organized popular power.”42 Amid the central contradiction of capital and social 
reproduction, class actions have been mobilized for greater social protections and human 
security, including in struggles over the maintenance of sustainable conditions of social, 
biological, and ecological reproduction associated with pollution, housing, food, education, 
and health. This deployment of class actions as ‘crucial instruments of resistance’ against 
the encroachments of market fundamentalism into material life can be viewed in light of 
what Isabella Bakker identifies as the “intensifying contradiction”43 between the power of 
capital and its accumulative logic and the destabilizing repercussions for social 
reproduction which ensures the maintenance of the species (and capital accumulation, by 
extension).  
Finally, the bifurcated political debate in the present historical conjuncture over the 
legitimacy of group litigation may be illuminated by considering the longue durée of 
                                                        
40 Herman Schwartz, “The Death of the Class-Action Lawsuit?” The Nation 24 September 2015, online: 
https://www.thenation.com/article/the-death-of-the-class-action-lawsuit/.  
41 See Wendy Brown, “Law and Legal Reason,” in Undoing the Demos (New York: Zone Books, 2015), 
152. 
42 Ibid., 153-54. 
43 Isabella Bakker, “Social Reproduction and the Constitution of a Gendered Political Economy,” in New 
Political Economy 12, no. 4 (2007): 547; See also, Nancy Fraser, “Contradictions of Capital and Care,” in 
New Left Review 100 (2016): 99-117. 
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collective claims-making: although class actions have come to be viewed as the “dominant 
judicial innovation of the late twentieth century,”44 the existence of collective claims-
making in English common law predates the advent of classical liberalism and its 
individualistic premises.45 Class action historian Stephen C. Yeazell has observed that 
“[m]odern class actions are part of a much longer tradition” of English group litigation 
from medieval times, which was “a natural outgrowth of social organization.”46 Yeazell 
observes:  
Where villages, parishes, guilds and other unites [sic] provided the center of economic and 
social life, the appearance of these groups in court, litigating through representatives, was no 
more noteworthy than the court appearance of a corporation would be today.47 
 
According to Yeazell, class actions in the present historical conjuncture only appear as 
innovative vehicles of collectivism given the dominance of liberal individualism—in fact, 
Yeazell suggests that “the modern class action provides a microcosmic laboratory in which 
to examine legal intuitions about the relative claims of individualism and collective 
organization, and the justification for both.”48 Broadly speaking, the political tensions 
between the classical liberalism that informs the paradigm of Canadian law and the social 
collectivism that remains an intrinsic part of Canadian society are partially crystalized in 
the treatment of class actions.49 
                                                        
44 John C. Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation: Its Rise, Fall, and Future (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2015), 2. 
45 Needless to say, English common law forms the basis of the Canadian legal system, as well as the 
American system, which introduced the modern class action in 1966.  
46 Stephen C. Yeazell, From Medieval Group Litigation to the Modern Class Action (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1987), 21. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., 7. 
49 Given Canada’s nascent class action history and its strong American influence, these political tensions 
are more noticeable in the American context. However, divided opinions in Canada similarly reflect 
political evaluations on the legitimacy of collectivist legal vehicles. Objections raised include (1) 
jurisprudential, (2) consequentialist, and (3) ideological objections, such as the (1) difficulties associated 
with undemocratically representative plaintiffs and absent class members, (2) the negative economic 
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These political tensions similarly extend to conceptualizations of access to justice 
in the context of class actions. As Roderick A. Macdonald has observed, the “access to 
justice idea that ought to animate class action proceedings is more political” as opposed to 
other areas of the law in which individualistic justice-seeking predominates.50 In contrast 
to collective claims advanced under the equality provisions of s.15(1) of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms—provisions that controversially exclude economic 
criteria—class actions are “vehicle[s] that socio-economic coalitions can deploy to effect 
changes in government policy.”51 More to the point, the mobilization of class actions as 
instruments of resistance against powerful adversaries such as corporations and 
governments suggests that collective access to justice occupies a potentially liberatory 
space in the broader political economy. Within Bakker and Gill’s schema of the social 
forces associated with social reproduction, class actions can be conceptualized as “power 
potentials” which involve the “mobilization of resources, capabilities, enforcement 
mechanisms or power potentials of political and social actors.”52 Even classical approaches 
highlighted the unique challenges faced by collective actions against more powerful 
adversaries. Notably, Cappelletti and Garth observed in The Florence Access to Justice 
Project (‘Florence Project’) that groups and individuals “have most trouble asserting their 
                                                        
repercussions for the usage of scarce judicial resources, and (3) ideological incompatibility of collectivist 
vehicles in a liberal legal paradigm.   
50 Macdonald, “Access to Justice in Canada Today,” 64. 
51 Ibid. In this light, the enormous Charter scholarship that has proliferated since 1982 is distinct from class 
action scholarship. S.15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms holds that: “Every individual is 
equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without 
discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, 
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.” Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 15(1), 
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c.11. See also, 
Sophie Harnay and Alain Marciano, “Seeking rents through class actions and legislative lobbying: a 
comparison,” in European Journal of Law and Economics 32 (2011): 293-304. 
52 Bakker and Gill, eds., Power, Production, and Social Reproduction, 25. 
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rights when the vindication of those rights entails legal actions [...] against powerful 
organizations.”53 This is particularly apparent in cases of environmental injustices, which 
have been widely recognized by courts and commentators as the paradigmatic type of class 
actions.54 As explained below, this study proceeds by substantively evaluating 
environmental class actions rather than providing a formal or cursory analysis of the 
multiple and diverse types of class actions at a heightened level of generality. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY AND SCHOLARLY CONTRIBUTION 
While the rapid growth of class actions in Canada since the passage of Ontario’s 
groundbreaking legislation has received significant coverage in the mainstream media, this 
important political-legal development has not received commensurate academic attention, 
at least not in the Canadian context. This proliferation has largely occurred in the early 
twenty-first century as a result of a trilogy of cases55 that has breathed new life into the 
legal vehicle, as well as the long-standing American tradition that has served as an 
instructive model for accelerating Canadian developments. However, as W.A. Bogart, 
Frederick Zemans, and Julia Bass plainly observe in their foundational overview of access 
                                                        
53 Cappelletti and Garth, General Report, 20. The authors also provide instantiations of the problems at 
stake in collective access to justice for diffuse interests: “The new substantive rights which are 
characteristic of the modern welfare state, however, have precisely these features: on the one hand, they 
involve efforts to bolster the power of citizens against governments, consumers against merchants, people 
against polluters, tenants against landlords, and employees against employers (and unions), and, on the 
other hand, the monetary interest of any one individual—as plaintiff or defendant—is likely to be small.”  
54 See supra note 5. 
55 Western Canadian Shopping Centres v. Dutton, 2000 S.C.J. 63, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 534; Hollick v. Toronto 




to justice in the twenty-first century, “[s]ometimes, American research is assumed to be 
applicable to Canada and to other societies when this may not be the case.”56 
 In Canada, existing research on class actions has tended to focus on procedural rules 
and jurisprudential developments.57 Where substantive concerns have been raised, these 
have mainly focused on single high-profile cases (i.e. Residential Schools) as opposed to 
developing more systematic analyses.58 Are such cases representative of Ontario’s (or other 
provincial) class action regime(s) or notable exceptions to the rule? Although existing 
research on access to justice has been decidedly less proceduralistic in its various 
manifestations, it has largely focused on individuated access to justice (i.e. self-represented 
litigants) rather than collective dimensions as found in class actions. The relationship 
between collective actions and access to justice has been largely neglected in Canadian 
scholarship with few exceptions, such as Jasminka Kalajdzic. By extension, the 
intersections of access to justice, environmental justice, and class actions – an intersection 
that I have rearticulated in this study as ‘multilayer access to environmental justice’ – has 
similarly experienced neglect from these respective fields: (1) access to justice research 
tends to have an individualistic focus; (2) class action research is largely proceduralistic 
with select high-profile cases garnering isolated attention (i.e. Residential Schools); (3) 
                                                        
56 Julia Bass, W.A. Bogart, and Frederick H. Zemans, “Introduction,” in Access to Justice for a New 
Century: The Way Forward, eds., Bass et al (Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada, 2005), 12. 
57 Hensler, “Class actions in context,” in Class Actions in Context, 387. See, e.g., Craig Jones, Theory of 
Class Actions (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003); John C. Beyer, “The Role of Economics in Class Certification 
and Class-Wide Impact,” in Litigating Conspiracy: An Analysis of Competition Class Actions, ed., Stephen 
G.A. Pitel (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006): 325-35; John Kleefeld, “Class Actions as Alternative Dispute 
Resolution,” Osgoode Hall Law Journal 39, no. 4 (2001): 817-41; Janet Walker, “Who’s Afraid of US-
style Class Actions?” Southwestern Journal of International Law 18, no. 2 (2012): 509-66. 
58 The notable major cases that have attracted scholarly attention have included the Residential Schools and 
Chinese ‘head tax’ claims. See, e.g., John Borrows, “Residential schools, respect, and responsibilities for 
past harms,” University of Toronto Law Journal  64, no. 4 (2014): 486-504; David Dyzenhaus and Mayo 
Moran, eds., Calling Power to Account: Law, Reparations, and the Chinese Head Tax Case (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2005).  
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environmental justice research in Canada generally does not engage with the legal 
dynamics of class actions. Needless to say, this does not suggest that legal environmental 
justice scholarship is inexistent,59 but rather that much of this scholarship insufficiently 
examines access to justice considerations and generally posits class actions as available 
vehicles for environmental justice-seeking without fully considering the exclusionary 
dynamics of class action regimes as uncovered in this study. This project is situated within 
the under-explored cross-section of these interrelated fields of research. Finally, by 
exploring the exclusionary dynamics that operate to impede multilayer access to 
environmental justice in light of the power, production, and social reproduction60 
associated with toxic exposures, this study expands the ambit of environmental class 
actions beyond the traditional proceduralistic confines to the broader political economy of 
pollution. In so doing, this study incorporates descriptive and normative aspects of 
traditional access to justice research with explanatory argumentation for an integrated 
approach to evaluating multilayer access to environmental justice in Ontario.  
Given the resurgent popularity of access to justice discourses, Garth has raised 
concerns that access to justice has been mobilized for ideological purposes and advocates 
for contemporary research to embrace critical social science approaches: 
[T]he key to advancement of any access to justice agenda […] is its relationship to critical 
scholarship informed by the theories and methods of social science, especially sociology. 
Sociology has a particular focus on hierarchy and inequality, which makes its methods well 
designed for taking on issues that are too easily defined by a professional agenda and 
                                                        
59 For example, leading Canadian environmental law scholars Heather McLeod-Kilmurray and Lynda 
Collins are referenced throughout this study, particularly in Chapter 4.  
60 The basic contradiction of the power of capital and its accumulative impetus and processes of social 
reproduction is the central hypothesis of Isabella Bakker and Stephen Gill’s volume, Power, Production 
and Social Reproduction, which informs this analysis, supra note 11. 
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ideology. Law without the sociology of law easily slips into the reiteration of legitimating 
rhetoric.61 
The current project of critically examining environmental class actions through a political 
economy approach that recognizes issues of power, production, and social reproduction 
unites Bakker’s proposition that future research into the crisis of social reproduction needs 
to incorporate collective actions with Garth’s methodological advocacy of embracing 
critical social science approaches in future access to justice research.62 The starting point 
of this analysis is that multilayer access to environmental justice must be situated in the 
context of the broader political economy. 
 In order to uncover the dynamics of environmental class actions in Ontario and 
their implications for substantive environmental justice, I have used a multi-level, 
integrative mixed-methods approach that includes doctrinal and theoretical analysis and 
qualitative approaches to empirical data collection, including purposive case study 
analysis, archival research, theoretical and empirical texts bearing on the substance of the 
topic, relevant jurisprudence, and in-depth interviews with class and defense attorneys 
currently practicing in Canada, with a focus on Ontario.  
The province of Ontario was selected as a jurisdiction of analysis given that class 
actions in Canada are dominated by Ontarian actions (with British Columbia a distant 
second and Quebec the third most voluminous jurisdiction). This selection permitted the 
most expansive range of potential actions within the legislative confines of a single 
                                                        
61 Garth, 258. See also Jennifer Earl’s “sociology of troubles” for an indication of the type of socio-legal 
approach that incorporates critical social science in access to justice research. Jennifer Earl, “When Bad 
Things Happen: Toward a Sociology of Troubles,” in Access to Justice (Sociology of Crime, Law and 
Deviance, 12) ed., Rebecca Sandefur (Bingley, U.K.: Emerald Group Publishing, 2009): 231-54. 
62 Bakker, 547.  
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province as a case study. Ontario’s influential Class Proceedings Act, 1992 was the first 
legislation introducing class actions in Canadian common law provinces. Although the 
focus of this study is Ontario’s class action regime, the study periodically develops sub-
state comparative analyses of other provincial jurisdictions (particularly British Columbia 
and Quebec) as appropriate, in addition to inter-state comparative analyses (primarily 
American developments given the origins of the modern class action, but also Australian 
developments on issues of litigation financing given their forerunning status). This 
integrated multi-level comparative approach allows for optimal balance between a 
methodological focus on a single provincial regime in light of similar or contrasting 
regimes in other state and sub-state formations.   
The in-depth interviews with 21 class and defense attorneys were conducted from 
April 2015 to March 2016.63 This time period includes the completion of action research 
cycles and member checks for maximum accuracy and transferability of collected data. 
The confidential interviews ranged from 15 minutes to 2.5 hours with a median length of 
30 minutes. Although interviews had conversational adaptability, interactions were guided 
by a series of predetermined themes and areas of focus permitting standardized yet open-
ended interviews. A sample template of guide-based interview questions is provided in the 
Appendix. Initial participants were selected based on experience, relevance, and 
                                                        
63 It was my determination that a data saturation point was achieved with this number of qualitative 
participants with strong factual confluence. As numerous methodological researchers have observed, this is 
within the parameters of the typical point of saturation beyond which qualitative data collection yields 
‘diminishing returns’, with some investigations yielding such points much earlier, depending on the type of 
investigation. See, e.g., Barbara DiCicco-Bloom and Benjamin F. Crabtree, “The Qualitative Research 
Interview,” in Medical Education, Vol. 40, No. 4 (2006): 314-321; Greg Guest, Arwen Bunce, and Laura 
Johnson, “How many interviews are enough? An experiment with data saturation and variability,” in Fields 
Methods 18, no. 1 (2006): 59-82; Jane Ritchie and Jane Lewis, eds., Qualitative Research Practice: A 
Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers (London: Sage Publications, 2003). 
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availability, with subsequent participants recruited using a chain-referral sampling 
technique (“snowball sampling”) which effectively expanded the breadth of participants 
and permitted greater access via introductions to previously inaccessible participants.  
This study has attempted to explore the dynamics of multilayer access to 
environmental justice through theoretical and empirical investigation, however, given the 
resource constraints of a doctoral project in terms of time and financial expenditures, as 
well as various logistical impediments in data collection on a mass scale, empirical data 
collection from past and present class members has not been included in this study. The 
exceedingly high number of class members involved in past and present actions requires 
extensive resource expenditures in order to satisfy basic methodological requirements. This 
knowledge gap is a promising area for future research.  
 
4. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The empirical reality of Ontario’s class action regime starkly contrasts with the widespread 
belief of class actions as promotive vehicles for greater access to environmental justice. 
This was the preliminary hypothesis of this dissertation. I argue that the exclusionary 
dynamics structuring the practice and development of environmental class actions have 
produced an anemic regime in Ontario (particularly for environmental health-impairment 
claims). The primary policy objective of the Class Proceedings Act has gone largely 
unfulfilled as it pertains to environmental class actions, which were ironically originally 
posited as paradigmatic actions. Although this preliminary hypothesis has been qualified 
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and strengthened with greater theoretical and empirical nuance over the completion of this 
dissertation, the basic tenets have remained intact as explicated in the following chapters. 
 Chapter 1 proceeds by tracing the development of ‘access to justice’ from classical 
approaches to the contemporary resurgence through the discursive heuristic proposed by 
the Florence Project of the waves of access to justice. In so doing, every successive wave 
is critically assessed from the perspective of collective actions aimed at protecting 
multilayer interests with an emphasis on the social variables associated with inaccessibility, 
including gender, race, ability, and class. Following this critical conspectus, the role of 
class actions in promoting multilayer access to justice is explored in light of recent 
jurisprudential developments. Finally, the appeal to incorporate critical social science 
approaches in access to justice research is addressed through the pursuit of a political 
economy approach that recognizes issues of power, production, and social reproduction in 
the context of multilayer access to environmental justice. 
 Chapter 2 pursues this critical approach by contextualizing environmental class 
actions in the broader political economy. This chapter examines what I call the central 
paradox of class actions: the contradiction between class actions as ‘crucial instruments’ 
of social protection against the destabilizing tendencies of the capitalist system of 
accumulation and class actions as ‘policy instruments’ in the institutionalization of private 
enforcement regimes that permit this accumulative logic to determine social priorities of 
regulatory enforcement through entrepreneurial litigation. In so doing, I posit that class 
actions are ‘crucial instruments’ of social protection to the extent that they complement 
public agency enforcement, especially in cases where governments are recalcitrant to 
enforce regulations; however, the neo-liberal shift towards a co-optative role of class 
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actions as vehicles that replace rather than support public agencies serves to destabilize the 
very processes of social reproduction that class actions in their complementary role can be 
mobilized to protect. Chapter 2 is primarily concerned with the limitations of Ontario’s 
emerging private enforcement regime from the perspective of multilayer access to 
environmental justice. To this end, the chapter begins by sketching out the ideological 
parameters of private enforcement in light of the retrenchment of access to justice through 
what Wendy Brown calls de-democratization. The term de-democratization refers to the 
substantive “hollow[ing] out [of] the practices and institutions of liberal democracy,” 
according to Brown, who has cited the retrenchment of access to justice in the context of 
class actions as an important facet of the “law’s contribution to neo-liberal de-
democratization” by restricting the capacity of collectivities from accessing the “primary 
legal means by which consumers or workers band together to fight corporate abuses.”64 
Thereafter the chapter critically focuses on the pivotal agent in a private enforcement 
regime—Private Attorney General—before situating the analysis within the historical 
context of Ontario’s class action regime through an examination of the Class Proceedings 
Act, 1992. Finally, the exclusionary facets of Ontario’s entrepreneurial class action regime 
are examined with a focus on the gatekeeping role played by Private Attorneys General.  
 Chapter 3 extends the analysis of the neo-liberalization of civil justice developed 
in previous chapters by examining the emerging third party litigation finance industry in 
Ontario’s class action regime. The demand for litigation finance has been prompted by the 
                                                        
64 For Brown, class actions are a crucial “level of organized popular power and collective consciousness” in 
a legal form. See Wendy Brown, “Law and Legal Reason,” in Undoing the Demos (New York: Zone 
Books, 2015), 153-54. For a detailed exploration of the various facets of de-democratization, see Wendy 
Brown, “We Are All Democrats Now...” in Democracy in What State? ed., Giorgio Agamben et al (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 44-57. 
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dual factors of (1) risk aversion and (2) budget constraints on the part of Private Attorneys 
General. Such financialization may offset these burdens by (1) indemnifying claimants and 
(2) providing financing to maintain claims, thereby promoting a type of multilayer access 
to justice. Through the integration of consequentialist, jurisprudential, and axiological 
concerns about litigation finance, this chapter develops and expands the political-economic 
analysis of this study by examining the key dynamics of the monetizing, liberalizing, and 
privatizing imperatives of the emerging industry in Ontario. These dynamics include the 
liberalization of maintenance and champerty laws that have traditionally prohibited the 
financial activities promoted by this industry, the regulatory gap, and the broader 
marketization of civil justice, including the prospective securitization of litigation. As this 
chapter explicates, the social and political impacts of privatizing regulatory enforcement 
(Chapter 2) can be compounded by the financialization of litigation (Chapter 3) which 
intensifies the power of market forces to influence which collective claimants are able to 
access justice. The outcomes of such developments are distributed unevenly across 
Ontario’s class action regime to the benefit of investor rights and securities actions and to 
the detriment of more socially beneficial actions, including environmental claims. The 
impacts for multilayer access to environmental justice of this type of financialization are 
highlighted throughout this chapter.  
 Chapter 4 examines the significant gap between the widespread view of 
environmental class actions as paradigmatic claims and the abysmal reality of their 
floundering in Ontario’s regime in light of the politico-economic developments discussed 
in previous chapters. A critical analysis of the ways in which the political economy of 
pollution constructs barriers to multilayer access to environmental justice is developed by 
 
 26 
exploring the paradigm of scientific uncertainty that structures environmental claims, 
including the complexities of health-based harms associated with toxic consumption, the 
lack of empirical data to substantiate claims of health-impairment, and the discursive 
misalignment of scientific inquiry and legal reasoning. Chapter 4 proceeds by (1) exploring 
scientific uncertainty in toxic consumption and (2) identifying the problematics of 
establishing toxic causation in environmental health-impairment claims. These two 
sections comprise the parameters of the central argument of this chapter that Ontario’s class 
action regime systematically privileges private property over human health in 
environmental justice. A series of representative case studies are subsequently presented 
that empirically substantiate this argument. 
 Chapter 5 moves beyond the largely proceduralistic analysis of multilayer access 
to environmental justice by addressing substantive dimensions of class actions as vehicles 
of redistributive justice. The chapter proceeds by sketching out the parameters of Ontario’s 
class action settlement culture, before exploring a series of crucial facets that determine 
outcomes for collective claims-makers in form and substance, including potential conflicts 
of interest and the possibility of collusion, the adversarial void, take-up rates and notice 
practices, and the efficacy of objectors. These dynamics are situated within a broader 
political economy analysis that concomitantly considers Ontario’s settlement paradigm as 
part of the privatization of civil justice and its adverse impacts for social and democratic 
values. The chapter subsequently considers the intricacies of the cy près doctrine in light 
of the secondary policy objective of the Class Proceedings Act of behaviour modification. 
This acquires heightened significance given the mobilization of class actions as ‘policy 
instruments’ in the implementation of a private enforcement regime in Ontario. Throughout 
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the chapter, the particularities of environmental justice-seeking and the substantive justice 
associated with such claims are highlighted.  
 Finally, in the Conclusion, I consider the implications of this study moving forward. 
I argue that despite their paradigmatic character, environmental class actions face mounting 
obstacles in promoting multilayer access to justice. In so doing, I demonstrate that the 
history of environmental class actions has been bleak—a bleakness that extends to their 
future prospects. This indicates that the type of ex post facto justice presently achieved or 
achievable in Ontario’s class action regime leaves much to be desired from the perspective 
of access to environmental justice. I conclude with a brief review of the major arguments 

















SPEAKING JUSTICE TO POWER: 
MULTILAYER ACCESS TO ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE  
 
“[J]ustice is a basic good in our society to which every woman, man and 
child should have access, regardless of how much money they have or who 
they know. Justice is a basic social good, like food, shelter, and medical 
care.”65 
-   Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter proceeds by tracing the development of ‘access to justice’ from classical 
approaches to the contemporary resurgence through the discursive heuristic proposed by 
the Florence Project of the waves of access to justice. In so doing, every successive wave 
is critically assessed from the perspective of collective actions aimed at protecting 
multilayer interests with an emphasis on the social variables associated with inaccessibility, 
including gender, race, and class. Following this critical conspectus, the role of class 
actions in promoting multilayer access to justice in Canada is explored in light of recent 
jurisprudential developments. Finally, the appeal to incorporate critical social science 
approaches in access to justice research is addressed through the pursuit of a political 
economy approach that recognizes issues of power, production, and social reproduction in 
the context of multilayer access to environmental justice.66  
                                                        
65 Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and Family Matters, Colloquium Report (Ottawa: Action 
Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and Family matters, 2014), 5. Online: http://www.cfcj-
fcjc.org/sites/default/files/docs/2014/ac_colloquium_web_FINAL.pdf  
66 This is informed by the innovative framework developed by Bakker and Gill, see Introduction.  
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1. WAVES OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
The cornerstone of twentieth-century scholarship on access to justice is the multivolume 
research project initiated in the 1970s by Mauro Cappelletti and Bryant Garth: The 
Florence Access to Justice Project (‘Florence Project’).67 Guided by the recognition that 
access to justice is a “fundamental social right”68 and a “social problem, or a basic social 
need,”69 as well as the “most basic challenge to our modern legal systems,”70 the Florence 
Project developed a comparative analysis of the costs of justice and the various reform 
initiatives developed by contemporary states to address the problem of inaccessibility. At 
root, the Florence Project was premised on the view that “social justice, as sought by our 
modern societies, presupposes effective access.”71 As Cappelletti and Garth observe: 
[T]he right of effective access is increasingly recognized as being of paramount 
importance among the new individual and social rights, since the possession of rights is 
meaningless without mechanisms for their effective vindication. Effective access to 
justice can thus be seen as the most basic requirement—the most basic “human right”—
of a modern, egalitarian legal system which purports to guarantee, and not merely 
proclaim, the legal rights of all.72 
Access to justice as ‘the most basic human right’ acquires the characteristics of a meta-
right—a right that precedes other rights insofar as it operates as a mediality through which 
other rights can be vindicated. This meta-right status partly explains why access to justice 
has emerged as a major focus in the domain of law and development, given the thriving 
                                                        
67 Mauro Cappelletti and Bryant Garth, eds. Access to Justice – A World Survey (Alphen aan den Rijn: 
Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1978). The project was commenced in 1973 and completed in 1977-78.  
68 Ibid., General Report, 9. 
69 Ibid., Foreword, viii. 
70 Ibid.  
71 Ibid., General Report, 6. 
72 Ibid., 9. 
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intersection between human rights discourses and the development of “new rights 
advocacy,”73 which focuses on inequitable poverty through the integration of human rights 
principles and socio-economic development by NGOs and civil society actors.  
 In the decades since Cappelletti and Garth’s globalization of access to justice 
scholarship, the Florence Project has been elevated as a seminal study in the field. One of 
its enduring discursive contributions has been its division of access to justice into 
metaphoric waves of reforms and developments. The wave metaphor has been applied in 
various contexts, most notably as a model to delineate feminist activism in the history of 
the Western women’s movement. In this context, the wave metaphor has been 
problematized by numerous scholars who critique its potential homogenizing and 
ahistorical aspects, particularly as it pertains to racialized women and LGBTQ activism.74 
Such critiques have not materialized in the context of access to justice, although it must be 
noted that the historical periodization offered by this model is not universally applicable 
and varies across states and sub-state formations. Nevertheless, the wave metaphor has 
enjoyed general acceptance in access to justice scholarship and provides a practicable 
model for mapping developments and policy reforms. As Roderick A. Macdonald 
observes, the five waves of access to justice broadly correspond to ten-year cycles: 1960-
1970; 1970-1980; 1980-1990; 1990-2000; 2000 to the present.75 Notably, a new (sixth) 
wave of access to justice has also become discernible in Canada, as explored further below.  
                                                        
73 Paul J. Nelson and Ellen Dorsey, New Rights Advocacy: Changing Strategies of Development and 
Human Rights NGOs (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008). 
74 An instructive symposium on the topic of the wave model can be found in Kathleen A. Laughlin, Julie 
Gallagher, Dorothy Sue Cobble, Eileen Boris, Premilla Nadasen, Stephanie Gilmore, and Leandra Zarnaw, 
“Is It Time to Jump Ship? Historians Rethink the Waves Metaphor,” Feminist Formations 22, no. 1 (2010): 
76-135. 
75 Macdonald, “Access to Justice in Canada Today,” 20. 
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A. FIRST WAVE – LEGAL AID FOR THE POOR 
The first wave (1960-1970) is characterized by an emphasis on legal aid regimes designed 
to mitigate the costs of court proceedings for the poor. Cappelletti and Garth stress the 
importance of Judicare systems in which individuals with insufficient economic resources 
(who satisfy state qualification criteria) are provided with state-funded legal services.76 
Such systems operate on the principle whereby “legal aid is established as a matter of right 
for all persons eligible under the statutory terms, with the state paying the private lawyer 
who provides those services.”77 The source of remuneration is perhaps the most distinctive 
feature of Judicare systems: the state assumes all legal costs. In other words, the underlying 
objective is affording clients the same legal services, irrespective of their ability to pay for 
a lawyer.78 In Canada, litigation costs have increased dramatically since the 1970s 
indicating that such concerns rightfully occupy a significant role in contemporary 
scholarship and policy debate on access to justice. Given its focus on prohibitive costs, the 
first wave of reforms advocated a proceduralistic conception of access to justice as ‘access 
to courts’. Simply put, this wave recognized the onerous costs associated with litigation by 
emphasizing the importance of economic resources in accessibility promotion.  
It goes without saying that several other types of barriers—social, psychological, 
                                                        
76 Ibid., 24-7. Of course, much policy debate has raged on these qualification criteria as persons with 
insufficient financial means for legal services do not exclusively belong to those living below the poverty 
line. A main objection of this emphasis has been its traditional exclusion of the unmet legal needs of those 
who do not qualify for legal aid. For a contemporary Canadian discussion of this difficult topic, see supra 
note 12. 
77 Cappelletti and Garth, General Report, 25. (emphasis in the original) 
78 Ibid.. “The goal of Judicare systems is to provide the same representation for low income litigants that 
they would have had if they could afford a lawyer. The ideal is to make a distinction only with respect to 
the billing: the state, rather than the client, is charged the cost.” 
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cultural, geographical, and so forth—are inadequately addressed in first wave initiatives.79 
Moreover, the proceduralistic focus of this period unduly diminishes issues of substantive 
justice that are highlighted in later developments of access to justice. Above all, as 
Cappelletti and Garth point out, the normative basis of Judicare systems is highly 
individualized: “[J]udicare treats the poor as individuals to the neglect of the poor as a 
class.”80 While this form of individualization is partially mitigated in different legal aid 
models, such as the Public Salaried Attorney Model (wherein legal aid offices are staffed 
with attorneys working on salaries) or models combining PSAM and Judicare, there remain 
significant areas of diffuse interests that are largely unaddressed (i.e. environmental 
injustices).81 Such diffuse interests are largely beyond the scope of individualized 
approaches to access to justice. However, although the liberal proceduralist character of 
first wave approaches precipitated socially progressive developments that incorporated 
issues of substantive and collective justice, the universality which marked such approaches 
in their earliest incarnation in the 1960s and 1970s testifies to their social ambitions. For 
Macdonald, the central paradox of Judicare models in Canada is the contradiction between 
the universality of this social ambition and the “inconceivable” status of such social 
expenditures in the present historical conjuncture: 
The social ambition is universality: no one should be deprived of the most basic services of a 
lawyer for lack of money. The economics dictate a different taxation and expenditure goal: 
                                                        
79 Ibid., 27. The Judicare model “relies on the poor to recognize legal claims and seek assistance; it fails to 
encourage or even allow for efforts by individual practitioners to help the poor understand their rights and 
identify the areas where they may be entitled to legal remedies… Moreover, even if they recognize their 
claims, poor people may be intimidated from pursuing them by the prospect of going to a law office and 
discussing them with a private lawyer. Indeed, in societies where the rich and poor live apart, there may be 
geographic as well as cultural barriers between the poor and private bar.”  
80 Ibid., 27. 
81 Ibid., 28-35. 
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society simply does not have the resources to apply the Canadian medical care model to legal 
services.82 
The political economy analysis of this study rests upon the recognition of the budgeting 
preferences and taxation policies of successive provincial and federal governments. As a 
matter of economic policy, it may be reasonable to suggest that the central issue is resource 
allocation rather than resource availability.83 Finally, the ‘inconceivability’ of the social 
ambition of universality in basic legal aid programs is a condition of the parameters 
imposed by regressive taxation policies under neo-liberal governance in which major 
socialization initiatives are viewed as beyond the realm of possibility, or to borrow Richard 
Falk’s terminology, beyond the “horizon of feasibility.”84 Although access to justice 
advocates continue their demands for greater resource allocation for the “most important 
issue facing the legal system,” as the Chief Justice of Ontario and the Chief Justice of 
Canada both observe, many advocates have adjusted to this restrictive budgeting climate 
by exploring innovative strategies and technologies of accessibility promotion and injustice 
prevention.85  
B. SECOND WAVE: MULTILAYER INTERESTS 
The second wave (1970-1980) seeks to address the problem of diffuse interests through its 
focus on the justiciable problems of groups of similarly situated individuals or cohesive 
                                                        
82 Macdonald, 34. 
83 Macdonald recognizes that universal legal aid may be financed through general taxation, however, he 
remains decidedly pessimistic about this possibility in the contemporary political-economic climate. Ibid., 
40. 
84 Richard Falk as quoted by Stephen Gill and A. Claire Cutler, “New Constitutionalism and World Order,” 
19.  
85 Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, P.C. Chief Justice of Canada, “The Challenges We Face,” 




collective actors. This wave tends to emphasize the public interest dimensions of law. 
Cappelletti and Garth famously invoke the example of environmental harms to identify 
potential sites where individual and collective interests are intertwined.86 Perhaps the major 
barrier to access to justice in such situations is that the economic and/or non-economic 
costs of advancing claims are too prohibitive for any single individual to undertake. In 
point of fact, issues of environmental health and the maintenance of the biological, 
agricultural, and ecological foundations upon which human health is premised and 
reproduced structurally affect entire communities as opposed to isolated individuals. An 
individualistic legal paradigm—and concomitantly, an individualistic approach to access 
to justice—insufficiently accounts for the collective dimensions of environmental 
injustices. Accordingly, the second wave has sought to expand the prevailing 
“individualistic vision” of access to justice towards a “social, collective conception.”87 
There are also doctrinal difficulties confronted by collective actors of environmental 
injustice, such as the difficulty of achieving legal standing—although the Supreme Court 
of Canada has increasingly emphasized access to justice as a factor in the granting of 
standing.88 For the purposes of the present analysis, the second wave of access to justice is 
directly relevant since it encompasses class action litigation. 
                                                        
86 Cappelletti and Garth recognize that an emphasis on diffuse interests necessarily entails a widening of the 
scope of access to justice, given that multiple classes of people are affected by cases involving 
environmental pollution, consumer protection, and other causes of action typically suitable for mass 
litigation. Cappelletti and Garth, General Report, 18, 45.  
87 Ibid., 36. 
88 Lorne Sossin, “The Justice of Access: Who Should Have Standing to Challenge the Constitutional 
Adequacy of Legal Aid?” University of British Columbia Law Review 40 (2007): 727-44. See also, Dana 
Phillips, “Public Interest Standing, Access to Justice, and Democracy under the Charter: Canada (AG) v. 
Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence,” Constitutional Forum 22, no. 2 (2013): 21-31; 
Jane Bailey, “Reopening Law’s Gate: Public Interest Standing and Access to Justice,” University of British 
Columbia Law Review 44 (2011): 255-276; Cappelletti, “Advocates for the Public Interest,” in Access to 
Justice Vol. II, Promising Institutions (Milan: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1979): 859-60. The Supreme Court 
of Canada recently elucidated the issue of standing in Canada (Attorney General) v. Downtown Eastside 
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 Notably, Cappelletti and Garth describe the interests involved in collective actions 
as ‘diffuse’ in order to connote that these are not concentrated in a single spatial area or 
temporal period. Simply put, diffuse interests may be spread across an expansive region 
and/or over a prolonged period of time.89 This introduction of spatiality and temporality is 
one of the distinguishing conceptual features of second wave scholarship. The concept of 
diffuse interests, however, has not remained unchallenged. In a recent overview of 
collective actions, Stefan Wrbka, Steven Van Uytsel, and Mathias Siems have suggested 
that the term “multilayer interests”90 might be more appropriate given that such disputes 
are not reducible to individual and collective dimensions; that is to say, disputes which give 
rise to collective actions often involve a public dimension as well. For example, toxic 
emissions from a factory in Sarnia’s Chemical Valley might negatively affect the health of 
residents within a certain geographic region over the duration of the factory’s operation, 
but the repercussions are not limited to any single individual or collective, since the “rising 
health care costs resulting from an increase in disease”91 are assumed by the public health 
care system. The major distinction between public and collective interests in this 
                                                        
Sex Workers United Against Violence Society 2012 SCC 45, observing that “courts must consider three 
factors: whether the case raises a serious justiciable issue; whether the party bringing the case has a real 
stake in the proceedings or is engaged with the issues that it raises; and whether the proposed suit is, in all 
of the circumstances and in light of a number of considerations, a reasonable and effective means to bring 
the case to court. A party seeking public interest standing must persuade the court that these factors, applied 
purposively and flexibly, favor granting standing. All of the other relevant considerations being equal, a 
party with standing as of right will generally be preferred” (525). 
89 H.U. Jessurun d’Oliveira has noted that diffuse interests tend to connote the interests of “weaker 
members of society,” while also remarking that “diffuse, fragmented and collective interests lend 
themselves only to ostensive definitions and general indications on their characteristics.” See, “Protection 
of Diffuse, Fragmented and Collective Interests in Civil Litigation,” Netherlands International Law Review 
30, no. 2 (1983):161-186. See also Sutatip Yuthayotin, Access to Justice in Transnational B2C E-
Commerce: A Multidimensional Analysis of Consumer Protection Mechanisms (New York: Springer, 
2014): 41-43. 
90 Stefan Wrbka, Steven Van Uytsel, and Mathias Siems, “Access to justice and collective actions,” in  
Collective Actions: Enhancing Access to Justice and Reconciling Multilayer Interests? (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
91 Wrbka, Van Uytsel, and Siems, 8. 
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formulation is the directness of the repercussions: collective interests are understood as 
those of groups that are directly affected by a dispute, whereas the public interest is often 
indirectly affected.92 Moreover, given the deterrence function of collective legal vehicles 
such as class actions—behaviour modification is a secondary policy objective of the 
CPA—the public interest is served through the prevention of future harms through the 
deterrence of wrongful conduct by similarly situated corporations or governments (re: 
potential wrongdoers). Given that disputes which give rise to collective actions involve 
these tripartite interests—individual, collective, and public—Wrbka, Van Uytsel, and 
Siems have proposed that the term ‘multilayer interests’ exhibits greater reflection of the 
dynamics of collective actions. This term can be viewed as problematizing the rigidities of 
the public/private distinction by reconfiguring the traditionally perceived private legal 
vehicle of class actions as necessarily involving public interests.93   
 
 
                                                        
92 Ibid., 8-9. “Negative results caused by a lack of access to justice for public interests do not emerge 
directly or as fast as would be the case with diffuse interests.” 
93 Ibid., 9. This rearticulation is warranted insofar as the three categories of interests are explicitly 
represented—in Cappelletti and Garth’s original formulation, the public interest was largely implicit. At the 
same time, the concept of ‘multilayer interests’ may serve less as a replacement and more as a complement 
to the earlier concept of ‘diffuse interests’. In their rearticulation, Wrbka, Van Uytsel, and Siems 
rearticulate the concept of diffuse interests to signify collective or fragmented interests: “If one understands 
diffuse interests as collective or fragmented interests belonging to groups of people who are usually un- or 
underrepresented, but still directly affected by a dispute, public interests should be separately mentioned.” 
[emphasis added] Elsewhere, Stefan Wrbka makes this reduction more explicit: “[T]he second wave deals 
with diffuse interests, i.e. collective interests…” in European Consumer Access to Justice Revisited 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 24; Wrbka, Van Uytsel, and Siems, 8. This conceptual 
reduction does not fully account for one of the distinguishing features of the interests involved in collective 
actions: diffuseness. This involves the recognition of spatiality and temporality in considering affected 
interests; that is to say, diffuseness involves an explicit recognition of interests that are not concentrated in 
a single geographic area or affected at a single juncture. Moreover, the category of diffuse interests in 
public policy and socio-legal scholarship is often associated with the interests of marginalized citizens and 
“weaker members of society,” an association that is not insignificant when evaluating access to justice for 
vulnerable groups.  
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C. THIRD WAVE – ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
In the early 1980s, the third wave (1980-1990) of access to justice sought to expand the 
very basis of reforms from an emphasis on formal court procedures to alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms (ADRs). With the emergence of the neo-liberal conjuncture, 
restrictions in social expenditures and increasing costs associated with pursuing claims in 
the justice system precipitated governance strategies that moved beyond concerns of 
“finding effective legal representation for interests otherwise unrepresented or 
underrepresented”94 by focusing on “the full panoply of institutions and devices, personnel 
and procedures, used to process, and even prevent, disputes in modern societies.”95 
Notably, shifting strategies in this conjuncture favouring privatization informs these 
processes, such as arbitration, which typically involves power imbalances and procedural 
deficiencies. Although the effectiveness of ADRs has been incontrovertible in practical 
terms according to the standards of ‘case management’ and the preservation of ‘scarce 
judicial resources’ (i.e. backlog reduction), serious concerns have been raised about the 
potential democratic ramifications of this reliance on privatizing initiatives.96 While the 
strongest formal justification for such private alternatives has been its promotion of access 
to justice (in a rather restrictive understanding of this concept) for those who otherwise 
suffer from inaccessibility, this justification is inextricably bound to an efficiency-based 
rationality that favours cost-effective and expeditious solutions over other considerations, 
including basic democratic values such as transparency and fairness. As Trevor C. W. 
                                                        
94 Cappelletti and Garth, General Report, 49. 
95 Ibid. 
96 See, e.g., Trevor C. W. Farrow, Civil Justice, Privatization and Democracy (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2014). 
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Farrow has extensively observed, this privatizing trend raises serious concerns about the 
type of access to justice that is being increased (as discussed further below).97 
 In the context of class actions, the most problematic development of the third wave 
of reforms might be the advent of mandatory arbitration clauses. The basic objective of 
such clauses is the diversion of justiciable problems out of the public court system and into 
private arbitration, which often involves extreme power imbalances and procedural 
deficiencies. This has been particularly controversial in the context of consumer contracts 
whereby individuals are effectively prevented from participating in class actions. While 
the Supreme Court has consistently upheld the legitimacy of mandatory arbitration clauses 
in a series of decisions,98 there have been several interventions by provincial legislatures 
(notably, Ontario, Quebec, and Alberta) which have sought to safeguard the interests of 
their residents by expressly prohibiting or overriding such clauses in their respective 
consumer protection frameworks.99 In Ontario, the relevant provision of the Consumer 
Protection Act, 2002 confirms the precedence of the policy objectives of the Class 
Proceedings Act, 1992 irrespective of any preexisting mandatory arbitration clause: 
                                                        
97 In addition to several notable concerns raised by this trend toward privatization, including concerns over 
procedural fairness, the development of the common law, and broader democratic ramifications, Farrow 
observes that “the access to justice case that is typically made in support of the privatization trends […] 
largely equates access to justice with access to courts and legal services.” A less restrictive and more 
aspirational understanding of access to justice might expand its scope to include “much more of what are 
considered to be the basic tools of living and operating in a modern society (including, for example, 
healthcare, food and housing, access to information and education, voting rights, and so on).” Ibid., 265, 
274-335. 
98 See, e.g., Bisaillon v. Concordia, [2006] 1 SCR 666; Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des consommateurs, 
[2007] 2 SCR 801; Seidel v. TELUS Communications Inc., [2011] 1 SCR 531. 
99 A different approach can be seen in British Columbia where courts do not automatically override or 
invalidate mandatory arbitration provisions, but rather consider their existence in light of the determination 
of preferability at the certification stage (i.e. whether the class action is the preferable procedure over 
arbitration). Janet Walker and Garry Watson, eds., Class Actions in Canada: Cases, Notes, and Materials 
(Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2014): 116-17. 
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8. (1) A consumer may commence a proceeding on behalf of members of a class under the 
Class Proceedings Act, 1992 or may become a member of a class in such a proceeding in 
respect of a dispute arising out of a consumer agreement despite any term or 
acknowledgment in the consumer agreement or a related agreement that purports to prevent 
or has the effect of preventing the consumer from commencing or becoming a member of 
a class proceeding.100 
Comparatively speaking, there has been a noticeable shift in American civil 
procedure towards class arbitration as a form of dispute resolution101—class arbitration 
can be broadly described as a combination of private arbitration and traditional class 
actions. Whereas arbitration has historically been a bilateral process (or, at any rate, has 
tended to involve a limited number of parties), class arbitration has a representative 
character and may involve significantly more parties, rather like traditional class 
proceedings. However, class arbitration remains a distinctly American procedure that has 
not yet been introduced to Canada. Given Canadian statutory frameworks and ongoing 
jurisdictional concerns, as well as the contentious state of arbitration in the context of class 
actions more generally, the prospect of class arbitration in Canada in the foreseeable future 
appears fortunately remote.102 
 
                                                        
100 Consumer Protection Act, 2002, c. 30, Sched. A, s. 8 (1). 
101 As part of a broader curtailment of mass litigation in the United States, even class arbitration has come 
under criticism and to varying degrees been curtailed. See, e.g., Georgene Vairo, “Is the Class Action 
Really Dead? Is that Good or Bad for Class Members?” Emory Law Journal 64 (2014): 477-529. Class 
arbitration in the United States has its origins in the early 1980s, but gained increased momentum following 
Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, [2003] 539 US 444, wherein the United States Supreme Court 
“implicitly approved the procedure.”  
102 For an overview of class arbitration and its potential introduction in Canada, see Michael Schafler and 
Amer Pasalic, Is Canada Ready For Class Arbitration? Presented at ADRIC 2013 – Gold Standard ADR, 
Friday, October 25, 2013. Accessed on March 15, 2015: <http://www.dentons.com/~/media/PDFs/Insights 
/2013/October/Is%20Canada%20ready%20for%20class%20arbitration%20ADRIC%20version.pdf> See 




D. FOURTH WAVE – PREVENTATIVE APPROACHES 
In a seminal work in Canadian access to justice scholarship, “Access to Justice in Canada: 
Scope, Scale and Ambitions,” Roderick A. Macdonald expanded Cappelletti and Garth’s 
metaphor by conceptualizing two additional waves. In this expanded framework, the fourth 
wave emerged in the 1990s and “reflected the recognition that true access to justice had to 
encompass multiple non-dispute resolution dimensions,”103 particularly preventative 
approaches and conflict avoidance. In other words, the notion that access to justice entails 
the dual features of accessibility promotion and injustice prevention.   
Richard Susskind has encapsulated the fourth wave of thinking with a popular 
metaphor culled from risk management studies: “[M]ost people would surely prefer a fence 
at the top of the cliff rather than an ambulance at the bottom (no matter how swift or well-
equipped).”104 The basic premise of this preventative approach is that people “would surely 
prefer to avoid legal problems altogether rather than to have them well resolved,”105 which 
suggests that “access to justice is as much about dispute avoidance as it is about dispute 
resolution.”106 Interestingly, Susskind expands the medical analogy by drawing a parallel 
with shifts in public health policy toward health-promoting activities (i.e. aerobic exercise) 
and dietary habits: 
The idea is not only to prevent ill-health but to promote our physical and mental well-being. 
Similarly, the law can also provide us with ways in which we can improve our general well-
being; and not simply by helping to resolve or avoid problems. Instead, there are many 
                                                        
103 Macdonald, “Access to Justice in Canada Today,” 22. 
104 Richard Susskind, The End of Lawyers? Rethinking the nature of legal services (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 231.  
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid. [emphasis in original] 
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benefits, improvements, and advantages that the law can confer, even when there is no 
perceived problem or difficulty. And yet, many people are lamentably unaware of the full 
range of facilities available today… I look forward to the day when we will be committed 
to legal health promotion underpinned by community legal services that are akin perhaps 
to community medicine programmes.” 107 
The merits of such promotive activities are straightforward: encouraging 
individuals and collectivities to actively participate in their own well-being. However, 
when such promotive activities are posited as substitutes (rather than supplements) of state 
expenditures, the problematics of individualizing structural problems are compounded.  
Critical scholars in health and food security studies have long recognized the limits of 
behavioural approaches to ill-health and food insecurity by pointing toward the structural 
inequities that systematically disadvantage many vulnerable groups. Notably, Julie 
Guthman has critiqued the questionable “if they only knew”108 logic that has gained 
prominence in recent years by exposing the “structural privileges”109 and “historical and 
social processes of racialization”110 that have contributed to ill-health and food insecurity 
among ethnic and racial minorities. In similar fashion, Elizabeth McGibbon and Charmaine 
McPherson have emphasized the structural causes of ill-health over promotive initiatives 
premised upon “individual-based lifestyle [choices]”111 in their analysis of the social 
                                                        
107 Ibid., 231-32. “The medical analogy also helps identify a third sense of access to justice. I am thinking 
here of relatively recent work on health promotion—we are advised today to exercise aerobically for at 
least 20 minutes, three times a week, not just because this will reduce our chances of, for example, 
coronary heart disease but because it will make us feel a whole lot better.” 
108 Julie Guthman, “If They Only Knew: Color Blindness and Universalism in California Alternative Food 
Institutions,” The Professional Geographer 60 (2008): 387-397. 
109 Ibid., 390. 
110 Ibid. 
111 The authors provide a succinct formulation of this approach: “A social determinants of health (SDH) 
perspective increasingly takes aim at the structural causes-of-the-causes of social and material deprivation 
that lead to ill health.” Elizabeth McGibbon and Charmaine McPherson, “Applying Intersectionality & 
Complexity Theory to Address the Social Determinants of Women’s Health,” Women’s Health & Urban 
Life 10, no. 1 (2011): 67.  
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determinants of women’s health. Although these analogical critiques do not diminish the 
relative merits of legal health promotion—clearly disseminating legal information and 
preventative techniques in an accessible manner is a social good112—they nevertheless 
highlight the limitations of behavioural approaches to structural problems and the broader 
responsibilization thesis of neo-liberal governance strategies. It should also be noted that 
the indistinct boundary between the provision of legal information and the delivery of legal 
services creates serious challenges for fourth wave access to justice programs given that 
the legal profession in Canada is governed by private self-regulatory bodies that remain 
vigilant in protecting the interests of legal professionals as the sole providers of legal 
services.113 One promising development in this area is the promotion of new legal service 
providers (i.e. paralegals) by reducing or eliminating the monopoly on legal services 
currently enjoyed by the Canadian legal profession.114  
Above all, in the context of multilayer access to environmental justice, these 
analogical critiques become directly applicable to inaccessibility concerns. The 
consumption of chemicals from contaminated food, water, and air, resulting in health-
impairment and food insecurity cannot be uniformly avoided with promotive activities. For 
example, the capacity of negatively harmed individuals to engage in ‘precautionary 
consumption’ (i.e. screening for toxic contaminants in commodities, notably food and 
                                                        
112 Then again, the promotion of legal information might also lead negatively affected individuals or groups 
to the false belief that their justiciable problems can only be resolved through formal legal means. See, e.g., 
Ottawa, National Symposium: Expanding Horizons, Rethinking Access to Justice in Canada (Ottawa: 
Department of Justice, 2000). 
113 See, e.g., Jennifer Bond, David Wiseman, and Emily Bates, “The Cost of Uncertainty: Navigating the 
Boundary Between Legal Information and Legal Services in the Access to Justice Sector,” Journal of Law 
and Social Policy 25 (2016): 1-25.  
114 For an argument in favour of new legal service providers, see Alice Woolley and Trevor C. W. Farrow, 
“Addressing Access to Justice Through New Legal Service Providers: Opportunities and Challenges,” 
Texas A&M Law Review 3, no. 3 (2016): 549-81. 
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hygienic products) is limited by socio-economic status, spatial proximity to alternative 
sources, and a host of other barriers.115 Such consumer-oriented approaches (although 
necessary in terms of transparency and informational disclosures) ultimately emphasize 
individual responsibility in the consumption of chemicals rather than eliminating toxicants 
from consumer products; that is, individuated responses to toxic exposures such as 
‘precautionary consumption’ overemphasize the consumption of chemicals to the 
detriment of the production of chemicals and the power dynamics in the political economy 
that operate in pursuit of such productive activities. Such individualized regulatory regimes 
have strong gendered dimensions insofar as decision-making burdens are privatized and 
downloaded onto primary caregivers in households (work that is disproportionately 
undertaken by women), thereby contributing to the ‘care burden’ of social reproduction 
and reinforcing the gendered division of household labour.116 These issues of power, 
production, and social reproduction require structural changes in the context of multilayer 
access to environmental justice. 
Fundamentally, toxic exposures are not evenly distributed across social locations 
and the extent to which harmed groups can engage in preventative activities is often 
dependent on broader structural forces. For example, the Aamjiwnaang First Nation 
experiences the highest air pollution in Canada as a result of its proximity to chemical 
manufacturers in nearby Sarnia.117 The extent to which Indigenous residents can engage in 
                                                        
115 See Norah MacKendrick, “Protecting Ourselves from Chemicals: A Study in Gender and Precautionary 
Consumption,” in ed., Dayna Nadine Scott, Our Chemical Selves: Gender, Toxics, and Environmental 
Health (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2015), 58-77. 
116 Antonella Picchio, Social Reproduction: The Political Economy of the Labour Market (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992); Susan Buckingham and Rikibe Kulcur, “Gendered Geographies of 
Environmental Injustice,” Antipode 41 (4): 659-83. 
117 Sarah Marie Wiebe and Erin Marie Konsmo, “Indigenous Body as Contaminated Site? Examining 
Struggles for Reproductive Justice in Aamjiwnaang,” in eds., Stephanie Paterson, Francesca Scala, and 
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individuated preventative activities (i.e. face masks, remaining indoors, etc.) is limited to 
the reservation borders and does not extend to physical relocation. From a methodological 
standpoint, behavioural approaches often do not account for perceptual disparities, such as 
the presence of a form of differential legal consciousness as a result of past negative 
experiences with state institutions which directly affects the ability of harmed individuals 
or groups to access justice through institutional mechanisms.118 As the Supreme Court 
recently recognized, “alienation from the legal system as a result of negative 
experiences”119 remains a significant barrier to accessing justice. The extent to which 
preventative measures—either health-based or legal—address the environmental injustices 
to which such Indigenous groups are exposed remains negligible.  
While it may be self-evident that people would prefer to avoid legal problems 
altogether, the extent to which promotive activities effect such changes is not evenly 
distributed across social locations. Rebecca Sandefur has observed that “people whose 
social position is near the bottom of an unequal structure will be less likely to take actions 
that might protect or further their own interests, whether those actions involve seeking 
information or advice.”120 Similarly, Constance Backhouse’s expansive body of research 
indicates that this orientation toward the structural roots of inequities is imperative in 
evaluations of inaccessibility across the familiar social locations in Canada (i.e. race, 
                                                        
Marlene K. Sokolon, Fertile Ground: Exploring Reproduction in Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2014), 325-58. 
118 See Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey’s influential study, The Common Place of Law: Stories from 
Everyday Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).  
119 AIC Limited v. Fischer, at para. 27. 
120 Rebecca Sandefur, “The Importance of Doing Nothing: Everyday Problems and Responses of Inaction,” 
in eds., Pascoe Pleasance, Alexy Buck, and Nigel Balmer, Transforming Lives: Law and Social Process 
(London: HMSO, 2007), 117. 
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gender, class, etc.).121 Simply put, structural barriers to accessing justice are not reducible 
to knowledge gaps and the availability of legal information. Finally, the limitations of the 
individuated solutions of legal health promotion are strikingly apparent in the context of 
collective claims-making which definitionally involve issues that are beyond individuation. 
That is not to say that dispute avoidance as a principle is inapplicable in this context, but 
rather that its purview must be extended beyond the individualistic measures associated 
with interpersonal disputes.  
In point of fact, the strongest application of the logic of preventative measures in 
the context of multilayer access to environmental justice may be adherence to the 
Precautionary Principle in environmental governance. This globally recognized concept 
holds that scientific uncertainty or incomplete scientific knowledge should not preclude the 
prevention of a proposed activity; in other words, the potential of environmental harm (that 
has not been conclusively determined according to positivistic standards) is sufficient for 
states to prohibit any proposed activity.122 The basic impetus of this preventative approach 
is the recognition that the rigid standards of positivistic knowledge-formation may 
contribute to the deterioration of environmental health and safety. Although critics have 
                                                        
121 See, e.g., Constance Backhouse, Colour-Coded: A Legal History of Racism in Canada, 1900-1950 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999).  
122 The Precautionary Principle originates in its contemporary form in the German policy of 
vorsorgeprinzip from the 1970s which broadly required that any proposed activity that could potentially 
cause environmental harm should not be allowed until and unless this potentiality was scientifically proven 
to be false; in other words, the absence of a scientific consensus on the possibility of environmental harm 
should not prevent the impermissibility of the proposed activity. In its original formulation, the 
Precautionary Principle entailed the following: “(1) socialized planning and heavy state influence; (2) 
forward-looking, active, and participatory measures to avoid harm; (3) measures to stimulate the economy 
through replacement of polluting technologies with ‘green’ alternatives; (4) decisions based on a number of 
criteria, including, but not limited to, ‘sound science’ with the aim of pursuing ‘complementary goals 
without becoming subject to the accusation of irrationality’ and including social and political as well as 
environmental harms; and (5) a strong moral requirement to avoid damage.” For an overview of the 
Precautionary Principle, see P. Saradhi Puttagunat, “The Precautionary Principle in the Regulation of 
Genetically Modified Organisms,” Health Law Review 9, no. 2 (2001): 10-18. 
 
 46 
posited that adoption of the Precautionary Principle is an intrusion upon the ‘spontaneous 
ordering of the market’ in delivering social goods by radical environmentalists, a 
comprehensive report commissioned by the European Environmental Agency, “Late 
Lessons From Early Warnings: The Precautionary Principle, 1896-2000,” provides a strong 
historical account of the social benefits of such preventive measures in the context of 
environmental injustices.123 The critique of ex post facto accessibility promotion 
encapsulated by Susskind’s widely cited refrain—“[M]ost people would surely prefer a 
fence at the top of the cliff rather than an ambulance at the bottom (no matter how swift or 
well-equipped)”124—finds strong resonances with the ‘common sense’ approach of the 
Precautionary Principle rooted in nineteenth-century adages, such as “an ounce of 
prevention is worth a pound of cure.”125  
In Canada, the Precautionary Principle is evident in the preamble to multiple 
environmental statutes, including the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999.126 As 
it pertains to environmental class actions, the incorporation of the fourth wave logic of 
preventative measures in the form of the Precautionary Principle broadly aligns with an 
aspirational understanding of access to justice that recognizes both formal legal and non-
legal avenues of accessibility promotion and injustice prevention. In Ontario’s class action 
                                                        
123 Late Lessons From Early Warnings: The Precautionary Principle, 1896-2000 (Copenhagen: European 
Environment Agency, 2002). Online: http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/ environmental_issue_report 
_2001_22. 
124 Susskind, The End of Lawyers? Rethinking the nature of legal services, 231.  
125 Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway, The Collapse of Western Civilization: A View From the Future 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 46. 
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Precautionary Principle: “Whereas the Government of Canada is committed to implementing the 
Precautionary Principle that, where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
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regime, moreover, the secondary policy objective of the Class Proceedings Act of ensuring 
behaviour modification addresses the prevention of injustices by similarly situated parties 
(i.e. corporations) insofar as successful class actions acquire a deterrence function; in this 
sense, behaviour modification complements the primary policy objective of access to 
justice. Ultimately, the conceptualization of the Precautionary Principle through the fourth 
wave logic of preventative action provides a productive bridge connecting ‘access to 
justice’ and ‘environmental justice’.127 
 
E. FIFTH WAVE – EVERY FACET OF SOCIAL LIFE 
Starting in the early 2000s, a fifth wave of reforms sought to expand the scope of access to 
justice to include “every facet of the social life of citizens.”128 According to this expansive 
vision, “[t]here is no issue of interpersonal or group relationships that does not call forth 
considerations of substantive justice, procedural fairness and equal access to legal 
institutions.”129 At root, this expansion into social life has been largely governed by an 
aspirational conception of access to justice that recognizes the lived experiences of citizens 
and the multiple sites of injustices in contemporary societies. Christine Parker has 
articulated this promise of fifth wave reforms as “speaking justice to power,”130 a 
formulation that explicitly recognizes power imbalances in social relations that contribute 
                                                        
127 In other words, the conceptualization of the Precautionary Principle through the critical frame of 
‘speaking justice to power’ extends such preventative dimensions beyond the specific context of any 
particular case (that might implicate similarly situated parties) towards the broader political economy of 
pollution addressed by the Precautionary Principle in environmental justice discourses. 
128 Ibid., 23. 
129 Ibid. 




to everyday injustices. “People experience domination,” Parker observes, “in the places 
where they spend their daily lives in the presence of more powerful others—families, 
schools, workplaces, shops, government departments, and community organizations.”131 
Clearly the conception of ‘justice’ that animates the fifth wave has progressed beyond the 
largely proceduralistic conception of earlier waves. Marc Galanter has described this 
conceptual progression as reflecting the essential feature of ‘justice’ as a “fluid, moving, 
and labile thing,”132 which suggests that the normative goal of ‘access to justice’, by 
extension, remains a constantly “moving frontier.”133  
This progressive conception has necessitated similar developments in strategies of 
accessibility promotion and injustice prevention. Policy reforms focusing exclusively on 
formal legal channels have started to be viewed as insufficient measures of dealing with 
the multidimensionality of Canada’s access to justice crisis. The demand for dynamic and 
proactive strategies which include “establishing partnerships with health and social 
services agencies”134  has been grounded on appreciating the “correlation between health, 
social service, employment, security from violence and access to civil justice.”135 It is 
therefore neither surprising nor inconsequential that Macdonald concludes his influential 
overview of access to justice in Canada by remarking that ultimately “disparities in social 
power, and our seeming unwillingness as a society to do much about them—much more 
than procedural glitches in processes of litigation—are the root cause of injustice.”136 More 
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132 Marc Galanter, “Access to Justice as a Moving Frontier,” in eds., Julia Bass, W.A. Bogart, and Frederick 
H. Zemans, Access to Justice for a New Century: The Way Forward (Toronto: Law Society of Upper 
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to the point, these socially exclusionary and oppressive dynamics are “not randomly 
distributed,” but are rather distributed along the social locations familiar to critical social 
scientists (i.e. race, gender, class, age, etc.).137   
Needless to say, the progression of access to justice discourse has not occurred in a 
political economic vacuum. The social conditions under which this expanded scope of 
access to justice has developed are significantly removed from those of earlier waves. 
Although access to justice in its earliest manifestations under the Keynesian welfare state 
was characterized by the liberal proceduralism of its analyses and reforms, it nevertheless 
contained a normative universality that was not constrained by the prevailing restrictions 
of contemporary neo-liberal governance. Whereas Parker’s notion of ‘speaking justice to 
power’ adopts a progressive understanding of the multiple sites of injustices in advanced 
capitalist societies, the manner in which these injustices are addressed is generally limited 
by the “new regulatory state”—although “regulatory capitalism”138 might be a more 
appropriate, less state-centric term—which promotes self-regulatory models of 
accessibility promotion and injustice prevention. For example, environmental injustices are 
notionally addressed in Parker’s proposal through corporate self-regulation, such as 
compliance reports and environmental impact statements. This proposal favours regulated 
self-regulation—in other words, it is a meta-regulatory strategy aiming towards “regulating 
organizations to self-regulate injustice prevention and provision of access to justice.”139 
According to Parker, this form of environmental meta-regulation is in the long-term 
                                                        
137 Ibid.  
138 See, e.g., John Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism (Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2008). 
139 This meta-regulatory strategy would certainly also include some type of access to justice accreditation 
agency to monitor reports and corporate conduct. Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism, 187. 
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interests of corporations who ostensibly find it “desirable to initiate their own compliance 
audits before outside regulators do it for them.”140 
Although the capacity of such meta-regulatory strategies to address environmental 
justice concerns remains to be seen, the limited extent to which corporate self-regulation 
has served to improve the prevalence of environmental injustices such as chemical 
consumption and toxic pollution does not inspire confidence in the commitment of 
corporate actors to ensure substantive justice for negatively affected individuals and 
collectivities. Practically speaking, the efficacy of meta-regulatory strategies is dependent 
upon the strength of binding mechanisms associated with ensuring compliance. As Stephen 
Gill has pointed out, the laws “governing corporate social responsibilities for the 
environment [...] are soft and non-binding”141 which serves a “legitimizing role by 
facilitating the enforcement of hard corporate rights [...] in the face of the soft corporate 
social responsibilities.”142 Gill and Cutler have appropriately referred to these regulatory 
schemas as emblematic of the “new informality”143 in regulatory compliance. As explored 
in Chapter 2, environmental class actions are paradigmatic claims largely because 
environmental regulations have historically been negligibly enforced (and adhered to) by 
                                                        
140 Parker, 188-89. This policy direction may be critically viewed as a modification of the responsibilization 
thesis of neo-liberal governance, which aims to devolve state responsibilities onto private individuals and 
organizations. Parker is quite clear that “moving responsibility for creating and financing a large proportion 
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this policy stance. Ibid., 203. It should be clear, however, that Parker’s proposed meta-regulatory strategy 
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governments and corporations alike, thereby precipitating demands for a collective claims-
making vehicle to ensure enforcement and compliance where governments are recalcitrant 
to enforce regulations.  
 
F. SIXTH WAVE – PUBLIC-CENTRED ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
In recent years in Canada, a new wave of access to justice research has become discernible. 
One of the distinguishing facets of this new wave has been the embrace of a public-centred 
approach that seeks to prioritize the perspectives of the public in access to justice discourse 
and policy. This is borne out of the recognition that ‘access to justice’ as a field of inquiry 
has been dominated since the earliest days of the Florence Project by the perspectives of 
lawyers, academics, judges, and other justice stakeholders in relatively privileged social 
positions. To the extent that ‘access to justice’ reforms are designed to address the needs 
of the public, the proactive inclusion of public perspectives in access to justice discourse 
and policy formation is a welcome development.  
 In a pivotal study in this new wave—“What is Access to Justice?”144—Farrow seeks 
to develop precisely such a public-centred approach to access to justice by soliciting and 
incorporating public perspectives on a range of access to justice issues. In an observation 
that is emblematic of this new wave of thinking, Farrow notes that “[t]he public, which 
uses the system, needs to be at the centre of how we think about, understand, and reform 
the system.”145 The study’s findings coalesce around several important themes, including 
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the importance of both procedural and substantive justice, alienation from the justice 
system, the need for increased state support, and the unequal distribution of accessibility, 
among other themes.146 In the Canadian context, this new wave of access to justice reforms 
has benefited from the guidance of the Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and 
Family Matters (‘Action Committee’), an organization that has embraced a collaborative 
approach among justice stakeholders in addressing the everyday legal problems faced by 
Canadian residents; in so doing, the Action Committee has embraced a public-centred 
understanding of access to justice which draws on the major insights of previous iterations 
of access to justice reform, including the need for preventative approaches, simplifying 
procedures, public education and increased legal literacy, as well as laying the foundation 
for greater collaboration and coordination between and among justice stakeholders in 
Canada.147 For example, this focus on everyday legal problems and the various costs 
associated with inaccessible justice has been tackled directly by the Canadian Forum on 
Civil Justice in a recent study—“Everyday Legal Problems and the Cost of Justice in 
Canada”—that documented the various economic and non-economic costs of inaccessible 
justice, including “decreasing physical health, high levels of stress and emotional 
problems, and strains on relationships among family members.”148 The findings of the 
study indicate that the various costs of not dealing with the access to justice problem are 
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significant, not merely for the individuals who suffer from inaccessible justice, but also for 
the state through increases in various types of costs, including $248 million annually in 
social assistance payments, $450 million annually in employment insurance payments, and 
$101 million annually in health care costs.149  
Although the full implications of this new wave of access to justice reforms for the 
types of collective claims involved in class actions remain to be seen, one significant aspect 
of this recent development that is immediately relevant to multilayer access to justice is the 
increased focus on civic engagement and the urgency of raising ‘access to justice’ as an 
important social, political, and economic issue. Clearly ‘access to justice’ has historically 
been viewed as a ‘poor cousin’ in comparison to other facets of the welfare state, such as 
health care or education, however, the renewed commitment to increase awareness and 
politicize ‘access to justice’ as an important area worthy of greater public and state attention 
(and action) certainly bodes well moving forward.   
 
 2. MULTILAYER ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN CANADA 
In 1978, Quebec became the first Canadian jurisdiction to introduce class action legislation 
with An Act Respecting the Class Action—a second wave reform that explicitly sought to 
facilitate social justice for collectivities. Despite the relatively early adoption of American-
style class actions, common law provinces did not adopt similar legislation until Ontario 
passed the groundbreaking Class Proceedings Act in 1992, precipitating British Columbia 
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to adopt similar legislation in 1995, followed by Saskatchewan and Newfoundland in 2002, 
and Manitoba and Alberta in 2003 and 2004. These provincial class action regimes have 
been shaped by a trilogy of decisions released by the Supreme Court in the early 2000s.150  
 
A. CLASS ACTION TRILOGY 
The first of these landmark decisions was Western Canadian Shopping Centres Inc. v. 
Dutton (2000) in which the Supreme Court determined that class actions possessed 
sufficient public importance to warrant adoption into Canadian common law  (irrespective 
of provincial statutory regimes).151 Apart from Prince Edward Island, every province that 
had not passed class action legislation at the time of the decision has since introduced such 
legislation. In Dutton, Chief Justice McLachlin provides one of the most succinct defenses 
in Canadian jurisprudence of the public importance of class actions: 
The class action plays an important role in today’s world. The rise of mass production, 
the diversification of corporate ownership, the advent of the mega-corporation, and the 
recognition of environmental wrongs have all contributed to its growth. A faulty product 
may be sold to numerous consumers. Corporate mismanagement may bring loss to a large 
number of shareholders. Discriminatory policies may affect entire categories of 
employees. Environmental pollution may have consequences for citizens all over the 
country. Conflicts like these pit a large group of complainants against the alleged 
wrongdoer. Sometimes, the complainants are identically situated vis-à-vis the defendants. 
In other cases, an important aspect of their claim is common to all complainants. The 
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class action offers a means of efficiently resolving such disputes in a manner that is fair 
to all parties.152 
Chief Justice McLachlin also reconfirmed the three main advantages of class actions as 
promoting judicial economy,153 access to justice,154 and behaviour modification.155 Within 
these parameters, access to justice and judicial economy have been posited as primary 
policy objectives, whereas behaviour modification has been posited as a secondary policy 
objective.  
Interestingly, the two primary policy objectives are not necessarily compatible. The 
formal logic underlying judicial economy as a policy objective holds that class actions 
preserve scarce judicial resources by allowing for the aggregation of individual claims that 
would otherwise clog the courts into a single procedural vehicle, thereby allowing for a 
mass resolution of the aggregated claims and preventing the expenditure of judicial 
resources on repetitive individual claims. By the same token, the formal logic underlying 
the policy objective of access to justice holds that individual claims would not be pursued 
without a vehicle for collective claims-making such as a class action. The contradiction is 
self-evident: if such claims are individually non-viable, then they would not otherwise clog 
the courts in absence of an aggregative vehicle; if such claims would otherwise clog the 
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courts, then they are not individually non-viable. However, this distinction is a consequent 
of a difference in the character of the respective claims; that is, negative value claims are 
those that would not be pursued without a class action, whereas positive value claims are 
those that would be pursued with or without a class action. In the former case, the class 
action promotes access to justice, whereas in the latter case, the class action promotes 
judicial economy. In fact, the class action may also be construed as promoting access to 
justice in the latter case insofar as collective claims-making produces a strength-in-
numbers dynamic against powerful defendants. Nevertheless, to the extent that class 
actions promote meritorious negative value or individually non-viable claims that would 
not otherwise have been pursued, this promotion contradicts the policy objective of judicial 
economy. From a strictly economical perspective, any increase in litigation contradicts the 
objective of preserving scarce judicial resources, irrespective of the merits or frivolity of 
the claim.  
As it pertains to access to justice, the Supreme Court observed that “by allowing 
fixed litigation costs to be divided over a large number of plaintiffs, class actions improve 
access to justice by making economical the prosecution of claims that would otherwise be 
too costly to prosecute individually.”156 To emphasize the public importance of class 
actions in promoting access to justice, particularly for negative value claims, the Supreme 
Court confirmed that “[w]ithout class actions, the doors of justice remain closed to some 
plaintiffs, however strong their legal claims.”157  
                                                        




Delivering the decision of the Supreme Court in Hollick v. Toronto (2001)—the 
second case in the trilogy—Chief Justice McLachlin reiterated the economistic conception 
of access to justice outlined in Dutton that “class actions improve access to justice by 
making economical the prosecution of claims that any one class member would find too 
costly to prosecute on his or her own.”158 The lasting impact of Hollick rests largely on the 
flexible and generous approach to certification set forth by the Supreme Court (this has 
come to be known as “the Hollick approach”).159 Since pre-trial certification is the most 
critical juncture for prospective class actions (as explored more fully in Chapter 4), the 
Hollick approach signaled a positive development for access to justice advocates.  
In the final case of the trilogy, Rumley v. British Columbia (2001), the Supreme 
Court expanded the concept of access to justice beyond exclusively economic factors by 
recognizing potential social and psychological barriers to accessing justice for collective 
claims-makers. The extraordinary character of the claim—institutional abuse of blind and 
deaf children—was cited by the Court as a primary factor with the observation that 
permitting the “suit to proceed as a class action may go some way toward mitigating the 
difficulties that will be faced by class members.”160 Subsequent class actions involving 
historical wrongs, such as the Residential Schools and the Chinese ‘head tax’ class actions, 
testify to the social benefits of a collective claims-making vehicle in overcoming social and 
psychological barriers to multilayer access to justice.  
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In hindsight, the cumulative effect of Dutton, Hollick, and Rumley served to 
entrench class actions into the fabric of Canada’s civil justice system. From an access to 
justice perspective—despite heavy reliance on predominantly economistic rationales—the 
Supreme Court has sought to expand the scope of the concept to include non-economic 
factors. Given Canada’s relatively nascent class action history, the extent to which non-
economic factors prefigure into judicial decision-making remains to be seen. For now, the 
consistent emphasis on overcoming barriers, as opposed to ensuring substantive results, 
indicates a strong procedural conception of multilayer access to justice. 
Nonetheless, in 2013 the Supreme Court released its decision in AIC Limited v. 
Fischer;161 a decision that may be indicative of a commitment to an expansive conception 
of multilayer access to justice. Firstly, the Supreme Court reiterated that although economic 
barriers are more prevalent, social and psychological barriers also warrant consideration.162 
The Supreme Court subsequently enumerated several non-economic barriers faced by 
potential plaintiffs: 
•   Ignorance of the availability of substantive legal rights; 
•   Ignorance of the fact that significant injuries have occurred; 
•   Limited language skills; 
•   Elderly age of the claimants; 
•   Frail emotional or physical state of the claimants; 
                                                        
161 AIC Limited v. Fischer, 2013 3 S.C.R. 949 [2013] SCC 69. In this case the Supreme Court augmented 
the ‘access to justice’ criterion in the preferability test determining certification by engaging in an 
economic cost-benefits analysis in order to evaluate the preferability of the class proceeding over other 




•   Fear of reprisals by the defendant; and, 
•   Alienation from the legal system as a result of negative experiences.163 
Additionally, the Supreme Court recognized that access to justice cannot be 
reduced to access to court procedure, noting the interconnected nature of procedural and 
substantive concerns. The Supreme Court held that these are “interconnected because in 
many cases defects of process will raise doubts as to the substantive outcome and defects 
of substance may point to concerns with the process.”164 It goes without saying that simply 
allowing claimants access to court procedure does not necessarily ensure substantive 
results. While the latter is dependent upon the former, a restrictive conception of access to 
justice fails to address the multidimensionality of justice and the interconnectedness of 
procedural and substantive concerns. This view is echoed by the Honourable Frank 
Iacobucci (also quoted in Fischer), who remarks: 
I find it difficult to accept that providing injured parties with a process to pursue their claims 
can be divorced from ensuring that the ultimate remedy arising from the process provides 
substantive justice where warranted. A definition of access to justice that does not include a 
substantive result is simply incomplete.165 
Such shifting perceptions on access to justice testify to the development of the concept 
from its proceduralist origins in earlier waves towards substantive justice considerations. 
Although this progressive development is identifiable throughout access to justice 
scholarship, it is particularly relevant to class actions. Indeed, it is questionable how the 
                                                        
163 Ibid., at 27. The last barrier, “alienation from the legal system as a result of negative experiences,” 
constitutes and is constituted by the legal consciousness of the affected individual or group; in the case of 
groups, differential legal consciousness may be a more suitable term. I am using the concept of “legal 
consciousness” in light of Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey’s influential study, The Common Place of Law: 
Stories from Everyday Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). 
164 Ibid., at 23.  
165 Iacobucci, “Access to Justice in the Context of Class Actions,” 20. 
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preferability of a collective claims-making vehicle that possesses a social dimension—as 
the Supreme Court has posited on several occasions166—can reasonably be evaluated on 
strictly procedural grounds.  
International actors such as the UNDP similarly endorse a substantive conception 
of access to justice by observing that it “entails much more than improving an individual’s 
[or group’s] access to courts or guaranteeing legal representation”167 and demands to be 
“defined in terms of ensuring that legal and judicial outcomes are just and equitable.”168 In 
the context of multilayer access to justice, the ‘strength-in-numbers’ logic of class actions 
effectively contributes to substantive results, particularly when such collective claims-
making is undertaken against powerful adversaries such as corporations and governments. 
Iacobucci rightly observes that “class actions can facilitate the substantive element of 
access to justice”169 by virtue of this collectivist dimension given that an unified class is 
stronger than atomistic individuals and can “exert greater pressure”170 which “may lead to 
a more restorative result.”171 It goes without saying that this expansive understanding of 
access to justice was not promoted at its proceduralist origins, but rather has progressively 
developed since Cappelletti and Garth’s Florence Project. 
 
                                                        
166 See Bisaillon v. Concordia University, 2006 1 S.C.R. 666 [2006] SCC 19; Dell Computer Corp. v. 
Union des consommateurs, 2007 2 S.C.R. 801 [2007] SCC 34. 
167 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 2004 Access to Justice Practice Note. Online: 
<www.undp.org/governance/docs/Justice_PN_En.pdf>. 
168 Ibid. 





B. MULTILAYER ACCESS TO ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
Since the mid-1990s, a growing body of scholarship has emerged on the concept of 
Environmental Justice that broadly refers to environmental policy, enforcement, laws and 
regulations, and public participation in decision-making processes.172 One of the central 
principles of Environmental Justice has been the demand that harmed individuals and 
communities receive full compensation for their incurred environmental harms, including 
reparations for damage and clean-up of contaminated sites. In point of fact, the 
Environmental Justice Paradigm (EJP) elevates collective compensation to the level of a 
right.173 However, despite the fact that Environmental Justice research generally 
corresponds to developments in access to justice, the two paradigms have largely operated 
in separated spheres. In contrast to other jurisdictions, such as the European Union, the 
synthesis of ‘access to justice’ and ‘environmental justice’ has been largely underexplored 
in Canada.174 As a central principle of Environmental Justice, the right of compensation for 
environmental harms demands greater analysis. To this end, this project explores 
environmental harms through the scope of multilayer access to justice by focusing on 
environmental class actions, the paradigmatic types of actions.  
                                                        
172 See, e.g., Andil Gosine, Environmental Justice and Racism in Canada (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 
2008); Dorceta Taylor, “The Evolution of Environmental Justice Activism, Research, and Scholarship,” 
Environmental Practice 13, no. 4 (2011): 280-301; Alexandre Berthe and Sylvie Ferrari, “Ecological 
Inequalities: Relating Unequal Access to the Environment to Theories of Justice,” Cahiers du GREThA – 
Working Paper Series (2012): 1-20; Vandana Shiva, Soil Not Oil: Environmental Justice in an Age of 
Climate Crisis (Berkley: North Atlantic Books, 2015); Toban Black et al, eds., A Line in the Tar Sands: 
Struggles for Environmental Justice (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2014); Julian Agyeman, ed., Speaking 
for Ourselves: Environmental Justice in Canada (Toronto: University of British Columbia Press, 2010); 
Felicity Millner, “Access to Environmental Justice,” Deakin Law Review 16, no. 1 (2011): 189-207. 
173Dorceta Taylor, “The Rise of the Environmental Justice Paradigm: Injustice Framing and the Social 
Construction of Environmental Discourses,” American Behavioural Scientist  43 (2000): 555. 
174 But see, e.g., Richard D. Lindgren and Theresa A. McClenaghan, Ensuring Access to Environmental 
Justice: How to Strengthen Ontario’s Environmental Bill of Rights (Toronto: Canadian Environmental Law 
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To the extent that multilayer interests are implicated in environmental class 
actions—that is, environmental class actions are not solely aggregative vehicles for the 
pursuit of individual interests nor vehicles of collective interests, but rather extend towards 
the broader social context by advancing public interests—multilayer access to 
environmental justice can be articulated as a subfield within the EJP under the principle of 
compensation in the interests of individuals, collectivities, and the general public. 
 First and foremost, this project posits that the inequitable distribution of 
inaccessibility strongly correlates to the inequitable distribution of environmental 
injustices in Canada. Any synchronic analysis of this correlation neglects the impacts of 
historical oppression and power imbalances that have contributed to this inequitable 
distribution of inaccessibility and environmental harms. As it pertains to access to justice, 
Macdonald briefly addresses concerns over the distribution of social power and its 
concomitant implications for access to justice by observing that dominant groups in Canada 
“historically have been white, male, middle-aged, middle-and-upper-class, English- or 
French-speaking citizens”175 and that “[e]very step away from that socio-demographic 
profile is a step away from access.”176 In response, Constance Backhouse examined the 
dominance of this socio-demographic group by focusing on the intersectional categories of 
gender, indigeneity, race and ethnicity, dis/ability, and class.177 As Backhouse observes, 
the “hierarchies within our present society were erected upon discriminatory laws and 
                                                        
Association, 2016). Lindgren is counsel for the Canadian Environmental Law Association, the only major 
Canadian organization that employs the term ‘access to environmental justice’.   
175 Macdonald, 28.  
176 Ibid.  
177 Constance Backhouse, “What is Access to Justice?” in Julia Bass, W.A. Bogart, and Frederick H. 
Zemans, eds, Access to Justice for a New Century: The Way Forward (Toronto: Law Society of Upper 
Canada, 2005), 113-146. 
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practices that prevailed for centuries.”178 The astonishing fact that the paradigmatic claims-
maker in civil justice disputes has been “white, male, non-immigrant, English or French 
speaking, professional, well-educated, falling within the 40-80 percentile of wage earners 
and aged between 35 and 60”179—in other words, what Audre Lorde calls the “mythical 
norm”180—cannot be adequately comprehended without considering the historical 
foundations upon which  “present-day realities”181 are grounded. This ‘mythical norm’ 
reflects a privileged form of legal consciousness (and elevated sense of legal entitlement) 
which has been exposed in multiple arenas, perhaps most famously by Gwen Brodsky and 
Shelagh Day who observed that this socio-demographic group is the “most likely to bring 
Charter challenges alleging discriminatory treatment under the equality provision in 
section 15.”182 Simply put, the capacity of individuals and collectives to access justice has 
been historically contingent on oppressive structures of power. “Past inequities have left 
enduring legacies,”183 as Backhouse observes, and the Canadian justice system “continues 
to reflect the same patterns of inequity.”184  
 Notwithstanding this critical focus on social power and social locations, classical 
access to justice scholarship has largely viewed class actions (in general) and 
environmental class actions (more specifically) as developed to promote the interests of 
                                                        
178 Ibid., 114. 
179 Ibid., 113. Backhouse positions her critique in response to an empirical study (which Macdonald cited) 
of the Montreal Small Claims Court (approximately 9,000 cases were examined). This study found that the 
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180 Audre Lorde, “Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference,” in Sister Outsider: Essays 
and Speeches (New York: Crossing Press, 2007), 116. 
181 Ibid., 114. 
182 Ibid., 122. 
183 Ibid., 124. See, e.g., Pascoe Pleasance et al, “Causes of Action: first findings of the LSRC periodic 
survey,” Journal of Law and Society 30 (2003): 11-30.  
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“the suburbanite [as opposed to] the ghetto [sic] dweller”185 and generally not developed to 
“protect the very poorest in society.”186 In other words, environmentalism has been 
conceived as a ‘post-materialistic privileged white concern’ that does not address the 
material injustices faced by vulnerable communities along the familiar social gradients (i.e. 
race, class, gender, etc.). This dominant perspective of environmentalism as a post-
materialistic and largely privileged white endeavour must be problematized in order to 
synthesize multilayer access to justice with environmental matters. As Dorceta Taylor 
observes, environmental considerations have historically been advanced along four 
principal pathways: 
1.   The wilderness path, which urged the protection of the natural environment alongside 
respect for wildlife. This path was dominated by well-financed white males in the late 
19th century and began including middle-class white females in the 20th century. This 
remains the dominant approach in environmentalism. 
2.   The urban environmental path developed by middle-class participants which focused on 
urban parks and natural spaces, as well as broader public health considerations. 
3.   The working-class environmental path developed by progressive middle-class and 
working-class participants, typically with union support, with a focus on occupational 
health and safety. 
4.   The people-of-colour environmental path that explicitly linked social justice 
considerations like “self-determination, sovereignty, human rights, social inequality, 
access to natural resources, and disproportionate impacts of environmental hazards with 
traditional working-class environmental concerns like worker rights and worker health 
and safety.”187   
 
                                                        
185 Guido Calabresi, “Access to Justice and Substantive Law Reform: Legal Aid for the Lower Middle 
Class,” in Mauro Cappelletti and Bryant Garth, eds., Access to Justice, Vol. II: 178, as quoted by Jasminka 
Kalajdzic, “Access to Justice for the Masses?” (LL.M. Thesis, University of Toronto, 2009), online: 
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186 Ibid. 
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More to the point, environmental justice scholarship has empirically investigated and 
corroborated linkages between gender, race, class, and age with environmental hazards. 
For example, environmental racism scholars have problematized the dominant perspective 
of environmental justice as a privileged white concern by observing that racism and 
classism are major determinants of the distribution of such justiciable problems.188 A recent 
example that amply illustrates these racial and classist dimensions of environmental harms 
and their inextricable linkage with access to justice occurred in 2016 when a high-ranking 
executive for Range Resources, a resource extraction firm specializing in fossil fuels, 
explicitly acknowledged that Range Resources “sites its shale gas wells away from large 
homes where wealthy people live and who might have the money to fight such drilling and 
fracking operations.”189 Although the direct relationship between inaccessible justice and 
toxic exposures that fall along intersectional categories will be addressed in greater detail 
in Chapter 4, at present it suffices to observe that such concerted targeting of vulnerable 
communities that do not possess the capacity to access justice suggests that the concept 
necessarily entails the capacity to obtain protection of the law (in various forms) in addition 
to pursuing vindication of infringed rights. These incapacities do not merely prevent 
                                                        
188See, e.g., Michael Mascarenhas Rensselaer, Where the Waters Divide: Neo-liberalism, White Privilege, 
and Environmental Racism in Canada (Toronto: Lexington Books, 2012); Dorceta Taylor, Toxic 
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individuals and groups from accessing justice, but they also encourage the creation of 
justiciable problems for such vulnerable people in the political economy of pollution which 
directly targets the social reproductive activities of low-income, racialized communities 
with differential gendered and age-related health impacts—quite literally targeting those 
who do not ‘have the money to fight’ such environmental injustices. Such abusive practices 
indicate that analyses of multilayer access to environmental justice must be situated within 
the context of the broader political economy of pollution.  
 
C. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POLLUTION 
In Ontario, a ‘feminist political economy of pollution’ has recently been proposed by 
Dayna Nadine Scott as a constructive approach to “contextualize the interconnectedness of 
environmental health harms, chemical production, gender, and consumption within 
historical and structural findings.”190 This specific political economy approach features a 
social reproduction framework191 which examines the productive and reproductive 
                                                        
190 Scott et al, 7.  
191 The concept of “social reproduction” originates in the work of Pierre Bourdieu. See Bourdieu, 
Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture (London: Sage Publications, 1977). Bourdieu also 
provides a working definition of neo-liberalism that animates this investigation as “[a] programme for 
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liberalism,” Law and Contemporary Problems 77, no. 4 (2014): 2, 1-23.  
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activities involved in sustaining everyday life, with particular emphasis on environmental 
health-impairing events.192 Social reproduction is a concept pioneered in the Canadian 
context by feminist political economy that challenges the tendency in classical political 
economy of neglecting the material foundations of social life. As Isabella Bakker aptly 
observes:  
[T]he lens of social reproduction offers a more holistic view of political economy—shifting 
the concept of ‘the economy’ away from merely market forces, relations or measures 
toward a more ample and dynamic understanding. This includes institutions (and social 
relations) that provide for socialization of risk, healthcare, education [...] The lens of social 
reproduction also clarifies questions of material living standards and wellbeing in the 
context of how neo-liberal disciplines are radically reordering social life and relations.193 
During its origins in the 1970s and 1980s, social reproduction focused almost exclusively 
on the ‘care economy’ and the gendered division of domestic labour. At the most abstract 
and general level, social reproduction refers to the ways in which societies reproduce. The 
concept typically involves food provisioning, sheltering, caring needs, human security, 
education, health care, in addition to “the development and transmission of knowledge, 
social values, and cultural practices and the construction of individual and collective 
identities.”194 Despite this broad purview, many feminist political economists continue to 
prioritize the care economy and domestic labour, without fully considering the myriad 
ways societies reproduce beyond these restrictive confines. Notably, spatiality must 
                                                        
192 Although all the contributors examine issues directly affecting environmental health and social 
reproduction, Adrian A. Smith and Alexandra Stiver’s contribution makes this theoretical foundation most 
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prefigure into any analysis of social reproduction, particularly in the context of 
environmental injustices that are inequitably distributed across geographical regions.195 In 
this context, injustices are clearly not limited to domestic spaces such as households. An 
expansive conception that moves beyond these rigid parameters is not only necessary, but 
will also provide a fertile basis for interdisciplinary research, such as the present project.  
 Bakker has developed precisely such an expansive theory of social reproduction 
that recognizes the spatial dimensions associated with the ecological and agricultural 
structures upon which the “biological reproduction of the species”196 is founded. Bakker’s 
theorization of social reproduction moves beyond the ideological rigidities of earlier 
approaches and thereby allows for broader applicability in emerging areas of critical 
concern, such as the “depletion and destruction of ecological and biological structures and 
systems that sustain life.”197 The standpoint that access to justice is about “access to a kind 
of life—and the kinds of communities in which—people would like to live”198 (as Farrow 
notes in the newest wave of access to justice research) resonates in this expansive approach. 
This is similarly apparent in the environmental justice literature where intergenerational 
and intragenerational reproduction are highlighted in the enumerated Principles of 
Environmental Justice.199 Clearly environmental health-impairing events directly impact 
                                                        
195 Isabella Bakker and Rachel Silvey, “Introduction: Social Reproduction and Global Transformations—
from the everyday to the global,” in eds., Isabella Bakker and Rachel Silvey, Beyond States and Markets: 
The Challenges of Social Reproduction (New York: Routledge, 2008), 1-15. The authors note that they aim 
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197 Ibid., 26. [emphasis in original]  
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the biological reproduction of human life and the intergenerational maintenance of 
collective life. In environmental health studies, Michelle Murphy has argued that the 
“intensification of production and consumption in recent decades has […] alarming future 
effect[s],”200 which Scott et al have emphasized in their feminist political economy of 
pollution, observing that this “raises the prospect of today’s chemical consumption 
reaching forward, into future generations.”201  
 The intergenerational and intragenerational dimensions of environmental injustices 
indicate that multilayer access to justice must involve both restitutionary and preventative 
dimensions—the former primarily through positive judicial outcomes or settlements for 
incurred environmental harms, injunctive relief, and clean-up of contaminated sites, and 
the latter through the deterrence of future misconduct by similarly situated parties.202 This 
deterrence function suggests that behaviour modification—a secondary policy objective of 
Ontario’s Class Proceedings Act—acquires a heightened significance in the context of 
environmental justice. 
 As Cindi Katz observed in a seminal contribution to social reproduction theory: 
“[t]he widespread and serious environmental problems symptomatic of capitalist relations 
of production have received plenty of attention, but generally not as problems of social 
                                                        
200 Needless to say, Bakker’s critical approach, which recognizes spatiality and intergenerationality in the 
realm of ecological and biological reproduction is better suited for such a feminist political economy of 
pollution. Scott et al, 13. The authors also point out that “[t]hese intergenerational equity aspects of our 
current production and consumption of chemicals have been brought forcefully to the fore by Indigenous 
activists in Canada.” See, also, Allen Habib, “Sharing the Earth: Sustainability and the Currency of Inter-
Generational Environmental Justice,” Environmental Values 22, no. 6 (2013): 751-64. 
201 Ibid. 
202 This suggests that access to justice and behaviour modification are distinct but overlapping policy 
objectives in this particular context.  
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reproduction.”203 The same could be said of the continuingly ‘abysmal’ state of access to 
justice in Canada, which has dominated legal discourse for several decades, but has 
generally not been conceived through the political economic frame of social reproduction. 
This is patently apparent in the context of multilayer access to environmental justice, which 
is playing an increasingly critical role in combatting environmental injustices in domestic 
and foreign jurisdictions. As previously stated, for example, targeted environmental racism 
whereby “toxic waste repositories” and “noxious industries” are spatially situated in 
locations where vulnerable communities suffer from inaccessibility and cannot access legal 
protections against such encroachments—recall Range Resources’s corporate strategy—is 
a prime example of the importance of access to justice in the political-ecological dimension 
of social reproduction. Only from such a material standpoint—which recognizes the racial 
hierarchies and gender orders that impact the capacity of vulnerable people to access 
justice—can the contemporary task of incorporating “every facet of the social life of 
citizens” be achieved. 
 Finally, one of the distinguishing features of this political economy approach is the 
conceptualization of multilayer access to environmental justice as a field of contestation. 
Wendy Brown has recently described a central feature of neo-liberal governance and its 
concomitant political rationality as instrumentally reducing public life and politics to 
“problem solving and program implementation” in contradistinction to the “political 
contestation” of twentieth-century social liberalism and more radical political projects.204 
Robert Cox has similarly distinguished between “problem-solving” theory that is primarily 
                                                        
203 Cindi Katz, “Vagabond Capitalism and the Necessity of Social Reproduction,” Antipode 33 (2001): 714. 
204See Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos (New York: Zone Books, 2015), 68-70, 127. 
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aimed at smoothening the edges of “the prevailing social and power relationships” and 
more critical approaches which problematize these relationships.205 This project 
characterizes the crisis in multilayer access to environmental justice as borne out of a 
political contestation that systematically disadvantages vulnerable people in the political 
economy of pollution. In other words, this project considers the ‘de-democratizing’ 
initiatives by the polluter-industrial complex to curtail the purview of class actions with 
the objective of denying multilayer access to justice for collectivities who cannot otherwise 
vindicate their harmed interests (see Chapter 2) in order to facilitate the strengthening of 
“the political hand of capital,” to invoke Brown’s terminology.206 To the extent that 
political economy is distinguished by the rejection of the artificial separation of the political 
and the economic into separate spheres, the retrenchment of class actions—particularly in 
the United States, where environmental class actions have effectively been neutralized and 
the “death of class actions”207 is arguably forthcoming, but also in Canada where the “death 
of environmental class actions”208 has similarly been posited—effectively amounts to a 
form of ‘de-democratization.’209  Insofar as the civil justice system is a fundamental 
institution in a democratic society, the forces actively seeking to prevent vulnerable people 
from accessing justice through this fundamental democratic institution are pursuing ‘de-
democratization’ strategies.  
                                                        
205 Robert Cox as quoted by Gill and Cutler, “New Constitutionalism and World Order,” 2. 
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 Simply put, the present analysis examines those vulnerable people who cannot 
access justice for their reproductive needs in conjunction with the beneficiaries of 
inaccessibility, rather than solely focusing on the former and neglecting the latter. As Scott 
et al have demonstrated, the “consumption of chemicals in Canada is inseparable from the 
generation of pollution in this country.”210 To focus exclusively on people who suffer from 
environmental injustices without considering the powerful forces that are facilitating the 
production of such injustices and preventing justice-seeking by harmed people, thereby 
destabilizing processes of social reproduction that ensure the biological and ecological 
reproduction of life, yields an incomplete picture of the multidimensional accessibility 
crisis for collectivities in environmental matters.  Such beneficiaries of inaccessibility in 
environmental justice are typically corporate actors in the political economy of pollution, 
including corporations involved with resource extraction, biomedicine, pharmaceuticals, 
chemical production, and industrial manufacturing. As Daniel Faber has documented, there 
is a polluter-industrial complex that capitalizes on environmental injustices whose 
expansive network of state and civil society institutions, including research centres, public 
relations firms, think tanks, and policy institutes, collectively mobilizes against multilayer 
access to environmental justice through various de-democratization strategies.211 By 
conceptualizing multilayer access to environmental justice as a field of contestation, this 
project corroborates a principal insight of the ‘feminist political economy of pollution’ 
which recognizes the “inseparable links between profit incentives, the unsustainable 
production of waste, exploitative labour practices, racialization, and differential exposure 
                                                        
210 The phrase “consumption of chemicals” broadly signifies the various ways in which toxicants might 
enter the human body (e.g. ingesting, breathing, epidermal contact, etc.). Scott et al, 3. 
211 Danier Faber, Capitalizing on Environmental Injustice: The Polluter-Industrial Complex in the Age of 
Globalization (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008). 
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to pollutants.”212 As explored more fully in subsequent chapters, the political contestation 
of environmental accessibility is particularly striking in the context of class actions, which 
have historically been received along ideological lines.  
 In a review of civil justice scholarship, Rebecca Sandefur proposes a future research 
agenda that advocates for “a rejection of vague concepts like disadvantage in favour of a 
deep engagement with existing theories of inequality, particularly sociological theories 
about what race, class, and gender are and how they work.”213 This reorientation of access 
to justice research towards the racial hierarchies and gender orders that produce and 
reproduce injustices and inaccessibility aligns with Garth’s advocacy for contemporary 
scholarship to embrace critical social science approaches that “focus on hierarchy and 
inequality.”214 Pursuant to these new directions, the present analysis examines multilayer 
access to environmental justice through a feminist political economy approach that 
recognizes that power, production and social reproduction are inextricably bound with 
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During the heyday of the post-war Keynesian welfare state with its normative vision of 
universality in social provisioning, access to justice was generally viewed as a “social 
right.”215 Although it never rose to the level of other social sectors, such as healthcare, 
being traditionally treated as a ‘poor cousin’ among the pillars of the welfare state, it is 
clear that under contemporary neo-liberalism, it has come to be viewed as more of a “social 
luxury.”216 The restructuring of the Canadian welfare state in the current historical 
conjuncture is inextricably linked to the retrenchment of access to justice into a social 
luxury—a ‘de-democratizing’ trend that has continued during the present era of austerity. 
This retrenchment (or de-democratization) has occurred despite the fact that access to 
justice has been globally recognized as a fundamental human right—a contradiction that 
should not be particularly surprising given the absence of binding mechanisms to ensure 
governmental compliance to social and economic rights obligations.217 Needless to say, the 
dominance of market-oriented imperatives and policy instruments associated with the new 
constitutionalism of disciplinary neo-liberalism (i.e. privatization, devolution of 
responsibility, deregulation, reductions in social expenditures, commodification) demands 
greater visibility in analyses of multilayer access to justice in the twenty-first century. This 
project will seek to explore these processes in the context of environmental class actions 
in subsequent chapters. It is similarly important to recognize that the theoretical and 
                                                        
215 Cappelletti and Garth, General Report, 9. 
216 Macdonald, Access to Justice in Canada Today, 32. 
217 As Bakker observes, such binding mechanisms are necessary to ensure that “governments will be held 
accountable for their obligations to fulfill economic and social rights under the United Nations Charter and 
international human rights covenants.” Bakker, “Social Reproduction, Fiscal Space and Remaking the Real 
Constitution,” 231. Bakker contends that ensuring compliance entails “the harnessing of national resources 
(e.g. via fiscal policies) to rights commitments.” 
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empirical retrenchment of access to justice in political discourse and policy reforms has 
occurred concurrently with the repeated insistence by socio-legal scholars that inaccessible 
justice is an “important engine in reproducing inequalities.”218  
 In this chapter, a critical overview of the progression of access to justice reforms 
and discourses from earlier waves that prioritized formal legal channels to later waves that 
reoriented the concept towards preventative measures and non-legal approaches has been 
provided. This progression has major implications for environmental justice; for example, 
the Precautionary Principle can be broadly articulated within the purview of multilayer 
access to environmental justice from a fourth wave preventative standpoint. Indeed, clearly 
the prevention of environmental injustices is preferable to a robust class action regime to 
redress such wrongs after they have already occurred. Yet the ex post facto character of 
environmental class actions testifies to the continuing failures of environmental 
governance to protect vulnerable communities from injustices. Such an ideal state of social 
protection requires active enforcement of existing regulatory standards, which remains a 
principal point of struggle for multilayer access to environmental justice: public 
enforcement of environmental regulations. In this context of negligible enforcement, 
collective claims-making vehicles such as class actions remain integral features of 
environmental justice programmes, notwithstanding the discursive and reformist 
progression of ‘access to justice’ beyond strictly legal channels. Simply put, the 
progression of access to justice reforms and discourses does not negate the indispensability 
of class actions as ‘crucial instruments’ of social protection. By the same token, the market-
oriented strategies of neo-liberal governance are particularly apparent in the context of 
                                                        
218 Sandefur, “Access to Civil Justice and Race, Class, and Gender Inequality,” 3. 
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class actions as ‘policy instruments’ in the implementation of private enforcement regimes. 
The paradoxical tension between class actions as ‘crucial instruments’ of social protection 
and class actions as ‘policy instruments’ in the privatization of regulatory enforcement 
(which further removes enforcement from democratic controls and compounds the 
destabilization of the very processes of social reproduction that class actions as ‘crucial 
instruments’ serve to protect), along with the concomitant gatekeeping role played by 




















GATEKEEPERS OF JUSTICE: 
PRIVATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL OF ONTARIO 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The principal reason why environmental claims are paradigmatic class actions is the 
negligible enforcement of environmental laws and regulations in Ontario.219 This failure in 
environmental governance has precipitated demands by social progressives for collective 
claims-making vehicles to address the diverse environmental injustices resulting from 
governmental recalcitrance to fully enforce regulations. These demands largely corroborate 
the viewpoint of class actions as ‘crucial instruments’ of social protection, particularly for 
low-income, racialized communities who disproportionately suffer from environmental 
injustices, with a strong gendered and age-related (i.e. children and the elderly are highly 
vulnerable) character of health-impairing effects within such geographical regions.220 In 
the United States, environmental justice analyses have largely focused on the unequal 
burdens of toxic exposures and chemical contamination by African American 
                                                        
219 The federal and provincial environmental regulatory framework is fairly extensive. At the federal level, 
environmental statutes include Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 (S.C. 2012, c. 19, s. 52); 
Hazardous Products Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. H-3); Species at Risk Act (S.C. 2002, c. 29); Transportation of 
Dangerous Goods Act, 1992 (1992, c. 34); Pest Control Products Act (S.C. 2002, c. 28); Fisheries 
Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. F-14); Canada Shipping Act, 2001 (2001, c. 26). At the provincial level, 
environmental statutes include Ontario Water Resources Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. O.40; Clean Water Act, 2006, 
S.O. 2006, c. 22; Environmental Bill of Rights, 1993, S.O. 1993, c. 28; Pesticides Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 
P.11; Safe Drinking Water Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 32; Environmental Assessment Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 
E.18; Toxics Reduction Act, 2009, S.O. 2009, c. 19; Green Energy Act, 2009, S.O. 2009, c. 12; Nutrient 
Management Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 4. The relevant ministries include the Ministry of the Environment, 
Ministry of Fisheries and Oceans, Ministry of Health, Ministry for Parks Canada, and the Ministry of 
Transport. 
220 Broadly speaking, the negligible environmental laws and regulations is a governance failure that 
amounts to “a political sanctioning of environmental injustice.” John Byrne, Leigh Glover, and Cecilia 
Martinez, eds., Environmental Justice: Discourses in International Political Economy, Energy and 
Environmental Policy (London: Transaction Publishers, 2009), 6. Environmental justice is a multifaceted 
movement, one aspect of which is environmental racism, which itself has numerous facets, not only 
enforcement priorities, but also greater public participation in decision-making and policy formation. 
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communities, whereas in Canada these analyses focus primarily on Indigenous 
communities, with an emphasis on Anishnaabe, Mi’kmaq, Beothuk, Lubicon Lake Cree, 
Ardoch Algonquin, Inuit, Aamjiwnaang, Dene, and James Bay Cree peoples.221 Although 
such vulnerable groups have borne the brunt of environmental harms in Ontario, elevating 
levels of toxic production have expanded the conventional borders of risk exposure towards 
middle-income and predominantly white regions traditionally perceived as insulated from 
such contamination, which has precipitated the mobilization of diverse social groups 
against common causes of action. At root, the social benefits of such private enforcement 
vehicles aligns with a conception of class actions as playing a complementary role to public 
agencies. In other words, in contrast to neo-liberal governance strategies that promote the 
privatization of regulatory enforcement, the socio-political objective of such progressive 
demands pragmatically recognizes the benefits of the availability of a collective claims-
making vehicle in cases where regulations are negligibly enforced. This contrasts with the 
former process of privatization, which is informed by a co-optative conception that 
postulates class actions as replacing rather than supporting public agencies.  
The co-optative conception involves a configuration whereby states deploy 
economic incentives for private actors (i.e. Private Attorneys General) to assume the 
enforcement duties of public agencies within a “private enforcement regime.”222 Under 
                                                        
221 See, e.g., Andil Gosine, Environmental Justice and Racism in Canada (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 
2008); Vandana Shiva, Soil Not Oil: Environmental Justice in an Age of Climate Crisis (Berkley: North 
Atlantic Books, 2015); Toban Black et al, eds., A Line in the Tar Sands: Struggles for Environmental 
Justice (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2014); Julian Agyeman, ed., Speaking for Ourselves: Environmental 
Justice in Canada (Toronto: University of British Columbia Press, 2010). 
222 Sean Farhang, The Litigation State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). Farhang provides a 
working definition of private enforcement regimes as the aggregative effect of legislative choices 
“concerning who has standing to sue, which parties bear the costs of litigation, what damages will be 
available to winning plaintiffs, whether a judge or jury will make factual determinations and assess 
damages, and rules of liability, evidence and proof that together can have profound consequences for how 
much or how little private enforcement litigation will actually be mobilized.” Farhang, 3-4. See also, 
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such regimes, the central impetus is the production of “a form of auto-pilot enforcement, 
with market incentives.”223 Such reliance on private litigation as a policy instrument has 
been a distinctive feature of governance in the United States since the 1960s, giving rise to 
its designation as “the litigation state.”224 Yet despite the popularization of private 
enforcement regimes under disciplinary neo-liberalism, this development has received 
insufficient critical attention from policymakers and commentators; unsurprisingly, the 
majority of the established literature is focused on the United States. This critical emphasis 
is understandable given that the liberal American model of ‘regulation through litigation’ 
has often been contrasted with state-centric approaches that have historically prioritized 
regulatory enforcement by public agencies.  
 In recent years, however, Canadian scholars have begun to furtively engage in the 
relative merits and shortcomings of such private enforcement regimes. Whereas some 
commentators have advocated for deepening private enforcement through the statutory 
provisioning of additional economic incentives—for example, Craig Jones has advocated 
in favour of greater public interest considerations in Private Attorney General fee 
calculations, prohibition of mandatory arbitration clauses, legislative favouring of opt-out 
rather than opt-in class action regimes, and substantive amendments to toxic causation 
towards a probabilistic conception225—others such as Jasminka Kalajdzic have advocated 
                                                        
Steven B. Burbank, Sean Farhang, and Herbert M Kritzer, “Private Enforcement,” Lewis & Clark Law 
Review 17, no. 3 (2013): 637-722. 
223 Farhang, 5. See also W. Kip Viscusi, ed., Regulation through Litigation (Washington D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2002).  
224 The term policy instrument is applicable insofar as private enforcement regimes are effectively 
extensions of state power. As Farhang suggests, any given “state capacity is not exhausted by the actions of 
state personnel or the expenditure of state resources. If the object of interest is the state’s capacity to 
implement its policy choices by controlling the behaviour of other entities, then one must attend not only to 
the direct actions of state officers, but also to more indirect pathways of regulatory control.” Ibid., 7, 12-19. 
225 Craig Jones, “Litigate or Regulate? The Elusiveness of an Effective Consumer Protection Regime,” 
Canadian Business Law Journal 53 (2013): 367-69; see also, Jacob Ziegel, “Class Actions to Remedy 
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for a balanced approach that strengthens the investigative powers of regulatory agencies.226 
At root, private litigation in the form of class actions and public enforcement are not 
necessarily oppositional; these can complement one another in various ways. For example, 
private litigation can prompt public agencies to initiate their own investigations, as well as 
compelling public agencies to adopt stricter regulations.227 
Needless to say, a major factor in the development of private enforcement regimes 
has been the budgetary incapacities of regulatory agencies imposed by state restructuring 
and regressive taxation policies which have permitted the deeper penetration of market 
forces into state institutions. By the same token, it should be noted that private enforcement 
regimes have not emerged spontaneously, but are rather products of governance strategies 
that promote legislative adjustments in statutory frameworks associated with economic 
incentivization (i.e. contingency fees and damages; but also standing requirements, rules 
of proof and liability, etc.) with the objective of increasing the probability and profitability 
of private actors exercising public authority in order to relieve budget-constrained 
regulatory agencies of enforcement duties. In this light, a private enforcement regime can 
be viewed as constituting a structural reconfiguration of a state form (typically through the 
invocation of principles of economic efficiency), indicating that processes of 
                                                        
Mass Consumer Wrongs: Repugnant Solution or Controllable Genie? The Canadian Experience,” 
Canadian Business Law Journal 27 (2009): 879-94; Edward T. Schroeder, “A Tort by Any Other Name? In 
Search of the Distinction Between Regulation Through Litigation and Conventional Tort Law,” Texas Law 
Review 83, no. 3 (2005): 897-931; Keith N. Hylton, “When Should We Prefer Tort Law to Environmental 
Regulation?” Washburn Law Journal 41, no. 3 (2002): 515-24. 
226 Michael Molavi, “Beyond the Courtroom: Access to Justice, Privatization, and the Future of Class 
Action Research,” Canadian Class Action Review 10, no. 1-2 (2015): 8-31; Jasminka Kalajdzic, “Public 
Goals by Private Means & Public Actors Protecting Private Interests,” Canadian Business Law Journal 53 
(2013): 371-81. 
227 Deborah Hensler, “Class actions in context,” in eds., Deborah Hensler, Christopher Hodges, and Ianika 
Tzankova, Class Actions in Context: How Culture, Economics and Politics Shape Collective Litigation 
(Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2016): 399-401. 
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‘privatization’ extend beyond state assets and services to include the basic functioning of 
state agencies.228  
  This politico-economic context gives rise to a hypothesis of what I call the central 
contradiction between (1) class actions as ‘crucial instruments’ of social protection against 
the destabilizing tendencies of the capitalist system of accumulation and (2) class actions 
as ‘policy instruments’ in the institutionalization of private enforcement regimes that 
permit this accumulative logic to influence social priorities of regulatory enforcement 
through entrepreneurial litigation. This contradiction can be articulated through the 
analytical schema of complementation and co-optation.229 To the extent that class actions 
operate as collective claims-making vehicles that complement public agency enforcement, 
they are ‘crucial instruments’ in promoting multilayer access to environmental justice, 
especially in cases where governments are recalcitrant to enforce regulations; however, the 
neo-liberal shift towards a co-optative role of class actions as vehicles that replace rather 
than support public agencies serves to destabilize the very processes of social reproduction 
that class actions in their complementary role can be mobilized to protect. 
Fundamentally, the ramifications of co-optative private enforcement are troubling 
from the perspective of multilayer access to environmental justice. One of the distinctive 
features of class action regimes is the reversal of the traditional recruitment process: 
attorneys recruit clients as opposed to clients recruiting attorneys (which is the norm in 
other areas of the law). In such a paradigm, the conditions of recruitment acquire the 
                                                        
228 This type of privatization corroborates a central insight of Isabella Bakker and Stephen Gill who observe 
that privatization extends to state forms. Isabella Bakker and Stephen Gill, eds., Power, Production, and 
Social Reproduction (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 18-19. 
229 A third category of coordination can also be discerned which refers to arrangements whereby private 
actors require the explicit permission of public agents to pursue claims. Given space limitations, this 
chapter focuses on the major two categories of complementation and co-optation, although this third 
category could potentially yield interesting theoretical and empirical insights.    
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characteristics of barriers. Although recruiting strategies based primarily on profit-motives 
may incidentally benefit vulnerable people who disproportionately suffer environmental 
injustices, this incidental benefit occurs only insofar as the minimum qualifying criteria for 
representation is satisfied. Ultimately, the reversed recruitment paradigm indicates that a 
major accessibility barrier for multilayer justice is the gatekeeping role played by these 
private actors. At present, multilayer access to justice is determined by the profitability 
criteria of the gatekeepers of justice. Indeed, the case selection criteria employed by such 
private actors—which are largely informed by profitability and risk-exposure 
considerations—operate in exclusionary ways for vulnerable people whose incurred 
environmental harms are deemed insufficiently profitable. The downloading of 
enforcement duties to such private actors under a ‘private enforcement regime’ compounds 
the extent to which such market forces determine who deserves vindication for incurred 
harms. 
This chapter is primarily concerned with the limitations of Ontario’s emerging 
private enforcement regime from the perspective of multilayer access to environmental 
justice. To this end, the chapter begins by sketching out the ideological parameters of 
private enforcement by exploring libertarian criticisms—which are largely aimed at the 
enforcement of regulation as opposed to the privatization of enforcement—before 
proceeding to neo-liberal advocacy of this specific type of privatization. This paradigm 
will subsequently be explored in light of the retrenchment of access to justice through what 
Wendy Brown calls a ‘de-democratization’ process. The following section will critically 
focus on the pivotal agent in a private enforcement regime—Private Attorney General—
before situating the analysis within the historical context of Ontario’s class action regime 
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through an examination of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992. Finally, the exclusionary 
facets of Ontario’s entrepreneurial regime are critically examined with a focus on the 
gatekeeping role played by Private Attorneys General (in the reversed recruitment 
paradigm). Throughout the analysis, the chapter is grounded in the viewpoint that public 
enforcement must remain an indispensible regulatory feature in the contemporary political 
economy of Canada. As such, increasing the regulatory capacities of public agencies by 
strengthening their “investigative, adjudicative, conciliatory and compensatory 
functions”230 must take precedence over deepening private enforcement.231 From a critical 
policy perspective, given the emphasis of deterrence in regulatory enforcement, the policy 
objective of behaviour modification (in Ontario’s Class Proceedings Act) is particularly 
implicated in this analysis; for example, in numerous environmental claims, including 
Hollick v. Toronto and Hoffman v. Monsanto, certification was rejected on the grounds that 
deterrence was preferably achieved through environmental legislation rather than through 
the courts.232 To conclude, the chapter reconfirms the importance of a complementary form 
of class actions in regulatory enforcement while simultaneously critiquing its co-optative 
form in private enforcement regimes.233  
                                                        
230 Kalajdzic, “Public Goals by Private Means & Public Actors Protecting Private Interests,” 380. 
231 The policy objective of behaviour modification is especially implicated in this reiteration of the need for 
public enforcement and legislative action. In numerous class actions, notably Hollick and Hoffman, 
certification was rejected on the grounds that deterrence was most optimally achieved through 
environmental legislation rather than through the courts.  
232 This pertains to the certification criteria as elucidated in the CPA of whether a class action is the 
preferable procedure for the advancement of the proceeding. Hoffman v Monsanto Canada Inc. [2007] SJ 
No 182 (CA); Hollick v. Toronto (City), 2001 3 S.C.R. 158 [2001] S.C.C. 68. 
233 This approach recognizes the importance of the availability of a vehicle of collective claims-making 
given the recalcitrance of successive federal and provincial governments to adequately enforce 
environmental rules and regulations, especially in cases where these involve or impede the resource 
extractive activities of the polluter-industrial complex in Canada. This is particularly true as it pertains to 
Indigenous groups. For successive federal and provincial governments, private litigation has proven to be 
one of the few avenues by which negatively harmed individuals and groups can effect positive change. As 
such, private litigation allows such collectives to hold governments accountable to the relevant regulations. 
As recently observed in British Columbia, “[v]iolating permitting rules or skirting proper consultation with 
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1. THE INVISIBLE FIST OF LAW 
In a classic treatise of the libertarian tort reform movement, Walter Olson critiques a 
perceived ‘litigation explosion’ that has occurred in the United States since the 1960s—
this widely refers to the proliferation of private litigation under the auspices of advancing 
public goals.234 According to Olson, whereas lawsuits were traditionally viewed as “private 
quarrels between private parties for private gain,”235 the contemporary period has witnessed 
the emergence of a profit-based industry based upon an emphasis on the purported benefits 
of private litigation for the public good. Notably, tort reformers claim that this distortion 
of private litigation objectives has been driven by the emergence of class actions, which 
are portrayed in the academic commentary and political discourse as unconstitutionally 
hindering ‘free enterprise’ for the economic benefit of supposedly frivolous claims-makers 
and entrepreneurial class action attorneys. In so doing, a reconceptualization of the 
                                                        
First Nations seems to be part of the due process” on the part of provincial governments, “It’s a spin of the 
dice, risk analysis on their part.” See, Carol Linnitt, “New Public Interest Law Office to Fight B.C.’s 
Biggest Environmental Battles,” 28 July 2016, online: http://www.desmog.ca/2016/07/28/new-public-
interest-law-office-fight-b-c-s-biggest-environmental-battles.  
234 It is beyond the scope of this investigation to fully explore the politics of the tort reform movement. 
Further, although this libertarian critique has been decisively refuted by numerous scholars, the socio-
cultural perception that the United States is an overly litigious society remains widespread. See, e.g., 
William Haltom and Michael McCann, Distorting the Law: Politics, Media, and the Litigation Crisis 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). As Haltom and McCann point out, the legal reform 
movement which touted the myth of the litigation explosion upheld the responsibilization thesis by 
attacking the alleged tendency of “citizens to avoid responsibility for the failings of personal behaviour by 
blaming a catalog of diseases, addictions, biological disorders, or even the malignant social order that 
overwhelm individual choice.” Ibid., 58. This emphasis on self-reliance and moral responsibility to resolve 
outstanding legal problems and infringed rights has been a pillar of conservative tort reform advocacy. 
Pursuant to this defining characteristic, the authors observe the parallels between this individualistic tort 
reform movement and broader “assaults on welfare entitlement, affirmative action, anti-discrimination 
claims by gays and lesbians, fairness in the criminal justice system, and other basic rights.” In other words, 
civil claimants receiving some form of redress are critiqued as being “undeserving in much the same way 
as are the welfare poor, the unemployed, the homeless, juvenile delinquents,” and so forth. Ibid., 24. See 
also, Max Boot, Out of Order: Arrogance, Corruption, and Incompetence on the Bench (New York: Basic 
Books, 1998); Charles J. Sykes, A Nation of Victims: The Decay of the American Character (New York: St. 
Martin’s Poor, 1992); Walter Olson, The Excuse Factory: How Employment Law is Paralyzing the 
American Workplace (New York: Martin Kessler Books, 1997); Patrick M. Garry, A Nation of Adversaries: 
How the Litigation Explosion is Reshaping America (New York: Plenum Press, 1997). 
235 Walter Olson, The Litigation Explosion (New York: Truman Talley, 1991), 50. 
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prevailing market ideology of neoclassical economics is provided (borne out of a 
misreading of Adam Smith): 
You might call it the invisible-fist theory. In Adam Smith’s famous account, the butcher and 
the baker are led in their self-seeking as if by an invisible hand to further the general welfare: 
private striving leads to public benefit. The bold new twist was the idea that private quarrels 
also lead to public benefit.236 [emphasis in original] 
 
The devolution of the ‘invisible hand’ into the ‘invisible fist’ signifies the state’s monopoly 
on violence upon which the law is ultimately premised; that is to say, noncompliance may 
result in enforced compliance through the use of coercive force against the losing party.237 
According to such libertarian critiques, this is objectionable insofar as private actors—
Private Attorneys General—illegitimately co-opt the coercive power of the state in the 
pursuit of socially progressive goals.238 The interrelated concerns over the democratic 
illegitimacy of this perceived co-optation and the notional injustices of the purposes for 
which this co-optation is undertaken are readily discernible. Given their redistributive 
character—‘litigation socialism’—it should not be particularly surprising that class actions 
have borne the brunt of these critiques. Influenced by the dismissal of redistributive justice 
offered by Friedrich von Hayek, the libertarian tort reform movement perceives class 
                                                        
236 Ibid., 51. 
237 Court orders are ultimately enforceable by police powers.  
238 This perceived distortion of legal mechanisms is the primary objective of this group. Indeed, the political 
dynamics of this critique are evident insofar as the discourse of a ‘litigation explosion’ is emblematic of 
broader libertarian critiques of progressive litigation, particularly when claims are levied against the 
corporate sector through the class action. As numerous scholars have pointed out, the plaintiff’s bar tends 
towards leftist politics—perhaps a lasting impact of the rights discourse of classical liberalism. Moreover, 
although the political contestation over the class action has remained most fervent in the United States, 
libertarian critiques of progressive litigation more broadly have been voiced in Canadian law and politics 
scholarship as well. Perhaps the most popular of these critiques can be found in F.L. Morton and Rainer 
Knopf, The Charter Revolution & the Court Party (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000). 
Fortunately, the conservative discourse of over-litigiousness has not spread across the border to Canada. 
However, conceptualizing access to justice as a field of contestation entails remaining vigilant about this 
potential distortion civil justice litigation. 
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actions as illegitimate intrusions into the spontaneous ordering of the market and its 
associated distribution of benefits and burdens. According to Hayek, “[t]o demand justice 
from such a process [spontaneous ordering of the market] is clearly absurd, and to single 
out some people in society as entitled to a particular share evidently unjust.”239 In this light, 
the true injustice is not whichever cause of action prompted any given class action in the 
first place, but rather the redistribution of wealth towards collective claimants. The co-
optation of the coercive force of the state for such redistributive purposes likely accounts 
for part of the polemical character of these critiques.240  
Generally speaking, such critiques are primarily concerned with the underlying 
substantive issues—relating to exploitative labour practices, product liability, 
environmental health, discrimination against women, racial and ethnic minorities, LGBTQ 
groups, and other similar causes of action—rather than the shift in governance strategies 
towards private enforcement regimes.241 As Deborah Hensler has observed, class actions 
empower vulnerable collectivities in capitalist societies with the “potential to disrupt the 
power structure”—a ‘power potential’ (to invoke Bakker and Gill’s term) that accounts for 
the fervent opposition by powerful politico-economic adversaries: “The fear that collective 
procedures will disrupt the economic, political and social status quo powers much of the 
opposition to adopting class actions [...].”242  
                                                        
239 Friedrich von Hayek, “‘Social’ or Distributive Justice,” in Law, Legislation and Liberty: Volume 2, The 
Mirage of Social Justice (London: Routledge, 1998), 65. 
240 It should be noted that simply because a critique takes on a populist or polemical character rather than a 
sober academic character, this does not indicate that it should not be taken seriously. In terms of the social 
production of knowledge, populist and polemical treatises can often be more influential than sober 
acamedic analysis.  
241 Employment discrimination has become the most common privately prosecuted type of litigation in the 
United States. 
242 Hensler, “Class actions in context,” 401. 
 
 87 
The deregulatory impetus of such critiques suggests that the objection to class 
actions is less about the privatization of regulatory enforcement and more about the 
regulations being enforced. Simply put, the object of critique is the enforcement of 
regulation as opposed to the privatization of enforcement. This is corroborated by the fact 
that the hegemonic logic of the invisible hand of the market which largely informs private 
enforcement regimes243 is never questioned or problematized in any meaningful way—
quite the contrary, this ideological device is affirmed as ‘sound economics’ while its 
legalization is simultaneously decried as an illegitimate encroachment into the spontaneous 
ordering of the market and the ‘free’ operations of economic institutions.244 In other words, 
the extension of market logic into the realm of regulatory enforcement is viewed as 
threatening to “strangle the economy”245 by enforcing regulations that purportedly impede 
‘free enterprise’—regulations that would otherwise remain negligibly enforced (or 
unenforced). As Brown notes, class actions as “legal supports for popular power are 
                                                        
243 See, e.g., Alberto Cassone and Giovanni B. Ramello, “The Simple Economics of Class Action: Private 
Provision of Club and Public Goods,” European Journal of Law and Economics 32 (2011): 205-224. “Yet 
this mechanism, endorsed by economic theory starting from the paradigm of the invisible hand, also 
underpins the economic analysis of law, given that many institutions, beginning with property rights, are 
designed to promote the collective interest through individual initiative.” Ibid., 209. 
244 Despite repeated claims of contemporary laissez-faire economics that ‘the invisible hand’ of the market 
serves the common good through the private pursuit of individual profit-maximization, it should be noted 
that the phrase ‘the invisible hand’ does not actually appear in Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations in this 
context. Its only appearance is in reference to the potential flight of British capital, wherein Smith 
postulates that British investors would remain in Britain and support domestic industry, rather than pursue 
higher rates of profit in foreign jurisdictions; according to Smith, these investors would be compelled to 
remain in Britain as if kept by an ‘invisible hand.’ The popularization of ‘the invisible hand’ of the market 
has been largely constructed as an ideological justification for neo-liberal reforms in the contemporary era. 
See, Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (Oxford: Oxford World Classics, 2000), 292. Others have 
postulated that the metaphor of ‘invisible hands’ was popularized in the eighteenth century by Scottish 
philosophers as a way to describe outcomes without reference to immediate intentionality, that is, as an 
explanatory metaphor for phenomena that are not reducible to human design. The metaphor thereby 
describes “dynamic social processes which explain aggregate and ordered social patterns and outcomes as 
specific kinds of unintended consequences of human action.” For an overview of the discursive use of 
‘invisible hands’, see Nils Karlson, The State of State: Invisible Hands in Politics and Civil Society (New 
Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2002).   
245 Sykes, 248. 
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discursively identified in neo-liberal reason as unacceptable blockades in a (mythical) free 
market, parallel to the ways that welfare provisions such as health care and even public 
services and public institutions come to be coded as socialist and cast as market 
democracy’s antithesis.”246 Needless to say, such objections appear inexplicable at first 
glance: otherwise stalwart proponents of entrepreneurialism, privatization, and self-
regulation vociferously object to entrepreneurial litigation, privatized enforcement, and 
demand strict and robust public regulation of litigation financing (see Chapter 3).247 
From an access to justice perspective, the crucial point at stake for libertarian tort 
reforms has not been that market forces should not be allowed to determine social priorities, 
but rather that private enforcement regimes have served to illegitimately allow claims-
makers access to justice through the use of vehicles such as class actions in order to 
vindicate their harmed interests.248 The polemical critique of class actions does not 
excoriate private enforcement regimes for inadequately promoting greater access to justice 
or submitting regulatory enforcement to the dictates of the market, but rather for operating 
too effectively in promoting greater access to justice and redistributing wealth through the 
co-optation of the coercive force of the law, which ultimately restricts the behaviour of 
economic actors such as corporations. This indicates a significant departure from the 
guiding premise of the present analysis: far from being too effective in promoting access to 
justice, class actions have not been effective enough. Moreover, the availability of class 
                                                        
246 Brown, 153-54. 
247 This recalls Karl Polanyi’s observation in The Great Transformation that where “the needs of a self-
regulating market prove incompatible with the demands of laissez-faire, the economic liberal turn[s] 
against laissez-faire and prefer[s]—as any antiliberal would have done—the so-called collectivist methods 
of regulation and restriction.” Updating this perspective, it may be possible to articulate this inexplicable 
situation as a confrontation between libertarianism and economic liberalism. Karl Polanyi, The Great 
Transformation (New York: Beacon Press, 2001), 155. 
248 This standpoint is indicative of the merits of conceptualizing access to justice as a field of contestation. 
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actions has been seized upon by state actors in order to privatize enforcement duties rather 
than to complement public agencies. Nevertheless, the empirical outcome of such 
ideological critiques has been the successful retrenchment of multilayer access to justice 
(especially in environmental matters) through a process that Brown has called ‘de-
democratization’.  
 
2. DE-DEMOCRATIZATION & ACCESS TO JUSTICE  
In the United States, libertarian tort reform advocacy has been fairly successful in shaping 
public perceptions of the civil justice system (and the broader socio-cultural discourse on 
litigiousness), as well as narrowing the purview of class actions through procedural 
reforms.249 This hegemonic project has extended into the functioning of democratic 
institutions to the point where environmental class actions have effectively been 
neutralized as viable vehicles of collective claims-making through a series of legislative 
amendments and restrictive jurisprudential shifts. Broadly identifiable as a ‘retrenchment 
of access to justice’, this de-democratizing process has not only occurred through partisan 
legislation, but also through the technical rules determining access to courts, lending 
credence to E.E. Schattschneider’s proceduralist dictum that “the rules of the game 
determine the requirements of success.”250 A similar restrictive development is underway 
in Canada where pre-trial certification hearings have consistently individualized collective 
harms and denied certification for environmental health-based claims (as explored in 
                                                        
249 The social production of legal knowledge indicates that polemical treatises such as Olson’s The 
Litigation Explosion are often more effective in shaping public discourse over more nuanced academic 
scholarship, as Haltom and McCann have observed. See, “The Social Production of Legal Knowledge,” in 
Distorting the Law, 1-32. 
250 E. E. Schattschneider (1892-1971) as quoted by Sarah Staszak in No Day in Court: Access to Justice and 
the Politics of Judicial Retrenchment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 211.  
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greater detail in Chapter 4). As some commentators have remarked, “the invention and 
development of the class action was the dominant judicial innovation of the late twentieth 
century,”251 and “its dismantling appears to be the major procedural project of the 
conservative majority of the contemporary Supreme Court in the twenty-first century.”252 
Moreover, numerous scholars253 have observed that this retrenchment of multilayer access 
to justice has not been confined to juridical dismantling, but has rather occurred at all levels 
of government in the United States (as evidenced by the passage of the Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2005) in addition to an array of similar retrenchment initiatives.254 Brown 
has described this juridical retrenchment as a form of  “de-democratization” that serves to 
“strengthen the political hand of capital and weaken associations of citizens, workers, and 
                                                        
251 John C. Coffee Jr, Entrepreneurial Litigation: Its Rise, Fall, and Future (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2015), 2. 
252 On the curtailment of mass torts, Coffee Jr. claims that the retrenchment might be a pragmatic 
compromise given that mass torts often involve claims that are individually litigable, i.e. not negative value 
claims. In this light, Coffee Jr. argues that the merits of mass torts is largely reducible to the policy 
objective of judicial economy. This unduly diminishes the importance of the economies of scale that class 
actions provide, as well as the broader social mission of class actions—reducing the latter into individual 
adjudication. Finally, this pragmatic compromise fails to recognize non-economic barriers to access to 
justice (i.e. social and psychological) that are overcome through class actions. See John C. Coffee Jr, 
Entrepreneurial Litigation: Its Rise, Fall, and Future (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2015), 
2, 95-118. For a range of emblematic U.S. cases of this judicial retrenchment, see, for example, (Walmart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes 131 S.C. 2541 (2011). 2011); (AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.C. 1740 
(2011). 2011); (Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S.C. 2368 (2011). 2011); (Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. 
Halliburton Co. (Halliburton I), 131 S.C. 2179 (2011). 2011); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S.C. 1426 
(2013). 2013; (Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S.C. 1523 (2013). 2013); (Amgen Inc. v. 
Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S.C. 1184 (2013). 2013). 
253 See, e.g., Steven M. Teles, The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement: The Battle for Control of the 
Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Sarah Staszak, “Institutions, Rulemaking, and the 
Politics of Judicial Retrenchment,” Studies in American Political Development 24, no. 2 (2010): 168-89; 
Judith Resnick, “Lessons in Federalism from the 1960s Class Action Rule and the 2005 Class Action 
Fairness Act: ‘The Political Safeguards’ of Aggregate Translocal Actions,” University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 156 (2008): 1929-69.   
254 As Sarah Staszak observes, “restrictions on Section 1983 actions for lawsuits against the government, 
attempts to cap punitive damages, changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure promoting settlement 
and summary judgment, continued development of state sovereign immunity and qualified immunity for 
government officials, and promotion of binding arbitration and alternative dispute resolution more 
generally.” Sarah Staszak, “Realizing the Rights Revolution: Litigation and the American State,” Law & 
Social Inquiry 38, no. 1 (2013): 242. 
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consumers.”255 According to Brown, this de-democratization is particularly apparent in the 
context of class actions, which “have long been crucial instruments of worker and 
consumer resistance to discriminatory, deceptive, or fraudulent corporate behaviour, from 
underpaying and overcharging to polluting or violating health and safety laws.”256 Brown 
concludes by suggesting that class actions have been “effectively neutered” 257 in the United 
States as a result of this de-democratization. 
 During this same period of juridical retrenchment by American courts and 
legislatures, the Supreme Court of Canada has opened the door to American-style class 
actions.258 Although the successes of tort reform advocacy have been most prominent in 
recent years, the retrenchment policies that have gained traction actually predate the 
introduction of class proceedings legislation in common law provinces (i.e. pre-1992). 
While this incongruous development might precipitate a sense of cautious optimism in 
Canada, nevertheless proponents and beneficiaries of multilayer access to justice should 
remain cognizant of the potential cross-border influence of such retrenchment policies.259 
As Catherine Piché has suggested, “it is difficult to argue in favour of a unified, truly 
Canadian or American legal culture.”260 A difficulty that is compounded by the observation 
that “social, political, economical and cultural developments in the United States 
                                                        
255 Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos (New York: Zone Books, 2015), 152.  
256 Ibid. 
257 Ibid. 
258 With the exception of Prince Edward Island, provincial legislatures in Canada have also opened the door 
to class actions by introducing respective class proceedings legislation during this period.   
259 Notably, there has thus far not been organized opposition to class action legislation by either business 
interests or provincial or federal governments in Canada. This might be a result of the relative absence of 
putative damages in the Canadian context. As the American experiences indicates, however, this general 
acquiescence in Canada should not be taken for granted.  




reciprocally influence those of Canada.”261 Although American institutional 
arrangements—specifically the structure of separated powers—facilitate the creation and 
maintenance of private enforcement regimes, the reciprocal influence in legal cultures 
within the parliamentary institutions of the Canadian state has nevertheless been 
significant, particularly in the context of class actions, which originated in 1966 through 
reforms to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In this context, the two national 
regimes “are subject to a constant cross-fertilization of ideas.”262 Indeed, the 
individualization of collective harms, particularly environmental health-based harms—
which strikes at the core of class actions to effectively neutralize their collectivist strength-
in-numbers logic—can already be distinguished in Canadian jurisprudence. Ultimately, the 
similarities between these regimes is indicative of the potential of similar ideological 
objections being levied by organized interests seeking to constrict the range of access to 
justice vehicles and remedies available to harmed individuals and groups in Canada. 
 In point of fact, the most influential of these critiques has already materialized in 
the Canadian context; namely, the problematic imperatives of entrepreneurial litigation, 
which class action regimes often foster. This broadly refers to litigation that is primarily 
driven by attorneys rather than clients. That is, the plaintiff’s attorney in class actions—
economically incentivized by the potential for significant monetary returns—has 
increasingly been viewed as “a profit-seeking entrepreneur, capable of opportunistic 
actions and often willing to subordinate the interests of class members to the attorney’s 
own economic self-interest.”263 Law and economics scholarship has traditionally 
                                                        
261 Ibid.  
262 Ibid. 
263 John C. Coffee Jr., “Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in 
Representative Litigation,” Columbia Law Review 100 (2000): 371. 
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characterized this major problem of entrepreneurial litigation through the theory of agency 
costs: whereas in ordinary litigation the client acts as the principal and the attorney as the 
client’s agent, in class action litigation the client often does not possess sufficient incentive 
or capacity to monitor the attorney’s conduct.264 Simply put, the primary instigator of class 
action litigation is often the plaintiff’s attorney, rather than the plaintiff. This is a fairly 
natural outgrowth of the pecuniary interests at stake in class action litigation: the primary 
(monetary) beneficiary of a successful action is often the plaintiff’s attorney. In other 
words, the primary instigators and the primary beneficiaries of class action litigation are 
plaintiff’s attorneys, rather than class members. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that law 
and economics scholars have repeatedly sought to correct this ‘market failure’ by 
realigning the interests of attorneys and clients through various proposals.265 Nor is it 
surprising that libertarian critics have repeatedly focused on the ‘agency problem’ in 
broader curtailment strategies.266 Notably, this conceptualization of the ‘agency problem’ 
does not sufficiently account for the pecuniary stake that attorneys have in any given class 
action, which is often significantly higher than any single class member. As John C. Coffee 
Jr. suggests, the “attorney thus behaves more like a principal than an agent,” and it may be 
instructive to view plaintiff’s attorneys less as agents than entrepreneurs, “with the class 
members serving largely as passive partners.”267 Although this reconceptualization may 
effectively circumvent the “agency problem” inherent in class actions, it merely serves to 
                                                        
264 See, e.g., John C. Coffee Jr., “The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and 
Efficiency in the Large Class Action,” The University of Chicago Law Review 54, no. 3 (1987): 877-937. 
265 Coffee has been the foremost scholar in this regard.  
266 Notably, see Martin Redish, Wholesale Justice: Constitutional Democracy and the Problem of the Class 
Action Lawsuit (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009). Unlike the aforementioned tort reforms who 
tend toward polemical analysis, Redish’s more sober critique of class actions identifies a number of 
important areas (i.e. settlement fairness; lack of representation; etc.) and ultimately argues that class actions 
should be abolished based on constitutional grounds in the United States.  
267 Coffee Jr., Entrepreneurial Litigation, 5. 
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reinforce the prevailing libertarian critique of tort reformers that the supposed public 
benefit of class actions is artificially manufactured in order to provide “a sorely needed 
moral basis for the sue-for-profit industry.”268 This is a pivotal facet of the ideological 
justification that informs the ‘invisible fist’ theory of law. 
Yet the objection to this form of entrepreneurialism is theoretically inconsistent 
with the market logic of laissez-faire economics that such detractors concurrently endorse. 
Tort reformers have taken fervent exception to the profit-maximizing behaviour of 
entrepreneurial litigators, as though economic self-interest in the pursuit of public goals 
does not adhere to the logic of the invisible hand of the market (which, needless to say, 
holds that the pursuit of economic self-interest ultimately promotes the common good, even 
when this is not explicitly the objective of the profit-maximizing behaviour). It stands to 
reason that if profit-maximizing behaviour in the pursuit of economic self-interest promotes 
the common good, even where this is not an explicit objective, then surely this type of 
economic conduct promotes the common good when it is an explicit objective. Despite this 
theoretical inconsistency, the libertarian critique has given rise to the negative designation 
of class attorneys as ‘bounty hunters’. Proponents of the class action as a pillar of private 
enforcement regimes have typically preferred to identify class attorneys by a more 
diplomatic moniker: Private Attorney General.  
Finally, the ongoing debate over the identification of private actors exercising 
public authority as (1) an illegitimate co-optation of the coercive force of law (i.e. the 
libertarian position) or (2) a legitimate privatization of enforcement duties pursuant to the 
principles of economic efficiency (i.e. the neo-liberal position) largely foregoes the 
                                                        
268 Olson, 53. 
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progressive critique of such privatization as removing regulatory duties beyond the control 
of democratic institutions, as posited by this analysis. In this light, the Private Attorney 
General as a gatekeeper of justice takes on the characteristics what A. Claire Cutler refers 
to as an entrepreneurial legal actor whose operative function contributes to 
“reconfigure[ing] state/society relations by legitimating private regulation [and] 
entrenching and deepening the paradoxical exercise of public authority by private 
agencies.”269 In other words, the dominant discursive parameters on private enforcement 
largely neglect the progressive critique of the neo-liberal position which problematizes 
private regulation as a viable governance strategy. According to Cutler: 
This alliance between public and private agents, between governmental and corporate elites, is 
working a reconfiguration of authority relations. It is blurring the distinction between the public 
and private realms and enhancing the legitimacy of the latter as a source of authority. The 
alliance is cemented by a commitment to the expansion of capitalism through the promotion of 
private regulatory authority. The disembedded law merchant provides the legal and ideological 
foundations for privatization.270 
Ultimately, such critiques of privatization speak to the detrimental impacts of allowing 
strictly market ordering of enforcement priorities. However, the positive role of class 
actions as ‘crucial instruments’ of social protection in the complementary form as opposed 
to the co-optative form requires greater investigation. The remainder of this chapter 
clarifies these distinct categorizations of the Private Attorney General. As Bryant Garth et 
al have observed, the Private Attorney General can be perceived as a “mercenary law 
                                                        
269 A. Claire Cutler, “Artifice, ideology and paradox: the public/private distinction in international law,” 
Review of International Political Economy 4, no. 2 (1997): 264. See also, Robert Wai, “Transnational 
Private Law and Private Ordering in a Contested Global Society,” Harvard International Law Journal 46, 
no. 2 (2005): 471-86. 
270 Ibid., 279. 
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enforcer”271 whose entrepreneurial character drives case selection, while conversely being 
perceived in another form as a “social advocate”272 who employs class actions as collective 
claims-making vehicles in cases where governments are recalcitrant to enforce regulations.  
 
3. PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
As examined in Chapter 1, the second wave of reforms concerned with collective access to 
justice is most applicable in evaluating the role of class actions. This wave witnessed the 
emergence of the Private Attorney General as a figurative private actor who exercises 
public authority alternatively pursuant to the principles of social protection and economic 
efficiency in the form of a social advocate and a legal mercenary. During this period 
(roughly 1970s-1980s), Bryant Garth et al identified this figurative actor as an “accepted 
character” and a widely supported “legal institution.”273 As Owen Fiss observes, the figure 
of the Private Attorney General is the combination of “two different agencies: public 
officers and private citizens.”274 Although the authors are speaking in the American 
tradition, where class actions have a richer history, the Private Attorney General similarly 
obtains in Canada, where many commentators have observed its figurative presence.275 But 
what does the term ‘Private Attorney General’ signify? And what are its implications for 
multilayer access to environmental justice?  
                                                        
271 Bryant Garth, Ilene H. Nagel, and S. Jay Plager, “The Institution of the Private Attorney General: 
Perspectives From An Empirical Study of Class Action Litigation,” Southern California Law Review 61 
(1988): 356. 
272 Ibid. 
273 Ibid., 352. See also, Carl Cheng, “Important Rights and the Private Attorney General Doctrine,” 
California Law Review 73, no. 6 (1985): 1929-55. 
274 Owen Fiss, “The Political Theory of the Class Action,” Washington and Lee Law Review 53, no. 1 
(1996): 21. 
275 Notably, see the Hon. Frank Iacobucci, “What is Access to Justice in the Context of Class Actions?” in 
ed., Jasminka Kalajdzic, Accessing Justice: Appraising Class Actions Ten Years After Dutton, Hollick, and 
Rumley, (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2011), 17.  
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 The earliest appearance of the concept of the Private Attorney General can be traced 
to an American federal appeals court ruling in 1943 involving New Deal regulatory 
enforcement. Despite this early invocation, the signifier of the ‘Private Attorney General’ 
remained largely neglected until the Rights Revolution of the 1960s and the emergence of 
the second wave of access to justice reforms in the 1970s. Thereafter, the signifier 
experienced a sudden surge in popularity in American jurisprudence. As William B. 
Rubenstein has pointed out, in the 1940s and 1950s, it appeared 7 and 11 times, 
respectively; followed by 70 appearances in the 1960s. Starting from the 1970s, the ‘Private 
Attorney General’ appeared 759 times, then 1,554 times in the 1980s and 2,523 times in 
the 1990s.276 Given Canada’s relatively nascent class action history—the trilogy of cases 
that opened the door to class actions arose in the early 2000s—the signifier has not 
experienced this heightened level of prevalence, although it has nevertheless been cited 
several times in Canadian jurisprudence from the mid-2000s to the present day.277  
Comparatively speaking, the prevalence of the Private Attorney General in the 
United States as opposed to Canadian jurisprudence might be attributable to differences in 
the cost regimes of each state (and sub-state formations). Whereas Canada largely upholds 
the English Rule, otherwise known as the ‘loser pays’ principle, the American Rule holds 
                                                        
276 William B. Rubenstein, “On What A ‘Private Attorney General’ Is—And Why It Matters,” Vanderbilt 
Law Review 57, no. 6 (2004): 2135. Interestingly, Rubenstein also offers a taxonomy of private 
enforcement through the figure of the Private Attorney General, although Rubenstein’s taxonomy rigidly 
upholds the private/public distinction by holding that simulation—his third category—is a solely private 
endeavour. However, the basic premise of the present analysis holds that class actions involve multilayered 
interests—that is, individual, collective, and public—rendering the simulation category of Rubenstein’s 
taxonomy theoretically incompatible with the present analysis. 
277 For example, we find a basic definition of the concept of being a private citizen as a “prosecutor or 
enforcement agency, what the Americans call a sort of private Attorney-General” in Alberta (Child, Youth 
and Family Enhancement, Director) v. B.M., 2009 ABCA 270. 2009) at 16. We can also find reservations of 
the concept: “The notion of private enforcers (or ‘private Attorneys General’), particularly where they act 
for personal gain, is worrisome unless strictly controlled,” in (Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co., [2002] 1 SCR 
595, 2002 SCC 18. 2002) at 44. 
 
 98 
that each party is liable for their respective costs.278 If understood through this analytical 
lens, the popularization of the concept in the 1970s was primarily a consequence of 
changing statutes relating to attorney’s fees in the United States, which allowed for the 
recovery of legal expenses for successful Private Attorneys General on condition that the 
advancement of the public interest was demonstrated. “Once loosed as a matter of money,” 
Rubenstein observes, “the Private Attorney General concept’s diffusion was limited only 
by the imagination of lawyer’s seeking attorney’s fees.”279 As such, class counsel became 
economically incentivized to employ the signifier of the Private Attorney General. In 
Canada, on the other hand, where the English Rule has prevailed in most jurisdictions, this 
economic incentive was largely inexistent.280 Indeed, the extent to which Canadian class 
counsel have been explicitly identified as Private Attorneys General is often limited to 
conceptualizations of their role as private actors exercising public authority in the pursuit 
of multilayer interests.281 Importantly, however, the relative prevalence of a particular 
signifier is not necessarily indicative of the prevalence of the activity that it signifies: 
private enforcement. 
 Nevertheless, despite this widespread deployment, there remains considerable 
ambiguity over its precise meaning. As Jeremy Rabkin has remarked, “[i]t is revealing that 
                                                        
278 Notably, the Ontario Law Reform Commission report on class actions from 1982, which laid the 
groundwork for the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, explicitly advocated for changes in the provincial cost 
regime in favour of the American Rule. This endorsement was ultimately rejected. Although some Ontarian 
firms choose to indemnify representative clients for costs, this practice is not mandatory. This does not 
mean that paying costs is automatic; the court may use its discretionary judgment to relieve the 
representative plaintiff of this burden if the case in question raises a novel point of law, involves the public 
interest, or qualifies as a test case.  
279 Rubenstein, 2136.  
280 Although Ontario’s influential class action regime upholds the English Rule, other provincial regimes, 
such as British Columbia, have opted in favour of the American Rule, given the potential disincentivization 
of the ‘loser pays’ principle in mass litigation.   
281 As opposed to plaintiff efforts to recover legal expenses (i.e. United States).  
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there is still no legal definition, nor any well-established pattern of usage, which precisely 
identifies a litigant as a ‘Private Attorney General’.”282 This leads Rabkin to polemically 
state that the Private Attorney General “could be almost anyone—an ordinary citizen, 
perhaps, with just a bit more public spirit than his neighbours.”283 Even defenders of the 
Private Attorney General Model of regulatory enforcement have recognized that the 
signifier has been “surprisingly mercurial,”284 since it has been used to refer to both 
plaintiffs and defendants, leading one commentator to pose the rhetorical question: “What 
other concept is so malleable that it can be deployed to signify either a plaintiff or a 
defendant, a lawyer or a client?”285  
Even though the signifier does contain a lingering indeterminacy, it cannot be said 
that the Private Attorney General has not demonstrated a “well-established pattern of 
usage,” notwithstanding Rabkin’s libertarian critique of the concept (and class actions, 
more broadly).286 While it is perfectly clear that various meanings have been attributed to 
the signifier since its earliest deployment in 1943, a customary understanding has 
developed around its key characteristic of private regulatory enforcement—a figurative 
private agent exercising public authority in pursuit of multilayer interests. Moreover, 
despite this notionally broad purview, the Private Attorney General has predominantly 
applied to plaintiff counsel in the context of class actions.287 Although a single citizen’s 
                                                        
282 Jeremy A. Rabkin, “The Secret Life of the Private Attorney General,” Law and Contemporary Problems 
61 (1998): 194-95 
283 Ibid., 180. 
284 Rubenstein, 2129. 
285 Ibid. 
286 In fact, Rubenstein has pointed out that Rabkin’s contention that the signifier of the Private Attorney 
General experienced diminished popularity in case reports after its eruption in the 1970s is an empirically 
false statement: the signifier continued to experience increased popularity in each successive decade. 
Rubenstein, 2135. 
287 Garth et al, 355. 
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individual suit may deter future misconduct by similarly situated parties, thereby 
promoting the public interest, a class action involving hundreds or thousands of claimants 
may exponentially serve the public interest, thereby yielding social benefits that are beyond 
the capacities of individual suits. As discussed below, the scale of class actions is directly 
related to their ability to obtain behaviour modification—deterring future misconduct is the 
most prominent intersection of private and public interests. In point of fact, established 
literature on the Private Attorney General corroborates these parameters, even as scholars 
vehemently disagree on its legitimacy and ideological character. However, the implicit 
spectrum involved in the private/public distinction as it pertains to the represented 
interests—that is, that achieving compensation for incurred wrongs being primarily a 
private interest whereas achieving deterrence for future misconduct being primarily a 
public interest—does not reflect the complexities involved in environmental harms. 
Indeed, the term ‘multilayer interests’ that this project employs is indicative of the tripartite 
interests represented in class actions: individual, collective, and public. The interrelations 
of these interests is perhaps most apparent in the context of environmental claims, as J.P.S. 
McLaren points out: 
In most instances the purpose of environmental litigation will be to seek an improvement 
in the environment in which the plaintiff and his [sic] neighbours live. The most satisfactory 
way of achieving this is to persuade the court to restrain the defendant from conducting his 
operations in such a way as to cause pollution. By grant of a perpetual prohibitory 
injunction direct pressure is brought upon the offender to seek ways of obviating the 
pollution which he is causing, and if he fails to comply his enterprise may be curtailed 
entirely. It may be argued that the same result can be achieved, albeit indirectly, through 
the award of damages. This assumes, however, that the damages awarded are high enough 
to cause the industrialist to consider changing his modus operandi. If the damages are 
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modest he may look upon them as a licence to continue pollution. If this is allowed to 
happen then the environmental interest is effectively subverted.288 
 
Notwithstanding the synthetic distinctions in the tripartite interests involved in 
environmental class actions, it should be noted that class action policy in Ontario has 
consistently prioritized ‘access to justice’ as the primary policy objective of the Class 
Proceedings Act, 1992—whereas behaviour modification is considered a secondary policy 
objective and judicial economy is logically inconsistent with class actions involving 
negative value claims (which environmental claims typically involve). This prioritization 
of access to justice over behaviour modification suggests that the primary objective of 
promoting remedies for harmed parties takes precedence over the secondary objective of 
promoting deterrence of future misconduct. Moreover, the tension between these policy 
objectives directly implicates the Private Attorney General Model given its tendency to 
diminish the role of class members through this reorientation towards punishment and 
deterrence—both of which can be achieved without any class members being remedied for 
their incurred harms through cy près awards. This fundamentally shifts the underlying 
compensatory framework of class actions into “either a bounty hunter or civil fine 
framework.”289 As an integral part of private enforcement regimes, the Private Attorney 
General Model may serve to reprioritize the policy objectives of class action regimes to the 
point where such actions can be viewed as successful with or without compensation for 
                                                        
288 J.P.S. McLaren, “The Common Law Nuisance Actions and the Environmental Battle – Well-Tempered 
Swords or Broken Reeds?” Osgoode Hall Law Journal 10 (1972): 547, as quoted by Heather McLeod-
Kilmurray, The Process of Judging the Environment: Civil Procedure, Environmental Ethics and their 
Effects on Environmental Law (SJD, University of Toronto, 2007) [unpublished]. 
289 Martin Redish, “Rethinking the Theory of the Class Action: The Risks and Rewards of Capitalistic 
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class members.290 Of course, the policy objectives of access to justice and behaviour 
modification are not necessarily mutually exclusive; that is to say, the compensatory 
objective of securing fair and equitable settlements may simultaneously serve to deter 
future misconduct simply by virtue of the settlement amount (and the concomitant risk 
posed to similarly situated wrongdoers). In other words, access to justice and behaviour 
modification are not unrelated objectives, despite the fact that each may manifest in distinct 
ways depending on any given case.  
In light of the analyses of preceding sections of private enforcement regimes and 
the Private Attorney General more broadly, this chapter now turns to Ontario’s Class 
Proceedings Act more specifically, in order to critically evaluate the origins of this 
provincial class action regime in light of the preceding framework.  
  
4. ONTARIO’S CLASS PROCEEDINGS ACT, 1992 
Although Ontario’s groundbreaking class action regime was formally introduced by the 
New Democratic Party of Ontario with the Class Proceedings Act, 1992,291 the legislative 
                                                        
290 This leads Redish to reject the Private Attorney General Model as producing a “skewed perspective on 
the class action, which effectively alters the underlying substantive law being enforced in democratically 
and constitutionally impermissible ways.” Of course, this is perhaps an unsurprising stance, given Redish’s 
general critique of class actions tout court as undemocratic and unconstitutional. Pursuant to this logic of 
distorting the compensatory framework, Redish rejects cy près awards. It should be noted that rejection of 
cy près awards effectively provides wrongdoers with a strategy for freely engaging in misconduct: to 
disperse harms in such a way that the only feasible distribution of a potential settlement would be through a 
cy près award. In this light, a civil fine framework, despite its distortion of the compensatory function of 
civil litigation, does not appear too objectionable. Ibid., 107-8.  
291 Originating in the Report on Class Actions, which was produced by the Ontario Law Reform 
Commission in 1982 and eventually formalized in the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, Ontario’s legislation 
identifies access to justice as one of the three guiding pillars of class actions (alongside the aforementioned 
judicial economy and behaviour modification). Interestingly, none of these principles are explicitly stated 
in the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992. However, SCC decisions since then, notably Dutton, 
Holick, and Rumley, as well as the more recent Fischer decision, have read access to justice into their 
reasoning, lending credence to the claim that Ontario’s class action regime (if not its legislative framework) 
shares these concerns. 
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history of this policy betrays a greater complexity. The origins of the Class Proceedings 
Act lay in the three-volume report of the Ontario Law Reform Commission (‘OLRC 
Report’) from 1982 which examined the inadequacies of individual remedies for collective 
harms and endorsed the creation of class proceedings legislation in common law 
jurisdictions.292 The OLRC Report was commissioned during the tenure of the Progressive 
Conservative Party of Ontario, however, class proceedings legislation was not formally 
introduced until the NDP was elected in 1992. The legislation was drafted in the late 1980s 
by the Liberal Party of Ontario, but the electoral defeat of 1991 prevented the Liberals from 
tabling the legislation in Parliament. To examine the legislative origins of the Class 
Proceedings Act, therefore, we must look toward the governing term of Liberal Attorney 
General Ian Scott, under whom the legislation was drafted. Scott observed that the Class 
Proceedings Act was the most important reform of his political career:  
In large part, the availability of class proceedings is an access-to-justice issue. But there is 
more to the innovation than that. Representative plaintiffs, empowered to litigate on behalf 
of a class, serve in effect as some sort of private attorney general to attack what they 
consider to be shoddy workmanship, environmental banditry or corporate skullduggery. 
Through class actions, the government found a cost-effective way to promote private 
enforcement and thereby take some pressure off enforcement by the budget-restrained 
government ministries.293 
This is a revealing statement that identifies the sweeping interconnectedness of the “cost-
effective” principle of efficiency, private regulatory enforcement, and the financial 
pressures on “budget-restrained government ministries” that is ostensibly relieved by 
Private Attorneys General. This interconnectedness suggests that evaluating Ontario’s 
                                                        
292 Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Class Actions (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 
1982). 
293 Ian Scott (1934-2006) as quoted by Jasminka Kalajdzic, “Access to Justice for the Masses?” (LL.M. 
Thesis, University of Toronto, 2009), 53. 
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class action regime through the analytical frame of any of these causes in isolation would 
likely yield an incomplete picture.294 For present purposes, perhaps the most consequential 
revelation is that class actions were not solely introduced to promote greater access to 
justice for collective claims-makers. According to Scott, class actions simultaneously 
promote private enforcement, thereby alleviating the financial pressures on insufficiently 
funded public agencies. The standpoint that increasing the budgets of such agencies to 
facilitate their proper functioning in regulatory enforcement is not advanced—this 
standpoint is often viewed as beyond the realm of possibility under neo-liberalism, or to 
borrow Richard Falk’s terminology, beyond the “horizon of feasibility.”295 Scott’s 
advocacy in favour of private enforcement is indicative of a pragmatic compromise 
reflective of the constraining economic conditions imposed by neo-liberal restructuring 
which has precipitated limitations in regulatory state capacities—that is, the capacity of 
states to implement and enforce regulations. In light of the immense growth in the quantity 
and complexity of law in developed states, regulation scholars such as John Braithwaite 
have suggested that delegating regulatory enforcement to private actors becomes “a coping 
strategy.”296 A normative distinction appears in this context between the complementary 
form of class actions as ‘crucial instruments’ of social protection intended to promote 
multilayer access to justice where governments are recalcitrant to enforce regulations and 
                                                        
294 Excluding considerations of the economic restructuring of which civil justice reform was but a part will 
certainly produce questionable analyses of the origins of the Canadian class action. 
295 Richard Falk as quoted by Stephen Gill and A. Claire Cutler, “New Constitutionalism and World 
Order,” 19. 
296 Braithwaite argues that such delegation should be publicly monitored. The argument is therefore in 




the co-optative form of class actions as intended to relieve budget-constrained public 
agencies of enforcement duties through privatization.  
More to the point, the constraining ‘fiscal space’ that has precipitated the promotion 
of private enforcement regimes has also shaped the functioning of these regimes. This is 
especially pronounced in the context of class actions, which are primarily resolved through 
settlements. Clearly this settlement culture is aided by a general assumption of fairness by 
courts, whether justifiable or not, which perpetuates the belief that settlements advance the 
interests of class members and promote access to justice. Yet the reason offering the 
greatest explanatory power for this policy preference is not the inherent merits of the 
settlement process, but rather the preservation of scarce resources—a consequent of strict 
public budgeting and constraining ‘fiscal space’ for access to justice objectives. Indeed, 
the ubiquity of the phrase (“scarce resources”) testifies to the unremitting financial pressure 
placed on the civil justice system by successive provincial and federal governments since 
the neo-liberal restructuring of the Canadian state in the 1980s. A basic search of case 
reports in the Canadian Legal Information Institute database reveals that the phrase has 
been invoked 1,740 times in Ontario alone.297 This settlement culture also negatively 
affects the development of the common law, thereby facilitating the privatization of a 
significant aspect of parliamentary democracy (veritably a “democratic deficit”).298  
Naturally, it is alarming to discover that inadequate funding of the civil justice 
system is primarily responsible for strong judicial biases in favour of class action 
settlement—despite the adversarial void, the absence of a mandatory amicus curiae, and 
                                                        
297Accessed on 14 May 2015. Online: http://www.canlii.org/en/on/#search/jId=on&all=scarce%20 
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the possibility of collusion between parties. One of the most consequential objections to 
entrepreneurial litigation has consistently been this possibility of collusion between 
plaintiff and defence attorneys—a possibility that is compounded by the adversarial void 
at the settlement stage. This gestures towards the fact that Private Attorneys General are 
generally not subject to the heightened levels of scrutiny and transparency as their public 
counterparts. As one commentator has observed, the “accountability problems associated 
with the Private Attorney General (and entrepreneurial litigation generally) grow with the 
case’s scale: The greater the size of the class and liabilities at stake, the greater the prospect 
of fiduciary failure. The incentives for collusion become ‘too big to decline.’”299 
 In light of these potentially conflicting interests, Catherine Piché has recently 
provided a set of reform-oriented principles designed to enhance the fairness of settlements 
in this “money-driven class action culture,”300 however, the strong public policy preference 
in favour of settlements has largely progressed unimpeded. At root, the imperatives of case 
management and market-oriented efficiency have taken precedence over the development 
of the common law and substantive justice considerations. This is indicative of a neo-
liberal displacement of democratic values with market principles and criteria. It is similarly 
axiomatic that Scott’s standpoint is rooted in the market logic of neo-liberal governance. 
The broad ideological confluence on the Private Attorney General is the outcome of a 
political consensus between the classical liberal perspective that governments are 
sometimes recalcitrant to “aggressively enforce various regulatory laws”301 and the market 
                                                        
299 Coffee Jr., Entrepreneurial Litigation, 117. 
300 Catherine Piché, Fairness in Class Action Settlements (Toronto: Carswell, 2012), 286. Piché’s 
instructive study of four target jurisdictions (Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia, and the United States 
Federal Courts) into the fairness of class action settlements yielded three reform-oriented principles aimed 
towards increasing transparency, information availability, evaluative standards, ethical representation, and 
interrogative rigour on the part of presiding judges. Ibid., 277-84.  
301 Garth et al, 353. 
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fundamentalist perspective that such regimes contribute to the privatization of “law 
enforcement pursuant to the ideals of economic efficiency.”302 From a progressive 
perspective, the pursuit of multilayer actions by private citizens is a social good insofar as 
active individuals have the capacity to hold private entities (typically corporations) and 
governments responsible for various types of misconduct.303 However, the market 
rationality that informs such mobilization of entrepreneurialism through the privatization 
of law enforcement and the institution of private enforcement regimes operates to displace 
democratic values with market values. As Brown observes, neo-liberal rationality displaces 
basic democratic values with “market criteria of cost/benefit rations, efficiency, 
profitability, and efficacy” which serves to render “every human being and institution, 
including the constitutional state, on the model of the firm and hence supplants democratic 
principles with entrepreneurial ones in the political sphere.”304 Such displacement of neo-
                                                        
302 Ibid. The authors suggest that privatization pursuant to the ideals of economic efficiency is a libertarian 
standpoint, rather than a standpoint of contemporary neo-liberalism, which I contest. The authors go on to 
empirically analyze the various ways that the concept has shifted in meaning since its origins.  
303 Lorne Sossin has advocated for a balanced approach when the aim of a class action is governmental 
(mis)conduct, suggesting that by rejecting the two-step process in Canada v. Grenier (which required a 
successful judicial review as a precondition to such class actions), the Supreme Court of Canada, in 
Canada (Attorney General) v. TeleZone Inc., may have opened the door to the privatization of oversight of 
Crown conduct. To this end, Sossin notes that an overreliance on “privately enforced administrative law 
accountability” potentially ‘distorts’ the commitments of a government to the public interest. Iacobucci has 
also raised concerns about the extent to which civil litigation ought to be used to address public wrongs, 
noting that such litigation “engages different principles and requires different tools from actions” that 
address “traditional disputes between private parties.” At the same time, R. Douglas Elliot, skeptical of the 
view that class actions against the Crown “distort sound public policy,” has argued that Binnie J’s rejection 
of the Grenier framework was correct insofar as the two-step process “added an unjustifiable layer of delay 
and expense to potential claims against the Crown.”  See, Lorne Sossin, “Class Actions Against the Crown: 
A Substitution for Judicial Review on Administrative Law Grounds?” University of New Brunswick Law 
Journal 57, no. 9 (2007): 9. See also “Revisiting Class Actions against the Crown: Balancing Public and 
Private Legal Accountability for Government Action,” in ed., Jasminka Kalajdzic,  Accessing Justice: 
Appraising Class Actions (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2011), 31; Iacobucci, “What is Access to Justice in the 
Context of Class Actions?” 27; R. Douglas Elliott, “Fringe Benefits: Class Actions for Marginalized People 
in Canada,” in ed., Jasminka Kalajdzic,  Accessing Justice: Appraising Class Actions (Toronto: LexisNexis, 
2011), 222. 
304 Wendy Brown, “We Are All Democrats Now...,” in Amy Allen, ed., Democracy in What State? (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 73. This aspect of neo-liberal rationality can be construed as part 




liberal rationality can be construed as part of de-democratization processes of which 
juridical retrenchment and libertarian campaigns against access to justice (described above) 
also prefigure.305  
 Above all, the potential societal ramifications of this type of privatization, 
particularly when informed by a co-optative form of the Private Attorney General, 
effectively amounts to permitting market ordering of access to justice priorities. This type 
of market fundamentalism may result in detrimental outcomes for the processes of social 
reproduction of vulnerable communities who may not have the resources or wherewithal 
to attain vindication of their incurred environmental harms. Broadly speaking, the racial 
hierarchies and gender orders that produce and reproduce social injustices are compounded 
by the prioritization of profitability over social and democratic principles, with claims 
involving environmental health, exploitative labour conditions, discrimination, human 
rights, and similar causes of action that disproportionately affect women, racial and ethnic 
minorities, and other vulnerable people, generally failing to attract the interest of the 
gatekeepers of justice. While contingency fees are designed in part to ameliorate this 
problem, the prospects remain bleak for justiciable claims of vulnerable communities 
lacking sufficient economic incentives for representation—given the reversed recruiting 
paradigm of Ontario’s class action regime.306 The logic of contingency fees reorients the 
                                                        
305 Brown identifies a set of late modern forces operating to ‘dedemocratize’ states, that is, hollow 
democracy of its substantive content, including corporate power, the commodification and marketization of 
elections, neo-liberal rationality, expansion of executive power, the juridification of politics, and increased 
securitization. Ibid., 71-77. 
306 Of course, the doctrinal rationale of the Class Proceedings Act suggests that adequate incentivization is 
present for entrepreneurial counsel to pursue litigation in the public interest. As Winkler C.J.O. has 
observed, “Sections 33(1) and (4) of the CPA, which provide for contingency fees and a multiplier effect on 
fees to reward risk and success, are intended to provide sufficient incentives for lawyers.” The sufficiency 
of these incentives, from the perspective of poor and socially marginalized groups, is up for debate. 
Winkler C.J.O. goes on to state that “[t]his is the entrepreneurial aspect of class proceedings litigation that 
enhances access to justice.” (Fantl v. Transamerica Life Canada, 2009 ONCA 377. 2009) at 67. 
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economic interests of gatekeepers towards prospective settlements (as opposed to the 
financial viability of clients); in cases in which these economic prospects are insufficient 
relative to the incurred costs and high risk exposures, the presence or absence of 
contingency fees is largely inapplicable to the capacity of vulnerable people to access 
justice. As it pertains to environmental harms that inequitably impair the social 
reproduction of low-income and racialized communities with strong gendered and age-
related health-impairing effects, the prospects for multilayer access to justice are impaired 
by the prioritization of entrepreneurial criteria by the gatekeepers of justice, contributing 
to the exclusionary character of Ontario’s class action regime.  
 
5. EXCLUSIONARY LITIGATION 
Notwithstanding the quality of substantive justice achieved via environmental class 
actions—accountability, monetary compensation, social recognition of loss, clean-up of 
contaminated regions, and so forth—which primarily affects claims-makers who have 
managed to proceed with their respective actions, there are two major conditions of 
entrepreneurial litigation that promote procedural inaccessibility: (1) the gatekeeping role 
of Private Attorneys General; (2) the inadequate protection of future claims-makers. These 
procedural barriers of class action regimes operate in exclusionary ways to prevent 
potential claims-makers from accessing justice in Ontario.  
 
A. RECRUITMENT PARADIGM 
John C. Coffee Jr. has offered a succinct description of the prevailing recruitment paradigm 
of class actions: “[T]he lawyer often appears to be hiring the client, rather than the client 
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hiring the lawyer.”307 The qualification criteria employed by class action lawyers demand 
greater analysis in order to determine which cases are structurally favoured or disfavoured 
over others. Given the onerous costs associated with mounting a class action, the immediate 
point at which Coffee’s insight gestures towards is the palpable economic interests of 
entrepreneurial gatekeepers of justice. To phrase it plainly: justice-seekers are not 
determined based solely on the merit of their claims, but rather based on the profitability 
of their claims. This does not necessarily suggest that unmeritorious or frivolous claims are 
being pursued over unprofitable (or insufficiently profitable) yet meritorious claims. In 
Ontario’s class action regime, Private Attorneys General are largely motivated by the dual 
factors of resource expenditure and risk exposure. Given the application of the English 
Rule of ‘loser pays’, Private Attorneys General are disinclined to pursue unmeritorious or 
frivolous claims given the high probability of adverse costs awards—unlike jurisdictions 
without cost-shifting rules. The point at stake is therefore not simply that cases are being 
selected based solely on profitability criteria irrespective of merits, but rather that 
meritorious cases are not being selected based on profitability criteria (as well as potential 
risk exposures, which are heightened in environmental claims, particularly those involving 
health-impairment). Ultimately, these dual factors of resource expenditures and risk 
exposures have contributed to a conservative class action regime in which Private 
Attorneys General are generally disinclined to pursue cases without adequate degrees of 
predictability. For some commentators, these recruitment characteristics have resulted in 
an “anemic class action regime, in which plaintiffs’s counsel prefer the low-hanging fruit 
                                                        
307 Coffee Jr, Entrepreneurial Litigation, 1. 
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and focus on fairly routine, more or less guaranteed claims.”308 In other words, the polar 
opposite of environmental class actions, which are typically highly complex and atypical 
claims with potential outcomes that are increasingly difficult to predict. Although it may 
be too early to definitely state that Ontario’s class action regime is distinguished by a 
particular pattern of behaviour, given its relatively nascent history, it has become 
increasingly apparent that the “operating paradigm in class litigation is not the traditional 
series of events whereby clients seek legal advice and retain a lawyer to prosecute their 
interests.”309 It is rather the opposite: the gatekeepers of justice recruit potentially harmed 
members of the general public.  
 On one hand, to the extent that entrepreneurial Private Attorneys General are 
alerting potentially harmed individuals and collectives about their infringed rights and 
offering representation, particularly in cases where sufficient knowledge about the relevant 
misconduct may not be widely available, a mutually beneficial situation may develop in 
which Private Attorneys General provide an educative and promotive role in access to 
justice.  However, the serious question remains concerning what types of cases are typically 
being selected. In other words, this hypothetical scenario does not address the structural 
aspects of the decision-making process (i.e. the qualification criteria employed by Private 
Attorneys General).  
A recent quantitative survey in Ontario by Jasminka Kalajdzic addresses the 
empirical void concerning these case selection criteria by finding that the legal merits of 
                                                        
308 It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, to discover that the legal merits of a claim is weighed alongside 
the quantum of damages as the most important criteria in case selection. Craig Jones, “Litigate or Regulate? 
The Elusiveness of an Effective Consumer Protection Regime,” Canadian Business Law Journal 53 
(2013): 370. 
309 Kalajdzic, “Access to Justice for the Masses?” 75. 
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the claim and the quantum of damages are the most important criteria for deciding to 
proceed with litigation.310 These findings corroborate the qualitative interviews undertaken 
for this project in which risk-averse and resource-constrained Private Attorneys General 
described their activities as seeking to promote meritorious claims to the extent that these 
are sufficiently profitable and do not result in intolerable risk exposures. Generally 
speaking, the relative merits of a claim are indicative of the potential risk exposures. 
Moreover, it does not logically follow that simply because a given case was accepted for 
representation on the basis of a profit-motive that the case is not also meritorious with a 
public interest dimension (in the traditional sense). Instead, these findings suggest that the 
public interest is not the determining factor in the decision-making process; and more 
pressingly, there may be cases that are in the public interest but that do not meet the 
minimum qualification standards. As Kalajdzic observes, “[s]uch a minimum monetary 
threshold [one million dollars] would appear to favour certain kinds of class actions over 
others; human rights claims, or those on behalf of a small group of individuals, for example, 
would be less likely to involve damages exceeding a million dollars.”311 Although such a 
minimum monetary threshold varies between class action firms (some uphold a multiple 
million dollar threshold), the conservative estimate of a million dollars suggests that private 
enforcement through class actions is structurally failing “in what might be the majority of 
                                                        
310 Ibid., 80. 
311 Ibid. See also, Michael Molavi, “Beyond the Courtroom: Access to Justice, Privatization, and the Future 
of Class Action Research,” Canadian Class Action Review 10, no. 1-2 (2015): 8-31. Several prominent 
class action attorneys and firms have corroborated a similar finding, which appears to be increasing given 
increasing costs. For example, Ward Branch similarly suggests that the “global damages should be $1 
million or more,” which is largely premised on the costs associated with certification. See, Ward Branch, 





cases,” which speaks to the “necessity of public enforcement.”312 As litigation costs 
increase, such thresholds increase, which subsequently raises exclusionary barriers and 
broadens the range of unvindicated claims.    
 In a class action paradigm where lawyers recruit their clients, the conditions of 
recruitment acquire the characteristics of barriers. Whereas entrepreneurial lawyering 
might promote multilayer access to justice in certain ways, as Winkler C.J.O. suggests, it 
also serves to reinforce exclusionary tendencies based on economic calculations. As one 
of Canada’s leading class action scholars, Garry Watson, has observed, the prevailing 
paradigm in Ontario is one wherein “the entrepreneurial, bounty hunter, plaintiff class 
action counsel funds the action and chases the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow; but 
the chase can be long, hard and very expensive,”313 which is precisely why the pursued 
claim must satisfy the profitability qualification criteria of Private Attorneys General. More 
to the point, an economistic rationale does not sufficiently address the ‘social mission’ of 
class actions. This ‘social mission’ is under erosion in Ontario’s class action regime which 
increasingly prioritizes securities class actions and investor rights given strong 
predictability factors and high potential returns—a type of action that primarily influences 
privileged social demographics as opposed to the vulnerable communities 
disproportionately affected by environmental injustices. While recruiting strategies based 
primarily on profit-motives may incidentally benefit those with negative value claims314 
who might otherwise suffer from inaccessibility, this only occurs insofar as the minimum 
                                                        
312 Jones, “Litigate or Regulate? The Elusiveness of an Effective Consumer Protection Regime,” 365-66. 
313 Garry Watson, “The Canadian Experience with Class Actions: Access to Justice or Just a New 
Moneymaking Product Line for Lawyers?” Amicus Curiae 45 (2003): 30. 
314 The term “negative value claims” broadly refers to those claims that are individually non-viable, i.e. 
claims in which potential costs outweigh potential damages.  
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qualifying criteria for representation is met. What happens to those vulnerable people 
whose harmed interests are not deemed sufficiently profitable? 
 
B. FUTURE CLAIMS-MAKERS 
The exclusionary outcomes of reversed recruiting apply universally across Ontario’s class 
action regime, however, the distinct problem of future claims-makers applies specifically 
to environmental class actions. The problem of future claims-makers broadly refers to the 
exclusion of certain claims-makers from present actions and the prevention of these claims-
makers from commencing future actions to vindicate their claims. More specifically, 
Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr. coined the term ‘futures problem’ in 2000 to describe claims “where 
a claimant cannot presently prove a causal connection between an injury and a supposed 
source of injury, but nevertheless suspects or fears that he or she is suffering injury that has 
its origins in the suspect source.”315 This definition has been expanded in several directions, 
most notably in cases where potential claims-makers are not aware that they have been 
exposed to toxic contamination and other causes of injury that do not manifest symptoms 
for years or decades. In the years since Hazard introduced the term, scholarship on the 
‘futures problem’ has proliferated316—moreover, the problem of future claims-makers has 
been most prominent in the context of chemical consumption given that certain toxic 
exposures have extended latency periods and adverse health effects may not manifest for 
                                                        
315 Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., “The Futures Problem,” Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository 1, no. 1 
(2000): 1903.  
316 Notable interventions in this literature include (but are not limited to): Linda S. Mullenix, “Back to the 
Futures: Privatizing Future Claims Resolution,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 148, no. 6 (2000): 
1919-32; Howard M. Erichson, “Uncertainty and the Advantage of Collective Settlement,” DePaul Law 
Review 60, no. 2 (2011): 627-46; Geoffrey P. Miller, “Conflicts of Interest in Class Action Litigation: An 
Inquiry into the Appropriate Standard,” University of Chicago Law Forum 1 (2003): 581-630; Deborah R. 
Hensler, “Bringing Shutts into the Future: Rethinking Protection of Future Claimants in Mass Tort Class 
Actions,” University of Missouri-Kansas City Law Review 74, no. 3 (2006): 585-612. 
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several years after exposure. Broadly speaking, ‘future claims-makers’ refers to those who 
have been exposed to a particular toxic substance, but who have not yet manifested 
symptoms of disease or injury to warrant pursuing their claims. For Samuel Issacharoff, 
the problem of future claims-makers is “the secular equivalent to a plenary indulgence,”317 
a reference to the Catholic doctrine of total remission of punishment for sins (re: wrongful 
conduct). The classic example of the problem of future claims-makers is the 1984 Agent 
Orange case in the United States in which exposed persons who developed symptoms 
(notably cancerous growths) at a later stage could not access compensation (the settlement 
fund was depleted); moreover, the conditions of the settlement precluded the provision of 
payment to affected persons who suffered harm post-1994.318  
 The problem of future claims-makers is particularly pronounced in the context of 
environmental class actions for several reasons. Firstly, future claims-makers often posses 
‘rationally apathetic’ stances towards ongoing actions, whether out of cautious optimism 
concerning the probabilities of developing adverse health effects or psychological 
repression over the gravity of this probability.319 Future claims-makers may additionally 
have been exposed to toxicants without their present knowledge; that is, future claims-
makers may be presently unaware of any incurred harms, even as they might gain 
awareness of such harms at some future date. Secondly, defendants in environmental class 
actions invariably recognize the potential threat of future claims-makers and thereby insist 
on the resolution of their total liability.320 By settling cases ‘for cheap’ with Private 
                                                        
317 Samuel Issacharoff, “Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions,” The Supreme Court 
Review 1999 (1999): 345. 
318 James Grimmelmann, “Future Conduct and the Limits of Class-Action Settlements,” North Carolina 
Law Review 91 (2012): 391. 
319 Coffee Jr., Entrepreneurial Litigation, 97. 
320 As Rhonda Wasserman points out, the “starting assumption in negotiations, in judicial opinions, and in 
the scholarly literature, is that defendants negotiating settlements of mass torts insist upon global peace; 
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Attorneys General motivated by economic self-interest, defending corporations and 
governments can effectively limit their total expenditures with legal finality. Although 
Private Attorneys General ostensibly serve to protect multilayer interests, their primary 
objective in their representative capacities is the protection of their present clients.321 This 
demand for global peace (i.e. resolution of outstanding liability) and the representative 
priorities of Private Attorneys General has resulted in structural disadvantages for future 
claims-makers whose chronic undercompensation has manifested in various ways:  
 
(1)   underestimating the number of likely future claims against the settlement fund (which 
is easily done given the long latency periods—up to forty years—associated with 
asbestos and other products); 
(2)   ignoring the impact of inflation, which trivializes any fixed recovery to be paid a 
decade or more later; or 
(3)   allowing early claimants to “raid” the settlement fund by filing extravagant claims, 
thereby depleting the funds available for future claimants.322 
 
Given these structural disadvantages of entrepreneurial private enforcement as it relates to 
future claims-makers,323 it may paradoxically be the case that class actions can sometimes 
be “less the plaintiff’s sword and more the defendant’s shield.”324 A relatively modest 
                                                        
they do not want piecemeal settlements that fail to resolve their total liability.” See Wasserman, “Future 
Claimants and the Quest for Global Peace,” Emory Law Journal 64, no. 2 (2014): 536. 
321 This leads to a situation in which “[n]either the trial bar, which is focused on the present clients, nor the 
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Litigation, 97.  
322 Ibid., 98. 
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settlement may serve to placate the short-term economic interests of entrepreneurial Private 
Attorneys General and a limited number of present claims-makers to the detriment of future 
claims-makers. 
 To conclude, it has become abundantly clear that the profit-oriented and risk-averse 
criteria employed in case selection (manifesting as a consequent of a reversal in the 
traditional recruiting paradigm) and the structural disadvantages against passive future 
claims-makers serve to reinforce the exclusionary dynamics of Ontario’s class action 
regime. Although sufficient economic incentives may serve to effectively mobilize Private 
Attorneys General to prosecute multilayer environmental claims—thereby promoting 
greater access to justice in a minimally procedural sense—the limitations of 
entrepreneurialism in private enforcement are nevertheless incontrovertible to even 
proponents of class actions. First and foremost, the approach of economic incentivization 
raises serious concerns regarding claims that are insufficiently profitable and/or claims 
with intolerable risk exposures. By the same token, the profit-maximizing behaviour 
endemic to entrepreneurial private enforcement raises concerns about the potential 
misalignment of economic interests (i.e. the classic agency problem), which underscores 
the inadequacy of a strictly procedural conception of multilayer access to justice. These 
concerns are addressed in greater detail in Chapter 5.  
 Finally, the exclusionary dynamics pertaining to future claims-makers in 
environmental class actions almost universally involve the extended latency periods of 
certain toxic exposures (and the absence of any manifested symptoms of health-
impairment). This problem arises in cases where reasonable causation has been established; 
that is, where toxicants have been scientifically linked to adverse health effects in a target 
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population. However, a major barrier to multilayer access to environmental justice 
stemming from chemical consumption has been the privileging of private property over 
human health. The myriad problems of establishing toxic causation have contributed to 
Ontario’s exclusionary class action regime in which the destruction of private property 
arising from toxic exposures is privileged over potential adverse health effects.325 To 
clarify: it is easier to establish causation as it pertains to harmed private property (i.e. 
diminution of property value; physical destruction; loss of use and enjoyment of private 
property; and so forth) than causation in human health given the uncertainties inherent in 
establishing scientific health-related facts. Such private property environmental claims are 
more attractive for risk-averse entrepreneurial Private Attorneys General given their 
heightened levels of predictability. Ultimately, the socio-economic barriers that this stricter 
conception of causation326 and restricted view of commonality constitute demand further 
analysis, not merely from a proceduralistic perspective, but also from a critical political 
economy perspective which recognizes the uneven distribution of toxic exposures and 
chemical consumption across social locations (see Chapter 4). As the following chapters 
explicate, this involves the production and reproduction of social inequities through the 
privileging of private property in Ontario’s emerging private enforcement regime. The neo-
liberal governance shift from a complementary conception of class actions towards a co-
optative conception compounds these exclusionary tendencies and intensifies the 
transformation of the market economy into a market society.  
                                                        
325 See, e.g., Steve C. Gold, “When Certainty Dissolves into Probability: A Legal Vision of Toxic 
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These discernible limitations of entrepreneurial litigation serve to structurally disadvantage 
future claimants and unprofitable (or insufficiently profitable) claimants alike. For these 
claimants, Ontario’s class action regime operates in an exclusionary manner, even as its 
primary policy objective is promoting access to justice. More to the point, these are not 
limitations that are resolvable through behavioural remedies aimed at compelling private 
actors to facilitate access to justice for a broader range of claimants; for example, ad hoc 
solutions such as (voluntary or mandatory) pro bono services are largely incongruous with 
class actions, given the associated onerous costs and high risks. To borrow the language of 
law and economics research, it would be tantamount to ‘economic irrationality’ for Private 
Attorneys General to engage in private enforcement irrespective of profitability.327 
Although critics of class actions often focus on the profit-maximizing behaviour of 
entrepreneurial attorneys and the general disinclination to pursue low value claims, this 
agent-oriented critique ultimately neglects the systemic nature of the problem of 
inaccessible justice. The ‘economic irrationality’ of pursuing claims irrespective of 
profitability simply reinforces the structural inadequacies of an overreliance on market 
logic in policy implementation.  
                                                        
327 This is indicative of the possessive individualism and profit-maximizing behaviour of homo economicus. 
See Wendy Brown, supra note 247. 
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Insofar as the class action is conceived as a “safety valve”328 or “failsafe”329 type of 
policy instrument of private enforcement regimes, it has displayed an exceptional capacity 
to promote access to justice (at least in a minimally proceduralist sense), particularly for 
negative value claims. This function assumes heightened significance in actions involving 
governmental parties. Moreover, the compensatory facet of access to justice features 
prominently in this context: remedies awarded in a successful action are generally provided 
to the victims as compensation (when cy près awards are not pursued), whereas statutory 
fines are provided to governments. This crucial policy instrument most effectively 
strengthens associations of citizens when its mobilization is underscored by a 
complementary conception of the Private Attorney General; in these cases, private actors 
engage in regulatory enforcement concurrently with public agencies.330 Interestingly, the 
availability of alternate routes to environmental justice in Ontario’s legislative 
framework—including the Environmental Bill of Rights and the Environmental Protection 
Act—has been cited by defendants at the preferability stage of certification; in other words, 
as a strategy to restrict multilayer access to environmental justice for class members, 
defendants have proposed that other preferable vehicles are available for polluter 
accountability.331  
                                                        
328 Ibid. 
329 Coffee Jr., “Public Enforcement and the Private Attorney General,” in Entrepreneurial Litigation 
(Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2015): 175. 
330 A coordinative conception would similarly strengthen such associations of citizens as an additional 
instrument in social protection. A prime example of such coordination is the ‘relator’ action, that is, a 
public nuisance claim (i.e. pollution) by private parties that can only be advanced with explicit permission 
of the Attorney General. In the environmental context, public interest standing in public nuisance (and the 
requirement of explicit permission by the Attorney General) has been addressed in s.103 of the 
Environmental Bill of Rights, 1993 which holds that no person who has suffered or may suffer 
environmental harm “shall be barred from bringing an action without the consent of the Attorney 
General.”330 According to the Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, this provision was intended to 
operate in a supplementary manner with the Class Proceedings Act, 1992. Environmental Bill of Rights, 
1993, S.O. 1993, c. 28, online: https://www.ontario.ca/laws/statute/ 93e28; Lynda Collins and Heather 
McLeod-Kilmurray, The Canadian Law of Toxic Torts (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2014), 55-6. 
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Where private litigation as a policy instrument becomes problematic is largely 
when Private Attorneys General are considered as being interchangeable with their public 
counterparts pursuant to the principles of economic efficiency.332 In other words, where the 
co-optative conception of the Private Attorney General animates governance strategies. 
This effectively amounts to allowing market imperatives to dictate priorities of regulatory 
enforcement. By prioritizing efficiency and profitability over considerations of social 
justice, fairness, and equality, the co-optative conception facilitates a limited form of 
accessibility—for those harmed interests that are deemed sufficiently profitable by 
entrepreneurial gatekeepers of justice. Simply put, the same market principles and criteria 
that serve to facilitate multilayer access to justice in certain (sufficiently profitable) cases, 
concomitantly serves to deny multilayer access to justice in other (insufficiently 
profitable/unprofitable) cases. Although both complementary and co-optative conceptions 
conform to market logic, the former operates alongside public enforcement whereas the 
latter is postulated as independently sufficient.  
 It goes without saying that the underlying stance of this project is that access to 
justice as a social good should not be overdetermined by market forces. As Mauro 
Cappelletti observed nearly forty years ago, an overreliance on private enforcement would 
                                                        
331 See, e.g., Hollick v. Toronto (City), 2001 SCC 68 [2001] 3 SCR 158; Environmental Bill of Rights, 1993, 
S.O. 1993, c.28, s. 61(1) and s. 74 (1); Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.19, s. 14(1), s. 172(1), 
and s. 186(1).  
332 The efficiency of private enforcement in the class action context is not negligible, given that Private 
Attorneys General often possess extensive litigation experience that often significantly exceeds those of 
public regulators. This private expertise, as well as privileged forms of information available to private 
actors, lends credence to multienforcer regimes in which public agencies can direct and mobilize private 
actors. As Engstrom points out, in “regulatory regimes where information about wrongdoing remains 
hidden—and so is prohibitively costly for public enforcers to discover and dislodge—there will be little or 
no enforcement at all unless private parties can be induced to surface information about wrongdoing.” 
David Freeman Engstrom, “Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers,” The Yale Law Journal 123, no. 3 (2013): 
632; see also, John Braithwaite, “Privatized Enforcement and the Promise of Regulatory Capitalism,” in 
Regulatory Capitalism, 64-86. 
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be “foolish,” given that “too many gaps would remain if the whole task were left to the 
haphazard existence, and to the will and whims, of spontaneous ‘champions’ of the 
common good.”333 Janine Brodie has similarly pointed out that social liberalism in the 
twentieth century recognized that certain social goods “should not be entrusted to capitalist 
markets because they were incapable of ensuring fair distribution or achieving collective 
goals.”334 This sharply contrasts with contemporary neo-liberalism, which involves the 
extension of market logics into political institutions and agencies, including the 
provisioning of social goods and services, such as access to justice. In short, there are 
palpable limits to private enforcement regimes from the perspective of multilayer access 
to environmental justice. Even its ardent defenders readily acknowledge that private 
enforcement acts as a “form of auto-pilot enforcement, with market incentives.”335 Where 
such incentives are absent, private enforcement is similarly absent. This enforcement gap 
indicates that public regulatory enforcement remains an indispensible feature in the early 
twenty-first century. At root, proponents of the privatization of regulatory enforcement 
typically cite the ‘scientific’ character of economics, that is to say, the supposedly neutral 
and value-free dictates of markets as a chief good to the extent that any particular interest 
is not directly served. As this project posits, however, allowing market forces to determine 
enforcement priorities privileges certain types of actors and interests over others. In class 
actions, for instance, securities actions are prioritized over environmental health-based 
claims—this prioritization has strong socio-demographic characteristics to the extent that 
                                                        
333 Mauro Cappelletti, “Governmental and Private Advocates for the Public Interest in Civil Litigation: A 
Comparative Study,” in eds., Mauro Cappelletti and John Weisner, Access to Justice: Promising 
Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1979), 865. 
334 Janine Brodie, “Neo-liberalism and Social Policy,” in eds., Stephen Gill and Claire A. Cutler, New 
Constitutionalism and World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 256. 
335 Farhang, 5. [emphasis added] 
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relatively privileged actors are affected by securities disputes, whereas largely low-income 
and racialized people are affected by environmental health-impairment with strong 
gendered outcomes. The alleged neutrality of this type of privatization exhibits a “strategic 
silence”336 about the racial hierarchies and gender orders constituted by the marketization 
of regulatory enforcement.  
This critical outlook should not detract from the relative merits of class actions in 
promoting multilayer access to environmental justice, which speaks to their continuing 
relevance in contemporary multi-enforcer regimes. One of their chief characteristics 
leading to their description as ‘crucial instruments’ of social protection has been their 
ability to circumvent the ‘political capture’ of regulatory agencies by the polluter-industrial 
complex (or any regulated industry, in fact) and thereby enforce regulations that would 
otherwise remain negligibly enforced (or unenforced).337 Class actions are uniquely 
situated to pursue claims against states, particularly when public agencies are recalcitrant 
to address outstanding issues of concern. As it pertains to broader enforcement priorities 
in the political economy, as Stephen Gill and A. Claire Cutler have pointed out, the 
emergence of the “new informality” in regulatory enforcement whereby corporate rights 
are articulated through “formal, hard, legal disciplines,” and corporate duties in “soft, 
                                                        
336 Isabella Bakker, The Strategic Silence: Gender and Economic Policy (New York: Zed Books, 1994). 
337 Pamela Bucy suggests that this “capture theory” has been largely substantiated in the environmental 
context in which states “compete with each other for economic development by offering lax environmental 
enforcement,” with “some states routinely collud[ing] with polluters.” Pamela Bucy, “Private Justice,” 
Southern California Law Review 76 (2002): 33. At the same time, this “capture theory” is likely 
incongruous with Engstrom’s synthetic institutional design for the greater investment of decision-making 
authority to public agencies over the direction of private litigation. See, supra note 324; David Freeman 
Engstrom, “Harnessing the Private Attorney General,” Columbia Law Review 112, no. 3 (2012): 1244-325; 
John Coffee Jr. has referred to this capacity to evade political capture as the ‘failsafe function’ of private 
enforcement. John Coffee Jr., “Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as 
Bounty Hunter is Not Working,” Maryland Law Review 42, no. 2 (1983): 215-88; John Coffee Jr., 
“Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of 
Law through Class and Derivative Actions,” Columbia Law Review 86, no. 4 (1986): 669-727. 
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unenforceable terms” suggests that the “formalization of corporate social responsibilities” 
remains imperative from the perspective of environmental justice, even in jurisdictions 
with robust class action regimes.338  
As the following chapters explicate, the multifaceted barriers to access to 
environmental justice in Ontario can only begin to be overcome through the interdependent 
coordination of progressive litigative and public regulatory enforcement mechanisms in a 
broader multi-enforcer regime. Although private actors can play an important 
complementary role in social protection and the pursuit of environmental justice,339 the 
primary instrument of policy enforcement and toxicant regulation must be a public regime 
that is “comprehensive, systematic, and proactive,” given the “vast universe of useful and 
potentially harmful chemical substances”340 in Canada. Before exploring this vast universe 
of toxic substances in greater detail (in Chapter 4), the next chapter continues the economic 
analysis of class actions by examining the emergence of litigation finance in Ontario and 






                                                        
338 A. Claire Cutler, “Legal Pluralism as the ‘Common Sense’ of Transnational Capitalism,” Onati Socio-
Legal Series 3 (2013): 730; Stephen Gill and A. Claire Cutler, “New Constitutionalism and World Order: 
General Introduction,” in eds., Gill and Cutler, New Constitutionalism and World Order (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015): 1-22. 
339 See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, “When Should We Prefer Tort Law to Environmental Regulation?” 
Washburn Law Journal 41 (2002): 515. 
340 Lynda Collins and Heather McLeod-Kilmurray, “Material Contribution to Justice: Toxic Causation after 




LITIGATION FINANCE IN ONTARIO’S CLASS ACTION REGIME 
 
INTRODUCTION 
A “revolution”341 is occurring in Ontario that has received scant academic and mainstream 
attention. The emergence of a third party litigation finance industry is revolutionizing 
Ontario’s class action regime through the financialization of litigation. In light of the 
enormous costs and risks associated with modern class actions, private litigation financing 
has been advocated as a market-based solution for the abysmal state of multilayer access 
to justice in Ontario. This effectively reconceptualizes class actions as ‘investment 
opportunities’ for financial capital. Such financing has been described as “a hot new 
investment commodity with high levels of reward not available in traditional investment 
vehicles.”342 The theoretical insularity of courtrooms from the instabilities and fluctuations 
of the global political economy has been cited as a major source of this growing appeal—
a perceived insularity that may have contributed to the growth of litigation finance in the 
aftermath of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis in common-law jurisdictions around the 
world where such investment practices are permissible.343 As the CEO of LexShares, a 
former mergers and acquisitions investment banker at Deutsche Bank, observes: class 
actions are “completely uncorrelated, zero-beta assets that are not influenced by broader 
                                                        
341 Sandra Rubin, “Enter the Silent Partner,” in Lexpert 1 July 2011, online: 
<http://www.lexpert.ca/article/enter-the-silent-partner/?p=&sitecode=>.  
342 Camille Cameron and Jasminka Kalajdzic, “Commercial Litigation Funding: Ethical, Regulatory and 
Comparative Perspectives,” The Canadian Business Law Journal 55, no. 1 (2014): 3. 
343 In addition to the relative insularity of such investments from the instabilities and fluctuations of the 
political economy, Kalajdzic and Cameron have pointed out that “tough economic times decrease 
traditional finance options and litigants’ risk tolerance.” See “Commercial Litigation Funding: Ethical, 
Regulatory and Comparative Perspectives,” 3.  
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economic factors,” which is to say, “it doesn’t matter what the stock market does – 
commodity prices, interest rates, none of that is having a direct impact on investment in 
litigation, which is really operating inside a courtroom vacuum.”344 Needless to say, such 
investments are portrayed to potential investors as a strategic form of portfolio 
diversification while simultaneously being portrayed to lawmakers and the general public 
as promoting access to justice. 
Given the nascent history of the industry in Ontario, the extent to which litigation 
financing has allowed collective claims-makers to overcome economic barriers in its 
provincial class action regime largely remains a matter of conjecture. However, the 
problematics of allowing market forces to further penetrate civil justice has sparked a 
contentious debate on the legitimacy of the developing industry within the meager ranks 
of those who have examined the ongoing revolution. Through a critical policy analysis, 
this chapter extends the analysis of the neo-liberalization of civil justice from Chapter 2 by 
focusing on the emergence of this industry in Ontario’s class action regime. 
Litigation financing applies in a variety of consumer and commercial contexts that 
span the breadth of Canadian law, however, the nascent industry in Ontario has been 
dominated by class actions in recent years.345 Ontario’s class action regime is distinguished 
by high costs and risks which act as economic barriers to multilayer access to justice. The 
demand for litigation financing is therefore prompted by the dual factors of (1) risk 
aversion and (2) budget constraints on the part of Private Attorneys General. Firstly, the 
                                                        
344 “Lexshares: Diversification and Access to Justice,” 10 August 2016, online: 
http://www.pymnts.com/news/investment-tracker/2016/lexshares-litigation-crowdfunding/.  
345 Litigation financing in various forms has existed for much of the twentieth century (i.e. the provision of 
legal financing by family members, etc.), however, litigation financing as a business enterprise has only 
recently emerged in Ontario. It is in this context that class actions have dominated the emerging litigation 
financing industry. Anthony Sebok, “Litigation Investment and Legal Ethics: What Are the Real Issues?” 
Canadian Business Law Journal 55, no. 1 (2014): 127. 
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continuing application of the English Rule whereby the losing party is liable for the 
winning party’s legal costs has created a demand for indemnification agreements with third 
parties which effectively operate as insurance measures in case of adverse costs awards. 
Secondly, as a “sport of kings,”346 the modern class action is a capital-intensive legal 
vehicle that requires Private Attorneys General to invest significant resources over a period 
of years (the average class action in Ontario takes approximately 3 years). The involvement 
of a litigation financier may offset these burdens by (1) indemnifying claimants and (2) 
providing the necessary financing to maintain the claim, thereby promoting a type of 
multilayer access to justice. 
 Although resource disparities between disputing parties are causes for concern 
across the legal spectrum, such concerns are particularly compounded in the class action 
context which often situates plaintiff classes against multinational corporations and 
governments with “vastly superior resources.”347 Despite the significant ‘war chests’ that 
Private Attorneys General in Ontario have amassed since the 1990s (which may be viewed 
as moderating this David vs. Goliath narrative), such resource disparities nevertheless 
remain prevalent in Ontario’s class action regime. Under these conditions, Private 
Attorneys General have become economically incentivized to limit their resource 
expenditures to their projected share of any recovery, whereas powerful defendants “have 
the resources and incentive to spend more than the amount at stake to build a reputation for 
‘scorched earth’ litigation.”348 The availability of third party litigation financing may serve 
                                                        
346 Kerr v Danier Leather Inc., 2007 SCC 44 [2007] at 63.  
347 Jeff Gray, “The Risky Business of Investing in Lawsuits,” The Globe & Mail 26 June 2012. See also, 
Maya Steinitz, “Whose Claim is this Anyway? Third Party Litigation Funding,” Minnesota Law Review 95, 
no. 4 (2011): 1268-338. 
348 Michael Trebilcock and Elizabeth Kagedan, “An Economic Assessment of Third-Party Litigation 
Funding,” Canadian Business Law Journal 55, no. 1 (2014): 64. As the authors point out, such financing 
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to mitigate the unequal impact of such incentives by strengthening the resource capacities 
(and limiting the risk exposures) of Private Attorneys General. To the extent that class 
actions are ‘crucial instruments’ of social protection for vulnerable groups, this 
strengthening can be viewed as a positive development against powerful adversaries.  
 Nevertheless, the emergence of litigation finance in Ontario has given rise to a 
series of objections that warrant further consideration. The litigation finance industry is 
primarily designed for the purposes of capital accumulation rather than access to justice 
promotion.349 Although access to justice may be a secondary objective that is achieved in 
a procedural and (monetary) compensatory sense in the process of attaining the former 
objective, the typically percentage-based returns on litigation investments are withdrawn 
from the portion of the recovery that would otherwise have been distributed to class 
members, which gives rise to the concern that litigation financing is a form of buying access 
at the expense of justice; that is to say, promoting procedural access through the 
diminishment of substantive justice. Needless to say, the converse side of this concern is 
that a percentage of a diminished recovery is preferable to a percentage of nothing; in other 
words, that insofar as litigation finance facilitates claims that otherwise would not be 
pursued, it promote access to justice. A critical perspective on this industry might 
nonetheless consider the extent to which ‘access to justice’ has been appropriated as a 
public-spirited value in furtherance of capital accumulation and posit the question: to what 
extent do financial entities such as Deutsche Bank or Bridgepoint Financial Services Inc. 
                                                        
could “enhance the accuracy of the settlement by eliminating factors unrelated to legal merit: that is, 
relaxing the risk aversion and budget constraints which unbalance bargaining power between plaintiff and 
defendant.” 
349 Whereas litigation financing may plausibly promote deterrence by strengthening meritorious claims 
against corporate or governmental defendants, the CPA policy objective of behaviour modification remains 
secondary to the primary objectives of increasing access to justice and promoting judicial economy.  
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consider access to justice an investment priority? Ultimately, critics have inquired about 
the extent to which litigation finance “transforms courtrooms into a stock exchange and 
litigation into a commodity”350 under the auspices of promoting access to justice. 
This revolutionary development has gone largely unexplored in extant political 
economy research on the financialization phenomenon that has spread globally since the 
mid-1970s. Similarly, legal scholarship has generally not situated litigation finance within 
this broader financialization phenomenon, which has been characterized as a 
transformative historical development of capitalist economies and democratic societies.351 
Although several conceptions of ‘financialization’ have been posited by various scholars, 
this analysis upholds Gerald A. Epstein’s definition that financialization describes the 
“increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial 
institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies.”352 The increasing 
role of financial capital in mediating everyday life has been insightfully examined by 
feminist political economists, including Adrienne Roberts who expresses the relationship 
between household capacities and global finance as the “financialization of social 
reproduction.”353 This focus on households can be expanded to include the environmental 
foundations upon which all reproduction rests, in light of Cindi Katz’s seminal theorization 
of social reproduction which explicitly identifies the importance of political ecology. 
                                                        
350 W. Bradley Wendel, “Alternative Litigation Finance and Anti-Commodification Norms,” DePaul Law 
Review 63, no. 2 (2014): 657. 
351 Costas Lapavitsas, Profiting Without Producing: How Finance Exploits Us All (New York: Verso, 
2013). 
352 Gerald A. Epstein, “Introduction: Financialization and the World Economy,” in ed., Gerald A. Epstein, 
Financialization and the World Economy (Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005), 3. 
353 Adrienne Roberts, “Household Debt and the Financialization of Social Reproduction: Theorizing the UK 
Housing and Hunger Crises,” in ed., Susanne Soederberg, Risking Capitalism (Research in Political 
Economy, Vol. 31) (Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing, 2016), 135-64. See also, Brigitte Young, Isabella 
Bakker, and Diane Elson, eds., Questioning Financial Governance From a Feminist Perspective (New 
York: Routledge, 2011). 
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Moreover, the financialization of litigation and the impacts of this financialization on 
multilayer access to environmental justice as a key facet of social reproduction has gone 
entirely unexplored in extant research. Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to 
comprehensively develop this further, the analysis offered provides a foundation for deeper 
integration of the financialization of litigation in political economy analyses on the global 
financialization phenomenon in the early twenty-first century.  
Given the multiple ways in which access to justice—as a fundamental human right 
and policy objective of the Class Proceedings Act—has been appropriated and mobilized 
by competing factions, it may be beneficial to distinguish between the critics and the 
critiques of third party litigation finance. Critiques of third party litigation finance have 
generally advanced either consequentialist or jurisprudential objections to the emerging 
industry. The consequentialist objections have typically raised concerns over the potential 
negative implications of litigation finance, including the adverse effects of introducing 
third parties into the civil justice system (i.e. increases in frivolous litigation, etc.). At the 
same time, jurisprudential objections are primarily concerned with the ethical challenges 
posed by litigation finance for the legal profession (i.e. conflicts of interest, potential 
collusion, etc.).  
 Lending credence to the conceptualization of access to justice as a field of 
contestation, corporate interests that have historically raised objections to the modern class 
action are among the most vociferous critics of litigation finance. Such critics (i.e. U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce) have adopted the popular right-wing anti-litigation stance that any 
increase in litigation is socially undesirable on the normative grounds that “a lawsuit is an 
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evil in itself”354 and on the politico-economic grounds that litigation finance is “antithetical 
to all notions of free enterprise,”355 which conceptually extends the theory of the ‘invisible 
fist of law’ discussed in Chapter 2 to the present discussion. In other words, the capacities 
of litigation finance to overcome the economic barriers to multilayer access to justice by 
promoting class actions against largely corporate defendants is viewed by such critics as a 
problematic development. Given these promotive capacities, it remains difficult to 
ultimately ignore the strategic subtext of such critiques (notwithstanding their potential 
validity) as motivated by ideological imperatives rather than the preservation of the 
democratic integrity of civil justice systems. Conversely, proponents of litigation finance 
have generally sought to dismiss or assuage consequentialist and jurisprudential concerns 
through various proposals, such as praising the merits of the prevailing self-regulatory 
model for the industry.  
The objective of this chapter is to develop and expand the political-economic 
analysis of Chapter 2 in the context of the litigation finance industry in Ontario through a 
contextual analysis of key dynamics of the monetizing, liberalizing, and privatizing 
imperatives of this emerging industry. 
 
1. THE COMMODIFICATION CRITIQUE 
The contentious debate over litigation finance has developed within the parameters of the 
prevailing market rationality; which is to say, any consequentialist or jurisprudential 
objections have largely been advanced without concomitant axiological or deontological 
                                                        
354 Ibid., 655. 
355 John H. Beisner and Gary A. Rubin, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Institute for Legal Reform, “Stopping 
the Sale of Lawsuits: A Proposal to Regulate Third-Party Investments in Litigation,” (2012): 15. 
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critiques over the illegitimacy of commodifying litigation.356 As one commentator has 
observed, the “perceived repugnancy”357 of litigation finance in Ontario “appears to be 
related to the potential abuses rather than a moral statement”358 that litigation “should not 
be subject to market forces.”359 As a matter of conceptual clarity, it may be worthwhile to 
observe that legal services can already be viewed as being commodified to the extent that 
the behaviour of private attorneys in a legal market is typically animated by economic 
interests and objectives and private lawyers already have a stake in litigation perceived as 
a capital generating activity; which is to say, that litigation is already subject to market 
forces and therefore describing litigation finance as ‘commodifying litigation’ may be 
conceptually untenable since an object (or process) that is already a commodity cannot be 
said to be commodified. Although the present analysis makes references to the 
‘commodification of litigation’ as a way to establish continuity with established literature, 
it may be more accurate to rather speak of the ‘financialization of litigation’. Insofar as the 
formal spectrum of perspectives on commodification ranges from the ‘universal 
commodification’ stance emblematic of laissez-faire economics to the ‘universal non-
commodification’ stance of heterodox economics,360 the limited range of perspectives on 
                                                        
356 The anti-commodification critique has not featured prominently in the growing literature. References to 
commodification are typically brief. For example, in his defence of litigation finance, Anthony Sebok 
critiques a number of objections to the emerging industry, however, on the question of the anti-
commodification critique, Sebok draws an analogy with the marketization of legal judgments (i.e. buying a 
judge’s decision) and proceeds to critique this latter practice and differentiate it from litigation financing 
(without responding to the anti-commodification critique). See supra note 338.  
357 Poonam Puri ,“Financing of Litigation by Third-Party Investors: A Share of Justice?” Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal 36, no. 3 (1998): 564. Notably, in her defence of third party litigation funding, Puri does not 
provide a counterargument for why lawsuits should be subject to market forces, but rather restricts her 
argument to the potential abuses that may arise out of third party litigation funding.  
358 Ibid.  
359 Ibid.  
360 Margaret Radin, “Market-Inalienability,” Harvard Law Review 100, no. 8 (1987): 1849-937. 
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litigation finance in Ontario may be indicative of a neo-liberal consensus on the legitimacy 
of market forces within the civil justice system.  
 Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a comprehensive 
overview of the relevant literature on commodification, it may suffice to observe that 
critical perspectives on commodification are primarily rooted in either radical political 
economics, such as the classic analysis offered by Georg Lukács who suggested that 
commodification should not be “regarded as the central problem in economics, but as the 
central, structural problem of capitalist society in all its aspects,”361 and may extend to the 
pragmatic approaches of critical pluralists such as Margaret Radin who has raised concerns 
in legal scholarship for decades over commodification and the encroachment of market 
rationality into non-market areas of human life.362 To the extent that proponents of litigation 
finance in Ontario have engaged with such critical perspectives, this has typically been 
limited to dismissive references to Michael Sandel’s recent moral objections to market 
encroachments.363 Ultimately, anti-commodification critiques have almost universally been 
rejected as contrary to the “market-liberal theory of value.”364 The absence of such critiques 
indicates a widespread consensus on the notional legitimacy of the penetration of market 
forces into non-market areas of democratic life and the associated commodification of 
social goods. In other words, the debate over litigation finance has largely involved 
consequentialist or jurisprudential objections rather than politico-economic critiques over 
                                                        
361 Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: The MIT 
Press, 1972), 83.  
362 Margaret Radin, Contested Commodities: The Trouble With Trade in Sex, Children, Body Parts, and 
Other Things (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001). See also, Margaret Radin, “Market-
Inalienability,” Harvard Law Review 100, no. 8 (1987): 1849-937. 
363 Michael Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets (New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 2013). 
364 W. Bradley Wendel, “Alternative Litigation Finance and Anti-Commodification Norms,” 675. 
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the commodification of litigation (and the political rationalities that legitimate such 
commodification) as a feature of the neo-liberalization of civil justice. 
To exemplify this observation in practical terms, the CEO of Burford Capital (a 
major litigation finance firm) has recently suggested that litigation finance “really is just 
corporate finance. It just happens that the underlying asset is a litigation claim instead of 
an airplane or a photocopier.”365 In this light, a consequentialist or jurisprudential analysis 
would examine the implications and dynamics of this ‘underlying asset’ in the context of 
the civil justice system, whereas an anti-commodification stance rejects the notion that an 
incurred harm is ontologically the same as a photocopier and that an incurred harm should 
normatively be treated the same as a photocopier; in short, that an incurred harm is a 
commodity and whether an incurred harm should be commodified and treated as such.366 
The economic basis of the anti-commodification critique presupposes that this ‘underlying 
asset’ or object of commodification is not ontologically produced for sale; to invoke the 
Polanyian distinction, such potential assets are “fictitious commodities.”367 Simply put, this 
stance is that the infringed right of a human being (or any part thereof) is not a product 
created for purchase and exchange on a marketplace. 
To clarify, W. Bradley Wendel has outlined the parameters of the commodification 
critique in the context of litigation finance as follows: 
Someone who believes that free markets are a good thing because they permit autonomous 
individuals to enter into value-enhancing exchanges should naturally be supportive of a 
mechanism by which causes of action and their proceeds are freely alienable to anyone 
willing to pay the price set by the market. On the other hand, someone who objects to [third 
                                                        
365 “Strings Attached,” Lexpert 1 July 2012. 
366 To answer the ontological question: the process of commodification implies that the object of 
commodification was not originally a commodity.  
367 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 2001), 71-81. 
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party litigation financing] as having a commodifying tendency in the domain of civil 
litigation would be expected to object to the hegemonic tendencies of market rationality in 
general, and to favor restrictions on the alienation of many forms of property.368  
Whereas Wendel adopts the former viewpoint in support of the commodification of 
litigation (and the concomitant alienability of litigable claims) with the neo-liberal belief 
in the goodness of “free markets,” the latter viewpoint has been largely absent from 
analyses of litigation finance. As Peter S. Spiro has pointed out, however, the “free market” 
often produces innovations such as litigation finance “in response to problems such as 
[access to justice], but they are not always socially beneficial innovations.”369 Spiro 
polemically compares financiers who “invest” in litigation as being “very much like vulture 
funds that buy distressed debt.”370  
Since consequentialist and jurisprudential analyses are conceptually distinct from 
one another (and from axiological or deontological analyses) yet raise interrelated and 
complementary concerns over litigation financing, this chapter will integrate various 
reservations raised by these respective standpoints.371 This serves as an extension of the 
analysis developed in Chapter 2 that a co-optative conception of class actions promotes the 
privatization of regulatory enforcement which further allows market forces to largely 
determine which collective claims-makers are able to access justice. The emergence of 
                                                        
368 W. Bradley Wendel, “Alternative Litigation Finance and Anti-Commodification Norms,” 659. 
369 Peter S. Spiro, “The Problem of Cost Awards and Third Party Funding in Class Proceedings,” 6 October 
2014. Online: <http://canliiconnects.org/en/commentaries/30012>. [emphasis added] 
370 Ibid.  
371 The conceptual distinction between consequentialist, jurisprudential, and axiological (or deontological) 
critiques of litigation finance does not imply that the concerns raised by such critiques are not interrelated. 
To artificially separate and categorize these objections might ultimately prove detrimental to achieving a 
comprehensive understanding of litigation finance and its critiques. More to the point, such conceptual 
distinctions may ultimately be synthetic; for example, although the anti-commodification critique is rooted 
in axiological or deontological reasoning, the social impacts of marketization are fundamentally the causes 
of concern (i.e. turning a market economy into a market society) and it may therefore not be theoretically 
sound to classify such arguments as wholly non-consequentialist.  
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litigation finance in Ontario compounds this market fundamentalism by allowing the 
penetration of market forces into civil justice with various impacts for class members, 
including the monetization of substantive justice.  
 
2. THIRD PARTY LITIGATION FINANCE 
Third party litigation finance refers to the provision of monetary assistance by parties who 
do not have any direct interest in the litigation for which the financing is provided (apart 
from the financing itself). Strictly speaking, third party litigation finance does not 
necessarily imply that the third party will share in the profits of the financed litigation. For 
example, charitable donations through legal fundraising activities do not commonly 
involve a pecuniary interest on the part of third parties. However, in the class action 
context, third party litigation financiers universally provide monetary assistance in 
exchange for a percentage of any recovery. In jurisdictions where the English Rule remains 
in effect, such as Ontario, third party litigation financiers often provide indemnification 
against adverse costs awards (in exchange for a percentage of any recovery). In other 
words, whether such financiers address the resource constraints or risk exposures inherent 
in class actions (or a combination of the two), the interest of such financiers is primarily 
pecuniary, although such financiers typically invoke secondary concerns such as 
promoting access to justice.  
 
A. THE ORIGIN OF THIRD PARTY LITIGATION FINANCE IN CANADA 
Third party litigation finance in Canada is a relatively recent development. The first cases 
in which Canadian courts were motioned to approve third party financing agreements 
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occurred in 2009 and 2010 (in Alberta372 and Nova Scotia373). However, in both Hobsbawn 
v. Atco Gas and Pipelines Ltd. and MacQueen v. Sydney Steel Corporation, the courts did 
not offer any reasons and any relevant materials were placed under seal. In Ontario, the 
first case in which court approval for a third party financing agreement was sought occurred 
in 2009 with Metzler Investment GMBH v. Gildan Activewear Inc. 374 
 
B. METZLER INVESTMENT GMBH V. GILDAN ACTIVEWEAR INC. 
The plaintiff (Metzler Investment GMBH) sought approval of a financing agreement (Costs 
Indemnification Agreement) into which it had entered with Claims Funding International, 
a third party litigation financier based in Ireland. The proposed financing agreement was 
fairly straightforward: in exchange for indemnifying the plaintiff in the event of any 
adverse costs award, Claims Funding International would receive a 7 percent commission 
on any “Resolution Sum”375 (i.e. settlement or monetary judgment). Although Justice 
Leitch held that it was not possible to conclude that the agreement would “not amount to 
over-compensation to the extent that it is unreasonable and unfair to those who will bear 
its expense,”376 namely, the class members, out of whose share the third party commission 
would have been drawn, the case nevertheless tentatively opened the door to third party 
financing in Ontario with the affirmation that such agreements are not “per se 
                                                        
372 Hobsbawn v. Atco Gas and Pipelines Ltd., A.S.C.J. (May 14, 2009) Calgary (QB).  
373 MacQueen v. Sydney Steel Corporation, N.S.S.C. (October 19, 2010) Halifax (SC).  
374 Metzler Investment GMBH v. Gildan Activewear Inc., [2009] O.J. No. 3315 (SCJ) [Metzler Investment]. 
In contrast to the previous two cases, Metzler Investment did not proceed on an ex parte basis. The 
defendants maintained that they were affected by the motion to approve the fee arrangement and the 
plaintiffs concurred (as did the court).  
375 Metzler Investment GMBH v. Gildan Activewear Inc., at 12. This “Resolution Sum” would not include 
disbursements, legal fees, and administrative expenses, which would be deducted from the “Resolution 
Sum” before Claims Funding International’s 7 percent commission would be calculated. 
376 Ibid., at 69.  
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champertous.”377 This applied the expansive conception of maintenance and champerty of 
McIntyre Estate v Ontario (see below) to third party financing agreements in the class 
action context.378 To clarify, champerty is a form of maintenance in which the litigation 
financier possesses a pecuniary interest in the financed litigation. However, Justice Leitch 
reserved judgment on whether or not the proposed financing agreement was champertous 
in nature (given the absence of a monetary cap) and the proceeding was eventually settled 
out of court.  
Interestingly, the stance that third party financing agreements are not per se 
champertous was subsequently contradicted by Justice Little who observed that such 
agreements  “may very well be per se champertous.”379 Although Justice Little’s position 
contradicts the growing consensus on the legitimacy of litigation financing, it nevertheless 
provides a critical counterpoint to the liberalization of maintenance and champerty laws in 
Ontario.  
 
C. DUGAL V. MANULIFE FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
Whereas Metzler Investment tentatively introduced third party litigation financing into 
Ontario’s class action regime with the application of the reasoning of McIntyre Estate to 
the class action context, Dugal v. Manulife Financial Corporation380 established its 
legitimacy with the approval of the proposed financing agreement. This approval was based 
                                                        
377 Ibid.  
378 “Expansive” in contradistinction to the formerly restrictive conception of champerty which would likely 
have considered third party financing agreements as champertous. 
379 Metzler Investment GMBH v. Gildan Activewear Inc., at 6. See also Steve Tenai and Nicholas Saint-
Martin, “Third Party Funding of Class Actions,” online: <http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/third-
party-funding-of-class-actions-pdf-199kb-52204.pdf>.  
380 Dugal v. Manulife Financial Corporation, [2011] ONSC 1785. 
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on the judgment that the financing agreement was not champertous given that the third 
party financier (Claims Funding International) did not “incite or provoke”381  the litigation 
and did not possess an “improper motive.”382 The propriety of the third party motive was 
determined according to the reasoning offered in Metzler Investment that “the nature and 
amount of the fees to be paid are critical in determining whether the motivation was 
improper.”383 According to Justice Strathy, “exacting an unfair price for the funding 
agreement, with the resultant unfairness to the litigant, would be an improper motive.”384 
In other words, the concern appears to be that an “unfair price” would unjustly deprive 
class members of their fair share of any recovery. Ultimately this criterion was employed 
in determining that the financing agreement was reasonable in its proposed commission 
rate and caps.385 The reasonableness of the proposed commission rate (7 percent) was also 
favourably determined in comparison to the levy imposed by the Class Proceedings Fund 
(10 percent).386 
In addition to the quantitative concerns over commission rates and caps, the 
landmark Dugal v. Manulife decision also considered qualitative factors pertaining to the 
legitimacy of third party litigation financing, such as control over litigation strategy, which 
have prefigured in legal debates wherever third party litigation financing has been 
                                                        
381 Ibid., at 19. 
382 Ibid. 
383 Ibid. 
384 Ibid., at 20. 
385 Although the third party financing was the same in both cases (Claims Funding International), the 
financing agreement in Dugal v. Manulife most notably differed from the agreement in Metzler Investment 
in that it contained commission caps and was therefore not prone to the overcompensation that Justice 
Leitch identified in the latter case; the commission rate of the agreement was the same 7 percent as the 
prior proposed agreement, however, a commission cap was introduced at “$5 million if the resolution 
occur[ed] at any time prior to the filing of the plaintiffs’ pre-trial conference brief and $10 million if the 
resolution occur[ed] at any time thereafter.” Dugal v. Manulife at 6. 
386 Ibid., at 33. 
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introduced. Moreover, given that Claims Funding International is a third party litigation 
financier based in Ireland without any material assets in Canada, Justice Strathy maintained 
that adequate security should be provided to ensure that Claims Funding International 
possessed the capacity to satisfy any potential costs award (as per the indemnification 
agreement).387 
 
D. CAMPBELL’S CASH AND CARRY PTY LTD. V. FOSTIF PTY LTD. 
The development of litigation finance has not occurred in a “national vacuum.”388 As 
Christopher Hodges et al have pointed out in a recent overview of litigation finance in 
England and Wales, the emerging industry has developed in an international context “in 
which arrangements, rules and developments in one jurisdiction can have a major impact 
on others”389 and in which litigation finance firms are “investing in cases outside their home 
jurisdictions.”390 The dominant presence in Canada of the Ireland-based financier Claims 
Funding International (a firm founded by Australian lawyers and financiers) testifies to this 
internationality. In the context of this interconnectedness of national jurisdictional 
developments and the increasing role of global capital flows in the financialization of 
litigation, the “principal constraint” on such developments has been “traditional public 
policy”391 against maintenance and champerty—the laws of which have experienced 
liberalization to permit greater financialization. Although developments have not been 
uniform across national jurisdictions, this liberalization is an indicator of the globalization 
                                                        
387 Ibid., at 35. 
388 Christopher Hodges, John Peysner, and Angus Nurse, “Litigation Funding: Status and Issues,” Centre 






of litigation finance, which has permitted global capital inflows and foreign financing into 
domestic civil justice systems, transforming these institutions into capital markets of global 
finance. The prospective securitization of litigation finance—a critical enabler of 
financialization—reinforces this development. At present, various types of litigation 
finance have developed globally, including in the United Kingdom, Canada, United States, 
South Africa, Ecuador, and several continental European jurisdictions (such as Belgium, 
Germany, and Austria), however, the most robust litigation finance industry has developed 
in Australia to the point of granting financiers the power to determine litigation 
strategies.392  
To the extent that contingency fees operate as an economic alternative to third party 
litigation financing, it should not be particularly surprising that Australia has been at the 
forefront of the litigation finance industry, given its regulatory prohibition on contingency 
fees. Conversely, the legalization of contingency fees in provincial class action legislative 
frameworks effectively reduced the demand for litigation financing in Canada. In a 
majority decision, the Australian High Court found in its landmark 2006 decision in 
Campbell’s Cash and Carry Pty Ltd. v. Fostif Pty Ltd393 that it was not contrary to public 
policy for a financier to provide monetary assistance and control the financed litigation 
with a pecuniary interest. However, the dissenting opinion provides an instructive window 
into the objection to litigation finance:  
The purpose of court proceedings is not to provide a means for third parties to make money 
by creating, multiplying and stirring up disputes in which those third parties are not 
involved and which would not otherwise have flared into active controversy but for the 
efforts of the third parties, by instituting proceedings purportedly to resolve those disputes, 
by assuming near total control of their conduct, and by manipulating the procedures and 
                                                        
392 Hodges et al., 37-61. 
393 [2006] HCA 41 (Aus. H.C.). 
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orders of the court with the motive, not of resolving the disputes justly, but of making very 
large profits. 
 
Courts are designed to resolve a controversy between two parties who are before the court, 
dealing directly with each other and with the court: the resolution of a controversy between 
a party and a non-party is alien to this role. Further, public confidence in, and public 
perceptions of, the integrity of the legal system are damaged by litigation in which causes 
of action are treated merely as items to be dealt with commercially.394 
 
Notably, the extent to which the Fostif decision endorses third party litigation financing—
to the point of allowing financiers to directly control the litigation rather than operating as 
passive third parties—has not been reflected in Canadian jurisdictions.395 This is similarly 
evident in England and Wales where financiers have not been granted the power to directly 
control litigation, which suggests that the cautious approach taken in Canada has greater 
similarity to the latter jurisdictions than Australia.  From the perspective of such financiers, 
the investment of significant resources and the exposure to high risks of adverse costs 
awards without concomitant control (and the expectation of total passivity) may ultimately 
prove unsustainable. As the industry has developed, litigation financiers, which are often 
comprised of experienced legal actors, have increasingly offered legal analysis and advice, 
which can take the form of ‘influencing’ as opposed to ‘controlling’ litigation.   
 
F. THE GRIM REALITY OF MULTILAYER ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
From an access to justice perspective, Justice Strathy observed that the “grim reality”396 of 
class actions in Ontario’s regime (with its English Rule) makes it ‘economically irrational’ 
                                                        
394 Ibid., at 226. 
395 The possibility that control over the litigation may be relinquished (formally or effectively) to third party 
financiers in Canada in the foreseeable future remains a cause for concern.   
396 Ibid., at 29. 
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for any representative plaintiff to pursue a class proceeding without indemnification. “No 
person in their right mind,” Justice Strathy stated, “would accept the role of representative 
plaintiff if he or she were at risk of losing everything they own. No one, no matter how 
altruistic, would risk such a loss over a modest claim. Indeed, no rational person would risk 
an adverse costs award of several million dollars to recover several thousand dollars or 
even several tens of thousand dollars.”397 The widespread response to this “grim reality” 
has been the indemnification of representative plaintiffs by Private Attorneys General—or 
by the Class Proceedings Fund, in cases where applications have been submitted and 
approved. Without such indemnification, the prospects of multilayer access to justice 
ostensibly rest upon the ‘economic irrationality’ of potential representative plaintiffs. 
Furthermore, given that indemnification provided by Private Attorneys General “impose[s] 
onerous financial burdens”398 and “risk[s] compromising the independence of counsel,”399 
and that the Class Proceedings Fund is selective with its provision of indemnification, 
Justice Strathy maintained that the proposed financing agreement in Dugal v. Manulife 
ultimately promotes access to justice, a policy objective that would otherwise be “illusory 
if access to justice were deterred by the prospect of a crushing costs award borne by the 
representative plaintiff or counsel.”400 
 As a landmark case, Dugal v. Manulife provides an instructive overview of the role 
of third party litigation financing in promoting access to justice, although primarily in the 
limited sense of providing indemnification. To reiterate, Justice Strathy’s position holds 
that the potential for adverse costs awards may impede access to justice by discouraging 




400 Ibid., at 33. 
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meritorious litigation, therefore agreements that provide indemnification may be 
complementary to the policy objective of increasing access to justice insofar as such 
agreements are fair and reasonable in their material terms and conditions. Needless to say, 
this widely-held position is premised on the continuance of the English Rule in Ontario’s 
class action regime; that is, a legislative intervention that abolishes the “loser pays” 
principle would effectively obviate the need for indemnification by any party to the 
proceeding. In fact, Justice Strathy’s comments may be interpreted as implicitly endorsing 
such a legislative reform, given the emphasis on the undesirability of the prevailing ‘grim 
reality’ of class actions in Ontario. As examined in previous chapters, the Ontario Law 
Reform Commission strongly recommended for the abolishment of the English Rule in 
1984 in its Report on Class Actions; a reform proposal that was not adopted in the Class 
Proceedings Act. It remains to be seen whether such a legislative reform will manifest in 
the foreseeable future. In fact, Justice Edward Belobaba recently noted: 
Most members of the class action bar, whether acting for plaintiffs or defendants, agree 
that a “no costs” rule would be much more sensible. Like them, I also wish that the 
recommendation on costs as set out in the Ontario Law Reform Commission’s Report on 
Class Actions had been accepted. Instead, the provincial legislature decided to adopt the 
views of the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee and continue the “costs follow the 
event” convention for the very different world of class actions as well. I was a member 
of that Advisory Committee. I now realize that I was wrong and that the OLRC was right. 
I understand that the provincial Law Commission is undertaking a review of the Class 
Proceedings Act, including the costs provisions. Hopefully, our mistake will be 
corrected.401 
 
Nevertheless, the extent to which the burgeoning industry of third party litigation 
financing in Ontario may be affected by such a legislative reform remains an open question, 
                                                        
401 Rosen v. BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc., 2012 ONSC 6356, at 2. 
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not least since the statutory prohibition on maintenance and champerty has been 
progressively liberalized (see below). In other words, a legislative reform which abolishes 
the English Rule may effectively obviate the need for the provision of indemnification by 
third party litigation financiers (or any party to the litigation). Such a development would 
not be inconsequential given that the primary motive for the pursuit of third party litigation 
financing by Private Attorneys General in Ontario has been indemnificatory.402 However, 
such a legislative reform does not actually address the financing of litigation by third 
parties (as opposed to the provisioning of indemnification). In practical terms, the 
elimination of the English Rule would obviate the need for adverse costs indemnity, 
thereby assuaging the exposure concerns of risk-averse Private Attorneys General, but 
would not substantively affect the pursuit of third party financing by budget-constrained 
Private Attorneys General.  
 
3. MAINTENANCE & CHAMPERTY 
The strongest doctrinal objection to the emergence of third party litigation financing is 
rooted in the interrelated doctrines of maintenance and champerty.403 As these pertain to 
modern class actions, however, the doctrines of maintenance and champerty have 
historically been invoked in the debate over the legitimacy of contingency fees. This should 
not be particularly surprising given that third party litigation financing is a relatively recent 
                                                        
402 Jasminka Kalajdzic, Peter Cashman, and Alana Longmoore, “Justice for Profit: A Comparative Analysis 
of Australian, Canadian, and U.S. Third Party Litigation Funding,” American Journal of Comparative Law 
61, no. 93 (2012): 118. 
403 It should perhaps come as no surprise that most of the insightful commentaries on the doctrines of 
maintenance and champerty were published in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. See, for 
example, AH Dennis, “The Law of Maintenance and Champerty” Law Quarterly Review  6, no. 2 (1890): 
169-88; Max Radin, “Maintenance by Champerty,” California Law Review 24, no. 1 (1935): 48-78; Percy 
H Winfield, “The History of Maintenance and Champerty” Law Quarterly Review 50, no. 35 (1919): 50-
72; EH Bodkins, The Law of Maintenance and Champerty (London: Steven and Sons, 1935).  
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development. Nonetheless, it stands to reason that the descriptions of maintenance and 
champerty offered in this section are appropriate for definitional purposes and applicable 
to the present discussion. 
There is a discernible continuity in the objections raised to contingency fees and 
those that may be raised to the emergence of third party litigation financing as it pertains 
to the potential distorting effects of financialization in the promotion of greater access to 
justice. For example, the OLRC Report observed that with the introduction of contingency 
fees the “lawyer acquires an interest in the lawsuit that might come between him and his 
client [sic], not only concerning the amount of the fee but also over the control of the suit 
on such questions as whether to accept an offer of settlement,”404 which is similarly true 
for third party litigation financing insofar as third parties may possess interests that are 
competing (or complementary, in optimal cases) to those of class members.405  
 
A. OVERVIEW 
In its monumental Report on Class Actions, the Law Commission defined maintenance as 
the “officious intermedd[ling] in a suit”406 in which the maintainer does not possess a proper 
or legitimate interest. The Law Commission also recognized that champerty “refers to a 
                                                        
404 Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Class Actions (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 
1982): 726. 
405 This is similarly true as it pertains to the introduction of additional interests that may come between 
class lawyers and class members, such as those of the third party litigation financier, who may prefer 
strategies concerning settlements (for example) that may not be aligned with the best interests of class 
members. It should be noted, however, that when the interests of the third party litigation financier aligns 
with those of the class members and serves to promote access to justice (in that limited sense), this is a 
consequence of the profit motive of the third party litigation financier serving a complementary role in the 
proceedings and not a consequence of public-spiritedness on the part of the third party litigation financier. 
As this chapter maintains, the motives of the third party litigation financier is universally the profit motive. 
The introduction of such additional interests might require class lawyers to engage in a balancing act to 
satisfy interests that may not be entirely complementary or outright competing. 
406 Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Class Actions, 716-17. 
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species of maintenance in which a person unlawfully maintains an action for a share of the 
proceeds that may be realized as a consequence of the suit.”407 More recently, the Ontario 
Court of Appeal provided a benchmark definition of both doctrines in McIntyre Estate v. 
Ontario (Attorney General):  
 
Maintenance is directed against those who, for an improper motive, often described as 
wanton or officious intermeddling, become involved with disputes (litigation) of others in 
which the maintainer has no interest whatsoever and where the assistance he or she renders 
to one or the other parties is without justification or excuse. Champerty is an egregious 
form of maintenance in which there is the added element that the maintainer shares in the 
profits of the litigation.408  
 
Maintenance does not necessarily involve champerty, whereas champerty necessarily 
involves maintenance; in other words, “without maintenance there can be no champerty.”409 
As it pertains to litigation finance in Ontario’s class action regime, the concerns raised 
primarily revolve around potential champertous behaviour given the universality of 
pecuniary interests.  
 
B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF CHAMPERTY 
The legislative roots of Ontario’s prohibition on champerty originate in the medieval 
English statute Statutum de Conspiratoribus (Statute Concerning Conspirators) from 
1305.410 The medieval language of this statutory prohibition on champerty was eventually 
modernized in 1763 when the Statute Concerning Conspirators was updated and 
                                                        
407 Ibid., 717. 
408 McIntyre Estate v. Ontario (Attorney General) (2002), 61 O.R. (3d) 257 (C.A.) at 26.  
409 Ibid.  
410 Ibid., at 18. 
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republished.411 This English prohibition was introduced in 1792 into the former Province 
of Upper Canada,412 followed by the recently established Province of Ontario’s enactment 
of An Act Respecting Champerty (Champerty Act) in 1897, which holds (in its entirety) as 
follows:  
1.   Champertors be they that move pleas and suits, or cause to be moved, either by their 
own procurement, or by others, and sue them at their proper costs, for to have part 
of the land in variance, or part of the gains. 
2.   All champertous agreements are forbidden and invalid.413  
 
This statute is based on the prior English prohibition. The language of s.1 of the Champerty 
Act is identical to the modern language of the English prohibition from 1763—the 
unambiguous prohibition of all champertous agreements of s.2 was a new addition that was 
formulated by the Ontario legislature in 1897.414 Although the abuses415 that the original 
medieval English statute sought to prohibit are no longer practiced, the prohibition on 
champerty has evolved to include other abusive practices that are broadly within the 
purview of the Champerty Act. These abusive practices include the prevailing 
understanding of champertous conduct as the improper profiting by a third party to 
litigation in which the “champertous maintainer might be tempted, for his own personal 
gain, to inflame the damages, to suppress evidence, or even to suborn witnesses.”416 
                                                        
411 Ibid. 
412 Report on Class Actions, 721. 
413 An Act Respecting Champerty, R.S.O. 1897, c. 327. 
414 McIntyre Estate v. Ontario, at 20.  
415 These abusive practices were unique to medieval English society: “In those times, there existed a 
practice of assigning doubtful or fraudulent claims to Royal officials, nobles and other persons of wealth 
and influence who would be expected to receive a more favourable hearing in court than the assignors. 
Typically, these arrangements provided that the assignee maintain the action and that the proceeds of 
success would be shared between the assignor and assignee. Over time, as conditions in the administration 
of justice improved with the emergence of an impartial and independent judiciary, the circumstances that 
gave rise to the enactment of what is now s. 1 of the Champerty Act no longer existed.” McIntyre Estate v. 
Ontario, at 19. 
416 Report on Class Actions, 719. 
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Notably, maintenance and champerty are no longer common law criminal offences 
in Canada (given the inclusion of s.9 into the Criminal Code of Canada which abolished 
common law offences in 1953). Unlike similar jurisdictions (i.e. England, Australia), 
however, the Champerty Act has not been repealed in Ontario, although the purview of 
maintenance and champerty has been progressively liberalized since the late nineteenth 
century.  
 
C. POLICY OBJECTIVES OF MAINTENANCE & CHAMPERTY 
The primary policy objective of the modern doctrines of maintenance and champerty417 is 
the prevention of litigation (not merely frivolous litigation); that is, the prevention of 
litigation that would not otherwise have been initiated. At the outset of its modern 
incarnation, this prohibition sought to restrict the facilitation of litigation irrespective of its 
merits. Legal historians have suggested that this normative stance “reflected a deeply 
entrenched English attitude that litigation itself was a socially disruptive evil.”418 In other 
words, the prohibition on maintenance and champerty cannot be reduced to administrative 
concerns over the clogging of courts through an increase in frivolous litigation, but rather 
encompasses a broader societal perspective on the undesirability of litigiousness.  
As the OLRC Report observed, the objection to the introduction of contingency 
fees through recourse to the modern doctrines of maintenance and champerty holds that 
contingency fees motivate the stirring up of lawsuits that are both “supportable but would 
                                                        
417 I am using the term “modern” (in the phrase “modern doctrines of maintenance and champerty”) in order 
to distinguish this doctrinal usage from its medieval roots. Although the doctrines are nominally identical, 
the abusive practices which each usage sought to prohibit are sufficiently different to warrant the 
distinction.   
418 Report on Class Actions, 717. 
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not be brought on the client’s initiative and those that are groundless but have nuisance 
value”419 which compounds the “already overcrowded courts and contribut[es] to an 
undesirable litigious attitude in the community.”420 This is the normative stance underlying 
the doctrines, which similarly extends to third party litigation financing. In short, the 
modern policy objective of discouraging litigation is rooted in concerns over the 
administration of justice, as well as broader societal concerns over increased 
litigiousness.421  
 
D. ACCESS TO JUSTICE AS A POLICY OBJECTIVE 
The restricted conception of maintenance and champerty outlined thus far has been 
progressively liberalized since the late nineteenth century by courts to allow for several 
exceptions in the provision of financial assistance by third parties. This expansion has 
primarily occurred as a consequent of balancing the countervailing policy objectives of 
discouraging litigation and increasing access to justice.422 Courts have recognized that the 
policy objective of increasing access to justice has been unduly restrained under the stricter 
                                                        
419 Ibid. 
420 Ibid. 
421 Although doctrinal restrictions remain in effect on the acceptability of such financing agreements, the 
extent to which these restrictions operate on a meaningful basis rather than operating as formalities that 
may be circumvented in a fairly straightforward fashion remains an open question. For example, litigation 
financiers cannot be viewed as stirring up litigation that would not otherwise have been pursued; however, 
the extent to which class action firms can initiate proceedings (for which they may not possess adequate 
resources) with the intention of pursuing a third party financing agreement may effectively circumvent this 
restriction. In other words, a proceeding that is pursued with the prospects of a financing agreement at some 
future date does not formally violate the doctrinal restrictions on maintenance and champerty, but can 
reasonably be interpreted as facilitating a claim that may not otherwise have been pursued.  
422 The countervailing policy objectives in this formulation are largely grounded in a restrictive conception 
of “access to justice” as meaning “access to courts.” This should not be particularly surprising given that 
the expansion of the concept of “access to justice” beyond the strictly court-based conception has primarily 
occurred in later discursive waves as policies have developed to combat the multifaceted nature of 
inaccessibility.   
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conception of maintenance and champerty given its reluctance to differentiate between 
meritorious and frivolous litigation. 
These exceptions in the provision of third party litigation financing have been 
distinguished by the motives attributable to third parties; where exceptions have been 
granted, these motives are adjudged as proper or legitimate by courts. For example, 
litigation funds obtained from family members have been recognized as proper or 
legitimate. Notably, although such funds have been identified as exceptions to maintenance 
for third parties, these exceptions do not extend to champertous agreements; which is to 
say, in cases where a third party (family member) were to possess a pecuniary interest in 
the litigation for which financing has been provided, such a champertous agreement would 
not be recognized by the courts (although practical enforcement of such familial 
agreements is predictably difficult).423 Additionally, charitable donations and altruistic 
legal fundraising activities are typically treated as exceptions to maintenance, however, 
rather like exceptions pertaining to family members, these do not commonly feature in the 
class action context.  
The enormous costs and high risk exposures associated with mounting a class 
action in Ontario has tended to restrict the possibilities of available financing opportunities, 
thereby contributing to the economic barriers associated with multilayer access to justice. 
Legislative initiatives have sought to overcome these economic barriers through various 
measures, such as the legalization of contingency fees which promotes access to justice 
through the economic incentivization of attorneys. In Ontario, this legalization first 
                                                        
423 Poonam Puri, “Financing of Litigation by Third-Party Investors: A Share of Justice?” 529. 
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occurred in the context of class actions with the enactment of the Class Proceedings Act.424 
In this context, all fee arrangements must obtain court approval. Moreover, as the Court of 
Appeal pointed out in McIntyre Estate v. Ontario, which remains the leading case on 
maintenance and champerty, it is not the case that “contingency fee agreements can never 
be champertous,”425 but rather that contingency fee arrangements “should no longer be 
considered per se champertous,”426 and that courts should consider the “circumstances of 
each case”427 before determining whether or not the “requirements for champerty are 
present.”428  
Given the direct applicability, proponents of third party litigation finance have 
sought to liberalize or abolish the laws of maintenance and champerty, with one critic 
positing that the “exceptions are fairly incoherent”429 and the “justifications are ancient and 
anachronistic and hold little force in contemporary society.”430 At the same time, 
proponents have expressed the view that without such financing any given class proceeding 
may never move past the certification stage. Against the critique that third party litigation 
financing is “morally questionable because it will allow third parties to profit from other 
people’s injuries,”431 some critics have argued that “it would seem perverse to maintain the 
status quo and thereby allow wrongdoers to profit from the plaintiff’s inability to pursue a 
                                                        
424 S. 33 (1) of the Class Proceedings Act holds: “Despite the Solicitors Act and An Act Respecting 
Champerty, being chapter 327 of Revised Statutes of Ontario, 1897, a solicitor and a representative party 
may enter into a written agreement providing for payment of fees and disbursements only in the event of 
success in a class proceedings.”  




429 Puri, “Financing of Litigation by Third-Party Investors: A Share of Justice?” 565. 
430 Ibid. 
431 Ibid., 563. 
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legal claim.”432 This latter point is plainly accurate, however, such a view may ultimately 
overvalue the role of private litigation financiers as facilitators of access to justice and 
undervalue to role of public funding models such as Ontario’s Class Proceedings Fund.  
 
E. JUDICIAL ECONOMY & ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
In Ontario, the consequentialist objection that third party finance encourages frivolous 
litigation assumes greater significance in the context of class actions since it evokes a 
primary policy objective of the Class Proceedings Act: judicial economy, that is, the 
preservation of scarce judicial resources. According to this objection, to the extent that 
class actions serve as procedural vehicles in the preservation of scarce judicial resources, 
litigation finance is a contradictory feature of Ontario’s class action regime insofar as such 
financing may encourage frivolous litigation, thereby placing additional (and unnecessary) 
strain on judicial resources. However, there is no empirical evidence in the Canadian 
context that third parties have provided litigation financing for unmeritorious or frivolous 
claims. In point of fact, the economic interests of litigation financiers is rooted in pursuing 
meritorious claims, which is to say, ‘winnable cases’. This is a major reason why litigation 
finance has taken hold globally in jurisdictions with strong reputations for judicial 
excellence and independence, which is to say, in civil justice systems in which meritorious 
cases possess greater degrees of predictability for success.  
 From a critical policy perspective, the primary objective of judicial economy 
(alongside access to justice) of the Class Proceedings Act has occupied a tenuous position 
in Ontario’s class action regime. The formal logic underlying this policy objective holds 




that class actions preserve scarce judicial resources by allowing for the aggregation of 
individual claims that would otherwise clog the courts into a single procedural vehicle, 
thereby allowing for a mass resolution of the aggregated claims and preventing the 
expenditure of judicial resources on duplicative individual claims. By the same token, the 
formal logic underlying the policy objective of access to justice holds that individual claims 
would not be pursued without a vehicle for collective claims-making such as a class action. 
The formal contradiction is abundantly clear: if such claims are individually non-viable, 
then they would not otherwise clog the courts in absence of an aggregative vehicle; if such 
claims would otherwise clog the courts, then they are not individually non-viable.  
However, this distinction is a consequent of a difference in the character of the 
respective claims; that is, negative value claims are those that would likely not be pursued 
without a class action by ‘rational actors’, whereas positive value claims are those that 
would likely be pursued with or without a class action by ‘rational actors’. In the former 
case, the class action promotes access to justice, whereas in the latter case, the class action 
promotes judicial economy. In fact, the class action may also be construed as promoting 
access to justice in the latter case insofar as collective claims-making produces a strength-
in-numbers dynamic against powerful adversaries. Nevertheless, to the extent that class 
actions promote meritorious negative value or individually non-viable claims that would 
not otherwise have been pursued, this promotion contradicts the policy objective of judicial 
economy. From a strictly economical perspective, any increase in litigation contradicts the 
objective of preserving scarce judicial resources, irrespective of the merits or frivolity of 




F. MOTIVE REQUIREMENT 
Although substantive differences in the exceptions are significant – a mother lending 
money to a daughter is substantively different from a charitable donation for a worthy cause 
– a common denominator among these exceptions is the determination of the proper or 
legitimate motive by the courts. Whereas courts previously held that any form of third party 
litigation financing “without lawful excuse”433 amounted to maintenance irrespective of the 
motives of the third party financier, the range of permissible funding sources has since 
progressively expanded through closer scrutiny of such motives.434 As the Court of Appeal 
discerned in McIntyre v Ontario, the second general principle (out of four)435 on 
maintenance and champerty elucidates the criterion of proper or legitimate motive as 
follows: 
For there to be maintenance, the person allegedly maintaining an action or proceeding must 
have an improper motive, which motive may include, but is not limited to, officious 
intermeddling or stirring up strife. There can be no maintenance if the alleged maintainer  
has a justifying motive or excuse.436 
Clearly courts have affirmed the primacy of the motive of the financier in the constitution 
of maintenance. Similarly the Privy Council affirmed the primacy of motive in 1860 by 
holding that maintenance and champerty “must be something against good policy, 
something tending to promote unnecessary litigation, something that in a legal sense is 
                                                        
433 Report on Class Actions, 718.  
434 Ibid.  
435 The general principles outlined in McIntyre v. Ontario are as follows: (1) “Champerty is a subspecies of 
maintenance. Without maintenance, there can be no champerty.” (2) “For there to be maintenance, the 
person allegedly maintaining an action or proceeding must have an improper motive, which motive may 
include, but is not limited to, officious intermeddling or stirring up strife.” (3) “The type of conduct that has 
been found to constitute champerty and maintenance has evolved over time so as to keep in step with the 
fundamental aim of protecting the administration of justice from abuse.” (4) “When the courts have had 
regard to statutes such as the Champerty Act and the Statute Concerning Conspirators, they have not 
interpreted those statutes as cutting down or restricting the elements that were otherwise considered 




immoral and to the constitution of which a bad motive in the same sense is necessary.”437 
This recalls the public policy objective of discouraging litigation over concerns about the 
administration of justice and societal litigiousness. In the case of a charitable donation, 
legal fundraiser, or a family member offering to donate the necessary funds, the 
determination of the motive is fairly unproblematic. However, the prospect of litigation 
financing in the class action context raises a number of concerns that are not necessarily 
applicable in the aforementioned exceptions, not least of which is the universality of third 
party profiting.  
 
G. THE PROFIT MOTIVE: BUYING ACCESS AT THE EXPENSE OF JUSTICE 
It is important to note that whether and to what extent the motives of financiers are 
discernible from the material terms and conditions of financing agreements has thus far 
been largely neglected in the relevant jurisprudence. Plainly speaking, it is not self-evident 
that third party motive is discernible from such material terms and conditions. Although 
courts have largely considered the matter incontrovertible, it is not immediately clear why 
the ‘fairness of the price’438 is indicative of the propriety of the motive, particularly since 
financiers are private enterprises who are motivated by profit maximization; that is, 
irrespective of commission rates or monetary caps, the primary motive of financiers is the 
profit motive. Of course, this does not foreclose the possibility that such financiers have 
                                                        
437 Fischer v. Kamala Naicher (1860), 8 Moo. Ind. App. 170 at 187 (P.C.) as quoted by Poonam Puri, 
“Financing of Litigation by Third-Party Investors,” 527. According to Puri, in addition to the 
aforementioned “bad motive” and the provision of litigation financing, the third party litigation financier 
also “must cause the action to be commenced, aggravated, or enlarged in some way,” in order to constitute 
maintenance.  
438 As maintained in Dugal v. Manulife, a landmark case in the determination of maintenance and 
champerty in the class action context. 
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secondary motives of increasing access to justice. Nevertheless, the point at stake is the 
objective observation that such financiers are not altruistic actors such as legal charities 
nor are the motives strictly discernible from the material terms and conditions of financing 
agreements.  
 Such terms and conditions are perhaps less indicative of the propriety of their 
motives and more indicative of their respective business strategies. It is safe to assume that 
a hypothetical financier does not charge a commission rate of 7 percent (as opposed to 20 
percent) out of public-spirited concern for greater access to justice for class members, but 
rather as a consequent of in-house economic calculations and strategic considerations on 
optimal commission rates (and monetary caps). It is an observation bordering on a truism 
that such private enterprises would charge higher rates if these were acceptable by courts 
(and Private Attorneys General); for example, Australian litigation financiers generally 
charge commission rates in the range of 25-40%, at times as high as 60-70%.439 The 
discernable tendency of approving financing agreements without usurious or 
unconscionable commission rates and caps is likely more indicative of the access to justice 
concerns of courts rather than those of third party financiers.  
 In short, the ‘fairness of the price’ is not indicative of third party motive as much 
as it is indicative of meticulous internal (in-house) deliberations and external (Private 
Attorney General) negotiations that occur in advance of a tentative agreement. The material 
terms and conditions of such agreements are reflections of the profit-maximizing priorities 
of third party financiers. Given that the overriding objective of this process is approval by 
the courts, negotiations that occur in advance of a tentative agreement often consider the 
                                                        
439 Kalajdzic, Cashman, and Longmoore, “Justice for Profit: A Comparative Analysis of Australian, 
Canadian and U.S. Third Party Litigation Funding,” 100. 
 
 158 
boundaries provided by courts on the acceptability of commission rates and caps. The 
immanent criticism herein is not that third party financiers do not sufficiently prioritize 
access to justice—these are profit-driven private enterprises, not state institutions 
motivated by the public interest or altruistic actors such as legal charities—but rather to 
observe that it does not stand to reason that their motivations are proper or legitimate by 
virtue of the material terms and conditions of their proposed agreements. As much as third 
party financiers may gesture towards the public benefits of their financing practices, these 
notional benefits are ultimately secondary to profit maximization.  
Substantively speaking, such profits are generally withdrawn directly out of any 
recovery of the financed litigation—every dollar in profits is a dollar that is not distributed 
to class members.440 The potential for collusion between Private Attorneys General and 
third parties may compound this problem insofar as financing agreements (privately 
negotiated by Private Attorneys General and litigation financiers) with unreasonable terms 
may be pursued against the interests of class members. As Michael Trebilcock and 
Elizabeth Kagedan have pointed out, this type of collusion serves to “stifle or misrepresent 
the value of the claim to the class representative, who is insufficiently informed or 
incentivized to carry out his [sic] role as agent and monitor of these arrangements,”441 
which would ultimately result in “all class members receiving a lower share of the award 
than the risks justify.”442 Such a strong incentive to exploit the informational advantages 
that Private Attorneys General and litigation financiers possess has serious negative 
                                                        
440 Defenders of third party litigation financing may posit that there would be no recovery to be distributed 
to class members without third party litigation financing; in other words, that a smaller percentage of any 
given recovery for class members is preferable to a larger percentage of no recovery whatsoever. As 
explained below, such a view overvalues the role of third party litigation financiers as facilitators of access 
to justice.  
441 Trebilcock and Kagedan, “An Economic Assessment of Third-Party Litigation Funding,” 65. 
442 Ibid.  
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implications for the access to justice benefits of this type of financing; that is to say, 
informational exploitation and the capitalization of imbalanced power relationships would 
“yield an unreasonably low class-member pay-out, compromising access to justice 
objectives.”443  
As a matter of policy, litigation finance may accentuate the deterrence function of 
class actions irrespective of the extent to which funds distributable to class members are 
diminished. This effectively elevates behaviour modification as a secondary policy 
objective to the status of a primary objective (on par with access to justice and judicial 
economy). From an access to justice perspective, the issue becomes whether and to what 
extent litigation finance serves to increase access at the expense of justice; in other words, 
whether and to what extent procedural access (i.e. a day in court) takes precedence over 
substantive justice (i.e. a fair and equitable recovery).  
 To recall the analysis of Chapter 2, the neo-liberalization of civil justice in the class 
action context was underway with the legalization of contingency fees in the Class 
Proceedings Act which introduced economic incentivization (via statute) as a cornerstone 
of the promotion of the policy objective of increasing access to justice—that is, as a form 
of harnessing market forces for the purposes of private regulatory enforcement and public 
policy implementation. The present analysis over the motives of litigation financiers may 
be viewed as a continuation of the previous analysis of the motives of entrepreneurial 
Private Attorneys General. “The motivations driving lawyers and investors are one and the 
                                                        
443 Ibid., 67. As the authors point out, “the most pressing informational concern is that the representative 
plaintiff will accept an inefficient funding agreement that does not reflect the class claim’s actual value and 
probability of success.” Moreover, given that the conception of justice that animates civil litigation 
primarily (though not exclusively: injunctive relief) assumes a monetary form, such reductions in the 
distributable recovery for class members concomitantly amounts to reductions in remunerative justice. 
 
 160 
same,”444 as one proponent of third party litigation financing has observed, which lends 
credence to the view that “[b]ecause the courts and legislatures have condoned the profit-
motive of entrepreneurial class counsel, it is hard to see how the motives of third-party 
funders could be viewed as obnoxious by comparison.”445 By the same token, a critique of 
the structural limitations of the profit motive of entrepreneurial Private Attorneys General 
naturally extends to third party litigation financiers (who are further unrestrained by the 
absence of professional obligations to class members which Private Attorneys General 
otherwise possess). Fundamentally, however, the political-economic dynamics that have 
facilitated the penetration of market forces into the civil justice system (and broader 
regulatory enforcement mechanisms) by courts and legislatures suggests that the 
financialization of litigation is not so much an anomaly as a continuation of neo-liberal 
governance in contemporary Canada.  
 
4. THE MARKETIZATION OF CIVIL JUSTICE 
Despite its nascent stage of development, it has become possible to discern several features 
of the marketization of civil justice in Ontario. The investment imperative of limiting 
exposures to economic instabilities and the desirability of ensuring liquidity in such 
investments contribute to the prospective securitization of litigation investments. 
Moreover, the financialization of litigation ultimately promotes the monetization of 
substantive justice over other types of reparations—this is particularly problematic in the 
context of environmental justice since such collective harms often involve demands for 
                                                        
444 Peter Senkpiel, “Three’s a Crowd: Third-Party Litigation Funding of Class Actions in Canada,” 




non-monetary outcomes, including clean-up of contaminated sites, de-toxification, public 
apologies, medical programmes, educational initiatives, and so forth. Finally, the non-
existence of a state regulatory regime in Ontario and the continuation of the self-regulatory 
model for litigation finance for the foreseeable future has effectively permitted market 
forces to determine the parameters of the emerging industry.  
 
A. LIMITED EXPOSURE TO ECONOMIC INSTABILITIES 
As an ‘investment opportunity’, the modern class action offers the potential for significant 
returns for third party litigation financiers. In Ontario’s class action regime, litigation 
financing has been described as “a hot new investment commodity with high levels of 
reward not available in traditional investment vehicles.”446 The desirability of such “high 
levels of reward” is reinforced by the established settlement culture of class action litigation 
in Ontario, wherein an adversarial void (and the absence of a mandatory amicus curiae) 
and the inefficacies of class objectors have contributed to produce conditions which are 
conducive to favourable settlements for Private Attorneys General (and by extension, third 
party litigation financiers).447  
Although the prospect of a healthy percentage from a class action settlement (or 
judgment) is axiomatically a major attraction for potential investors, the most attractive 
feature of third party litigation finance may be the extent to which such investments are 
sheltered from the instabilities and fluctuations of financial markets. That is to say, the 
cyclical crises of capitalism have served to promote litigation as an investment opportunity 
                                                        
446 Cameron and Kalajdzic, 3. 
447 This is explored in greater detail in Chapter 5. Moreover, the problematic class action settlement culture 
is not unique to Ontario and applies fairly evenly across Canadian jurisdictions. For an overview, see 
Catherine Piché, Fairness in Class Action Settlements (Toronto: Carswell, 2011). 
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with limited market exposure. As one commentator has observed, class action litigation is 
particularly attractive to potential investors as a way to “diversify their investment 
portfolios and achieve gains in bad markets”448 given that such investments “are potentially 
independent of economic conditions, since the prospects of winning a case depend on its 
merits, not the economy.”449 Such investments are portrayed to investors as a strategic form 
of portfolio diversification while simultaneously portrayed to lawmakers and the general 
public as promoting access to justice.  
Clearly the independence of such investments (or their perceived insularity from 
financial markets) originates in the stability and proper functioning of the civil justice 
system. However, the formal logic of this view does not account for the myriad ways in 
which political-economic conditions may influence the behaviour of legal actors who may 
otherwise be integrated in unstable or fluctuating markets; for example, an economically 
faltering class action firm may be compelled to accept a settlement that may otherwise have 
been deemed unacceptable in a more favourable political-economic climate, thereby 
compromising substantive justice for class members.450 The perceived insularity of such 
investments may inadequately account for the broader political economy in which class 
actions are situated. Nevertheless, this perceived insularity likely contributed to the growth 
of the third party litigation financing industry in the aftermath of the 2008 Global Financial 
Crisis in common-law jurisdictions where such investment practices are permissible.451 It 
                                                        
448 Senkpiel, “Three’s a Crowd: Third-Party Litigation Funding of Class Actions in Canada,” 311. See also, 
Sara Randazzo, “Litigation Financing Attracts New Set of Investors,” The Wall Street Journal 15 May 
2016, online: http://www.wsj.com/articles/litigation-financing-attracts-new-set-of-investors-1463348262.  
449 Ibid.  
450 This is similarly applicable to both corporate and governmental defendants who may be influenced in a 
variety of ways by shifting political-economic conditions.  
451 In addition to the relative insularity of such investments from the instabilities and fluctuations of the 
political economy, Kalajdzic and Cameron have pointed out that “tough economic times decrease 
traditional finance options and litigants’ risk tolerance.” See supra note 336.  
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is perhaps ironic (and almost tautological) that this type of financialization is viewed as an 
advantageous development by prospective investors given the insularity of such 
investments from the instabilities generated by financial capital.   
 
B. THE SECURITIZATION OF LITIGATION INVESTMENTS 
Since third party litigation financing can be accurately identified as an investment, Poonam 
Puri has suggested that such investments should be subject to the Ontario Securities Act.452 
According to Puri, such an application of the OSA is legitimate given that a security is by 
definition “any investment contract”453 and an investment contract is subjected to a four-
pronged test which third party litigation financing agreements typically meet: 
(1)   money has to be invested; 
(2)   in a common enterprise; 
(3)   with the expectation of profit; 
(4)   to be derived primarily from the efforts of others.454 
Such a prospective designation aims to constitute a securities market in litigation, thereby 
promoting third party litigation financing insofar as such investments would no longer lack 
liquidity, which has been a major undesirable feature of the current industry for investors. 
At present, the absence of a secondary market on which to trade litigation investments qua 
securities generally obliges third party financiers to commit to the duration of the financed 
proceeding (assuming the material conditions of any given financing agreement have not 
been violated by Private Attorneys General, which may permit third party financiers to 
                                                        
452 For an overview of the securitization of litigation finance in the United States, see, e.g., Maya Steinitz, 
“Whose Claim is this Anyway? Third Party Litigation Funding,” Minnesota Law Review 95, no. 4 (2011): 
1268-338. 
453 Puri, “Financing of Litigation by Third-Party Investors: A Share of Justice?” 545.     
454 Ibid.    
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withdraw).455 Although the prospect may appear remote—given the nascent stage of third 
party litigation finance in Ontario—there appears to be a growing consensus that the 
creation of a securities market is an inevitability. Even proponents of third party litigation 
finance have conceded that such an inevitable development would effectively “turn 
litigation into a stock market.”456 The implications of securitization for Ontario’s class 
action regime are remarkable: in a regime dominated by investor rights, class actions are 
being transformed into investments; securities class actions are transformed into securities. 
Ultimately, as a critical enabler of financialization, this securitization of litigation 
investments into tradable assets reinforces the power of financial capital in democratic 
states and societies.  
 
C. MARKET RATIONALITY & MONETIZATION 
From both a theoretical and empirical standpoint, a major concern in turning courts into 
stock markets is the deeper penetration of market rationalities into civil justice. For 
instance, the dominant preferences of financial investors for short-term gains may have 
negative impacts in the context of third party litigation financing. Such financiers do not 
possess fiduciary duties towards class members, but rather owe such duties to their 
shareholders, whose investment preferences may contradict litigation strategies that are 
beneficial to class members. This is a particularly striking concern in jurisdictions where 
litigation finance is self-regulated and does not involve adherence to codes of conduct. As 
                                                        
455 Courts have expressed caution regarding financing agreements that include voluntary withdrawal 
options for third party litigation financiers given the potential for undue influence or control that such an 
option may manifest. 
456 Senkpiel, “Three’s a Crowd: Third-Party Litigation Funding of Class Actions in Canada”, 314. In other 
words, the polemical critique of third party litigation financing as the legalization of buying and selling 
litigation may become a practical reality. 
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Elizabeth Chamblee Burch has observed, litigation financiers may be incentivized to 
“pressure plaintiffs to settle early, so that they can report higher quarterly profits” 457 for 
their shareholders. Such incentivization may extend to Private Attorneys General and 
compound the collusive tendencies of Ontario’s class action regime. In cases where these 
incentives align, Private Attorneys General and litigation financiers are incentivized to 
“collude with the defendant if the deal financially benefits them, pressure plaintiffs to 
accept an offer through questionable means, and misallocate settlement funds if it is 
necessary for achieving the deal’s required consensus.”458 Moreover, the marketization of 
civil justice would effectively prioritize the monetization of multilayer access to justice 
given that litigation financiers are principally motivated by profit maximization rather than 
access to justice concerns. This motivation may incentivize financiers and Private 
Attorneys General to compel representative plaintiffs to pursue a “simple monetary award 
instead of a socially desirable remedy such as injunction or clean-up.”459 Such a 
prioritization of monetary recoveries over other forms of substantive justice is particularly 
worrisome in the environmental context, which often involves non-monetary interests and 
social calls for restoration of polluted land, air, and water, as well as myriad other forms of 
redress, including medical programs and public apologies. In short, the penetration of 
market rationalities and monetization priorities is largely incongruent with environmental 
claims, which often favour preventative measures and deterrence over (or in addition to) 
compensatory damages. Even proponents of litigation finance, such as Maya Steinitz, have 
recognized that “a socially undesirable element to the commodification of legal claims is 
                                                        
457 Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, “Financiers as Monitors in Aggregate Litigation,” New York University Law 
Review 87, no. 5 (2012): 1319. 
458 Ibid.  
459 Trebilcock and Kagedan, 73. 
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to purely monetize all legal recovery, thereby dramatically affecting choice of remedies.”460 
The reinforcement of such monetizing imperatives may effectively reduce the multifaceted 
remedies sought by environmental classes into strictly compensatory forms favoured by 
litigation financiers—a reduction that would largely occur with the active or passive 
participation of Private Attorneys General working on a contingency fee basis who 
similarly prefer such compensation over other forms of remedies.   
 
D. REGULATORY GAP IN ONTARIO’S LITIGATION FINANCE INDUSTRY 
There is no statutory framework for regulating third party litigation financing in Ontario. 
The Law Society of Upper Canada has adopted a ‘wait and watch’ approach for the 
regulation of the litigation finance industry, which has effectively permitted the industry to 
remain self-regulated apart from the case-by-case interventions of class action judges.461 In 
its forthcoming review of Ontario’s class action regime, the Law Commission of Ontario 
will consider the emerging third party litigation financing industry, although the 
recommendations to the Ministry of the Attorney General that may emerge from its Class 
Action Project are not presently ascertainable.462 In other words, the emergence of the third 
party litigation finance industry has occurred largely as a self-regulated enterprise without 
governmental oversight—a state of affairs that will likely continue for the foreseeable 
future.  
Insofar as the modern class action operates as a policy instrument for private 
regulatory enforcement and the emergence of this industry has reinforced the dominance 
                                                        
460 Steinitz, “Whose Claim is this Anyway? Third Party Litigation Funding,” 1321. 
461 Cameron and Kalajdzic, 10. 
462 Whether the Law Commission of Ontario’s recommendations will differ from the ‘wait and watch’ 
approach of the Law Society of Upper Canada is a matter of speculation at present.   
 
 167 
of market forces in civil justice by financializing litigation, the absence of any state 
regulatory regime warrants greater reflection. The restructuring in neo-liberal governance 
towards the harnessing of market forces in the pursuit of policy objectives becomes 
especially problematic in the context of litigation finance given the absence of any so-
called ‘harnessing’ by regulatory bodies. The absence of a state regulatory regime has 
effectively permitted market forces to dictate the parameters of the emerging industry with 
scant judicial oversight. In practical terms, the current case-by-case model of subjecting 
proposed financing agreements to judicial review (to ensure doctrinal compliance) creates 
a fragmentary regulatory regime that lacks the comprehensiveness and sustainability of a 
principle-based statutory framework.  
This self-regulatory model has been endorsed by some proponents of third party 
litigation financing who view state interventions as cumbersome and constraining to the 
operation of market forces. Trebilcock and Kagedan have argued that the maintenance of 
the prevailing self-regulatory model is preferable on the basis that a robust regulatory 
regime “would be heavy-handed and inefficient”463 and may ultimately stifle litigation 
financing, although the authors consider the possibility of an amendment to the Class 
Proceedings Act to provide guidance on the acceptability of financing agreements.464 In a 
recent intervention, Puri has proposed a principle-based legislative framework that 
promotes transparency and fairness through the mitigation of “potential power 
imbalance[s] and information asymmetries”465 and outlines the expectations of all parties 
                                                        
463 Trebilcock and Kagedan, 81-2. Such an amendment would endorse a Kaplowian conception of standards 
(as opposed to rules) given the divergences in class actions, which may at times be fairly straightforward 
with minimal risks and at other times engage novel interpretations of law with high risks. 
464 Ibid. 
465 Poonam Puri, “Profitable Justice: Aligning Third-Party Financing of Litigation with the Normative 
Functions of the Canadian Judicial System,” Canadian Business Law Journal 55, no. 1 (2014): 53. Puri 
reviews other methods for regulating third party litigation financing, including an approach based on the 
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“with the judiciary interpreting, applying and enforcing the legislation”466 in cases where 
disputes arise. This legislative model is an improvement from the “incremental, case-by-
case approach that is currently the norm [which] lacks the capacity to provide timely and 
comprehensive regulatory reform.”467 To reiterate, however, the prospects of implementing 
a state regulatory regime for litigation finance remain remote at present in Ontario.  
 
E. STRANGE BEDFELLOWS: REGULATION PROMOTION BY CAPITAL GROUPS  
Somewhat ironically, vociferous proponents of robust statutory frameworks for the 
regulation of the litigation finance industry have largely come from ‘free enterprise’ 
interests that generally advocate in favour of self-regulatory models. The most prominent 
example has been the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Institute for Legal Reform, which has 
released a series of publications and increased lobbying efforts against the emerging 
litigation finance industry in the United States. According to the Chamber of Commerce, 
litigation finance “represents a clear and present danger to the impartial and efficient 
administration of civil justice”468 based on four public policy implications:  
1.   The potential for an increase in frivolous litigation;469 
2.   The potential for financiers to wrest control over the litigation from plaintiffs 
and counsel;470 
3.   The potential for the prolongation of litigation and the deterrence of 
settlement;471 
                                                        
fiduciary duty of the attorney-client relationship and the maintenance of the prevailing case-by-case 
approach, while ultimately endorsing a new principle-based legislative framework.   
466 Ibid., 49. 
467 Ibid. 
468 John H. Beisner and Gary A. Rubin, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Institute for Legal Reform, “Stopping 
the Sale of Lawsuits: A Proposal to Regulate Third-Party Investments in Litigation,” (2012): 1. 
469 Ibid., 4. 
470 Ibid., 4-5. 
471 Ibid., 5-6. 
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4.   The potential ethical compromises in attorney-client relationships with the 
inclusion of a third party.472 
In light of these potentialities, the Institute for Legal Reform advocates for the 
establishment of a “robust oversight regime”473 which includes the creation of a federal 
agency “empowered to make rules and regulations in pursuit of its mandate and to enforce 
any laws, rules, or regulations governing [third party litigation finance].”474 According to 
this view, the potential risks of litigation finance “are simply too acute to be left to industry 
self-regulation.”475 Presumably the Institute for Legal Reform considers the acuteness of 
these risks to be significantly worse than those posed in other areas for which deregulatory 
campaigns have been waged, including against environmental, financial, health, 
employment, and consumer regulatory protections. More to the point, the Institute for 
Legal Reform has reinforced these consequentialist and jurisprudential objections with 
quasi-moral objections to the effect that litigation finance is “antithetical to the free 
enterprise system because it allows private parties to subject businesses involuntarily to the 
coercive effects of our litigation system, all for the purpose of profit.”476 This selective 
protestation of the profit-motive recalls the earlier critique of class actions as discussed in 
Chapter 2. Needless to say, the Institute for Legal Reform has focused its efforts on 
preventing the use of litigation finance in the class action context, which gestures towards 
                                                        
472 Ibid., 6. 
473 Ibid., 2. 
474 Ibid. 
475 The US Chamber of Commerce’s Institute for Legal Reform contends that “the risks posed by [third 
party litigation financing] investments are so serious, and the incentives for misconduct by [third party 
litigation financing] investment companies are so great, that industry self-regulation is not a viable option 
to protect the administration of civil justice.” Ibid., 7. 
476 Ibid., 15. 
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an implicit recognition that litigation finance bolsters the capacities of entrepreneurial 
Private Attorneys General to pursue class actions against corporate actors.477  
Despite the at-times salient observations that inform such objections—such as the 
criticism advanced in the 2009 report, Selling Lawsuits, Buying Trouble, that a litigation 
financier seeks to “protect its investment, and its interest lies in maximizing its return on 
that investment, not in vindicating a plaintiff’s rights,”478 which raises valid access to 
justice concerns—it is not particularly difficult to interpret the critiques and proposals of 
corporate interests in a strategic light; which is to say, as stemming from self-interested 
concerns over the potential adverse consequences for corporate behaviour (rather than 
concerns over the administration of justice or access to justice for collective claims-
makers). As one commentator has observed, an “objection to the commodification of civil 
justice by [litigation finance] is likely to be purely strategic unless it is part of a broader 
theoretical agenda that seeks to displace economic modes of valuation from areas of life in 
which they do not belong.”479 The stance of this project has been precisely such a 
displacement of ‘economic modes of valuation’ from social and democratic life, whereas 
the objections of capital groups such as the Chamber of Commerce transparently evinces 
such strategic maneuvering. Interestingly, this strategic objection has created a peculiar 
situation in which socially progressive critics of self-regulation are provisionally (and for 
disparate reasons) aligned with their conventional adversaries in advocating for robust 
regulatory regimes in litigation finance.  
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5. THE PUBLIC MODEL: CLASS PROCEEDINGS FUND 
Although the OLRC Report’s recommendation that Ontario should discontinue the English 
Rule for its then-forthcoming class action regime was ultimately rejected by the Ministry 
of the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee on Class Action Reform in 1990, the 
Advisory Committee nevertheless recommended that the preservation of the English Rule 
should be accompanied by the creation of a sustainable public fund to promote the public 
interest and mitigate any disincentives of adverse costs awards.480 As the comprehensive 
review of the Class Proceedings Fund observed in 2013: “access to justice is the most 
fundamental objective of class proceedings, and as the Attorney General’s Advisory 
Committee recognized, it risked being undermined without the existence of a costs-
assistance fund.”481 According to the amendment of the Law Society Act, 1990, section 59.1 
holds the dual purposes of the Class Proceedings Fund as follows: 
1.   Financial support for plaintiffs to class proceedings and to proceedings commenced 
under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, in respect of disbursements related to the 
proceeding. 
2.   Payments to defendants in respect of costs awards made in their favour against 
plaintiffs who have received financial support from the Fund.482 
The Law Foundation of Ontario provided an endowment of $500,000 to the Class 
Proceedings Fund with the objective that the public fund should operate on a financially 
self-sustaining model: a 10% levy is charged for all class actions that have been granted 
financing (i.e. disbursements and/or indemnification), thereby ensuring its continued 
operation. As of June 2015, the Class Proceedings Fund had expanded to $9,495,618, a 
                                                        
480 Ontario, Report of the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee on Class Action Reform (Toronto: The 
Committee, 1990): 56-73.  
481 Class Proceedings Fund: 20 Years in Review (2013): 4. 
482 Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8. 
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1,900% increase in its funding capacities.483 Despite criticisms that the Class Proceedings 
Fund is too restrictive in its case selection methods—applications are evaluated according 
to the criteria provided by the Law Society Act (i.e. merits, public interest, reasonable 
proposal for funding usage, etc.)—out of 106 applications (excluding deferred and 
withdrawn/cancelled applications), it has approved 82 applications for an effective 
approval rate above 75%.484 Ultimately, the continued existence of the Class Proceedings 
Fund as a public option for litigation financing suggests that class actions in Ontario have 
a viable option for financing (for disbursements and indemnification). 
 
A. PRIVATE AND PUBLIC LITIGATION FINANCING 
Nevertheless, the emergence of this growing industry has renewed criticisms of the 
purported obsolescence of public financing of class actions in favour of the preferability of 
a market-based solution. Yet the case selection preferences for private litigation financiers 
and the Class Proceedings Fund are distinguished by the motives of profit maximization—
whereas the Class Proceedings Fund prioritizes access to justice and the public interest in 
case selection, private litigation financiers prioritize profit maximization in case selection. 
These priorities are reflected in the selected cases. Among these cases, private litigation 
financiers have preferred “high-stakes, large securities cases,”485 whereas the Class 
Proceedings Fund has financed public interest cases of various sizes in different areas of 
the law, including employment, environmental, pensions, residential schools, and 
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consumer protection.486 The social ordering imposed by such market discipline with the 
proliferation of litigation finance is self-evident. As the current counsel to the Class 
Proceedings Committee, Gina Papageorgiou, observes:  
[T]here are fewer concerns about conflicts of interest in CPF-funded cases, and disbursement 
funding has been more generous than any provided by third party funders. Because it is not 
driven by profit and operates in the public interest, the CPF has historically funded a variety 
of different types of cases and many important public interest and novel cases, which likely 
would not have proceeded without it, and which have not attracted third party funders.487 
Indeed, the numerous consequentialist and jurisprudential objections that have been levied 
against the litigation financing industry are largely inapplicable to the Class Proceedings 
Fund. More to the point, its non-profit status as a public option effectively obviates any 
anti-commodification objections.   
 
B. RESTRUCTURING THE FUND 
Notwithstanding its empirically substantiated strong condition as a public option for 
litigation financing, a potential legislative reform that has been proposed is to modify its 
fixed 10% levy to encourage greater flexibility and promote applications that might 
otherwise have been disincentivized. For example, some cases might possess more 
reasonable prospects of success and may therefore warrant lower levies. Jean-Marc Leclerc 
has raised concerns about a number of features of the Class Proceedings Fund, including 
its inflexible 10 percent levy and the fact that its financing coverage is limited to 
disbursements and adverse costs awards (it does not cover fees).488 In contrast, Quebec 
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offers financing for legal fees in addition to disbursements. The selectivity of its financing 
as well as its rigid (perhaps exorbitant) levy has resulted in the Class Proceeding Fund’s 
lower usage rates (10-20% of all class actions in Ontario). Garry Watson has suggested 
that the objective of the Class Proceedings Fund may be more successfully achieved if its 
levy were lowered and subsequently imposed on “all class action recoveries, whether or 
not these are covered by the Fund.”489 Similarly, Ward Branch has contrasted Ontario’s 
public financing program with Quebec’s Fonds d’aide aux recours collectifs which 
imposes a mandatory (and variegated) levy on all class action recoveries; a financing model 
that has logically contributed to higher usage rates.490  
Evaluating the merits of adopting the Quebec model, Jon Bricker has pointed out 
that the Fonds “continues to rely on public funding”491 and “[i]f tried in Ontario, public 
funding would almost certainly be resisted on both ideological grounds and on grounds 
that it is far less reliable than the current, self-sustaining funding model” [emphasis 
added].492 Although it is not axiomatic that a self-sustaining funding model is any more (or 
less) reliable than a public funding model, the more significant question may be the 
ideological opposition that would inevitably arise from such a proposal, which gestures 
toward the various socio-political forces acting upon Ontario’s (and other provincial) class 
action regime(s). The ideological preferences in Ontario’s class action regime for market-
based solutions to litigation financing are rooted in the neo-liberal belief in the goodness 
                                                        
489 Garry Watson, “Class Actions: The Canadian Experience” Duke Journal of Comparative and 
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of free markets. In an analysis of the role of political ideology in the introduction of class 
action regimes in Canada, Jacob Ziegel has suggested that class actions originated in 
Quebec in 1978 (the first province in Canada) given the “anti-capitalistic”493 tendencies of 
Rene Levesque’s government. This contrasts with the dominant proceduralism through 
which class actions in Ontario have historically been conceptualized. Notably, Quebec’s 
class action regime is distinguished by the primacy of access to justice considerations in 
judicial decision-making (at the certification stage), whereas Ontario’s class action regime 
exhibits a greater emphasis on judicial economy (at the certification stage).494 Such 
differences in legal cultures are not inconsequential given that the major battleground for 
class actions is the certification stage (once certified, class actions typically result in 
settlements). Moreover, the originary distinction between the ‘anti-capitalism’ of Quebec’s 
regime and the proceduralism of Ontario’s regime may help explain why Quebec has 
adopted a more collectivist or social democratic form of public financing which is 
uniformly imposed on all class actions in the province, whereas Ontario has adopted a more 
liberal form of public financing which promotes freedom of choice in financing options. It 
should be noted, however, that the public financing model has not only proven to be a 
viable policy option in Ontario, but that it may be further strengthened by following the 
example provided by Quebec’s Fonds model of litigation financing. In short, the notion 
that private litigation financing provides a service that public models are incapable of 
providing is neither persuasive nor empirically substantiated in the established literature.495  
                                                        
493 Jacob Ziegel, “Political Ideology and Class Action Legislation,” in Janet Walker and Garry Watson, 
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At root, third party litigation financing is a market-based solution for the high costs and 
risks associated with civil litigation, which are compounded in the context of the modern 
class action. Notwithstanding the continuing application of the English Rule in Ontario’s 
class action regime—which encourages the pursuit of indemnification by third parties as 
an insurance measure against adverse costs awards—the emerging litigation finance 
industry operates on the acceptance of economic barriers to multilayer access to justice as 
established facts. In other words, third party litigation financing provides Private Attorneys 
General with the capacities to overcome certain economic barriers to multilayer access to 
justice (i.e. high costs and risks) without eliminating these economic barriers. The position 
that such litigation financing may promote multilayer access to justice by overcoming 
economic barriers to the civil justice system and facilitating the pursuit of meritorious 
claims presupposes that these economic barriers remain for those meritorious claimants 
who are not able to secure adequate litigation financing. If Ontario’s class action regime is 
the “sport of kings”496  given that “only kings or equivalent can afford it,”497 as the Supreme 
Court observed in Kerr v. Daniel Leather, then third party litigation financing serves to 
intensify this capital-intensive sport by coronating select claimants.498 The underlying 
economic barriers to multilayer access to justice ultimately remain in place for every 
claimant who cannot ascend to the throne. It may be instructive to observe that in 
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Australia—the leading jurisdiction for litigation finance in the world—a court recently 
observed: 
It is a very good system [Western Australian justice system], the envy of many countries in 
the world. Every conceivable process is available to ensure that no stone is left unturned in 
the search for a just resolution. It is the Rolls Royce of justice systems in the sense that it is 
the best that money, a lot of money, can buy. 
 
But there isn’t much point in owning a Rolls Royce if you can’t afford the fuel to drive it 
where you want to go. You can polish it, admire it and take pride of ownership from it but it 
doesn’t perform its basic function sitting in the garage... 
 
The community owns the justice system of this State but very few of its citizens can afford 
to engage in its processes. It might be time to consider trading our Rolls Royce for a lighter, 
more contemporary and more fuel efficient vehicle which we can actually afford to drive and 
which will get us where we need to go just as effectively and perhaps more quickly.499 
The inaccessibility problem for which litigation finance is a market-based solution remains 
the unaffordability of civil justice, particularly in the class action context with its enormous 
costs and associated risks. Although litigation finance may promote procedural access to 
justice in select cases, the underlying economic barriers remain in place.  
 Furthermore, the gatekeeping role played by Private Attorneys General may be 
compounded by the inclusion of a third party financier with its own motivations and 
qualification criteria for case selection. Although litigation financiers proclaim the access 
to justice benefits of these ‘investment opportunities,’ such financiers determine whether a 
claim meets the qualification criteria for financing based on “a risk-adjusted valuation of 
the case, using traditional financial metrics, to come up with an estimation of value and 
return.”500 In short, the imperatives of profitability are determinative of case selection; the 
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potential access to justice benefits of such financing are dependent on the profitability of 
any given case. This raises the inevitable question of previous chapters: what happens to 
those claims that are not deemed sufficiently profitable? In this light, the emerging 
litigation finance industry in Ontario (and jurisdictions globally) can be conceptualized a 
novel facet of financialization of disciplinary neo-liberalism in the twenty-first century. 
Thus far, litigation financiers have primarily focused on high-value securities 
actions, which is to say, actions that possess high potential rates of return and a modicum 
of predictability. More to the point, securities class actions are dominant in Ontario’s class 
action regime (in the broad sense) and in Ontario’s litigation finance industry (in the limited 
sense). The primacy of investor rights as opposed to other types of harmed interests (i.e. 
human rights claims, labour exploitation, environmental degradation, etc.) should be a 
cause for concern for those who appreciate the capacities of class actions as ‘crucial 
instruments’ of social protection. Whether these potential capacities are actualized by the 
penetration of market forces into civil justice remains a questionable proposition. As 
several commentators have observed, the “commodification of litigation [...] does nothing 
to increase access to justice for litigants with human rights, civil rights or other public law 
based claims.”501 
 To conclude, this critical analysis has served as an extension of the politico-
economic critique offered in Chapter 2 that a co-optative conception of class actions 
promotes the privatization of regulatory enforcement which contributes to allowing market 
forces to largely determine which collective claimants are able to access justice. The 
emergence this type of financialization in Ontario has reinforced this market 
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fundamentalism by allowing the penetration of market forces into civil justice through 
various measures, including the liberalization of maintenance and champerty laws which 
have traditionally prohibited such financial activities. Moreover, the prospective 
securitization of litigation, the regulatory gap, and ideological resistances to collectivist 
models of public financing must be conceptualized within the broader social, political, and 
economic context. Finally, through the justificatory logic of increasing access to justice, 
the financialization of litigation through third party financing has further promoted the 
penetration of market rationality into civil justice. The gendered and racial biases inherent 
in commodification and the unequal distribution of accessibility remain outstanding issues 
of concern in a class action regime such as Ontario’s that prioritizes the protection of 























For nearly five decades, it has been axiomatic that environmental claims are especially 
well-suited for class actions. The globalization of class actions since American legislators 
ushered in the modern class action in 1966 has been distinguished by this widespread 
belief. In Canada, the introduction of class action legislation by the socially progressive 
Parti Québécois of René Lévesque in 1978 and the Ontario New Democratic Party of Bob 
Rae in 1992—the latter opening the floodgates for common law provinces in Canada to 
adopt similar legislation—was similarly distinguished by the notion that environmental 
claims are paradigmatic class actions. The reasoning that informs this popular belief is 
rooted in the multilayer interests (individual; collective; public) served in the pursuit of 
environmental class actions in light of the negligible enforcement (or non-enforcement) of 
environmental rules and regulations in Canada. Moreover, environmental class actions 
generally involve negative value claims that would not otherwise be individually brought 
by ‘economically rational’ actors (i.e. the cost of individually pursuing such claims 
outweighs the benefits; the risk of adverse costs awards similarly prefigures into such 
economic calculations). This widespread belief is reasonable given the combination of 
negative value claims and negligible regulatory enforcement in light of access to justice 
being a primary policy objective of class actions. However,  the capacity of environmental 
class actions to promote access to justice has been restricted in several jurisdictions, foreign 
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and domestic, including Ontario. The empirical reality of environmental class actions is 
not reflective of the theoretical promise of their promotive capacities.   
As explored in previous chapters, class actions serve as integral pillars of a private 
enforcement regime in Ontario that permits market forces to largely dictate access to justice 
priorities (Chapter 2). The social and political impacts of privatizing enforcement are 
compounded by litigation financialization in Ontario (Chapter 3) which intensifies the 
marketization of civil justice. Although these politico-economic developments apply to 
class actions on a general level, the material effects of this wide applicability are not evenly 
distributed across Ontario’s regime. For example, securities class actions involving 
investor rights are the primary beneficiaries of the neo-liberalization of civil justice, as 
opposed to actions involving environmental justice, human rights, discrimination, 
exploitative labour conditions, and other areas that disproportionately involve low-income, 
racialized, and gendered claimants. The supposedly neutral and value-free ‘scientific’ 
character of market criteria and imperatives effectively prioritizes the interests of certain 
socio-demographic sectors over others, exhibiting a “strategic silence”502 about this 
inequitable distribution and social ordering. Considering the policy justifications of such 
politico-economic developments as promoting access to justice in conjunction with the 
general consensus of the paradigmatic character of environmental class actions, we might 
reasonably expect that environmental class actions have been major beneficiaries of such 
developments. It may be surprising to discover, however, that such promotive benefits have 
failed to materialize in the environmental context. That no environmental class action has 
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been successful at trial in Canadian common law provinces reinforces this systemic failure 
of environmental claims to fulfill their original promise.503  
This state of affairs extends to the pre-trial certification stage. A recent quantitative 
study of certification decisions in Ontario between 2010-2015 found that 143 decisions 
were rendered during this period with 112 proceedings certified at first instance across the 
categories of class actions.504 Environmental claims ranked last across this range, which 
included securities, consumer protection, employment, competition, Crown liability, 
franchise, investment fraud, pension, intellectual property, and privacy claims. Only a 
single environmental claim was advanced among the 143 applications for certification.505  
It goes without saying that securities actions dominated as the most prevalent category.506 
These statistical findings provide quantitative support for the standpoint that Ontario’s 
class action regime has shifted at the level of the decision-making of Private Attorneys 
General against environmental claims. It is not solely that environmental claims are 
advanced and denied certification, but rather that they have largely ceased to be advanced 
altogether.  
 This chapter examines the great chasm between the widespread view of 
environmental class actions as paradigmatic claims and the abysmal reality of their 
floundering in Ontario’s regime. A critical analysis of the ways in which the political 
                                                        
503 This is tempered by the phenomenon of the ‘vanishing trial’ and the strong judicial and public policy 
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economy of pollution constructs barriers to multilayer access to environmental justice is 
developed by exploring the paradigm of scientific uncertainty that structures environmental 
claims, including the complexities of health-based harms associated with toxic 
consumption, the lack of empirical data to substantiate claims of health-impairment, and 
the discursive misalignment of scientific inquiry and legal reasoning. The chapter proceeds 
by (1) critically exploring scientific uncertainty in toxic consumption and (2) identifying 
the problematics of establishing toxic causation in environmental health-impairment 
claims. These two sections comprise the parameters of the argument that Ontario’s class 
action regime systematically privileges private property over human health in 
environmental justice. A series of representative case studies are subsequently provided 
that substantiate the central contention of this privileging of private property. Throughout 
this chapter, the exclusionary dynamics of environmental class actions are addressed 
through an analysis of vulnerable groups whose social reproduction is disproportionately 
harmed by environmental injustices, thereby revealing the ‘strategic silence’ of permitting 
market forces to largely determine social priorities. 
 
1. THE PARADIGM OF SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY 
One of the greatest substantive barriers to multilayer access to environmental justice is the 
prevalence of scientific uncertainty, particularly in claims involving human health-
impairment. This prevalence operates in a mutually constitutive manner with economic 
barriers; for example, scientific uncertainty contributes to the exclusionary dynamics of 
Ontario’s class action regime by disincentivizing entrepreneurial Private Attorneys 
General from pursuing otherwise meritorious claims. Given the reversed recruiting 
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paradigm in Ontario’s regime, the gatekeeping role played by Private Attorneys General is 
influenced by the prospects of success for potential claims—such prospects are 
significantly diminished in health-impairing claims involving high degrees of scientific 
uncertainty. As this section explicates, scientific uncertainty manifests in various ways 
throughout Ontario’s class action regime. These manifestations have the cumulative effect 
of disincentivizing the pursuit of multilayer environmental justice in Ontario’s regime by 
diminishing the prospects of success for such claims at trial (or more commonly, the pre-
trial certification stage). Notably, the lack of empirical data, the complexities of evidence 
and toxic harms, and the incongruities of scientific inquiry and legal reasoning produce 
mutually constitutive barriers to access to environmental justice.  
 
A. TOXIC KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION 
The difficulties associated with mounting an environmental class action originate in 
substantive form with the myriad fields of scientific inquiry that are implicated in evidence 
production. From an economic perspective, the procurement of expert testimony and 
evidential research is a capital-intensive process that operates as a major disincentive for 
risk-averse and budget-constrained Private Attorneys General, particularly when 
governmental research into the health-impairing effects of relevant toxicants is either 
inexistent or negligible. Without state-sanctioned research (or insufficient research), the 
prospects of multilayer access to environmental justice are exceedingly remote; several 
factors may contribute to such insufficiencies, including political recalcitrance and 
budgetary restrictions as a result of broader economic restructuring and the squeezing of 
fiscal space. Neo-liberal fiscal policy and regressive tax regimes have precipitated 
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declining state expenditures on research initiatives affecting the social reproduction of 
Canadians in general and vulnerable people in particular.507 
The most common domains of knowledge production relevant to environmental 
class actions include pharmacology, toxicology, and epidemiology.508 In cases involving 
public health considerations, the primary scientific field of inquiry is generally 
epidemiology, which is traditionally conceived as “the science of the distribution of 
diseases and other health-related features in human populations and of the factors that 
influence this distribution.”509 The standard feature of such studies is the linkages between 
a target human population and the distribution of health-impairing events as distinguished 
by exposures to specific variables. From the perspective of collective claims-makers, 
epidemiological studies provide suggestions on potential causalities between health-
impairment and toxic exposures (these do not attain the certainty of strict causation, 
although such studies are beneficial when conjoined with other forms of scientific 
evidence). Although epidemiological studies possess a wide spectrum of potential faults, 
including the underestimation of the prevalence of health-impairment, the most 
consequential limitation for public health in Canada is the lack of such studies given their 
resource-intensive character (i.e. time and funding). Without strong epidemiological 
evidence, many potential environmental health claims flounder at the case selection stage 
for Private Attorneys General; in other words, as gatekeepers to justice, Private Attorneys 
General typically evaluate the availability of necessary empirical data (of which 
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epidemiological studies figure prominently). Given the significant investment of time and 
funding sources, the probability of Private Attorneys General independently undertaking 
epidemiological studies are exceedingly remote. In qualitative interviews undertaken for 
this project, not a single participant would consider an environmental health-impairment 
claim without significant extant empirical research—the potential of independently 
undertaking such research was viewed as practically inconceivable.  
In similar fashion, toxicological studies that examine the “adverse effects of 
chemicals on living organisms”510 with a primary focus on “substances that can cause 
[poisonous] adverse effects after exposure to relatively small quantities”511 are often 
necessary evidentiary studies in environmental class actions. Such studies are similarly 
time-consuming and capital-intensive processes that are beyond the resource capacities of 
Private Attorneys General. Moreover, toxicological studies are premised on the 
extrapolation of evidence-formation in animal testing to human beings (a process that is 
often problematized by defendants in the class action context despite the wealth of 
corroborating evidence that such extrapolations possess a high degree of veracity).512 The 
extensive investments of time and resources necessary for toxicological studies produce 
situations wherein toxicants that are socio-culturally recognized as poisonous remain open 
to questionable counter-claims for extended periods of time. For example, despite 
widespread recognition in developed societies throughout the twentieth century that 
asbestos, benzene, radiation, arsenic, and other poisonous substances were harmful to 
human health and the environment, scientific consensus based on toxicological data 
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required several decades before such socio-culturally held views were scientifically 
validated.513  
 In contrast to both epidemiology and toxicology, pharmacological studies are 
prevalent given regulatory mandated clinical trials for the introduction of new substances 
into Canada. Pharmacology as the “study of drugs and their effects of life processes,”514 
particularly in the treatment of human diseases, benefits from the pervasiveness of human 
testing (as opposed to animal testing) which permits comparative analyses and strong 
conclusive evidence-formation in class actions involving pharmaceuticals. 515 Given these 
strengths, it should not be particularly surprising to discover that pharmaceutical claims are 
more frequently prosecuted and certified as class actions (compared to other health-based 
claims) in states and sub-state formations with class action regimes.516 This privileging of 
pharmaceutical claims suggests that the relative scarcity of other environmental health-
based claims (relative to their pervasiveness) is largely a consequent of insufficient 
empirical data and suboptimal evidence formation rather than ideological opposition or 
political disinclination by Private Attorneys General. 
 
B. CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT, 1999 
A number of overlapping federal and provincial statutes comprise Canada’s environmental 
regulatory framework, including (at the federal level) the Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Act, 2012, Hazardous Products Act, Species at Risk Act, Transportation of 
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Dangerous Goods Act, 1992, Pest Control Products Act, Fisheries Act, and the Canada 
Shipping Act, 2001.517 In Ontario, the relevant provincial statutes include the Ontario Water 
Resources Act, Clean Water Act, Environmental Bill of Rights, Pesticides Act, Safe 
Drinking Water Act, Environmental Assessment Act, Toxics Reduction Act, Green Energy 
Act, and the Nutrient Management Act.518 Although federal statutes take precedence over 
provincial statutes, these are generally more complementary than contradictory. 
Of particular relevance to the present analysis is the Canadian Environmental 
Protection Act (‘CEPA’), which was originally drafted in 1988 as a systematic assessment 
and management framework for chemical substances that posed a threat to human health 
and the environment—it was comprehensively revised and replaced in 1999.519 Although 
promising in purpose, CEPA was limited in scope, given its major foundational 
shortcoming: the assessment and evaluation of potentially harmful chemicals was limited 
to the testing of new chemicals that were introduced post-1988 into Canada (approximately 
2,000 chemicals per year) without simultaneously testing the estimated 23,000 chemicals 
already in circulation. In 2006, the federal government introduced its Chemical 
Management Plan (‘CMP’) to address a subset of 1,550 high-priority chemicals, with a 
proposed deadline of 2020 for the completion of these assessments. Although the CMP 
includes environmental monitoring and human biomonitoring of select priority chemicals, 
                                                        
517 Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 (S.C. 2012, c. 19, s. 52); Hazardous Products 
Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. H-3); Species at Risk Act (S.C. 2002, c. 29); Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act, 
1992 (1992, c. 34); Pest Control Products Act (S.C. 2002, c. 28); Fisheries Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. F-14); 
Canada Shipping Act, 2001 (2001, c. 26). 
518 Ontario Water Resources Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. O.40; Clean Water Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 22; 
Environmental Bill of Rights, 1993, S.O. 1993, c. 28; Pesticides Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.11; Safe Drinking 
Water Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 32; Environmental Assessment Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.18; Toxics Reduction 
Act, 2009, S.O. 2009, c. 19; Green Energy Act, 2009, S.O. 2009, c. 12; Nutrient Management Act, 2002, 
S.O. 2002, c. 4. 
519 Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999 (S.C. 1999, c. 33). 
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the budgetary constraints of regulatory bodies and associated research institutes has 
precluded comprehensive assessments of roughly 20,000 chemicals currently in use in 
Canada. Such budgetary constraints are produced by neo-liberal fiscal policies with 
adverse impacts on social reproduction with gendered, racialized, and class-based 
dimensions.520  
As Isabella Bakker points out, the mobility of capital in the new constitutionalism 
of disciplinary neo-liberalism promotes the constraining of state tax revenue and 
expenditures with inequitable effects on the social reproduction of vulnerable people.521 
The systematic lack of empirical data as a result of declining tax revenues and state 
expenditures implicates processes associated with neo-liberal governance that promote the 
mobility of capital and tax avoidance/evasion by transnational corporations (a recent report 
by the Tax Justice Network estimated that Canada loses over $80 billion annually in tax 
evasion).522 By declining to adequately research substances to which communities are 
exposed, the Canadian state effectively (re)privatizes social reproduction523 activities by 
downloading the responsibilities for chemical consumption and toxic exposures to 
households largely through the promotion of ‘precautionary consumption’, a gendered 
practice operating as a form of “self-protection in response to insufficient regulatory 
                                                        
520 The rich body of scholarship on environmental justice in general and environmental racism in particular 
(as a subfield of the former) testifies to such inequitable impacts. 
521 Bakker, “Social reproduction, fiscal space and remaking the real constitution,” 219-232. To critique 
micro-level effects of sub-state and state policies without linking these to macro-economic developments 
yields an incomplete picture of the politico-economic forces impacting access to environmental justice. 
522 Ibid. 
523 Bakker pioneered the thesis of the “reprivatization of social reproduction.” See, e.g., Isabella Bakker, 
“Neo-liberal Governance and the Reprivatization of Social Reproduction: Social Provisioning and Shifting 
Gender Orders,” in eds., Bakker and Stephen Gill, Power, Production and Social Reproduction (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 66-82. 
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precaution”524 that disproportionately burdens women and domestic workers.525 As Bakker 
observes, this governance shift “reflect[s] the increasingly privatized and marketized forms 
of social provisioning and risk that characterize the neo-liberal moment where everyday 
activities of maintaining life and reproducing the next generation are increasingly being 
realized through the unpaid and paid resources of (largely) women.”526 
 The systemic lack of empirical data is compounded by a series of gendered and 
racial shortcomings of testing standards and evaluative frameworks for those priority 
chemicals that qualify for formal state assessments. According to CEPA methodologies, 
chemical substances must be assessed for the ‘endpoints’ of reproductive and 
developmental toxicity, carcinogenicity, and mutagenicity—an endpoint refers to a 
“biological event used to determine when a change in the normal function of the human 
body occurs as a result of toxic exposure.”527 Across these endpoints, however, state 
assessments have overwhelmingly focused on carcinogenicity.528 The gendered dynamics 
of this research focus are straightforward: the social reproductive vulnerabilities implicated 
in reproductive and developmental toxicity and mutagenicity have been inequitably 
neglected. For example, chemical substances with endocrine-disrupting properties are 
chronically understudied in CMP risk assessments, leading critical scholars to advocate in 
favour of alternative toxicity endpoints that address neglected health-impairing events that 
disproportionally affect women.529 Furthermore, the largely gender-neutral risk 
                                                        
524 Scott et al, “The Production of Pollution and Consumption of Chemicals in Canada,” 18. 
525 Norah MacKendrick, “Protecting Ourselves from Chemicals: A Study of Gender and Precautionary 
Consumption,” in ed., Dayna Nadine Scott, Our Chemical Selves: Gender, Toxics, and Environmental 
Health (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2015), 58-77. 
526 Bakker, “Social reproduction, fiscal space and remaking the real constitution,” 221. 
527 Dayna Nadine Scott and Sarah Lewis, “Sex and Gender in Canada’s Chemical Management Plan,” 85. 
528 Ibid. 
529 Ibid., 87.   
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assessments of the CMP often deviate toward gender blindness to the extent that 
autonomous abstract individuals are conceptualized as human subjects rather than allowing 
for gender-specific evaluations (re: data is aggregated into average individual intake of 
chemical substances which does not distinguish between biological and gendered 
differences). To the extent that gender-specific evaluations are conducted, these focus 
almost exclusively on biological reproduction (i.e. pregnancy) rather than encompassing 
the myriad aspects of the daily lives of women and girls, and research focused on health-
impairing events that disproportionately affect women continues to be undertaken with 
male laboratory animals during testing.530 Such essentialist and androcentric tendencies 
remain outstanding issues of concern for the CMP, in addition to broader shortcomings, 
such as the absence of mandatory assessments of the cumulative effects of chemical 
substances and their interactions with environmental factors, as well as the absence of 
occupational exposure testing, particularly precarious labour in which toxicity exposures 
tend to be higher than workforce averages.531  
Above all, the CMP operates on the problematic logic of the management of risk 
as opposed to the prevention of contamination; that is, the management of chemical 
substances and hazardous toxicants is prioritized over precautionary approaches. For 
example, toxicity designations under the CEPA framework necessitate both “a potential 
for exposure and a potential for harm,” which is to say, a chemical “substance 
demonstrating a high probability of harm at any exposure level will not be listed as toxic 
                                                        
530 Ibid., 88. See also, Robert N. Hughes, “Sex Does Matter: Comments on the Prevalence of Male-Only 
Investigations of Drug Effects on Rodent Behaviour,” Behavioural Pharmacology 18, no. 7: 583-89; 
Donna Mergler, “Neurotoxic Exposures and Effects: Sex and Gender Matter! Hänninen Lecture 2011,” 
Neurotoxicology 33, no. 4: 644-51. 
531 Scott and Lewis, 89-92. 
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if estimates of exposure are currently considered low” [emphasis added].532 This preference 
for managing rather than preventing toxic contamination and exposures directly contradicts 
the imperatives of the Precautionary Principle. If preliminary signals from the negotiations 
of the forthcoming Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) are any indication, the 
Precautionary Principle will continue its gradual delegitimization in favour of such risk 
management practices. The meso and micro level impacts of such macro-economic 
developments can be directly observed in the impaired capacities of vulnerable 
communities to socially reproduce. At root, such shortcomings favour the polluter-
industrial complex and generate inequitable racial and gendered impacts with the ensuing 
corollary of creating disincentivizing conditions for the pursuit of multilayer access to 
environmental justice.  
 In point of fact, the lack of empirical data is a recurring barrier at every turn in the 
pursuit of environmental justice in Ontario’s class action regime. It remains incumbent 
upon plaintiffs to provide the relevant data to substantiate their claims, despite the reality 
that defendants in environmental health-based actions are best positioned for data 
collection. As the leading scholars in the field in Canada, Lynda Collins and Heather 
McLeod-Kilmurray, observe: 
In the case of toxic products, defendants manufacture, market, and disseminate the 
substances at issue; they have the resources, the opportunity, and the duty to investigate 
their products both before and after release. In contrast, plaintiffs in such cases are unable 
to assess the product before or after release, and are frequently unaware of its toxicity and 
therefore incapable of avoiding a toxic exposure. In the case of contaminant emissions, 
polluting defendants have the opportunity and the statutory duty to monitor and report their 
discharges, and are far better equipped to research and determine the human health effects 
                                                        
532 Ibid., 95. 
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of the substances emitted. Again, plaintiffs typically have neither the resources to 
investigate the risk nor the opportunity to avoid it.533  
 
This imbalanced situation recalls a central pillar of Parker’s notion of ‘speaking justice to 
power’ discussed in Chapter 1: the meta-regulatory strategy of regulated self-regulation.534 
That is, Parker recognizes that corporations are ideally situated to gather information about 
their own products and practices—a recognition that leads Parker to advocate in favour of 
corporations engaging in data collection on behalf of state regulatory bodies. Although 
meta-regulatory strategies identify such informational asymmetries and power imbalances, 
the proposal that relevant corporations would actively engage in data collection and 
investigation, despite the potential of civil liability, remains an improbable prospect. The 
abyss separating current agnotological strategies with such meta-regulatory proposals does 
not inspire confidence in the probability of transformational change in prevailing corporate 
governance strategies.  
 
C. THE PRODUCTION OF IGNORANCE 
It is becoming increasingly apparent that scientific uncertainties are not reducible to the 
limitations of contemporary research, but rather extend to policy failures and the pursuit of 
agnotological strategies. Wendy Wagner has proposed a clarifying distinction between 
“trans-scientific uncertainties”535 which chiefly exist as consequences of the limitations of 
scientific inquiry at any given point in history and “preventable scientific uncertainties”536 
                                                        
533 Collins and McLeod-Kilmurray, 140-41. 
534 Christine Parker, Just Lawyers: Regulation and Access to Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), 174-205. 
535 Wendy Wagner, “Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products,” Cornell Law Review 82 
no. 4: 774-80; see also, Collins and McLeod-Kilmurray, 23-6. 
536 Ibid., 780-84. 
 
 194 
which refer to failures of investigative programmes. The former category poses a host of 
difficulties in the context of establishing causation, particularly since health-impairing 
events in contemporary societies are often compounded by multiple contributing factors. 
This multi-factorial tendency permits defendants to espouse alternative theories and causes 
of harm for relevant health-impairing events. 
 The latter category—‘preventable scientific uncertainties’—entails the passive 
production of ignorance through inequitable redirection of resource capacities, as well as 
the active production of ignorance through the suppression of critical knowledge and 
concomitant refusals to investigate the potential harms of toxic commodities. This similarly 
creates unfavourable conditions for multilayer access to environmental justice insofar as 
toxic manufacturers are incentivized to manufacture ignorance of product toxicity. In other 
words, as a legal tactic to avoid civil liability, toxic manufacturers engage in agnotological 
strategies (i.e. refraining from conducting research on their own processes and 
commodities). Given the common law requirement for plaintiffs to produce scientific 
research in support of their claims against defendants, as well as the resource-intensive 
character of such research in the context of environmental health and toxic exposures, the 
production of ignorance on the part of such manufacturers serves the purpose of 
minimizing available research on their toxic commodities. As Wagner explains, a 
manufacturer that ‘chooses ignorance’ in this respect is behaving rationally since a 
“manufacturer that conducts no research can generally avoid liability because plaintiffs and 
government research programs are unlikely to conduct scientific research on their own.”537 
As others have pointed out, “chemical manufacturers and polluting industries are profit-
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driven enterprises, with clear economic disincentives to investigate the potential harmful 
effects of the substances they release into the environment.”538 The extent to which 
agnotological strategies have been pursued by chemical manufacturers has been 
extensively documented by critical scholars539 and remains a significant barrier in the 
pursuit of multilayer access to environmental justice not merely through formal legal 
channels, but also within the socio-political domain wherein such strategies (i.e. 
misinformation, etc.) produce uncertainties and doubts about the veracity of scientific 
claims. For example, a trove of newly discovered documents by the Center for International 
Environmental Law substantiates the longstanding belief that tobacco and oil industries 
collaborated as early as the 1940s in their agnotological strategies by sharing public 
relations firms, research institutes, scientists, marketing, and advertising strategies with the 
objective of “shaping science to shape public opinion”540 as it pertains to the environmental 
harms posed by their respective practices and products. To speak of a polluter-industrial 
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D. SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY & LEGAL REASONING 
The primary discursive barrier for claimants in environmental class actions at the 
evidentiary level remains the incongruity between scientific inquiry and legal reasoning; 
that is, the standards and criteria of scientific uncertainty often misalign with evidentiary 
standards of civil justice.541 This is similarly evident in broader socio-political discourses 
in which events are disputed by competing factions that can mobilize scientific experts in 
defense of their respective positions (i.e. global warming). Such incongruities have greater 
susceptibility for the ‘manufacturing of doubt’ and the postulation of alternative theories 
and causes of harm, particularly in multi-factorial health-impairing events.  
 Whereas scientific inquiry aspires to objective truths that are empirically 
substantiated through a conservative process of data collection and laboratory testing, legal 
inquiry necessitates the adjudication of a dispute in a timely manner. The methodological 
discrepancies and normative disparities in purpose operate to create a tenuous relationship 
between scientific evidence and legal argumentation whereby strong evidentiary claims are 
disputed through the application of legal standards of proof to the standards of scientific 
consensus-formation. As described above, numerous toxicants that were socially perceived 
as harmful substances (i.e. benzene, asbestos, arsenic, etc.) did not attain scientific 
consensus for several decades, given the pace of discovery and conservative preferences 
of scientific inquiry (in addition to agnotological production and other mobilization efforts 
by industry). The repercussions of such delays in the legal setting cannot be solely 
discovered in the failures of pursued civil actions, but extend to claims that were never 
pursued in the first place as a consequence of inadequate evidentiary grounding, as 
                                                        




indicated at the outset of this chapter with the pre-trial certification statistics. Carl F. Cranor 
aptly describes this “slow knowledge accumulation” as “science delayed means justice 
denied.”542 This incongruity does not suggest that scientific advancement and 
methodologies should adjust to the demands of adjudicatory bodies, but rather that 
adjudicators should recognize the limitations of consensus-formation and adjust their 
evaluative frameworks in order to have “a more realistic view of the availability of 
evidence [and to] change what they expect of it and modify how they treat the evidence 
before them.”543 Although such incongruities apply in various legal settings, they pose 
particular difficulties for class actions involving environmental health-impairment given 
the heavy dependence on scientific evidence required to prove causation. This difficulty is 
compounded in multi-factorial cases in which “a signature disease”544 is not evident; that 
is, a case in which a direct cause-and-effect relationship between the chemical substance 
and the incurred harm is unproblematically establishable (such as mesothelioma and 
asbestosis claims).545  
 A possible strategy to ameliorate the adverse effects of such incongruities is the 
adoption of a ‘weight of evidence’ approach.546 Given the recognition of injustices that may 
result from the application of conservative scientific standards to legal contexts, several 
regulatory and scientific bodies have endorsed this approach as an optimal strategy to avoid 
false negatives in chemical testing, including Health Canada and Environment Canada. 
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According to s.76.1 of CEPA, the “weight of evidence approach and the precautionary 
principle” must be applied by relevant ministers to high-priority (identified) chemical 
substances, although the extent to which the approach and the principle have been 
meaningfully applied remains questionable. This multi-step approach involves the 
following steps: 
 The scientist must:  
(1)   identify an association between an exposure and a disease; 
(2)   consider a range of plausible explanations for the association; 
(3)   rank the rival explanations according to their plausibility; 
(4)   seek additional evidence to separate the more plausible from the less plausible 
explanations; 
(5)   consider all of the relevant available evidence;  
(6)   integrate the evidence using professional judgment to come to a conclusion about the 
best explanation.547 
The advantage of the ‘weight of evidence’ approach to scientific uncertainty is to permit 
expert witnesses to introduce subjective explanatory features to otherwise descriptive 
testimonies, thereby allowing for judgment-formation based on the availability of existing 
data using an ‘inference to the best explanation’ criterion.548 In other words, the 
conservative standards of scientific certainty are moderated to allow for “a finding of 
causation even if some individual pieces of evidence are weak, or some forms of evidence 
are missing.”549 This approach strengthens the evidentiary foundation of claimants by 
lowering the unduly high scientific principles against which such claimants would 
otherwise be measured in a legal setting. In short, the ‘weight of evidence’ approach is a 
positive development for the prospects of multilayer access to environmental justice.   
                                                        
547 Milward v. Acuity Specialty Products Group Inc., 639 f.3d 11 (1st Circuit 2011) at 17-18, as quoted by 





 Finally, the incongruities between scientific inquiry and legal reasoning are 
implicated in causation analyses insofar as the standard of proof may be misaligned from 
a balance of probabilities standard towards a standard of scientific empiricism.550 This is 
particularly apparent in environmental health actions in which competing expert 
testimonies are presented. Although the court recognized in Ring v. The Queen that “a 
meaningful scientific answer with respect to a specific dose-response relationship”551 is 
qualitatively distinct from “a meaningful legal answer regarding the creation of 
unreasonable risks for the general public,”552 the court also stated in Palmer v. Stora 
Kopparbergs Bergslags AB that the finding of “no scientifically acceptable proof of risk to 
health” contributed to its rejection of an injunction application.553 Ultimately, however, 
such misalignments are infrequent in Canadian courts, attesting to the discipline with which 
standard of proof analyses are conducted.554 
 
2. TOXIC CAUSATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL CLASS ACTIONS 
Questions of scientific uncertainty gain prominence at the causation stage in environmental 
health-based class actions. Causation refers to the relationship that must be established 
between the wrongful act of the defendant and the incurred harm of the plaintiff. Without 
proof of causation in toxic actions, there can be no compensatory damages in the Canadian 
civil justice system. A substantial body of scholarship has developed over the years to 
address the problem of causal indeterminacy and a general consensus has emerged that 
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establishing causation is the greatest doctrinal barrier to multilayer access to justice in the 
context of environmental health and chemical consumption.555 It is beyond the scope of this 
chapter to provide a comprehensive overview of Canadian approaches to toxic causation, 
however a critical exploration of relevant features is necessary to illustrate major barriers 
to multilayer access to environmental justice in Ontario’s class action regime.   
The scientific uncertainties that inform toxic causation relate to the capacity of a 
toxic substance to produce an alleged harm, as well as the empirical claim that a particular 
toxic substance caused a specific harm to the claimants. In other words, causation entails a 
necessary subdivision between (1) generic causation and (2) specific causation—a 
successful environmental health-based action must typically provide strong evidence 
relating to both forms of causation.556 Private Attorneys General must demonstrate that a 
particular substance is (1) capable of producing the alleged harm, before demonstrating 
that the (2) represented class has empirically been harmed by the relevant substance. 
Within this framework, scholars have categorized the problem of causation into three forms 
of indeterminacy that identify particular types of uncertainty. The three types of 
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indeterminacy thus identified are plaintiff indeterminacy, defendant indeterminacy, and 
harm indeterminacy.557 The interplay between generic and specific causation and the types 
of indeterminacy applicable in environmental health actions warrants brief consideration.  
 
A. THREE TYPES OF INDETERMINACY 
Plaintiff indeterminacy refers to situations in which generic causation is establishable, but 
specific causation is elusive; that is, this type of indeterminacy is applicable in situations 
wherein established facts confirm that a specific defendant has engaged in wrongful 
conduct that has harmed a subset of an exposed group, but no particular harmed individual 
within this group is capable of proving that they have specifically been harmed by the 
defendant’s wrongful conduct. A classic example of plaintiff indeterminacy is the Agent 
Orange class action in which a carcinogenic herbicide manufactured by Dow Chemical and 
Monsanto Corporation was alleged to have caused a series of health-impairing events 
(including cancerous growths) in exposed individuals. As Paul Sherman observes, a 
number of broader questions were raised in this class action: 
(1)   How can injury to members of a plaintiff class be shown when there is only statistical 
or epidemiological evidence to show a correlation between increases in the incidence 
of the injury and exposure to the product? 
(2)   How can an individual class member establish a connection between his or her 
particular injury and the product?558 
Such questions indicate that doctrinal requirements present particular challenges to access 
to justice in the environmental health context. A more pertinent example might be the 
hypothetical situation in which a toxic polluter contributes to the degeneration of a 
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habitable environment (whether through land, air, or water pollution) and thereby threatens 
the social reproductive activities of exposed individuals and communities. Although 
Canadian legislatures have not enacted causation reforms to address the particularities of 
toxic actions, the Supreme Court has exhibited an openness to such reform by observing 
that “new situations [may] raise new considerations”559 and that “the scenario might arise 
in mass toxic tort litigation with multiple plaintiffs, where it is established statistically that 
the defendant’s acts induced an injury on some members of the group, but it is impossible 
to know which ones.”560 The lack of environmental class actions that have gone to trial in 
Canada has impeded the development of the relevant common law to date, however, the 
openness towards causation reform by the Supreme Court as it pertains to plaintiff 
indeterminacy is a positive sign from an access to justice perspective.561 
 The second type of indeterminacy—defendant indeterminacy—simply reverses the 
logic: whereas plaintiff indeterminacy refers to situations in which individuals or groups 
have been generally harmed by wrongful behaviour by an identifiable defendant (or 
defendants), the second type of indeterminacy refers to situations in which the plaintiff can 
demonstrate that a particular substance has the capacity to cause the relevant harm and 
actually caused the relevant harm—that is, generic and specific causation is provable—
however, it is impossible to identify the wrongdoer.562 Such situations typically arise when 
multiple defendants have engaged in similar or identical forms of wrongful conduct, such 
as pharmaceutical companies who have commercialized toxic substances or industrial 
polluters who have poisoned the land, water, and/or air of a community using similar or 
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identical toxic substances. Although defendant indeterminacy was traditionally viewed as 
a serious impediment for environmental health class actions, this type of indeterminacy has 
effectively been resolved in Canada since Clements v. Clements.563 
 Finally, the third type of indeterminacy—harm indeterminacy—refers to situations 
in which claimants can reasonably posit that a defendant has exposed them to harmful toxic 
substances, without the concomitant ability to establish that any harm has been incurred.564 
This type of indeterminacy assumes a heightened significance in the environmental health 
context insofar as health-impairments as consequences of exposures to toxic substances 
potentially have long latency periods and may not be empirically discernible at any specific 
point in time. The intergenerational inequities arising from exposures to toxicity are 
directly implicated in this type of indeterminacy to the extent that the actualization of harm 
does not foreclose its possibility—nor the potential negative non-material (i.e. 
psychological) impacts that may arise from such exposures. 
 
B. JURISPRUDENTIAL AND LEGISLATIVE TOXIC CAUSATION REFORMS 
At present, there have not been any comprehensive legislative reforms addressing the 
unequal impacts of traditional causation standards in Canada. The traditional standard for 
establishing causation is the ‘but for’ test, which examines the proposition that if not for 
the defendant’s wrongful conduct, the plaintiff would not have sustained the alleged harms; 
in other words, the plaintiff would not have been harmed ‘but-for’ the wrongful conduct of 
the defendant (the standard under which this test is conducted is a balance of probabilities, 
                                                        




re: 50% plus one).565 As this chapter documents, the scientific uncertainties in 
environmental health class actions have cumulatively produced an unfavourable climate 
for collective claims-makers against chemical manufacturers and toxic polluters. As 
Collins and McLeod-Kilmurray have pointed out, this traditional test for causation is 
particularly problematic in the environmental health context: 
A rigid application of the but-for test produces manifest injustice in scenarios in which the 
plaintiff can show that the defendant exposed him or her to an unreasonable risk of 
developing a particular illness and that he or she in fact did contract that illness, but he or 
she cannot prove causation on a balance of probabilities because of a lack of data 
concerning the substance in question. The injustice is particularly pronounced where this 
uncertainty stems from the defendant’s own failure to investigate its own substance.566 
In the face of the exceptional circumstances (i.e. environmental health), a series of 
alternatives have been proposed to ameliorate the ‘manifest injustices’ of a rigid 
application of the traditional causation test—these alternatives include the “radical step” 
of introducing the “less onerous” ‘material contribution to risk’ test in which risk exposures 
are given prominence; that is, the defendant materially contributed to the risk of harm 
experienced by the plaintiff.567 According to the court in Resurfice Corp. v. Hanke, this 
alternative test only applies in exceptional circumstances in which: 
(1)   It must be impossible for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s negligence caused 
the plaintiff’s injury using the “but for” test.  
(2)   It must be clear that the defendant breached a duty of care owed to the plaintiff, thereby 
exposing the plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of injury, and the plaintiff must have 
suffered that form of injury.568 
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566 Ibid., 129. 
567 Ibid. 
568 Resurfice Corp. v. Hanke, [2007] 1 SCR 333, 2007 SCC 7 (CanLII) at 25. 
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Notably, the court recognized that the impossibility of proving that the defendant’s 
negligence caused the plaintiff’s injury could be due to “current limits of scientific 
knowledge.”569  
 The proposal that has the greatest potential to correct the power imbalances and 
informational asymmetries confronted by collective claims-makers seeking access to 
environmental justice may be the proposition to reverse the burden of proof in toxic 
causation.570 As it stands, corporations associated with toxic production are incentivized to 
manufacture ignorance of their products (and practices). However, a reversed burden of 
proof could conceivably ameliorate these agnotological tendencies by imposing liability 
for failures to adequately monitor, investigate, and disseminate findings relating to toxicity 
and environmental health.571 Hypothetically speaking, a plaintiff could demonstrate that a 
defendant did not engage in such monitoring, investigating, and disseminating activities, 
at which point the defendant must prove the contrary. Such a reversal in the burden of proof 
effectively penalizes agnotological strategies and aligns “defendants’s commercial 
interests with the societal interest in constraining the release of hazardous or poorly 
understood chemicals.”572 Moving forward, it is foreseeable that scientific uncertainty in 
environmental class actions will remain one of the most significant barriers to multilayer 
access to justice in environmental matters. 
 
                                                        
569 Ibid. For an overview of the material contribution to risk test, see Lynda Collins and Heather McLeod-
Kilmurray, “Material Contribution to Justice – Toxic Causation after Resurfice Corp. v. Hanke,” Osgoode 
Hall Law Journal 48 (2010): 411-456. 
570 Collins and McLeod-Kilmurray, 153. 
571 This might align with Parker’s meta-regulatory strategy addressed earlier.  
572 Ibid., 153. See also, Wendy Wagner, “Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products,” 
Cornell Law Review 82, no. 4: 774-80. Margaret A. Berger, “Eliminating General Causation: Notes 
towards a New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts,” Columbia Law Review 97, no. 7 (1997): 2117-52. 
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3. PRIVATE PROPERTY IN ENVIRONMENTAL CLASS ACTIONS 
The dynamics explored in the above sections have operated to cumulatively impede 
multilayer access to environmental justice, particularly in the health-based context. Such 
exclusionary dynamics apply inequitably in Ontario’s class action regime. The 
complexities of environmental health claims are increasingly viewed as ‘red flags’ by 
Private Attorneys General. This unfavourability is substantiated by the repeated narrowing 
of the scope of environmental class actions by courts across Canada. In Ontario’s regime, 
environmental class actions have developed in a restricted way to focus on environmental 
claims that do not involve scientific uncertainty (at least not to the extent of health-based 
claims). The prevailing strategy of Private Attorneys General appears to be to circumvent 
this intractable problem by pursuing claims with lower risk exposures and greater 
predictability in terms of prospects for success. Although the continuing application of the 
English Rule contributes to this circumvention strategy, the difficulty in certifying health-
based claims and the low prospects for success feature prominently in disincentivizing 
Private Attorneys General from pursuing environmental health-based claims. As this 
section explicates, the restrictive development of class actions in Ontario has produced a 
regime that systematically privileges private property rights over other forms of 
environmental harms.  
 
A. THE CERTIFICATION STAGE 
It should not be particularly surprising that procedural barriers play a prominent role in 
access to environmental justice in Ontario’s class action regime. After all, the modern class 
action is fundamentally a procedural vehicle—despite its arguably substantive dimensions. 
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Indeed, a multilayer claim is considered a ‘class proceeding’ at the outset of litigation and 
must be certified in order to proceed as a ‘class action’. The power of class actions as 
collectivist vehicles for claims-making has contributed to producing a regime in which 
settlements are endemic.573 In fact, only a single environmental class action has proceeded 
to trial on its merits: once a class proceeding is certified, it generally results in a negotiated 
settlement. In this context, the true battleground for class actions is the certification stage—
a pre-trial motion of a proceeding seeking certification as a class action. At this procedural 
stage, the merits of a claim must not be considered, according to the Class Proceedings 
Act.574 Given the pervasive settlement culture in Ontario’s class action regime (and every 
other common law province in Canada), the primacy of certification as determinative of 
the relative success or failure of a class action produces a legal climate in which class 
actions generally (and environmental class actions especially) are not determined on their 
merits, but rather on strictly procedural grounds. From a broader democratic perspective, 
this pervasive settlement culture serves to impoverish the development of the common law 
as it substantively pertains to environmental justice.575 
The importance of certifying a class proceeding can scarcely be overstated: without 
certification, a class proceeding cannot move forward as a class action. Although failure to 
certify a class proceeding does not preclude class members from pursuing their claims on 
individual bases, such pursuits do not benefit from the collectivist power of the class action 
vehicle; indeed, the prospects for individual claims against transnational corporations and 
                                                        
573 The strong judicial and public policy preference for settlements is addressed in greater detail in Chapter 
5.  
574 According to the CPA, certification is not a ruling on merits: “An order certifying a class proceeding is 
not a determination of the merits of the proceeding. 1992, c. 6, s. 5 (5). 
575 See, e.g., Trevor C. W. Farrow, Civil Justice, Privatization and Democracy (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2014). 
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governments are exceedingly bleak. Moreover, environmental claims are primarily 
negative value claims—a strong indication that such claims would not otherwise be 
individually brought by ‘economically rational’ actors. In this light, attaining certification 
is a necessary condition for multilayer access to environmental justice. 
 At the certification stage, a proceeding must meet the five criteria enumerated in 
the Class Proceedings Act in order to be certified as a class action.576 According to s.5(1), 
these criteria are the following: 
5.(1)  The court shall certify a class proceeding on a motion under section 2, 3, or 4 if, 
 (a) the pleadings or the notice of application discloses a cause of action;  
(b) there is an identifiable class of two or more persons that would be represented 
by the representative plaintiff or defendant; 
(c) the claims or defences of the class members raise common issues;  
(d) a class proceeding would be the preferable procedure for the resolution of the 
common issues; and 
(e) there is a representative plaintiff or defendant who, 
 (i) would fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class, 
(ii) has produced a plan for the proceeding that sets out a workable 
method of advancing the proceeding on behalf of the class and of 
notifying class members of the proceeding, and 
(iii) does not have, on the common issues for the class, an interest in 
conflict with the interests of other class members.577 
The Class Proceedings Act also holds that the following matters are not barriers to 
certification: 
6.   The court shall not refuse to certify a proceeding as a class proceeding solely on  
any of the following grounds: 
1.   The relief claimed includes a claim for damages that would require individual 
assessment after determination of the common issues.  
                                                        
576 Although the term “class action” is colloquially invoked across Ontario’s class action regime, 
technically a claim only becomes a class action once it has passed the certification stage; before 
certification, it is a class proceeding. The terminological distinction between a class proceeding and a class 
action is often waived in common parlance.  
577 Class Proceedings Act, SO, 1992, at s. 5(1). 
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2.   The relief claimed relates to separate contracts involving different class members. 
3.   Different remedies are sought for different class members. 
4.   The number of class members or the identity of each class member is not known. 
5.   The class includes a subclass whose members have claims or defences that raise 
common issues not shared by all class members.578 
 
Although certification is generally the procedural battleground upon which class actions 
are won and lost in Ontario’s regime, this does not apply evenly across the required criteria. 
The requirements of (1) an identifiable class of people and (5) a representative plaintiff are 
generally unchallenging, however, the requirements of (1) disclosing a cause of action, (3) 
commonality of issues, and (4) the preferability of the procedure have consistently proven 
to be the most difficult criteria to fulfill for environmental class actions. These difficulties 
have produced an inhospitable climate in which an exceedingly low number of 
environmental class actions have successfully attained certification.579 
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to explore the procedural intricacies of the 
certification stage, however, it must be noted that there is no statutory predominance 
requirement—a requirement that the drafters of the Class Proceedings Act intentionally 
did not include in the legislation.580 In other words, there is no requirement holding that 
                                                        
578 Ibid., at s.6. 
579 The exact number of environmental class actions is currently not known given the absence of a 
comprehensive database for class actions in Ontario, despite repeated calls and proposals for empirical 
research programmes. The closest approximation to an empirical database is the National Class Action 
Database, instituted by the Canadian Bar Association to address the various challenges arising out of multi-
jurisdictional class actions; however, the NCAD is comprised of voluntary rather than mandatory 
submissions by class counsel and does not attain an exhaustive standard. The Law Commission of Ontario 
has recently undertaken a Class Action Project, a part of which entails compiling a database of class actions 
in Ontario. It should also be noted that the inhospitable climate described above precedes certification as a 
class action; which is to say, class proceedings are not included in class action databases. However, based 
on qualitative interviews conducted with counsel, the general consensus is that environmental claims are 
among the least (if not the least) successful at certification for the reasons stipulated below. See, Canadian 
Bar Association, National Class Action Database, online: http://www.cba.org/Publications-
Resources/Class-Action-Database/About.  
580 See, e.g., Hollick v. Toronto (City), 2001 3 S.C.R. 158 [2001] SCC 68;  Cloud v. Canada (Attorney 
General), 2004 CanLII 45444 (ON CA).  
 
 210 
common issues need to predominate over individual issues in a multilayer claim. By 
refusing to include such a requirement in the Class Proceedings Act, the drafters sought to 
expand the purview of possible class actions, given that predominance requirements 
generally result in fewer class proceedings being certified. From an access to justice 
perspective, this absence is a positive feature of Ontario’s class action regime—a sharp 
contrast with approaches typical of American jurisdictions, as well as provinces such as 
British Columbia, which include some form of predominance requirements in their 
respective statutory frameworks. To narrow environmental claims on the grounds that 
common issues do not predominate over individual issues effectively usurps the legislation 
governing Ontario’s class action regime. Although such valuations generally do not 
prefigure into considerations on common issues, they may implicitly play a role in the 
determination of whether or not a class action is a preferable procedure over individual 
justice-seeking. The repeated decisions by courts that class actions are not preferable 
procedures for environmental health claims given the purported need for individual health-
based assessments and the predominance of individual issues is indicative of the usage of 
a form of predominance reasoning despite the intentional exclusion of any such 
requirement in the Class Proceedings Act.  
This tension between the statutory framework and judicial decision-making recalls 
the major political conflict posed by class actions, namely, that the legal vehicle operates 
at the intersection of the liberal individualism that underscores the paradigm of Canadian 
law and the collectivism that is an integral part of Canadian society. The dominance of 
liberal individualistic judicial reasoning in certification decisions indicates that courts 
prefer to conceive of class actions as aggregative vehicles (rather than collectivist 
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vehicles); in other words, as vehicles that aggregate individual claims rather than as 
vehicles that possess substantive collectivist dimensions. This judicial preference is 
especially problematic in the environmental context insofar as environmental harms are 
often collective rather than individual harms; that is, the application of predominance 
reasoning may effectively amount to the individualization of collective harms through the 
invocation of judicial economy.581 
More to the point, environmental harms, like other class actions, involve three 
layers: individual, collective, and public. Whereas these layers can be difficult to 
distinguish in various other types of claims, particularly the public interest, all three layers 
are easily distinguishable in environmental claims. This public interest directly relates to 
the secondary policy objective of behaviour modification—deterring wrongful conduct by 
similarly situated parties—but also involves the consciousness-raising that high-profile 
cases often provide in the broader Canadian society through increased media coverage. 
Through such individualizing tendencies, the multilayer interests involved in 
environmental class actions are reduced to matters of individual justice. 
As the following case studies demonstrate, the interplay between these procedural 
requirements and scientific uncertainty in environmental claims has resulted in a restrictive 
focus on private property over other infringements—a proprietary focus that reflects the 
prevailing liberal paradigm of Canadian law.  
 
                                                        
581 Typically, judicial decision-making that is informed by predominance reasoning cites the policy 
objective of judicial economy in favour of denying certification by holding that the resolution of common 
issues would not go very far in resolving the dispute given a preponderance or predominance of individual 
issues that demand individual resolution. The justification herein holds that it would not be an economic 
use of scarce judicial resources to allow the claim to proceed as a class action. 
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B. PRIVILEGING OF PRIVATE PROPERTY 
From 1918 to 1984, a nickel processing refinery was owned and operated by the 
transnational corporation Inco Ltd (now Vale Ltd; the world’s largest producer of nickel), 
in the small town of Port Colborne, Ontario.582 The refinery emitted tons of nickel oxide 
particles into the surrounding environment during this historical period by engaging in 
what the trial judge referred to as “abnormally dangerous activities.”583 This contamination 
disproportionately affected the nearby residential area of Rodney Street, a low-income 
community. According to a comprehensive research study—Soil Investigation and Human 
Health Risk Assessment for Rodney Street Community, Port Colborne—commissioned by 
the Ontario Ministry of the Environment, an international panel of experts determined that 
elevated levels of nickel and lead contamination warranted action (the presence of other 
toxicants was also discovered, including arsenic, antimony, beryllium, cadmium, cobalt, 
and copper).584 Pursuant to this incurred harm, the residents of the Rodney Street 
community bound together for a class action to recover damages for the toxic exposures 
and risks posed to human health and the natural environment, in addition to the devaluation 
of private property values in the surrounding region.  
 The class proceeding was initially denied certification, however, this decision was 
overturned by the Ontario Court of Appeal. Notably, the claim had undergone significant 
                                                        
582 Pearson v. Inco Ltd., 2001 CanLII 28084 (ON SC); Pearson v. Inco Ltd., 2004 CanLII 34446 (ON 
SCDC); Pearson v. Inco Ltd., 2004 CanLII 4038 (ON SCDC); Pearson v. Inco Ltd., 2005 CanLII 42474 
(ON CA); Pearson v. Inco Ltd., 2005 CanLII 5393 (ON CA); Pearson v. Inco Ltd., 2006 CanLII 7666 (ON 
CA); Pearson v. Inco Ltd., 2006 CanLii 913 (ON CA); Pearson v. Inco Limited., 2008 CanLII 46701 (ON 
SC); Pearson v. Inco Limited., 2009 CanLII 37928 (ON SC); Pearson v. Inco Limited., 2009 CanLII 9371 
(ON SC). 
583 Pearson v. Inco Ltd., at 66. 
584 Ontario Ministry of the Environment, Soil Investigation and Human Health Risk Assessment for the 




changes between these two decisions. As the Court of Appeal observed, the original claim 
“was much broader and included sweeping claims for damages from the alleged adverse 
health effects from nickel oxide contamination.”585 The modified claim, on the other hand, 
had been “significantly narrowed [...] to damages for the devaluation of real property 
values arising from soil contamination.”586 To be precise, the devaluation of real property 
values referred not to any decrease in property values per se, but rather to the retardation 
of property appreciation as a consequence of the stigma from nickel oxide contamination.587 
This narrowing of the scope of the claim was not inconsequential. According to the Court 
of Appeal, the appeal called upon the court to “consider whether a class proceeding is a 
suitable vehicle in an environmental case,”588 and quoted the Supreme Court’s observation 
in Dutton that “pollution cases may be especially suited to class proceedings.”589 The 
suitability of class actions in environmental matters was positively viewed to the extent 
that the claim was narrowed to focus on the devaluation of private property to the exclusion 
of human health-impairment claims. The Court of Appeal explicitly noted that certification 
was approved as a result of this narrowing with its observation that “[t]he individual claims 
of injury to health and related claims would dwarf the resolution of the common issues,”590 
however, “[w]ith the narrowing of the claim that is no longer the case.”591 Simply put, the 
                                                        
585 Pearson v. Inco Ltd. at 3.  
586 Ibid. 
587 For an overview of stigma damages in real property devaluation, see, e.g., John C. McMeekin, John 
Ehmann, and Aaron Mapes, “Stigma Damages and Diminution of Property Claims in Environmental Class 
Actions,” Environmental Claims Journal 24, no. 3 (2012): 260-87; for a general overview of the emerging 
field of real estate valuation in the context of environmental class actions, see, e.g., Thomas O. Jackson, 
“Real Property Valuation Issues in Environmental Class Actions,” Appraisal Journal 78, no. 2 (2010): 141-
49;  
588 Ibid., at 1. 
589 Ibid. 




certification battle hinged upon the commonality of the issues and whether a class action 
was a preferable procedure for the resolution of the claim. In fact, the defendant’s argument 
that individual assessments were needed and the class action was not a preferable procedure 
from a judicial economy perspective extended to the devaluation of property values, 
although the court rejected the argument that even the resolution of the private property 
claim required individual assessment.592 Given the reluctance of courts to accept the 
viability of aggregate assessments of damages to property to date, the decision of the court 
in Inco to accept such aggregate assessments may be construed as a modest step forward 
in cases of historical contamination. However, it is abundantly clear that the environmental 
claim was successful at certification as a consequence of its narrowing to the exclusion of 
any health-impairment claims. 
Despite this privileging of private property over human health (and concerns over 
the natural environment), the Court of Appeal reconfirmed the normative view that 
“environmental claims are well suited to class proceedings”593 and repeated the merits of 
class actions as these pertain to the policy objectives of access to justice and behaviour 
modification that “[e]nvironmental pollution may have consequences for citizens all over 
the country.”594 Interestingly, although the Court of Appeal confirmed that class actions 
serve an important purpose in modifying the behaviour of defendants, as well as the 
behaviour of “other operators of refineries who are able to avoid the full costs and 
                                                        
592 As the court pointed out, the claim was staked “on the propositions that public knowledge of nickel 
contamination in the Port Colborne area has had a detectable impact on property values in that area and that 
as the source of the contamination, Inco must pay damages to owners whose property values have fallen.” 
To this end, “[r]esolution of the common issues will determine the question of Inco’s liability for the nickel 
pollution and whether knowledge of that pollution impacted on property values in the defined area,” and 
that a “resolution of these issues” is not “negligible in relation to the individual issues.” Ibid., at 70-1.  




consequences of their polluting activities because the impact is diverse and often has 
minimal impact on any one individual,”595 it nevertheless reiterated that the environmental 
claim would not have succeeded without being narrowed (effectively allowing the nickel 
refinery to “avoid the full costs and consequences of [its] polluting activities”). As 
discussed below, the implications of this systemic narrowing are potentially far-reaching 
for Ontario’s class action regime, not exclusively in terms of the secondary policy objective 
of ensuring deterrence for similarly situated parties, but also in terms of ensuring access to 
environmental justice, an objective that is not reducible to rights of private property. For 
the foreseeable future, however, it appears as if health-impairment will continue to be 
systematically excluded from environmental claims as part of legal strategies to attain 
certification while casting “a very large shadow” over the proceedings, as the “proverbial 
elephant in the room.”596 
 Unlike the majority of certified class actions, Inco did not culminate in a negotiated 
settlement, but rather advanced to trial on its merits. To date, it is the only environmental 
class action in common law Canada to proceed to trial on its merits. Notwithstanding this 
relative victory at certification—‘relative’ in the sense that certification came at the cost of 
removing any health-impairing features from the claim—the claimants in Inco ultimately 
lost on the merits at trial. Although the trial was initially victorious with a damages award 
of $36 million—a sum that was calculated based on the speculative devaluation of property 
values597 in comparison to a similar residential area—the defendants appealed the case and 
                                                        
595 Ibid. 
596 Peter Bowal, “Environmental Class Actions for Historical Contamination: Smith v. Inco Limited,” 
Journal of Environmental Law and Practice 24, no. 3: 298-99. 
597 According to Justice Henderson, “Port Colborne residential property values would have increased from 
1999 to 2008 by 59.5% plus 4.35%, or 63.85%. The average residential property assessment in Port 
Colborne in 1999 was $103,395, and therefore if Port Colborne had kept pace with Welland the average 
residential property value in Port Colborne would be $169,412 as of 2008. This equates to a loss on average 
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ultimately won at the Court of Appeal which overturned the liability and damages 
assessment. The court concluded that physical changes to a given property do not 
necessarily constitute physical damages and that “actual, substantial, physical damage”598 
must be empirically demonstrated.  
Perhaps most interestingly, it was the Court of Appeal that initially overturned the 
denied certification motion on the grounds that the claim no longer included the “sweeping 
damages” associated with health-impairing events, however, the same court held in the 
appeal on the merits that the nuisance claim was not constituted because “it was incumbent 
on the claimants to show that the nickel particles caused actual harm to the health of the 
claimants or at least posed some realistic risk of actual harm to their health and 
wellbeing.”599 That is to say, the very aspect of the claim that allowed it to gain 
certification—the removal of health-impairment—constituted grounds to negate liability 
upon appeal at trial on its merits. In other words, the collective claims-makers could not 
include health-impairment as part of the claim given that they would not have attained 
certification with such a sweeping claim, however, at trial on its merits, the narrowed claim 
was rejected on the grounds that the claims-makers could not prove any health-impairment 
effects from the nickel contamination. According to the court, if “the claimants [had] 
shown that the nickel levels in the properties posed a risk to health, they would have 
established that those particles caused actual, substantial, physical damage to their 
properties.”600 The irony is that a claim that includes health-impairment is generally 
                                                        
of $4,514 per property for 7,965 residential properties or a total of $35,954,010, which I will round off to 
$36,000,000.”  Smith v. Inco Ltd. 2010 ONSC 3790, at 298. 
598 Ibid., at 52. 
599 Ibid., at 57. 
600 Ibid., at 52. 
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incapable of attaining certification, but a narrowed claim that focuses on private property 
is incapable of proving “actual, substantial, physical damage”601 since such damage is 
apparently incumbent upon proof of health-impairment. This circularity suggests that 
certification may remain the major battleground for environmental class actions. The 
victory of Inco at trial similarly suggests that defendants may start challenging claims more 
vigorously by refusing to settle post-certification. 
 
C. HEALTH IMPAIRMENT AT CERTIFICATION 
A series of historical contamination cases attained certification across Canada post-Inco by 
pursuing the strategy of narrowing the scope of the respective claims to private property 
harms (to the exclusion of health-impairment). For example, the Alberta Court of Appeal 
in Windsor v. Canadian Pacific Railway upheld the certification of an environmental action 
in 2007 that alleged that the widespread usage of trichloroethylene by the defendant 
resulted in the devaluation of property values and concomitant losses in rental incomes as 
a consequent of toxic contamination of groundwater in a residential area near Calgary.602 
Despite the fact that trichloroethylene is a known carcinogenic toxicant, the claim in 
Windsor v. Canadian Pacific Railway did not include any health-impairment events in 
order to maximize the likelihood of attaining certification.  
One of the major points of concern of this privileging of private property over 
health-impairment claims is well-illustrated in this case insofar as the claim accentuated 
the rights of property owners; that is, even properties that were extensively rented out to 
lower-income households (who suffered health-impairing effects of the contamination of 
                                                        
601 Ibid. 
602 Windsor v. Canadian Pacific Railway Limited, 2007 ABCA 294. 
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their groundwater) were speculatively covered by the claim—not merely as it related to 
devaluation of property, but also loss of rental income—however, the low-income residents 
of such rental properties were systematically excluded from the claim. For such non-
property owning households, the exclusion of health-impairment claims effectively 
excludes them from the pursuit of multilayer access to environmental justice.603  
Another point of concern of the judicial emphasis on private property (and its 
extended influence on the delimitation of the scope of environmental claims by Private 
Attorneys General) is the reduction of the collective character of claimants into an 
aggregation of individual property owners rather than environmentally-concerned 
citizens.604 This reduction is evidenced as early as Hollick—one of the trilogy of 
groundbreaking cases that ushered in the new paradigm of class actions in Canada. Simply 
put, a theoretical merit of the class action is its collectivism—a class action is not only an 
aggregation of individual claims, but rather permits claims-makers to act collectively in 
pursuit of justice. However, courts have consistently displayed liberal predilections by 
individualizing collective harms. The importance of the collective dimension of class 
actions in the environmental context is in part that “[e]nvironmentalists can present the 
interference as a single, continuing harm to the community and environment,”605 which 
contrasts with the prevailing judicial treatment of class members as a “class of property 
                                                        
603 Once again, although such health-impairment claims may proceed on an individual basis, the prospects 
of success for individuals against powerful defendants such as transnational corporations or governments is 
rather bleak; moreover, if it is a negative value claim, as environmental claims tend to be, then it would be 
economically irrational for claimants to pursue rights vindication through the courts. 
604 This is not an universally applicable dichotomy. Moreover, at times such actions do entail an 
aggregation of individual property owners rather than a collective of citizens.   
605 Heather McLeod-Kilmurray, “Hollick and Environmental Class Actions: Putting the Substance into 
Class Action Procedure,” Ottawa Law Review  34, no. 2 (2003): 275. 
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owners pooling resources to recover their individual compensation, rather than as an 
environmental group seeking pollution prevention.”606 
 In similar fashion, Ring v. Canada attained certification in Newfoundland in 2007 
only to have the certification order overturned in 2010.607 The class action involved the 
spraying of herbicides at the Canadian Forces Base at Gagetown between 1956 to the 
present day and represented all individuals who were exposed to dangerous levels of 
hexachlorobenxene and dioxin—carcinogenic toxicants that cause lymphoma. The 
Newfoundland Court of Appeal overturned the certification order on numerous grounds, 
including the notion that health-impairing environmental claims were not suited to class 
actions on the grounds that individual assessments needed to be conducted, including toxic 
causation analyses based upon those individual assessments, while additionally adjudging 
that the class definition was too broad; once again, the commonality and preferable 
procedure criteria of certification posed the greatest procedural barriers (in addition to the 
first criterion of an identifiable class).608 The court’s enumeration of the various obstacles 
in upholding certification bears recognition, given the wider applicability in the context of 
environmental class actions: 
[T]here would have to be a determination of the “toxic level” of each and every chemical 
sprayed and every combination of sprays used and a determination of how long each area 
was “toxic.” Toxic levels, of course, would have to be related to the various lymphomas. 
For each claimant there would have to be an assessment of when he or she was at CFB 
Gagetown, where he or she went on the base, what chemicals might have been in those 
areas at the time of the visit or visits and whether there might be a cumulative effect from 
multiple visits. For others, for example, those who helped clean mud from equipment, it 
would require an examination of where the equipment had been on the base and what 
chemicals had been sprayed in those areas. For claimants who had contracted lymphoma, 
                                                        
606 Ibid. 




even if Ring is correct regarding the chemicals used at CFB Gagetown, there would also 
have to be extensive medical evidence, among other things, before the connection alleged 
by Ring could be established between the spraying and the lymphoma. Inferences may be 
made in the case of environmental claims which arise out of one incident (e.g. one spill of 
a toxic substance). Here, in light of the time frame involved, the large number of people, 
the size of the base, and the different chemicals used, the proposed common issues are 
insignificant when compared to the large number of individual inquiries which would be 
needed to resolve this claim. I must conclude that judicial economy, if any, would be 
minimal.609  
 
The court’s enumeration of these obstacles in environmental class actions illustrates the 
interplay between procedural barriers at the certification stage and broader problems of 
scientific uncertainty and the lack of empirical data. From a critical policy perspective, the 
concluding statement of the above passage indicates that judicial economy or a lack 
thereof—as a primary policy objective of class actions alongside access to justice—may 
be sufficient cause to hinder the certification of a class proceeding. Indeed, in Bryson v. 
Canada (Attorney General), a case that arose from the same facts of toxic herbicide usage 
in Gagetown (certification was denied), the court observed that “[a]ccess to justice, 
although one of the most important objectives of class proceedings, is not the only 
consideration and I am not satisfied that the proposed class proceeding would result in any 
significant advancement of the goal of judicial economy or that it would provide an 
efficient and manageable method of resolving the dispute.”610 As explored in Chapter 3, 
the counterbalancing of access to justice with the imperatives of judicial economy, 
                                                        
609 Ibid., at 107. 
610 Bryson v. Canada (Attorney General), 2009 NBQB 204, at 91. 
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particularly in cases involving negative value claims, gives rise to grave concerns about 
the compatibility of these policy objectives.611 
 A notable exception to many of the enumerated obstacles was identified above: 
environmental health claims based on a single event. Such was the case in Durling v. 
Sunrise Propane Energy Group Inc., which arose out of a series of explosions at a Toronto-
based propane facility on 10 August 2008.612 These propane explosions resulted in damages 
to approximately 6,386 residents of the affected area, including displacement, inhalation 
of noxious substances, property damage, fear of life, post-traumatic stress disorder, lost 
income, and incidental costs.613 In contrast to the growing tendency in Ontario’s 
environmental class action regime, Durling v. Sunrise Propane was successfully certified, 
however this certification motion was largely uncontested by the defendants and a 
settlement was quickly reached.614 Although environmental health claims based on single 
events more easily pass certification than historical contamination cases, it does not stand 
to reason that single event cases are automatically ensured certification; more to the point, 
it should be noted that such single event cases are relatively uncommon and that the 
                                                        
611 Such reasoning indicates that the policy objectives of class actions are not necessarily complementary—
this recalls the discussion in Chapter 2 concerning the contradictory purposes of negative value class 
actions; that is, class actions that would not otherwise be individually pursued. In fact, the policy objectives 
of class actions as described in Western Canadian Shopping Centres Inc. v. Dutton was quoted in Ring v. 
Canada, including the well-known observation that “by allowing fixed litigation costs to be divided over a 
large number of plaintiffs, class actions improve access to justice by making economical the prosecution of 
claims that would otherwise be too costly to prosecute individually. Without class actions, the doors of 
justice remain closed to some plaintiffs, however strong their legal claims.” Of course, if the objective of 
judicial economy is prioritized above access to justice, it would stand to reason that the access to justice 
benefits of class actions in negative value claims are contradictory to the objectives of the CPA; that is, it 
would serve judicial economy to keep such claims out of the civil justice system, irrespective of their 
merits. Ring v. The Queen, 2007 NLTD 146 (CanLII) at 69. 
612 Durling v. Sunrise Propane Energy Group Inc., 2011 ONSC 7506 (CanLII) at 16-8.  
613 Ibid., at 19. 
614 It should also be noted that such single-incident claims are qualitatively distinct from historical 
contamination claims that are exponentially more challenging for potential or actual claimants.  
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majority of environmental claims pertain to historical contamination.615 For such claims, 
the mounting obstacles to attaining certification is a major source of concern, not merely 
for the access to justice objectives of class members in the respective claims, but also for 
the future of environmental health claims in class action regimes across Canada.  
A prominent recent example from Nova Scotia illustrates the various obstacles 
faced by such actions. The claim in Canada (Attorney General) v. MacQueen pertained to 
toxic emissions from a steel production plant in Sydney, Cape Breton, which the claimants 
alleged harmed their personal health and private property. The steel plant operated for 
nearly a century—from 1903 to 2000—in the center of the city of Sydney, during which 
time the facility (and the coke ovens associated with steel production) were alleged to have 
“spewed hundreds of thousands of tonnes of contaminants, including heavy metals, 
polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons and dangerous respirable particles into the air, water, 
and soil”616 of the surrounding region. The Sydney Tar Ponds (as the region is called) has 
been widely recognized “one of the most notorious contaminated sites in Canada”617 for 
decades. As a strategy to increase the likelihood of attaining certification given the 
aforementioned examples, the claimants did not directly seek any recovery for damages 
pertaining to individual injuries and health-impairments, but rather sought a series of 
interrelated remedies, including the “cessation of exposure by either remediation by 
removal of contaminants from the properties or relocation of residents,”618 as well as the 
                                                        
615 This point has been echoed by Jennifer Fairfax in private correspondence with the author and in a report 
delivered on 19 January 2015 at the Ontario Bar Association 2015 Institute Conference, “Rougher Waters 
to Come for Environmental Class Actions: Will Class Action Plaintiffs Rage Against the Dying of the 
Light?” 
616 Canada (Attorney General) v. MacQueen, 2013 NSCA 143 at 1, 13. Another industrial facility in which 
coke ovens were operational was also included in the claim. This facility closed in 1998. 
617 Meinhard Doelle, “The Sydney Tar Ponds Case: Shutting the Door on Environmental Class Action Suits 
in Nova Scotia?” Journal of Environmental Law and Practice 27, no. 3 (2015): 279. 
618 Ibid., at 14. 
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“implementation of a medical monitoring program consisting of a large-scale 
epidemiological study and an education program,”619 in addition to damages involving 
nuisance, trespass, negligence, battery, negligent battery, strict liability, and breach of 
fiduciary duty.620  
Despite the relatively narrow claim, the certification order was overturned at the 
Court of Appeal on a series of grounds, including that the pleadings alleging nuisance, 
negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty did not meet the commonality criterion, and that 
no cause of action was disclosed for the pleadings alleging battery, negligent battery, and 
strict liability.621 Notably, the court recognized the basic access to justice benefits of 
negative value claims by observing that Private Attorneys General argued that the claims 
of the class members “are so small that it would not be worthwhile for them to pursue relief 
individually and their financial resources are such that they cannot afford to bring separate 
proceedings.”622 However, the court reiterated that the class action was not the preferable 
procedure on the grounds that the claims were too individualized for a collective legal 
vehicle.623 As Meinhard Doelle has observed, the “devastating effect of this decision on 
environmental class actions” might effectively ‘shut the door’ on such actions in Nova 
Scotia.624 As this section has documented, this delimitation of environmental class actions 
is evident across common law provinces in Canada.  
To the extent that health-impairing events directly affect the social reproduction of 
negatively affected individuals and communities, the persistent difficulty of attaining 
                                                        
619 Ibid. 
620 Ibid. 
621 Ibid., at 68, 109-10, 151-52, 161. 
622 Ibid., at 184. 
623 Another complexity that bears recognition is the shifting standards of care over time and the reluctance 
to hold historical harmful activities to the contemporary standards.  
624 Doelle, 285. 
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certification for environmental health claims remains a cause of growing concern. Judicial 
preferences for individual resolution to collective health-impairments may be indicative of 
the standpoint that courts do not possess a “role in the regulatory process affecting 
industrial or landfill pollution or genetically modified plants, for example, which leaves 
extensive discretion in the legislative and executive branches by virtually eliminating 
citizen access to courts on these issues.”625 This judicial preference creates a substantial 
access to justice problem, particularly when governmental bodies are reluctant to enforce 
and regulate powerful polluting industries associated with toxic exposures and the 
production of chemicals, which speaks to the interrelations of power, production, and social 
reproduction in environmental justice.626 More to the point, as explored in Chapter 2, class 
action legislation in Ontario was partly introduced with the neo-liberal objective of 
privatizing regulatory enforcement. The refusal of courts to certify environmental health 
class actions through the individualization of such claims produces a serious enforcement 
gap for claims based on health-impairing events.  
Although environmental class actions involving health-impairment have proven to 
be particularly difficult to certify—such cases are perhaps the most challenging in class 
action regimes across Canada—the obstacles at certification do not exclusively apply to 
such claims. In fact, attaining certification for environmental class actions across the board 
has consistently proven to be elusive, even in cases that do not involve health-impairing 
claims, such as Hoffman v Monsanto Canada Inc., Roberts v. Canadian Pacific Railway 
                                                        
625 Heather McLeod-Kilmurray, The Process of Judging the Environment: Civil Procedure, Environmental 
Ethics and their Effects on Environmental Law (SJD, University of Toronto, 2007) [unpublished]. See also, 
Patrick Hayes, “Exploring the Viability of Class Actions Arising from Environmental Toxic Torts: 
Overcoming Barriers to Certification,” Journal of Environmental Law and Practice 19, no. 3 (2009): 189-
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Co., O’Neill & Chiasson v. St-Isidore Asphalte Ltée, and Paron v. Alberta (Environmental 
Protection).627 According to McLeod-Kilmurray, the dominance of proceduralism in 
environmental class actions (and the concomitant failures at the certification stage) is 
partially attributable to the fact that courts have viewed class action certification “not as 
environmental decisions that happened to involve procedural steps of class certification but 
as a procedural hearing that happened to involve environmental facts,”628 which is a view 
that is “reinforced by the fact that the courts rarely focused on the cumulative harm, 
preferring to see [...] an amalgamation of individual claims.”629 
This emerging inhospitality to environmental class actions has permeated into legal 
cultures of class action regimes and the gatekeeping decision-making criteria of Private 
Attorneys General. Prospects for success figure prominently in the case selection criteria 
of Private Attorneys General and given the established settlement culture of class action 
regimes across Canada, such success is typically conceptualized as a favourable post-
certification settlement. Insofar as the major battleground for class actions remains the 
certification stage, the persistent difficulties in certifying environmental class actions poses 
a significant barrier for potential claims-makers and remains a growing cause for concern 
for the future prospects of multilayer access to environmental justice.  
 Finally, the negative effects for multilayer access to environmental justice of the 
numerous procedural barriers at certification are compounded by the failed outcome of 
Smith v. Inco, the only environmental class action to be decided on its merits at trial. This 
                                                        
627 Hoffman v Monsanto Canada Inc. [2007] SJ No 182 (CA); Roberts v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co. 
[2006] BCJ No 2905 (BCSC); O’Neill & Chiasson v. St-Isidore Asphalte Ltée, 2013 NBQB 72; Paron v. 
Alberta (Environmental Protection), [2006] AJ No 573 (QB). 
628 Heather McLeod-Kilmurray, “Hoffman v. Monsanto: Courts, Class Actions, and Perceptions of the 




failure has produced disincentivizing repercussions on Private Attorneys General to pursue 
similar claims: 
It took 10 years to take the case to trial. The trial itself took months. And the plaintiffs came 
out of the process with nothing. Against this background, there will undoubtedly be some 
who will prefer more low-hanging fruit rather than take on the risk of an environmental 
class action and its unique challenges...630 
 
In addition to the devastating loss at trial, Vale (formerly Inco) was awarded adverse costs 
of over $5 million from Ontario’s Class Proceedings Fund, which had funded and 
indemnified the class action (this adverse costs award was later reduced to $1.76 million 
on appeal).631 As explored in previous chapters, the economic incentives of risk-averse and 
resource-constrained Private Attorneys General militate against the pursuit of socially 
beneficial class actions possessing a high degree of uncertainty in regards to prospective 
outcomes—an ‘investment preference’ that is compounded by the emergence of litigation 
financing that prefers low-risk investments. To the extent that environmental class actions 
involve myriad difficulties from scientific uncertainty and the lack of empirical data to 
procedural obstacles at the certification stage, it appears as if Ontario’s class action regime 
is moving towards the pursuit of ‘low-hanging fruit’ over potentially economically 
devastating class actions with social benefits. As previously elaborated, the recruitment 
strategies of Private Attorneys General has produced an “anemic class action regime, in 
which plaintiff’s counsel prefer low-hanging fruit and focus on fairly routine, more or less 
guaranteed claims,”632 in other words, the polar opposite of environmental class actions.  
 
                                                        
630 Bowal, 319. 
631 Smith v. Inco Ltd., 2013 ONCA 724. 
632 Jones, “Litigate or Regulate? The Elusiveness of an Effective Consumer Protection Regime,” 370. 
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D. TOWARDS A JUDICIAL ENVIRONMENTAL FRAMEWORK? 
The proceduralism that dominates the certification stage continues to pose significant 
obstacles to multilayer access to environmental justice for claims seeking to proceed as 
class actions (re: claims that have already overcome the qualification stage of Private 
Attorneys General). However, alternative approaches that modify this austere 
proceduralism have been postulated by critical scholars whereby substantive law informs 
judicial decision-making at this crucial stage. The basic premise for such approaches is the 
recognition that procedure is neither trans-substantive nor apolitical. Specifically, the 
privileging of private property is a logical extension of classical liberalism, which informs 
the prevailing proceduralism in Canadian law. Despite the hegemonic insistence about the 
neutrality of procedural rules, civil procedure is “never neutral” insofar as it “contains or 
embodies the values and priorities of traditional approaches to civil litigation and its 
purposes, namely the protection of individuals and proprietary interests.”633 The politicality 
of ‘apolitical procedures’ is revealed most incontrovertibly in the political battles that occur 
when procedural rules are developed and amended.634 In short, the privileging of private 
property and the dominant proceduralism at the certification stage are not mutually 
exclusive, but are rather complementary and interdependent features of Ontario’s class 
action regime. As long as this proceduralistic dominance continues unabated, the socio-
                                                        
633 McLeod-Kilmurray, The Process of Judging the Environment: Civil Procedure, Environmental Ethics 
and their Effects on Environmental Law, 4. 
634 For example, as Kent Roach points out in relation to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the United 
States: “The seemingly neutral and apolitical character of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is unmasked 
[when the details of] some of the political battles over recent amendments” are observed. Kent Roach, 




political and economic dimensions of class actions as vehicles for collective claims-making 
will continue to be limited in scope and viability.635 
 One promising framework – a ‘judicial environmental framework’ – has been 
articulated by Heather McLeod-Kilmurray whose appraisal of the relative failures of 
environmental class actions at the certification stage through the invocation of procedural 
technicalities has produced the conclusion that if such proceedings were viewed as 
“environmental decision[s]” instead of “procedural motion[s] divorced from [their] 
substantive context” then the individualization of collective harms may be prevented since 
the “perception of the class as an entity with a united purpose”636 would be enhanced. Such 
a reorientation in the judicial approach at certification would aim to contextualize class 
proceedings according to established environmental concepts, such as sustainability and 
the Precautionary Principle.637 The paradigm of scientific uncertainty in environmental 
harms examined earlier in this chapter testifies to the necessity of greater contextualization 
at the certification stage through the recognition of the underlying substantive law and the 
environmental principles that inform such regimes (notably, the Precautionary Principle, 
which has been a feature of environmental governance domestically and internationally, 
although its gradual delegitimization under the new constitutionalism of disciplinary neo-
liberalism can be discerned). Basing certification decisions on environmental concepts 
such as the Precautionary Principle “might lead judges to err on the side of caution and 
                                                        
635 On a related note, Richard A. Posner has suggested that judicial recourse to formalistic principles is 
exacerbated in complex cases, which is doubly applicable in the context of environmental class actions – 
which often feature high levels of complexity pertaining to toxic causation and scientific uncertainty – that 
must pass through the certification stage. The complexity of a given case often determines the application 
of decontextualized reasoning, according to Posner. See, Richard A. Posner, Reflections on Judging 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013).  
636 McLeod-Kilmurray, 4. 
637 It should also be recalled that certification is not a ruling on the merits, as per CPA s.5: “An order 
certifying a class proceeding is not a determination of the merits of the proceeding.” 1992, c. 6, s. 5 (5). 
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grant certification where there is uncertainty on some of the branches of the certification 
test.”638As explored in this chapter, the preferability criterion has often been cited in 
decisions to reject certification for environmental class actions through the importation of 
a variant of a predominance requirement despite the rejection of such a requirement by the 
Ontario legislature and its noticeable exclusion from the Class Proceedings Act. By 
reorienting such proceedings as environmental decisions involving procedural steps rather 
than as procedural decisions involving environmental facts,639 the prevailing tendency to 
individualize collective harms may be mitigated, with positive implications for multilayer 
access to environmental justice.  
Clearly such a ‘judicial environmental framework’ is a radical proposal that needs 
to be developed further and its implemenation would require broad consensus and 
exploratory research on its viability, however, from the perspective of environmental 
justice, it is promising that such alternatives have started to be explored by environmental 
scholars who are beginning to recognize the shortcomings of the present framework for 
environmental claims.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined the great chasm between the widespread view that 
environmental claims are paradigmatic class actions and the abysmal reality of their 
                                                        
638 McLeod-Kilmurray, “Hoffman v. Monsanto: Courts, Class Actions, and Perceptions of the Problem of 
GM Drift,” 197. “At minimum, the environmental presumption that doubt and uncertainty should be 
resolved in favour of the environment would have led the court to err on the side of certification, to allow a 
full record to be brought,” argues McLeod-Kilmurray, however, Canadian courts appear to prefer that “any 
penalty or remediation should be left to the economics of cost internalization or to the legislative and 
administrative structure.” McLeod-Kilmurray, The Process of Judging the Environment: Civil Procedure, 
Environmental Ethics and their Effects on Environmental Law, 349-51. 
639 Ibid., 192. 
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floundering in Ontario’s class action regime. This abysmal reality has resulted in the 
strategic narrowing of the scope of environmental class actions to the exclusion of health-
impairing events, which has produced a class action regime in Ontario that systemically 
privileges rights of private property over other infringements. To the extent that multilayer 
access to environmental justice applies beyond restitutionary justice to include a 
preventative dimension—that is to say, access to justice in the twenty-first century 
encompasses the dual features of accessibility promotion and injustice prevention—the 
current anemic state of Ontario’s environmental class action regime is cause for grave 
concern, not only for current claims-makers, but also for future claims-makers. As an 
integral pillar of Ontario’s private enforcement regime, class actions have systemically 
failed to protect the social reproduction of vulnerable communities, effectively signaling 
to the polluter-industrial complex that health-impairing events will not be prosecuted 
through collective legal action. The potential weapon of environmental class actions for 
health-impairing events against transnational corporations and governments associated 
with toxic pollution has started to be viewed as a hollow threat. The ramifications of this 
privileging of private property over human health does not solely apply to past and present 
claims-makers who have unsuccessfully attempted to obtain multilayer access to 
environmental justice: future claims-makers are similarly affected by this weakening of 
environmental class actions, given the diminishment of the deterrence function.   
 By exploring the exclusionary dynamics that operate to impede multilayer access 
to environmental justice in light of the power, production, and social reproduction 
associated with the polluter-industrial complex and toxic exposures, this analysis has 
expanded the ambit of environmental class actions beyond the traditional confines of 
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procedural law to the broader political economy of pollution. From the production of 
ignorance by transnational corporations associated with toxicity and the agnotological 
power of knowledge production to the structural limitations of toxic causation in the legal 
context, this chapter has synthesized the dynamics that have produced the systemic 
privileging of private property over human health in Ontario’s class action regime. These 
exclusionary dynamics conjoin with those identified in previous chapters—notably, the 
reversed recruitment paradigm and the gatekeeping role of Private Attorneys General 
according to market criteria and imperatives—to produce an inhospitable climate for 
multilayer access to environmental justice in Ontario. To the extent that class actions 
function as integral pillars of private enforcement regimes, this privileging of private 
property over human security is rooted in the reconfiguration of ‘litigation states’ and the 
broader neo-liberalization of civil justice. The preceding chapters have largely focused on 
procedural barriers to justice (i.e. certification; gatekeeping), however, in recognition of 
the importance of both procedural and substantive dimensions, in the next chapter the 
capacity to achieve substantive justice for environmental claims is examined in light of the 












EXCLUSIONARY DYNAMICS OF PRIVATE REDISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In previous chapters, we have identified a series of barriers to multilayer access to 
environmental justice in Ontario’s class action regime. These have included the 
exclusionary gatekeeping role played by Private Attorneys General, which is a facet of 
Ontario’s regime that applies across sectors, as well as specifically environmental barriers, 
such as the paradigm of scientific uncertainty and the privileging of private property in 
environmental class actions to the detriment of health-impairing claims. Although these 
critical areas address several interrelated facets of multilayer access to environmental 
justice, the barriers examined in previous chapters have largely focused on procedural 
concerns—the notion of ‘barriers’ is proceduralistic as it denotes obstacles to having one’s 
day in court. As observed in Chapter 1, however, progressive conceptions of access to 
justice in the early twenty-first century must incorporate substantive considerations in 
contrast to the strictly procedural conceptions envisaged in earlier waves of research and 
policy reforms. There is minimal value in procedural access without substantive justice. 
  To the extent that environmental class actions facilitate a form of redistributive 
justice in the political economy of pollution, the dynamics impacting the attainability of 
justice demand critical analysis. Although the difficulty of evaluating substantive justice is 
self-evident (given its highly subjective character), this self-evidence does not preclude 
critical policy analyses at a heightened level of generality, including addressing the 
structural inadequacies, ethical problems, misalignment of economic interests, as well as 
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shortcomings in the legislative framework of the Class Proceedings Act. These are 
contextual variables that independently and cumulatively impact substantive justice in 
Ontario’s regime. As it pertains to multilayer access to environmental justice, substantive 
considerations are largely focused on achieving compensation, deterring misconduct, and 
social recognition of loss (i.e. public apologies). As we have observed, however, the 
monetizing preferences of Private Attorneys General and litigation financiers, as well as 
defendants who seek settlements for relatively modest sums without public admissions of 
guilt, dominate Ontario’s regime to the detriment of other forms of substantive justice. The 
fact that nearly every certified class action results in a privately negotiated settlement 
heightens the decision-making powers of such legal actors in favour of monetary 
outcomes—only a single environmental class action has proceeded to trial on its merits in 
Ontario. Such privatization is endemic in Ontario’s class action regime and civil justice 
more broadly. The starting point for a critical analysis in this context must therefore 
consider the dynamics that animate the settlement stage, including the misalignment of 
economic interests, the adversarial void, take-up rates and notice practices, and the 
(in)efficacy of objectors. A broader political economy analysis concomitantly considers 
this settlement paradigm as a facet of the privatization of civil justice and its adverse social 
and democratic ramifications. Notably, the strong judicial and public policy preference for 
settlements is partly precipitated by the insufficiency of state expenditures in civil justice 
in the current historical conjuncture.  
 The chapter proceeds by briefly sketching out the parameters of Ontario’s class 
action settlement culture before exploring a series of contextual variables that determine 
outcomes for collective claims-makers in form and substance. Following the analysis of 
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the dynamics of settlement in Ontario’s regime, the chapter considers the complexities of 
cy-près distribution programs in light of the secondary policy objective of the Class 
Proceedings Act of behaviour modification.640 This acquires heightened significance given 
the mobilization of class actions as policy instruments in the implementation of a private 
enforcement regime in Ontario. Although many features of this analysis are applicable 
across Ontario’s regime, the specificities of substantive justice-seeking in environmental 
matters are highlighted throughout the chapter.  
 
1.   THE SETTLEMENT STAGE 
Access to justice analyses of class actions are typically focused on procedural barriers 
associated with the pre-trial certification stage. This focus on procedural barriers is 
understandable since the certification stage is strictly procedural—no substantive analysis 
of the relative merits of a class proceeding are permitted as per the Class Proceedings 
Act.641 More to the point, these barriers are not inconsequential, particularly for 
environmental health-impairment claims (Chapter 4). The pre-trial certification stage is 
generally viewed as the major battleground for prospective class actions, since class 
proceedings that attain certification as class actions typically result in privately negotiated 
settlements rather than proceeding to trial on their merits. As such, there is a certain 
logicality in focusing on procedural barriers. However, the progressive standpoint of this 
                                                        
640 This Chapter is gratefully indebted to Garry Watson and Michael Rosenberg, who covered a number of 
these issues during their co-taught Class Action Seminar at the University of Toronto’s Law School, as well 
as Jasminka Kalajdzic, who has published extensively on these issues as a leading class action scholar in 
Canada.   
641 Although no consideration of merits is statutorily permitted, the general understanding in Ontario’s class 
action regime as culled from the qualitative interviews conducted for this project is that courts often engage 
in a ‘sniff test’ in terms of evaluating the potential merits of any given proceeding. Whether and to what 
extent such ‘sniff tests’ determine outcomes is unknown.  
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project has consistently been that access to justice necessarily involves both procedural and 
substantive facets. To reduce ‘access to justice’ to strictly procedural concerns regressively 
prioritizes ‘access’ to the detriment of ‘justice’. Given the dominant settlement culture in 
Ontario’s regime, the dynamics of settlement should be a primary site of critical analysis 
(as opposed to public trials, which are exceedingly rare, even as some commentators 
speculate that trials are becoming increasingly common). 
As explicated in previous chapters, Ontario’s regime is distinguished by 
entrepreneurial Private Attorneys General pursuing claims that satisfy criteria based 
primarily on profitability and predictability. This has produced an anemic regime in which 
low-hanging fruit are preferable over otherwise meritorious cases involving the social 
reproduction of vulnerable people. In this context, the risk aversive behaviour of Private 
Attorneys General is conducive to a preference for privately negotiated settlements over 
the contingencies of public trials on the merits. As several participants interviewed for this 
project repeatedly emphasized, even trials in which legal claims are perceived as being 
exceptionally strong nevertheless contain the possibility of adverse outcomes—a 
possibility that is often economically intolerable to resource-constrained and risk-aversive 
Private Attorneys General.642 The strong preference for privately negotiated settlements is 
not solely a matter of public policy or the case management priorities of the judiciary, but 
rather extends to the economic imperatives of entrepreneurial litigators. Similarly, 
defendants are averse to risk exposures and typically prefer privately negotiated settlements 
over the contingencies of unpredictable trials. The cumulative outcome of such economic 
                                                        
642 It should be noted that the narrative of the ‘resource-constrained’ Private Attorney General may need to 
be mitigated given the dominance in Ontario of a select few class action firms who have amassed sizable 
‘war chests’, as indicated earlier.  
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imperatives suggests that the major actors in Ontario’s class action regime are strongly 
aligned with a preference for private settlements. Although legal analyses of the settlement 
stage have typically focused on ethical and jurisprudential concerns, a political economy 
analysis must necessarily start from the broader socio-political context that has produced 
the strong judicial and public policy preference for settlements. 
 
A. PRIVATIZATION & EFFICIENCY 
One of the distinctive features of contemporary neo-liberalism has been a reduction in 
social expenditures and greater privatization of state assets and services. The former 
process has typically operated as a justification for the latter process: privatization has been 
posited as a viable strategy pursuant to the principles of economic efficiency in order to 
address social needs that otherwise require state expenditures. The ideological imperatives 
of such processes are perhaps most clearly identifiable in state taxation regimes, 
particularly in regressive taxation policies which effectively operate to redistribute wealth 
upwards to privileged sectors of society. Social and democratic ramifications of such neo-
liberal processes have been widely observed across Canadian society, including the 
deleterious effects on fundamental democratic institutions such as the civil justice system.  
 Trevor C. W. Farrow has persuasively argued that the privatization of civil justice 
demands greater visibility and politicization given the serious negative impacts across a 
range of critical areas, such as imbalanced power relations, procedural unfairness, the 
development of the common law, and broader democratic ramifications.643 These insights 
apply across civil justice systems in Canada, including to environmental claims in 
                                                        




Ontario’s class action regime. Moreover, Farrow’s trenchant critique of civil justice 
privatization extends to include the inadequacies of public budgeting and political 
ambivalence towards civil justice by political parties and civil society actors. The 
budgetary constrains imposed by prevailing macro-economic policies—articulated through 
features such as balanced budgeting imperatives, deficit reduction, and regressive taxation 
schemes—has contributed to the strong public policy preference for settlements across the 
Canadian civil justice system. Such macro-economic policies are structured by the new 
constitutionalism of disciplinary neo-liberalism which creates constraints on democratic 
controls over economic policy-making.644 The ‘locking in’ of commitments to disciplinary 
neo-liberalism effectively delimits the bounds of political possibility for socio-democratic 
expenditures, including civil justice spending.645 Ultimately, the macro-economics of fiscal 
austerity in the present historical conjuncture indicate that comprehensive increases in civil 
justice expenditures are not forthcoming. 
 This dominant settlement paradigm has garnered increasing attention over the past 
thirty years on what Marc Galanter famously calls the phenomenon of the “vanishing 
trial.”646 Statistically speaking, the settlement rate for all types of civil justice disputes 
across Ontario is roughly 98% and the rate for class actions is estimated at a comparable 
                                                        
644 Isabella Bakker and Stephen Gill, eds., Power, Production, and Social Reproduction (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Stephen Gill and Claire A. Cutler eds., New Constitutionalism and World 
Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
645 Stephen Gill, “New Constitutionalism, Democratisation and Global Political Economy,” Pacifica 
Review 10, no. 1 (1998): 23. As Gill observes, a primary issue is the extent to which the new 
constitutionalism of disciplinary neo-liberalism serves to “‘lock in’ commitments to liberalization, whilst 
‘locking out’ popular-democratic and parliamentary forces from control over crucial economic, social and 
ecological policies.” 
646 Galanter introduced the term in “The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in 
Federal and State Courts,” Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 1, no. 3 (2004): 459-570. For a brief 
overview, see Trevor C. W.  Farrow, Civil Justice, Privatization, and Democracy (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2014): 117-20. 
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level.647 Perhaps the strongest policy rationale for this settlement preference is the 
theoretical capacity of negotiations to promote cooperation and compromise in dispute 
resolution. The basic premise of this rationale is that adversarial trials typically result in 
polarized outcomes in favour of one party over another, whereas settlements promote a 
middle pathway between the two extreme positions that would otherwise constitute an 
adversarial process. The applicability of this logic in the class action context—particularly 
given conflicting economic interests, ethical challenges, and structural flaws in Ontario’s 
institutional framework—deserves greater critical attention than has heretofore been 
provided. From a broader perspective, however, the preference for settlements largely 
derives from the neo-liberal ethos of efficiency-based civil justice reforms that valorizes 
economic efficiency as a determinative principle. As Binoy Kampmark has observed in a 
critique of legal efficiency as neo-liberal dogma, the “coupling of justice, efficiency and 
cost” in this paradigm illegitimately assumes a relationship between justice and efficiency 
that is often conflictual rather than complementary. Kampmark observes that “[c]ase 
management has become code for efficiency, the watchword of legal reformers,”648 a 
paradigm that has produced so-called ‘managerial judges’ who actively promote 
settlements and various alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. From this viewpoint, 
the primary objective of the judicial preference for private settlements is not the inherent 
merits of a conciliatory or compromising process as a preferable means to substantively 
just outcomes, but rather the preservation of scarce judicial resources through ‘expediting 
                                                        
647 Such high rates are largely the outcome of the advent of the case management paradigm. Farrow, 119. 
See also, Honourable Warren K. Winkler, “Civil Justice Reform – The Toronto Experience,” 12 September 
2007, The Warren Winkler Lectures on Civil Justice Reform, accessed 7 February 2016. Online: 
http://www.ontariocourts.ca/coa/en/ps/speeches/civiljusticereform.htm; Kalajdzic, “Access to Justice for 
the Masses?” 101. 
648 Binoy Kampmark, “Legal Efficiency as Dogma: Neo-liberalism, justice and the Australian civil law 
system,” Social Alternatives 35, no. 2 (2016): 69. 
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the process’ and preventing any delays.649 The valorization of economic efficiency as a 
determinative principle privileges expeditious resolutions (typically achieved through 
privatizing initiatives) over substantive justice considerations.  
To recall the brief discussion of Ontario’s settlement culture from Chapter 2, the 
reason offering the greatest explanatory force for such high settlement rates may be the 
preservation of ‘scarce judicial resources’. In point of fact, a double privatizing movement 
is discernible: (1) macro-economic policies have produced restrictive budgeting for public 
bodies which has contributed to the mobilization of class actions as policy instruments in 
Ontario’s private enforcement regime; (2) further privatization is occurring through the 
strong preference for settlements within this private enforcement regime. In other words, 
regulatory enforcement is privatized through class actions and the resolutions of such class 
actions are subsequently privatized through settlement preferences. 
This imperative to preserve ‘scarce judicial resources’ must be viewed in light of 
the constraining fiscal space in the current conjuncture. The scarcity of judicial resources 
is not a spontaneous development. Critical access to justice programs must therefore 
confront the politico-economic dynamics that have facilitated this scarcity of judicial 
resources. The macro-economic fiscal policies of the Canadian state in the current 
conjuncture (i.e. post-1980) emphasizing balanced budgets, fiscal austerity, deficit 
reduction, and other similar measures designed to facilitate the restructuring of Canadian 
society and state formations (at both federal and provincial levels) must be incorporated in 
                                                        
649 Catherine Piché, “Judging Fairness in Class Action Settlements,” Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 
28, no. 1 (2010): 125. For Piché’s book-length study of class action settlements, see Catherine Piché, 
Fairness in Class Action Settlements (Toronto: Carswell, 2012). See also, Maximo Langer, “The Rise of 
Managerial Judging in International Criminal Law,” American Journal of Comparative Law 53, no. 4 
(2005): 835-909.  
 
 240 
critical analyses of access to justice. It simply does not suffice to uncritically accept the 
constraining parameters imposed by the macro-economics of fiscal austerity as intractable 
facts beyond the scope of access to justice analyses; rather, these very processes must be 
critiqued as problematically structuring the major institutions of democratic states and 
societies according to the dictates of market fundamentalism.  
Although the foreseeable prospects for increased state expenditures remain bleak, 
this “does not have to be, and should not be, the case,”650 as Farrow observes. In point of 
fact, several participants interviewed for this study expressed exasperation at the 
insufficient funding for civil justice in the class action context. The principled stance that 
must inform progressive visions of access to justice in the twenty-first century should 
similarly reject the notional impracticability of increased state expenditures by moving 
beyond the “horizon of feasibility”651 imposed by disciplinary neo-liberalism. David Singh 
Grewal and Jedediah Purdy have observed that one of the major premises of this paradigm 
is “a set of implicit bounds that is ostensibly pragmatic but typically less than fully argued 
for, which defines some policy options (such as nationalizing banks) as ‘off-the-wall’ in 
respectable and influential conversations, thus setting presumptive limits on political 
possibility.”652 The standpoint that increasing state expenditures for greater civil justice 
accessibility typically falls beyond these presumptive limits. However, such “politically 
expedient budgetary choices and preferences do not replace principled bases for decision-
making when it comes to public resources as important as civil justice.”653 To date, the 
                                                        
650 Farrow, Civil Justice, Privatization, and Democracy,306. 
651 Richard Falk as quoted by Stephen Gill and A. Claire Cutler, “New Constitutionalism and World 
Order,” 19. 
652 David Singh Grewal and Jedediah Purdy, “Introduction: Law and Neo-liberalism,” Law and 
Contemporary Problems 77, no. 4 (2014): 6.  
653 Farrow, Civil Justice, Privatization, and Democracy, 306. 
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imposition of market rationality on civil justice has operated to replace its democratic 
principles in favour of market principles to the detriment of vulnerable justice-seekers.654  
Fundamentally, it has become evident that neo-liberal legality, distinguished by the 
widespread ethos of economic efficiency and privatization, produces strong settlement 
preferences across the civil justice system, including class actions. What are the dynamics 
of this settlement paradigm? How do these dynamics operate to impede or promote 
substantive justice? In short, what are the ramifications for multilayer justice-seekers of the 
prevailing macro-economic policies that have produced this settlement paradigm? To start, 
this chapter turns to one of the major structural impediments in Ontario’s class action 
regime: the adversarial void. 
 
B. THE ADVERSARIAL VOID 
Notwithstanding the ethical challenges posed by private settlement negotiations, the 
structural problem of settlement approval hearings in which the respective attorneys no 
longer assume their traditional adversarial stances takes centre stage.655 In contrast to 
ordinary civil actions—wherein settlements are only legitimate and binding upon the 
named parties that have provided consent—class action settlements are binding on every 
member of the defined class, with or without the explicit consent of class members. Given 
this vulnerable position of absent class members, the Class Proceedings Act stipulates that 
class action settlements must receive court approval. As section 29(2) states, a proposed 
                                                        
654 Such justice-seekers are vulnerable to a host of negative impacts, including power imbalances, 
procedural unfairness, a lack of transparency, and so forth. In class actions, settlements must be approved 
by courts to ensure the protection of absent class members. 




settlement is not binding unless it has been approved by the court.656 Although such 
mandatory court approval may appear as a strong precautionary measure for the protection 
of absent class members, the atypical dynamics of approval hearings diminishes the 
veracity with which courts can determine the fairness of settlements.657 These atypical 
dynamics are institutionally characterized by the absence of an adversarial process. A basic 
incongruity arises in examining the adversarial void in light of the strong settlement 
preference: this preference is normatively rooted in a ‘presumption of fairness’ by courts 
concerning proposed settlements. This ‘presumption of fairness’ is explicitly recognized 
among the evaluative criteria employed by judges during approval hearings.658 However, 
                                                        
656 Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, s.29(2).  
657 The criteria employed by the judiciary to determine the fairness of a proposed settlement during 
approval hearings includes the following factors: 
(a)   to approve a settlement, the court must find that it is fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class; 
(b)   the resolution of complex litigation through the compromise of claims is encouraged by the courts and 
favoured by public policy;  
(c)   there is a strong initial presumption of fairness when a proposed class settlement, which was negotiated at 
arm’s-length by counsel for the class, is presented for court approval; 
(d)   to reject the terms of the settlement and require the litigation to continue, a court must conclude that the 
settlement does not fall within a zone of reasonableness; 
(e)   a court must be assured that the settlement secures appropriate considerations for the class in return for the 
surrender of litigation rights against the defendants. However, the court must balance the need to scrutinize 
the settlement against the recognition that there may be a number of possible outcomes within a zone or 
range of reasonableness. All settlements are the product of compromise and a process of give and take and 
settlements rarely give all parties exactly what they want. Fairness is not a standard of perfection. 
Reasonableness allows for a range of possible resolutions. A less than perfect settlement may be in the best 
interests of those affected by it when compared to the alternative of the risks and costs obligation. 
(f)   it is not the court’s function to substitute its judgment for that of the parties or to attempt to renegotiate a 
proposed settlement. Nor is it the court’s function to litigate the merits of the action or, on the other hand, 
to simply rubber-stamp a proposal; 
(g)   the burden of satisfying the court that a settlement should be approved is on the party seeking approval; 
(h)   in determining whether to approve a settlement, the court takes into account factors such as (i) the 
likelihood of recovery or the likelihood of success; (ii) the amount and nature of discovery, evidence or 
investigation; (iii) the proposed settlement terms and conditions; (iv) the recommendations and experience 
of counsel; (v) the future expense and likely duration of litigation; (vi) the recommendation of neutral 
parties, if any; (vii) the number of objectors and nature of objections; (viii) the presence of arm’s-length 
bargaining and the absence of collusion; (ix) information conveying to the court the dynamics of, and the 
positions taken by the parties during, the negotiations; and (x) the degree and nature of communication by 
counsel and the representative plaintiff with class members during the litigation. 
See Nunes v. Air Transat A.T. Inc., 2005 CanLII 21681 (ON SC) at 7. 
658 As enumerated in Nunes v. Air Transat A.T. Inc., 2005 CanLII 21681 (ON SC) at 7, “there is a strong 
initial presumption of fairness when a proposed class settlement, which was negotiated at arm’s length by 
counsel for the class, is presented for court approval.”  
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the very notion that settlements are ‘presumptively fair’ is not congruous with the 
inquisitorial role demanded of the judiciary given the adversarial void.659  
 In common law provinces of Canada, the basic structure of the justice system is an 
adversarial system in which competing attorneys represent their respective positions to a 
passive and impartial judge who arrives at a verdict after hearing the arguments. The only 
province that possesses a hybrid model is Quebec wherein public law upholds the common 
law tradition and private law upholds the civil law tradition—a notable distinction since 
the common law tradition involves an adversarial system with a passive judge who arrives 
at an impartial decision, as opposed to the civil law tradition which involves an inquisitorial 
judge who actively investigates the veracity of claims. As it pertains to the common law 
province of Ontario, the adversarial system is primarily a binary structure in which 
plaintiffs and defendants are positioned in directed opposition. It is beyond the scope of 
this analysis to examine whether and to what extent the adversarial character of the 
Canadian civil justice system is conducive to producing substantively just results (or 
whether a cooperative model might possess greater efficacy, for example). The point at 
stake is that common law judges are positioned as formally neutral adjudicators in a court 
structure wherein competing attorneys assume adversarial stances. In the class action 
settlement stage, however, an adversarial void is produced since the respective attorneys 
have arrived at a privately negotiated settlement that is subsequently presented to the court 
for approval. This can be conceived as blurring the distinction between the role of judges 
in the common law adversarial mode and the civil law inquisitorial mode—that is, the 
adversarial void compels judges in the common law tradition to assume the characteristics 
                                                        
659 Kalajdzic, “Access to Justice for the Masses?” 113.  
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of judges in the civil law tradition. In other words, during settlement approval hearings in 
Ontario, the respective attorneys abdicate their adversarial stances by presenting an unified 
front before the presiding judge, who is subsequently thrust into an inquisitorial position. 
  The Ontario Superior Court of Justice summarized this problematic structural 
arrangement in 2010 as follows: 
Normally, courts make determinations in the context of the dynamics of the adversary 
system where opposing views are heard. The theory of the adversary system is that truth 
and justice will emerge from the crucible of the opposing arguments and presentations of 
competing cases. However, for settlement and fee approvals because of the obvious conflict 
of interest of class counsel, the absent class members – who will be bound by the settlement 
– have no one to make their argument, unless a class member comes forward to raise an 
objection, which rarely occurs, or unless the court takes on the role of being an active 
advocate for the class, which the court is ill-equipped to do.660 
Garry Watson similarly observes that settlement approvals are the “most difficult and 
problematic area of class action practice” for the same reason: 
Although the court is entitled to insist on sufficient evidence to permit the judge to exercise 
an objective, impartial, and independent assessment of the fairness of the settlement, it is 
questionable whether common law judges (trained in the adversarial tradition and 
inexperienced in inquisitorial decision-making) are well-equipped to make these kinds of 
inquiries in the absence of adversarial presentation.661  
 
The limited capacity of judges to adequately interrogate the fairness of proposed 
settlements is compounded by the typically complex nature of class actions, which produce 
significant informational and expertise asymmetries. For example, the capacities of a 
presiding judge without any scientific expertise in pesticide usage to adequately interrogate 
a settlement in which both class and defence attorneys presenting an unified front have 
                                                        
660 Smith v. National Money Mart, 2010 ONSC 1334 at 27. See also Smith Estate v. National Money Mart 
Company, 2011 ONCA 233 at 19: “The process [...] places the court in the position of adversary and 
adjudicator at the same time; the court must test the case being put to it, while impartially adjudicating it.” 
661 Ibid., at 28. 
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exhaustively researched the subject matter for months or years, typically with extensive 
recourse to expert consultations, remains questionable. Such asymmetries may be partially 
mitigated when judges preside over cases from start to finish, however, in contrast to 
Quebec—a province in which judges preside over actions from start to finish, thereby 
allowing for greater familiarity with the specificities of any given case—judges in Ontario 
do not preside over actions in similar ways and may be confronted with an unfamiliar case 
for which they are asked to approve a settlement.662  
 The adversarial void at settlement approval hearings has precipitated discussion 
among justice stakeholders about the possibility of appointing an amicus curiae—typically 
external counsel who is not a party to the case to advise the court and provide adversarial 
opposition where necessary. This would restore the traditional role of presiding judges and 
permit greater interrogation of the fairness of proposed settlements.663 The justifying 
rationale for such a proposal is the representation and protection of absent class members; 
that is to say, such a proposal is designed to ensure that the interests of the class are not 
secondary to the profit-maximizing imperatives of Private Attorneys General or the cost 
reduction imperatives of defendant corporations or governments. In short, the proposal for 
the implementation of an amicus broadly aligns with access to justice priorities. 
Interestingly, among the interviewed participants for this project, the greatest 
resistance against the introduction of an amicus was offered by class attorneys who 
generally maintained that such a development would be unwarranted. The open question 
concerning the source of compensation for this theoretical amicus was also raised during 
                                                        
662 Piché, “Judging Fairness in Class Action Settlements,” 117. 
663 A good overview of such monitoring in light of the adversarial void, including amicus, monitors, 
guardian ad litem, and independent counsel, is provided in Smith v. National Money Mart, 2010 ONSC 
1334 at 23-33. 
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interviews, with universal dismissal of the proposition that such compensation should be 
deducted from class counsel compensation. There was greater ambivalence towards this 
proposal among defence counsel. Needless to say, increased state expenditures for civil 
justice could be mobilized to cover the expenses of ensuring adversariality in the form of 
an amicus—such expenditures could also be directed towards increasing the resources 
available to the judiciary (i.e. clerks) to better equip judges during this crucial stage. In the 
argument against such a proposal, one participant (class counsel) suggested that an amicus 
would not ‘stand a chance’ against the unified front of attorneys who have expended 
thousands of hours (or tens of thousands) on a particular case, as opposed to an amicus 
who would be inserted into the proceedings at the latest stage. This viewpoint suggests that 
any such position would be largely formal in character. Needless to say, if an experienced 
amicus with a fair amount of preparation does not ‘stand a chance’ against this unified front 
during a settlement approval hearing, it does not bode well for the presiding judge whose 
very function of an impartial adjudicator is reconstructed into an inquisitorial role and who 
has neither the experience nor expertise to adequately interrogate the fairness of any given 
settlement. If an amicus is ill-equipped to perform this function, then the same (if not 
worse) is true of the presiding judge.  
 As it stands, the class action settlement approval hearing in Ontario’s regime has 
acquired the characteristics of a formal stage to eventual approval. Notwithstanding the 
well-intentioned exertions of presiding judges, the structural flaw posed by the adversarial 
void remains a pivotal area of concern for ensuring substantive justice for collective claims-
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makers. This impediment to greater substantive justice is compounded by the largely absent 
characteristics of class members and the formality of objectors to proposed settlements.664  
 
C. OBJECTORS TO SETTLEMENTS 
The structural flaw posed by the adversarial void can be partially mitigated by class 
members who raise objections to proposed settlements. Such objectors potentially play an 
important role in ensuring that settlement approval hearings incorporate a semblance of 
adversariality. Unfortunately, the role of objectors occupies a largely neglected area of 
access to justice research.665 At approval hearings, any class members who do not approve 
of the terms of the settlement may submit formal objections to be considered by the court. 
These formal objections are typically written submissions. In contrast to several American 
jurisdictions, class members in Canada do not possess a statutory right to submit objections, 
although courts may grant leave for objectors to participate, as per the Class Proceedings 
Act. In Ontario, there is no systematic collection of quantitative data to provide a statistical 
foundation for empirical analyses of the prevalence and outcomes of objections to proposed 
class action settlements at approval hearings.666 The qualitative evidence collected for this 
project, however, paints a dismal picture about the relative success rates of objectors to 
substantively modify or impede proposed settlements before the granting of approval.  
 The precarious role of objectors in Ontario’s class action regime is accentuated by 
the competing economic interests of their own legal representatives. It remains in the 
                                                        
664 Without an amicus, it is largely incumbent upon class members to restore a semblance of an adversary 
process by formally objecting to proposed settlements. 
665 The topic of objectors in class action scholarship is fairly impoverished, with much of this scholarship 
based in the United States. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, “Class Action Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders or 
Fairness Guarantors,” University of Chicago Legal Forum 1, no. 1 (2003): 403-74. 
666 This might change with the forthcoming Class Action Project of the Law Commission of Ontario.  
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economic self-interests of Private Attorneys General to gain approval of proposed 
settlements expeditiously, without substantive modifications to the privately negotiated 
terms. The existence of objectors who may delay or modify the terms of any given 
settlement directly contravenes these economic interests. Needless to say, the absence of 
objectors does not necessarily indicate that the terms of the settlement are acceptable to the 
entire class: given the largely absent character of class members, the extent to which class 
members are aware of such approval hearings in the first place remains questionable. The 
absence of objectors may plainly amount to an extension of the general absent 
characteristics of class members. Although courts have typically interpreted the absence of 
objectors as indicative of the fairness of settlement terms and the presence of objectors as 
indicative of unfairness, to interpret the absence or presence of objectors in such ways does 
not reflect the myriad factors influencing class member behaviour. For example, the 
absence of objectors may be indicative of a failure to provide adequate notice of a 
settlement approval hearing or a failure to provide accessible language in order to facilitate 
greater comprehension among class members about the terms of the settlement. 
Conversely, the presence of objectors does not necessarily indicate that the terms of the 
settlement are unfair to the class as a collective entity; for example, any given class member 
may reject the terms of a proposed settlement based on individual self-interest rather than 
based on the interests of the entire class as a collectivity. As courts have maintained on 
numerous occasions, in “determining whether a settlement is reasonable and in the best 
interests of the class,” one of the factors that must be considered is “the number of objectors 
and nature of objections.”667 However, this complicated interpretive terrain is indicative of 
                                                        
667 See, e.g., Fantl v. Transamerica Life Canada, [2009] O.J. No. 3366 (S.C.J.) at 59; Corless v. KPMG 
LLP, [2008] O.J. No. 3092 (S.C.J.) at 38; Farkas v. Sunnybrook and Women’s Health Sciences 
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the serious difficulties faced by courts in determining the fairness of proposed settlements 
with an adversarial void.  
Christopher R. Leslie has pointed out that the absence or ‘silence of objectors’ is 
not indicative of class approval of a proposed settlement and that class member silence at 
the settlement stage is likely indicative of (1) ignorance of the ongoing class action and/or 
the settlement approval hearing; (2) insufficient time to prepare a formal objection; (3) 
insufficient resources to mount an objection; and (4) perceived futility of objecting.668 As 
Leslie concludes, silence is simply “a lack of response” rather than a “reaction to the 
proposed settlement,” and if “rational class members would remain silent when confronted 
with either an adequate or inadequate settlement, then a judge should read nothing into 
their silence.”669 It is exceedingly unlikely that ‘economically rational’ individuals will 
suspend their everyday activities of social reproduction (and arrange possible childcare, 
take time off work, etc.) to submit objections to environmental class action settlements, 
which are typically negative value claims. The confluence of the above factors strongly 
suggests that the absence of objectors is not indicative of an endorsement of the proposed 
settlement. A leading Canadian scholar on class action settlements, Catherine Piché, 
similarly observes that irrespective of “the presence or absence of objectors to a proposed 
settlement, courts should pursue an independent analysis of the settlement terms.”670 The 
                                                        
Centre, [2009] O.J. No. 3533 (S.C.J.) at 43; Kidd v. Canada Life Assurance Company, 2013 ONSC 1868 
(CanLII); Keyton v Canada Lithium Corp., 2016 ONSC 7354 at 41; Sutherland v. Boots Pharmaceutical 
plc, [2002] O.J. No. 1361 (S.C.J.) at 10; Vitapharm Canada Ltd. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche 
Ltd. (2005), 2005 CanLII 8751 (ON SC), 74 O.R. (3d) 758 (S.C.J.) at 117; Frohlinger v. Nortel Networks 
Corp., [2007] O.J. No. 148 (S.C.J.) at 8.  
668 Christopher R. Leslie, “The Significance of Silence: Collective Action Problems and Class Action 
Settlements,” Florida Law Review 59, no. 1 (2007): 71-134. 
669 Ibid., 134. 
670 Catherine Piché, “A Critical Reappraisal of Class Action Settlement Procedure in Search of a New 
Standard of Fairness,” Ottawa Law Review 41, no. 1 (2010): 37. 
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extent to which courts are capable of pursuing such independent analyses given the 
structural flaws of the settlement stage leaves much to be desired.  
 The typically individuated character of objectors also implicates a range of access 
to justice factors that are not commonly involved in class actions, particularly the 
heightened levels of legal empowerment and legal consciousness on an individual basis 
that is required to formally object to enormous proposed settlements involving highly 
experienced legal actors. The self-represented status of many objectors additionally limits 
the efficacy of such class members to modify or impede proposed settlements. As access 
to justice research has demonstrated throughout the Canadian justice system, self-
represented litigants are not evenly distributed across social locations, but are rather 
disproportionately distributed amongst vulnerable, low-income, gendered, and racialized 
groups. The social locations associated most problematically with lower levels of legal 
empowerment and legal consciousness disproportionately account for self-represented 
litigants. As it pertains to environmental claims, the inequitable distribution of accessibility 
correlates with the inequitable distribution of environmental injustices, which suggests that 
obstacles confronted by potential objectors are compounded in the context of 
environmental class actions. Based on anecdotal evidence, the strongest objections are 
typically posited during investor rights disputes in which relatively privileged actors are 
capable of hiring legal representatives to submit formal objections.671  
These accessibility dimensions are contributing factors to the general inefficacy of 
objectors. Moreover, to the extent that the distinguishing feature of class actions from an 
access to justice perspective is their collectivist nature and strength-in-numbers logic, the 
                                                        
671 Overall, there are multiple layers of accessibility concerns involved in submitting objections in 
environmental class actions.  
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benefits of this collective logic are deprived of individual objectors who are not only 
positioned against powerful defendants, but also against their own legal representatives. 
The promotive capacities resulting from this collective logic are largely inapplicable in the 
context of class member objections unless class members independently organize 
opposition against a proposed settlement (a theoretical possibility, but an empirical rarity). 
Simply put, the odds are significantly stacked against objectors. It may not be inaccurate 
to describe the role of objectors as a formality in the settlement approval process.672 This 
recognition of the formality or futility of objecting is a contributing factor to refusals to 
participate, as Leslie observes—a silent abstention that can be simultaneously cited as a 
justification for approving proposed settlements. 
 Furthermore, the capacity of class members to mount strong objections to proposed 
settlements is substantively limited by restrictions to access documentary evidence. 
Objectors are positioned against the unified front of highly experienced legal actors with 
full access to all relevant documentary evidence at their disposal, whereas objectors are not 
permitted to comprehensively access this evidence. Jasminka Kalajdzic has pointed out 
that this “lack of access to documentary evidence renders it very difficult for any objector 
to mount a serious, substantive argument in opposition to the terms of the settlement.”673 
This indicates that institutional reform is required in order to facilitate stronger objector 
capacities in Ontario’s class action regime. 
                                                        
672 John Kleefeld corroborates this insight by observing that the “class action participant who has not fared 
well in Canadian class actions so far [is] the objector. An objector may be seen as a thorn in the side of both 
class and defence counsel at the time of a settlement hearing, but a relatively minor one at that – to be 
treated respectfully but not especially seriously. At least this is the impression one might be left with from 
the few objector decisions in Canadian class action law. Objectors have, in a word, been given short shrift.” 
John Kleefeld, Book Review, The Modern Cy-Prés Doctrine: Applications & Implications by Rachael P. 
Mulheron, Canadian Class Action Review 4, no. 1 (2007): 209.  
673 Kalajdzic, “Access to Justice for the Masses?” 115. 
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 As a final option for class members whose objections to the terms of a proposed 
settlement are rejected, courts have proposed that such objectors can opt-out of the 
proceedings and individually pursue their claims. As Kalajdzic observes, however, the 
capacity of class members to opt-out of a proposed settlement is only applicable when 
certification and settlement are sought simultaneously—in cases where certification 
precedes settlements (i.e. contested certification), this capacity to opt-out is not available, 
which precludes class members from individually pursuing their claims by opting out of a 
proposed settlement that has been perceived as unfair: “Access to justice in such a scenario 
is turned on its head; the binding nature of the representative proceeding denies dissatisfied 
class members formal access to the courts.”674 This does not suggest access to justice is 
obtained in cases where class members are provided the choice of opting out of a proposed 
settlement: the viability of this choice is questionable given the basic rationale for pursuing 
class actions in the first place. The premise that objectors can simply opt-out and 
individually pursue their claims directly contradicts the access to justice logic of class 
actions as “making economical the prosecution of claims that would otherwise be too costly 
to prosecute individually.”675 The ‘choice’ of opting out is categorically unviable for 
negative value claims. Conversely, as it pertains to positive value claims—where litigation 
costs do not outweigh potential damages—the choice of opting out may acquire a modicum 
of viability; however, positive value claims are not pursued through class actions solely 
based on economic viability, but also given the strength-in-numbers logic of collective 
redress. Even in positive value claims, opting out effectively diminishes the power 
capacities of claims-makers against powerful adversaries. 
                                                        
674 Ibid., 106, 119. 
675 Western Canadian Shopping Centres v. Dutton, 2000 S.C.J. 63, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 534; at 28. 
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 To conclude, the perceived futility of class members mounting objections to 
proposed settlements is perhaps well-founded in the structural flaws of the approval 
process as outlined in this section. Although Private Attorneys General typically provide 
notices to class members as a means of relaying information about class action settlement 
hearings, such notices similarly take on the characteristics of a formality. As Deborah 
Hensler points out: 
[Class members] are told that they may object to a settlement, but sometimes they are not 
told much about how to go about doing that, and often what they are expected to do—e.g., 
appear in some place miles away or secure a lawyer to appear on their behalf—is infeasible. 
Whatever the notices say, the real message to class members is ‘stay away’.676 
 
Ultimately, the formality and futility of objectors remains a significant impediment to 
greater access to substantive justice, which indicates that reforms are required to facilitate 
greater class member participation. At root, these structural flaws are accentuated by the 
misalignment of economic interests to the detriment of class members.  
 
D. CONFLICT OF INTERESTS 
Perhaps the strongest argument in favour of deeper penetration of market forces into civil 
justice is the potential promotive benefits for multilayer access to justice. The basic 
trajectory of this position holds that Private Attorneys General are incentivized by 
economic self-interest to pursue claims that would otherwise remain unvindicated. This 
premise implies that the economic interests of Private Attorneys General align with those 
of collective claims-makers, which reinforces the belief that market forces can be harnessed 
                                                        
676 Leslie, 101. See also Deborah R. Hensler, Nicholas M. Pace, Bonnie Dombey-Moore, Elizabeth 
Giddens, Jennifer Gross and Erik Moller, Class Action Dilemmas: Pursuing Public Goals for Private Gain 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2000).  
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for the pursuit of access to justice. However, the ‘access to justice’ that is promoted through 
market forces remains severely restricted by those very same forces. For example, 
meritorious claims are systematically excluded when they do not satisfy the economic 
qualification criteria of gatekeeping Private Attorneys General. In the environmental 
context, the strategic privileging of private property over health concerns is a prime 
example of restricting procedural access to justice for collective claims-makers. As this 
section posits, however, substantive considerations are also negatively impacted by the 
marketization of civil justice. This section strikes at the core of the argument in favour of 
such marketization by exploring the misalignment of economic interests that rises to the 
foreground in the settlement stage.   
 To recall, class action critiques have generally been advanced by conservative 
critics who take exception to a ‘socialistic’ vehicle promoting redistributive justice. As 
Martin Redish has argued, the “class action functions as a form of litigation socialism, 
because it is for the most part designed to redistribute wealth from large concentrations of 
economic power.”677 Such critics raise the spectre of ‘legalized blackmail’, which is to say, 
the notion that class actions operate by “extorting unjust settlements from defendants.”678 
The victims in these accounts are typically multinational corporations who are unjustly 
persecuted by frivolous litigants in search of personal enrichment. In such accounts, 
corporations are incentivized to settle any claims, whether meritorious or frivolous, in order 
to minimize legal costs and avoid the potential for large adverse outcomes. This 
                                                        
677 Martin Redish, “Rethinking the Theory of the Class Action: The Risks and Rewards of Capitalistic 
Socialism in the Litigation Process,” Emory Law Journal 64 (2014): 113. For Redish’s book-length critique 
of class actions, see Martin Redish, Wholesale Justice: Constitutional Democracy and the Problem of the 
Class Action Lawsuit (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009). 




redistributive instrument is viewed as impeding the ‘spontaneous ordering of the market’ 
by legally abusing powerful economic actors to the benefit of litigious claims-makers. 
Firstly, as it pertains to meritorious actions, the OLRC Report aptly pointed out that “any 
increased pressure to settle meritorious class actions that flows simply from the potential 
of such actions to overcome barriers to litigation and provide greater access to the courts 
is legitimate and desirable.”679 Secondly, given the high costs and risk exposures involved 
with class actions in Ontario’s regime, the prospect of Private Attorneys General advancing 
frivolous claims for the purposes of ‘blackmailing’ corporations is exceedingly remote.680 
In Ontario, class action firms are highly incentivized to pursue claims with strong legal 
merits. The spectre of frivolous claimants taking advantage of vulnerable corporations 
appears rather as a rhetorical strategy of ‘de-democratization’ and the further retrenchment 
of multilayer access to justice. Ultimately, the notion of ‘unfair settlements’ in these 
accounts applies to this type of ‘legal blackmail’; which is to say, the party to whom 
settlements are unfair is the defending corporation (or government). 
On the other hand, the progressive critique of this project reorients the object of 
analysis towards collective claims-makers in its evaluation of settlement fairness. That is 
to say, the notion of ‘unfair settlements’ applies primarily to absent class members. 
Interestingly, although conservative and progressive critiques diverge on the character of 
collective claims-makers in class actions—legal blackmailers versus justice-seekers—the 
respective standpoints are broadly aligned concerning their critical appraisal of 
economically self-interested Private Attorneys General. From both standpoints, class 
                                                        
679 Ibid., 147. 
680 This is corroborated by a simple overview of the substantive content of class actions pursued in Ontario 
since the introduction of class action legislation in 1992. As the OHRC Report exhaustively detailed, the 
‘legal blackmail’ argument is statistically unverifiable and empirically dubious. Ibid., 149-63. 
 
 256 
attorneys are primarily self-interested entrepreneurs who capitalize on legal claims for 
economic gain. The protection of processes of social reproduction for vulnerable people 
does not feature as a determinative criterion in such pursuits. Moreover, the primacy of 
economic self-interest of Private Attorneys General conflicts with those of class members 
to the point where such entrepreneurialism can be viewed as capitalizing on incurred harms 
for profit. 
This conflict of interests between Private Attorneys General and collective claims-
makers is primarily economic. The typical situation in which such misalignment of 
economic interests occurs is where Private Attorneys General privately negotiate 
settlements that maximize their own compensation to the detriment of the potential 
recovery for the class members.681 The OLRC Report describes the situation as follows: 
[W]hile the class members’ financial interest is in their share of the total recovery, less the 
proportion of the recovery that is awarded as lawyers’ fees, lawyers, in determining their 
net compensation, must deduct from any fee award the value of the time and effort required 
to produce it. In other words, from the lawyer’s point of view, a relatively small settlement 
at an early stage of the proceedings may well yield a gross monetary return for the lawyer 
that bears a higher ratio to the cost of the work than a much larger recovery obtained only 
after extensive discovery, a long trial, and an appeal.682  
The economic interests of Private Attorneys General therefore favours the expeditious 
resolution of class actions in order to maximize the ratio of input work to output rewards, 
with strong risk-aversive conditioning. This contrasts with the economic interest of class 
members that chiefly resides in the maximization of the total recovery (within a reasonable 
time-frame). Although it is clear that delayed justice means denied justice, particularly in 
prolonged class action battles, this misalignment of economic interests is palpable from a 
                                                        




class member perspective (and critics of entrepreneurial litigation, progressive or 
conservative). 
 
E. COLLUSION BETWEEN PARTIES 
The two major objectives of courts during settlement approval hearings are (1) the 
protection of absent class members and (2) the prevention of collusion between 
attorneys.683 These objectives are interrelated since collusion operates to disadvantage 
absent class members.684 The prospect of collusive activity directly results from the 
misalignment of economic interests described above. Although the existence of such 
diverging economic interests is not determinative of collusive activity, such activity 
typically arises out of this divergence. As Janet Walker and Garry Watson have pointed 
out (quoting the OLRC Report): 
There is a real possibility that, without the benefit of appropriate safeguards, parties and 
their counsel might be tempted to abuse the class action procedure in reaching a settlement. 
For example [...] class members’ interests could be sacrificed for lawyers’ fees [...] in the 
context of a settlement negotiated on behalf of the entire class, the agreement reached could 
be inadequate or unfair to the class members.685  
The divergence of economic interests is most straightforwardly apparent in situations 
where settlements as privately negotiated by the respective parties “absorb the fees of the 
class lawyer, calculated at a premium rate, in return for the acceptance of an inadequate 
                                                        
683 Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Class Actions (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 
1982): 788-89. 
684 This does not suggest that the protection of absent class members is limited to prevention of collusion. 
685 Janet Walker, “Class Proceedings in Canada – Report for the 18th Congress of the International 
Academy of Comparative Law,” All Papers (2010): 29-30; Garry Watson, “The Canadian Experience with 
Class Actions: Access to Justice or Just a New Moneymaking Product Line for Lawyers?” Amicus Curiae 
45 (2003): 31. See also, Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Class Actions (Toronto: Ministry of 
the Attorney General, 1982): 163-68. 
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class award and discontinuance of the class action.”686 Richard Posner articulates this 
situation in starker terms by observing that the “lawyer for the class will be tempted to 
offer to settle with the defendant for a small judgment and a large legal fee, and such an 
offer will be attractive to the defendant, provided the sum of the two figures is less than the 
defendant’s net expected loss from going to trial.”687 The resultant settlements are identified 
as ‘sweetheart deals’ since they involve class attorneys settling otherwise meritorious 
claims for significantly lower values than they are worth.688 
Although collusive activity of this nature implies a modicum of intentionality on 
the part of Private Attorneys General, Walker and Watson suggest (quoting the OLCR 
Report) that such situations may occur “through indirect financial pressures, without any 
conscious misbehaviour on the part of the lawyer.”689 The blurry distinction between 
conscious and unconscious conduct is indicative of the limitations of behavioural analyses, 
however, the empirical observation of the misalignment of economic interests 
independently raises substantive concerns from the perspective of multilayer access to 
justice. As the OLRC Report perceived as early as 1982, this misalignment is a serious 
impediment to multilayer access to justice—a precautionary observation that precipitated 
the policy recommendation of greater court monitoring in the form of settlement approval 
hearings. In fact, the potential for collusive activity has been considered serious enough to 
warrant explicit inclusion as a key factor to be considered by courts in determining fairness 
of settlements.690 Once again, however, such approval hearings are distinguished by an 
                                                        
686 Walker, 29-30. 
687 Watson, 31. 
688 John C. Kleefeld, “Class Actions as Alternative Dispute Resolution,” Osgoode Hall Law Journal 39, no. 
4 (2001): 818-37.  
689 Ibid., 30. 
690 See, supra note 638.  
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adversarial void in which judges are ill-positioned to adequately interrogate proposed 
settlements and determine fairness for class members.  
 Finally, it may be the case that framing this problem of substantive justice as the 
risk of collusion serves to behaviouralize a structural problem. In other words, the 
fundamental problem of class action settlements from the perspective of substantive justice 
is not the potential for “conspiratorial wrongdoing”691 by unscrupulous or unethical 
attorneys, which applies to individual behavioural decision-making, but rather the 
misalignment of economic interests, which structurally applies across Ontario’s class 
action regime. This narrow framing of the substantive justice problem to collusive 
behaviour largely supplants the structural problem of misaligned economic interests and 
unduly limits the potentially objectionable impediment to settlement approval to an 
extreme situation of illegality.  
The point at stake is not that Private Attorneys General are engaging in explicitly 
illegal conduct with defendants in order to maximize their profits at the expense of class 
members. The grave access to justice concerns are not restricted to a ‘few bad apples’ 
engaging in unscrupulous behaviour (although these exist), but rather the broader economic 
forces that determine outcomes for justice-seekers. Although such unlawful behaviour is 
objectionable and rightly warrants consideration during approval hearings, the extremity 
of the behaviour serves as a ‘red herring’ for the broader structural problem: the economic 
interests of Private Attorneys General are conditionally aligned with those of defendants 
rather than class members. This misalignment generates situations in which the respective 
parties do not need to resort to collusive behaviour in order to maximize profits: simply 
                                                        
691 Howard M. Erichson, “The Problem of Settlement Class Actions,” Washington University Law Review 
82, no. 3 (2014): 953. 
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pursuing their economic interests is typically sufficient for the production of such 
outcomes. 
 
F. NOTIFICATION & IGNORANCE 
Given the largely absent character of class members, the extent to which they are informed 
of the various developments relevant to their actions is pivotal for ensuring substantive 
justice. Such periodical informational notifications (‘notice’) are essential to overcoming 
different types of ignorance that prevail in Ontario’s regime. For example, the lack of 
knowledge that an action has been initiated or certified is a critical agnotological failure 
that impacts the capacity of class members to opt-out of actions.692 As it pertains to 
settlements, failure to adequately notify class members of approval hearings negatively 
impacts their capacity to mount formal objections.693 To the extent that public policy 
favours active participation of informed class members—in recognition of the largely 
entrepreneurial attorney-driven character of class actions—the provisioning of notice is 
paramount to satisfy this policy objective.  
 Ontario’s Class Proceedings Act recognizes the importance of providing notice in 
several sections at various stages of actions.694 At certification, notice may involve (a) 
descriptions of the proceeding, (b) manner and deadlines of opting out for class members, 
(c) possible financial consequences, (d) summaries of any fee and disbursement 
agreements, (e) descriptions of any counterclaims by or against the class, (f) the binding 
                                                        
692 Kalajdzic, “Access to Justice for the Masses?” 121, 125. 
693 Irrespective of the largely formal character of such objections. 
694 Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, s.17-22 covering (17) notice of certification, (18) notice 
where individual participation is required, (19) notice to protect interests of affected persons, (20) approval 
of notice by the court, (21) delivery of notice, and (22) costs of notice. Section 27(4) also involves notice of 
discontinuance, abandonment, and settlement.  
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nature of judgments, (g) rights of participation for class members, (h) addresses at which 
class members can direct inquiries, and (f) any other relevant information.695 The ways in 
which notice may be given to class members typically varies according to the 
determinations of courts, including (a) in person or by mail, (b) advertising, publishing, 
etc., (c) individualized notice to a sample group of the class, and (d) any combination of 
the above.696 As it pertains to the resolution of actions, including settlements, courts may 
consider the provisioning of notice that includes (a) a summary of the proceeding, (b) the 
result of the proceeding, and (c) the plan for distributing settlement funds.697 At first glance, 
it appears that such informational notifications are exhaustive in scope and breadth, thereby 
facilitating greater class member awareness and participation. However, the existence of 
formal guidelines as enumerated in the Class Proceedings Act is not necessarily reflective 
of the empirical reality of Ontario’s regime.  
Firstly, the enumerated guidelines are not statutory requirements. Courts may 
consider the relative merits of notice provisioning, but the Class Proceedings Act does not 
require such provisioning. Although courts customarily order notifications as appropriate, 
the optionality of such provisioning is cause for reservation.  
Secondly, the guidelines for notice provisioning do not include any considerations 
of the inaccessibility of formal legal language to the great majority of legally illiterate 
claims-makers (or claims-makers with low legal literacy).698 This contrasts with American 
practices as outlined in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure section 2(b), which 
                                                        
695 Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, s.17(6).  
696 Ibid., s.17(4). 
697 Ibid., s.29(4). 
698 Kalajdzic, “Access to Justice for the Masses?” 122-23. 
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holds that “notice must clearly and concisely state in plain, easily understood language”699 
the relevant information. Moreover, this second obstacle entails two interrelated factors 
from an access to justice perspective: (1) in light of the emergence of the Plain Language 
Movement (PLM) as a major feature of access to justice in the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first century, the inaccessibility (and incomprehensibility) of formal legal notice 
constitutes a legitimate barrier to access to justice; (2) to the extent that legal information 
is a growing feature of access to justice, impediments to the provisioning of legal 
information constitute barriers to access to justice.700 The provisioning of legal information 
in inaccessible language concurrently implicates both of these concerns.  
 The basic imperative of a strong notice program is good communication, which 
involves plain and accessible language, but also “dissemination methodologies to ensure 
that people are effectively reached by notices, by frequency of exposure that people get 
multiple opportunities to act on messages that will result in benefits coming to them, and 
from design and style aspects that cause messages to come to the attention of those 
affected.”701 In an appropriately titled article, “Do You Really Want Me to Know My 
Rights?” Todd B. Hilsee et al observe that “[n]otice and notice programs amount to nothing 
more than a mere gesture when they seek the least amount of notice that will be acceptable 
to a judge who is not presented with any appropriate evidence to assess it.”702 In Ontario, 
                                                        
699 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 23(2)(b). 
700 See, e.g., Janice Gross Stein and Adam Cook, “Speaking the language of justice: a new legal 
vernacular,” in eds., Frederick H. Zemans, W.A. Bogart, & Julia Bass, Access to Justice for a New 
Century: The Way Forward (Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada, 2005); Rabeea Assy, “Can the Law 
Speak Directly to its Subjects? The Limitations of Plain Language,” Journal of Law and Society 38, no. 3 
(2011): 376-404; Kali Jensen, “The Plain English Movement’s Shifting Goals,” Journal of Gender, Race 
and Justice 13, no. 3 (2010): 807-34. 
701 Todd B. Hilsee, Shannon R Wheatman, and Gina M Intrepido, “Do You Really Want Me to Know My 
Rights? The Ethics Behind Due Process in Class Action Notice Is More Than Just Plain Language: A 
Desire to Actually Inform,” Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 18, no. 4 (2005): 1381. 
702 Ibid., 1382. 
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in addition to the absence of legislative requirements for notice provisioning and the 
typically inaccessible content of such notices on a linguistic level, a major component of 
notice provisioning is the ways in which such information is distributed. The problem of 
distribution is particularly apparent in cases with diffuse harms affecting a wide socio-
demographic range, which increases the difficulty of contacting every class member. 703 
Although the effectiveness and commitment to engage in adequate notice distribution 
varies on a case-by-case basis, especially across class action firms, recent developments 
indicate that greater efforts are being dedicated to this end.704  
The costs associated with mounting such extensive notice campaigns is typically 
cited as a chief concern among Private Attorneys General, particularly when such costs are 
proposed to be reduced from their profit margins. Given the entrepreneurialism of 
Ontario’s class action regime, it is logical for Private Attorneys General to “bear the 
expense of notice as one of their investment costs.”705 Attempts to offload this expense to 
class members through deductions from the settlement fund (excluding Private Attorney 
General fees) should be strongly discouraged by courts at approval hearings (or 
legislatively prohibited). Needless to say, accessing substantive justice in the prevailing 
monetary settlement paradigm of Ontario’s class action regime is directly associated with 
the provisioning of adequate notice. If absent class members are not informed of the 
existence of an action or a settlement, then they can scarcely submit claims to the settlement 
fund, receive monetary redress, or lodge formal objections to unfair settlements. Such 
dependencies on economically self-interested actors gives rise to the reservation of 
                                                        
703 For an overview of distribution types, see, e.g., Jordan S. Ginsberg, “Class Action Notice: The Internet’s 
Time Has Come,” University of Chicago Legal Forum 2003, art. 18 (2003): 739-72. 
704 Kalajdzic, “Access to Justice for the Masses?” 126. 
705 Ibid., 126-27. 
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overreliance on strictly legal vehicles in the pursuit of social objectives in the political 
economy of pollution; that is to say, the limitations of legalistic collectivism over broader 
socio-political coalitions and collective movements for substantive environmental justice. 
Although environmental class actions are pivotal aspects of environmental justice 
programs, the exclusionary dynamics of Ontario’s regime that have been identified in this 
chapter testify to the demand for non-legal channels of social protection in the political 
economy of pollution.  
 
G. FINALITY OF SETTLEMENTS 
The cumulative effects of the dynamics explored in this chapter is the disadvantaging of 
collective claims-makers through the strong preference for settlements, the adversarial 
void, the presumption of fairness, the formality and futility of objectors, and the 
misalignment of economic interests. This problematic situation is compounded by the res 
judicata706 effect of approved settlements, which prevents claims-makers from attaining 
vindication in the future given the finality of settlements. The approval of a class action 
settlement precludes claims-makers from pursuing future action against the wrongdoers. 
The largely absent character of class members and the enumerated shortcomings of the 
settlement stage (as described above) produce situations in which harmed individuals and 
collectives may not be aware that a class action has even been undertaken in the name of 
                                                        
706 An overview of the doctrine is provided in a recent case: “The doctrine of res judicata is a time-
honoured cornerstone of Canadian justice. Where a cause or a fundamental issue has been decided, it is said 
to be res judicata and, absent special circumstances, is precluded from being adjudged a second time. 
When res judicata applies, a litigant is stopped by the prior suit, from proceeding in the subsequent action... 
The paramount policy consideration include the avoidance of duplicative litigation, potential inconsistent 
results and inconclusive proceedings. Finality to litigation is the prime objective.” Tylon Steepe Homes 
Ltd. v. Pont, 2011 BCSC 385 (CanLII) at 52. 
 
 265 
vindicating their incurred harms, yet they are bound by the terms of the settlement as 
privately negotiated by Private Attorneys General possessing diverging economic interests 
in a questionable institutional framework distinguished by an adversarial void and judges 
incapable of comprehensively evaluating the fairness of settlements. Such settlements 
possess legal finality and claims-makers are precluded from pursuing vindication for their 
incurred wrongs at a future date.  
Even in cases where class members are aware of the ongoing proceedings and seek 
to dispute the terms of proposed settlements, the formality and futility of objections 
effectively neutralizes any agency that such awareness may have granted class members. 
As argued above, the capacity of objectors to opt-out of proposed settlements is typically 
either (1) a false choice that directly contradicts the access to justice rationale justifying 
class actions in the first place or (2) categorically unavailable. 
 The finality and binding nature of settlements is especially disadvantageous in the 
environmental context. The structural flaws of the settlement process are compounded in 
environmental claims involving health-impairment given that certain toxic exposures have 
extended latency periods and adverse health impacts may not manifest for several years 
after exposure (i.e. asbestos poisoning). In such cases, absent class members may not even 
be cognizant of their inclusion in a class action that has already been settled. This differs 
from absent class member ignorance concerning ongoing actions in the sense that the 
former case involves class members who are aware of incurred wrongs yet unaware of 
ongoing actions, whereas the latter case involves class members who are unaware of 
incurred wrongs—in this latter case, whether class members are aware or unaware of 
ongoing actions is largely irrelevant given that they do not perceive themselves as having 
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incurred wrongs. Such situations of harm-related ignorance are broadly categorizable under 
the rubric of the ‘futures problem’ which refers to vulnerable people who have been 
exposed to a noxious substance or toxicant, but who have not yet manifested health-
impairing effects, as examined in Chapter 2. John C. Coffee has observed that in such cases 
it may paradoxically be the case that class actions are “less the plaintiff’s sword and more 
the defendant’s shield.”707 That is to say, class action settlements effectively operate in 
these cases to protect defendants. Kalajdzic echoes this sentiment with the observation that 
the binding finality of settlements effectively ‘turns access to justice on its head’ by 
transforming an instrument for the promotion of access to justice into a mechanism for its 
delimitation.708  
These dynamics point towards the bleak reality of Ontario’s class action regime as 
structurally flawed from the perspective of multilayer access to justice. However, these 
structural flaws are not evenly distributed across Ontario’s regime. Positive value claims 
involving spatially concentrated class members with heightened legal consciousness and 
legal empowerment are likely best suited to avoid a few of the pitfalls in Ontario’s class 
action regime. By contrast, negative value claims involving diffusive harms incurred by 
vulnerable people with diminished legal consciousness and legal empowerment are likely 
poorly situated to avoid these pitfalls. Such structural flaws are particularly applicable in 
the context of many environmental class actions since these typically involve negative 
value claims for low-income and racialized people with strong gendered impacts. The 
systemic disadvantaging of future claims-makers is similarly applicable most directly in 
cases involving environmental health-impairment claims. These impediments are 
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capitalized upon in the political economy of pollution through corporate governance 
strategies involving the concerted targeting of vulnerable people who do not possess the 
capacity to access justice (i.e. environmental racism).  
 
H. ACCESSING SETTLEMENT FUNDS 
Notice adequacy directly impacts the capacity of class members to access funds by 
providing information about the relevant details of the claims process (i.e. 
where/when/how claims can be submitted; any relevant deadlines; etc.). Although 
settlement funds can be distributed directly to claims-makers (such as bank deposits), the 
standard practice in Ontario is establishing a claims process through which submissions 
can be deposited. The provisioning of legal information is pivotal at this juncture since 
class members may not be aware of submission deadlines and may effectively ‘miss their 
chance’ at recovery.  
Take-up rates (i.e. the rates at which settlement funds are distributed to class 
members) have been widely posited as indicative of the adequacy of notice programs—the 
higher the take-up rate, the better the notice program. Some have disputed this logic, 
however. For example, one judge has observed that “the actual take-up rate is immaterial 
to the issue of legal sufficiency of the notice. The test to be applied to the notice is an 
objective one.” 709 In other words, although conveying legal information is a necessary 
condition for ensuring the compensation of class members, such conveyance is not 
determinative for increasing take-up rates; that is, adequate notice is a necessary (but not a 
sufficient) condition for ensuring greater compensation for class members. 
                                                        
709 Meeking v. The Cash Store Inc. et al., 2012 MBQB 58 (CanLII) at 56. 
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Notwithstanding the causal effects of adequate notice on take-up rates, critical analyses 
must consider the rates at which class members attain compensation from settlement funds. 
As the Superior Court of Justice observed in Gariepy v. Shell Oil Co., “if very few of the 
members of the class wind up taking advantage of the settlement, that might be some 
evidence that the results of the settlement were less favourable than they might otherwise 
appear to be and/or that the issue itself was not one of great importance to the members of 
the class.”710 
By the same token, it must be noted that calculating take-up rates is not a 
straightforward endeavour: for many class actions, the actual size of the class is not 
definitively known.711 Although Private Attorneys Generally typically provide estimates of 
class sizes, the actual scope of a class action as it pertains to class members is often a matter 
of speculation. This is particularly apparent in the context of environmental claims in which 
the purported wrongful conduct affects a diffuse range of vulnerable people across spatial 
and temporal contexts (i.e. historical contamination in air pollution). Clearly calculating 
take-up rates with speculative numbers produces conjectural results. This is an acute 
problem in a regime such as Ontario’s where affected members of the public are 
automatically included unless they explicitly opt-out of the proceeding. Nevertheless, 
despite the fact that absolute precision may be unattainable for any number of class actions, 
the general tendency to provide estimations of class size could similarly extend towards 
take-up rates (based on such estimations). It should not be acceptable that Private Attorneys 
General provide high estimates of the class size as a strategy to inflate the public 
importance of their respective actions, but take-up rates are viewed as secondary 
                                                        
710 Gariepy v. Shell Oil Co., 2003 CanLII 24438 (ON SC) at 16. 
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afterthoughts and statistically unreliable given that they are based on speculative estimates 
of class sizes. 
 Although comprehensive statistical data on take-up rates is currently unavailable in 
Ontario, an exhaustive search of take-up rate citations in case law databases indicate that 
take-up rates are extremely low across Ontario’s class action regime. Leading class action 
practitioner Ward Branch has observed that “take-up rates are the dirty little secret in class 
actions in Canada” and that “class actions are losing respect because the numbers are so 
low.”712 In Hislop v. Canada (Attorney General), the Superior Court observed that “it is 
rare that a class action has more than a 75% ‘take-up’ rate,”713 although the average take-
up rate is estimated at between 2% to 40%.714 For critics, such as Paul Morrison and 
Michael Rosenberg, this ‘dirty little secret’ suggests that Private Attorneys General are 
pursuing ‘faux class actions’—class actions in which harmed people do not possess any 
interest in pursuing their claims in court, yet their claims are advanced by entrepreneurial 
class attorneys capitalizing on the opportunity for generating revenue.715 The objection of 
such critics largely rests on the pursuit of ‘faux class actions’ as engendering litigiousness 
                                                        
712 Paul Morrison & H. Michael Rosenberg, “Missing in Action: An Analysis of Plaintiff Participation in 
Canadian Class Actions,” Supreme Court Law Review, Vol. 53 (2011 at para. 42. 
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714 Daryl-Lynn Carlson, “Class actions: Taking on the low take-up rates for settlements,” Financial Post 8 
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715 Morrison & Rosenberg, supra note 70. In point of fact, the misalignment of economic interests 
consistently emphasized in this analysis is also evident at the certification stage wherein the interests of 
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Rosenberg to introduce a proportionality test during certification to account for the size of the litigious 
class—extracting the ‘non-litigious class members’ from class size estimations, which effectively reduces 
the compensatory (and deterrence) scope of the class action. In this critical light, concerns over the 
litigiousness (or lack thereof) of the proposed class effectively serves to diminish the compensatory scope 
of class actions and their potential deterrence function. As a participant interviewed for this project noted: 
“The plaintiff wants as big as possible a class size because the settlement will be higher. They want to get 
economies of scale and economies of heft. The defendant wants to minimize the class size to reduce the 
settlement.” Participant 14, interview conducted on 18 October 2015.  
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where none exists, thereby straining judicial resources, rather than the objectionable 
capitalization of incurred harms for private gain.716 This latter objection aligns with the 
commodification critique. The pursuit of ‘faux class actions’ effectively obviates the 
primary policy objective of access to justice through legal channels—after all, those who 
have incurred harm do not wish to pursue their claims in court, which is to say, they do not 
wish to access the justice system. Such ‘faux class actions’ also contradict the other primary 
policy objective of judicial economy—far from preserving judicial resources by 
aggregating individual claims into a single vehicle, ‘faux class actions’ expend judicial 
resources on cases where no individual claims would have been advanced (hence these 
could not be aggregated). 
Qualitative assessments based on anecdotal evidence indicate that low take-up rates 
are a systemic failing of Ontario’s class action regime. In Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies 
AG, the Superior Court observed: 
Based on anecdotal evidence, one of the problems of modern class action regimes is that 
too often the take up by class members of a settlement is poor. From a policy perspective 
[...] a poor take up rate has bad optics and can leave the impression that the major 
beneficiary of the class action was class counsel and not the class members who receive no 
or little compensation for their injuries. 
 
If the access to justice goal of a class proceeding is to be achieved, then class members 
should be encouraged to take up the settlement proceeds and thus an effective and robust 
notice program is money well spent.717 
 
                                                        
716 Moreover, such critics emphasize the prioritization of access to justice over deterrence, holding that 
deterrence alone does not justify class actions, which directly implicates the litigiousness (or lack thereof) 
of class members.  
717 Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG, 2014 ONSC 6082 (CanLII) at 77-78. 
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The extremely low take-up rates in Ontario’s class action regime have most recently been 
observed in Lozanski v. The Home Depot, Inc. (2016) in which the Superior Court plainly 
noted that “the take up of benefits of settlements is often disappointing.”718 This indicates 
a systemic failure to adequately ensure substantive justice for class members in the form 
of accessing settlement funds. 
 Ultimately, the primary problems of take-up rates in Ontario are twofold: (1) rates 
are extremely low, which leads to legitimate questions about the actual beneficiaries of 
class actions; that is to say, whether Private Attorneys General are the primary beneficiaries 
rather than collective claims-makers; (2) the absence of empirical data and any state 
directive for its collection is a policy failure that directly impacts the capacity to evaluate 
multilayer access to substantive justice in Ontario’s class action regime. Ward Branch and 
Greg McMullen describe the contingent character of take-up rate assessments in Canada 
as “operating on assumptions, hunches, and anecdotal evidence,”719 given the absence of 
any systematic collection of data by state or non-state actors—a dearth of systematic 
empirical data that extends across virtually every aspect of Ontario’s regime. 
 The extremely low take-up rates in Ontario’s class action regime indicate that direct 
compensation for collective claims-makers accounts for a fraction of any given settlement 
fund. What happens to the rest of the settlement? Should any unclaimed funds revert back 
to the defendants? Perhaps the remainder should be escheated to the state? Or 
proportionally distributed to identified class members who have already submitted claims 
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(i.e. increasing pro-rata shares)? The critical question over the distribution of unclaimed 
settlement funds is fundamentally a matter of public policy. For example, if unclaimed 
funds are reverted back to defendants, does that not negatively impact the achievement of 
the policy objective of behaviour modification? An innovative (though not unproblematic) 
solution to the problem of unclaimed funds has been embraced by common law 
jurisdictions around the world, including Canada: cy-prés distributions.  
 
2.   CY-PRÉS IN CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS 
The extremely low take-up rates in Ontario’s class action regime indicate that only a 
fraction of settlement funds are directly claimed by class members, leaving significant 
undistributed remainders. A number of reasons can produce situations in which settlement 
funds are not distributed to class members, including agent-oriented reasons such as apathy 
or ignorance of ongoing actions or claims processes, as well as structural reasons such as 
the possibility (or impossibility) of identifying class members, or the infeasibility or 
impracticability of distributing relatively small amounts to class members (in cases where 
costs of distribution outweigh the value of distributable funds). How should such 
unclaimed funds be distributed? What type of justice is achieved when class members are 
not directly compensated for the harms they have incurred? Such questions are imperative 
to the extent that class actions facilitate a form of redistributive justice in the political 
economy of pollution. Moreover, the distribution of settlement funds speaks to the broader 
policy objectives of class actions, particularly the interplay between behaviour 
modification and access to justice. 
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 The concept of cy-prés refers to the principle of ‘as near as possible’—derived from 
the French ‘cy-prés comme possible’—in the context of distributing settlement funds; that 
is, in cases where distribution of settlement funds to class members is impracticable or 
infeasible, a cy-prés program can be applied which distributes settlement funds in ways 
that would most closely benefit class members (i.e. ‘as near as possible’ or ‘the next best’ 
form of distribution).720 For example, in an environmental class action in which non-
identifiable class members have been exposed to airborne toxicants, undistributed funds 
may be diverted to environmental organizations associated with clean air promotion rather 
than reverting back to the polluting parties. This notionally ensures that the polluters 
internalize the total costs of the settlement while simultaneously promoting the underlying 
substantive objectives of the action in a general way (as opposed to specifically benefiting 
class members who were directly harmed by the airborne toxicants). A similar process is 
applicable in cases with low take-up rates, whereby the remainder of unclaimed funds is 
distributed to actors broadly aligned with the substantive objectives of the action (i.e. clean 
air promotion).  
Although the historical origins of cy-prés trace back to Roman antiquity, its 
common law manifestation in recent centuries largely applies to the law of charitable trusts 
in cases where literal compliance with a donor’s intentions are impracticable or infeasible, 
thereby necessitating the distribution of the donated funds in a manner ‘as near as possible’ 
to the donor’s stated intentions.721 For example, in cases where an individual donates a 
                                                        
720 Cassano v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 2009 CanLII 35732 (ON SC); Sutherland v. Boots Pharmaceutical 
PLC, [2002] O.J. No. 1361 (S.C.J.); Markson v. MBNA Canada Bank, 2012 ONSC 5891 (CanLII), 2012 
ONSC 5891 (S.C.J.).  
721 An excellent historical review of the cy-prés doctrine is provided by Rachael P. Mulheron, The Modern 
Cy-Prés Doctrine: Applications & Implications (London: University College London Press, 2006). See 
also, E. Rebecca Potter & Natasha Razack, “Cy Pres Awards in Canadian Class Actions: A Critical 
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portion of their estate to a hospital for research into a disease and the disease is 
subsequently cured, the remaining donation may be diverted according to the principle of 
‘as near as possible’ to research into a related disease (rather than, for example, being used 
to pave the hospital’s garage). Since the early 1980s, however, the concept of cy-prés has 
progressively expanded into other legal areas in common law jurisdictions around the 
world. Notably, class action regimes have witnessed a significant rise as post-settlement 
distribution programmes have viewed cy-prés as an efficacious method of distributing 
unclaimed or undistributed funds. 
This development has received scarce critical commentary in the literature on class 
actions despite its growing popularity. As Martin Redish, Peter Julian, and Samantha 
Zyontz have observed in their trenchant critique of the practice, it “is difficult to know for 
certain why the practice’s [cy-prés] growth has gone nearly unnoticed, much less criticized, 
by the scholarly world.”722 Indeed, the popularity of cy-prés distributions is evident across 
common law jurisdictions that have introduced class action legislation, including Canadian 
provinces like Ontario which permits cy-prés distributions under the Class Proceedings 
Act.723 In Ontario, as early as 1999 in Chadha v. Bayer Inc., sections 24 and 26 of the Class 
Proceedings Act have been interpreted by courts as supporting cy-prés distributions.724 
Before developing this section further, it should be noted that courts in Ontario must 
approve any proposed cy-prés distribution during settlement hearings. As such, the issues 
raised in this section concerning the various shortcomings of cy-prés distributions from an 
                                                        
Interrogation Of What Is Meant By ‘As Near As Possible,” Canadian Class Action Review 6, no. 2 (2010): 
299-329. 
722 Martin H. Redish, Peter Julian, and Samantha Zyontz, “Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies of the 
Modern Class Action: A Normative and Empirical Analysis,” Florida Law Review 62 (2010): 620-21. 
723 The earliest usage of cy-prés in the class action context is rooted in an American case from 1974 in the 
Southern District of New York, Miller v. Steinbach. Ibid., 635. 
724 Chadha v. Bayer Inc., 1999 CanLII 14812 (ON SC). 
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access to justice perspective can partly be mitigated by increased judicial scrutiny during 
such hearings. The few scholars examining this issue in Canada, like Jasminka Kalajdzic 
and Jeff Berryman, have observed that judicial scrutiny during such hearings involving cy-
prés distributions have tended to focus on the selected receivers of cy-prés funds rather 
than whether a cy-prés distribution is a legitimate recourse in the first place.725    
As this section suggests, the development of cy-prés in the contemporary historical 
conjuncture serves to reinforce the mobilization of class actions as policy instruments in 
the privatization of regulatory enforcement by facilitating the private regulator duties of 
Private Attorneys General through the legitimization of class actions in which the 
underlying compensatory function of civil justice is reoriented in favour of a deterrence 
function.  
 
A. CY-PRÉS IN ONTARIO’S CLASS ACTION REGIME 
Ontario has hosted the highest number of cy-prés distributions in Canada.726 This is perhaps 
unsurprising since Ontario is Canada’s dominant class action regime (by volume). The 
usage of cy-prés distributions can be viewed as a method of ensuring defending 
corporations or governments fully internalize the costs of their wrongful conduct. By 
pursuing such distributions, Private Attorneys General can ensure that defendants do not 
                                                        
725 Kalajdzic observes that “[i]n contrast to the paucity of judicial guidance as to when cy prés payments 
should be used at all, there is a comparatively rich jurisprudence on the second question of who should 
receive the cy près money.” Jasminka Kalajdzic, “The ‘Illusion of Compensation’: Cy Prés Distributions in 
Canadian Class Actions,” Canadian Bar Review 92, no. 2 (2013): 181. 
726 Although there is no comprehensive database or collection of empirical data on a national scale for class 
actions in Canada, based on available publicly accessible information, a Canadian Legal Information 
Institute database search in December 2016 reveals 116 citations of cy-prés in Ontario, in comparison to the 
60 in British Columbia, 18 in Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan, 16 in Alberta, 10 in Quebec, 7 in Prince 
Edward Island, 6 in New Brunswick, 5 in Newfoundland and Labrador, 3 in Manitoba, 2 in the Northwest 
Territories, and 1 in the Yukon.  There have not been any citations in Nunavut. For an older dataset, see 
Kalajdzic, “The ‘Illusion of Compensation’: Cy Prés Distributions in Canadian Class Actions,” 190.  
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benefit from low take-up rates by recovering the undistributed remainders of the settlement 
fund. The availability of this distributive recourse is particularly important in Ontario given 
that the Class Proceedings Act explicitly stipulates that any unclaimed or undistributed 
funds must be returned to defendants.727 At the same time, Ontario’s legislation allows for 
cy-prés distributions.728 As long as cy-prés is available as a recourse for distributing 
settlement funds, the systemic failure in Ontario’s regime to directly compensate class 
members does not operate in favour of wrongdoers by allowing the reversion of unclaimed 
or undistributed funds.  
Furthermore, without the sanctioning of cy-prés distributions, class actions 
involving unidentifiable class members would not receive certification by virtue of the fact 
that any recoveries would not be distributed to class members.729 This would negatively 
impact procedural access to justice. Unsurprisingly, one prominent critic of class actions 
has advocated against cy-prés with the explicit acknowledgement that a total prohibition 
would undermine access to justice.730 In this light, cy-prés can be viewed as advancing 
procedural access to justice by promoting claims that would otherwise remain 
unvindicated. By allowing such claims to proceed as class actions (in the case of 
                                                        
727 Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, s.26(10): “Any part of an award for division among 
individual class members that remains unclaimed or otherwise undistributed after a time set by the court 
shall be returned to the party against whom the award was made, without further order of the court.” 
728 Ibid., s.26(4): “The court may order that all or a part of an award under section 24 that has not been 
distributed within a time set by the court be applied to any manner that may reasonably be expected to 
benefit class members, even though the order does not provide for monetary relief to individual class 
members, if the court is satisfied that a reasonable number of class members who would not otherwise 
receive monetary relief would benefit from the order.” 
729 This would involve fixed cy-prés distributions.  
730 In his overview of the so-called ‘pathologies of class actions’, Martin Redish endorses the option of 
“simply denying class certification” rather than permitting cy-prés distributions. Although Redish 
acknowledges that “[t]hose who wish to see widespread corporate or governmental misbehaviour punished, 
however, understandably find this alternative unsatisfactory,” he nevertheless posits that the usage of cy-
prés in class actions “improperly distorts the remedial structure through use of a nakedly procedural 
device.” Redish et al, “Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies of the Modern Class Action: A Normative and 
Empirical Analysis,” 639-40. 
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unclaimable funds) and preventing remaining funds from reverting back to defendants (in 
the case of unclaimed funds), cy-prés also promotes the secondary policy objective of 
deterring future misconduct. But who should receive the unclaimed or undistributed funds 
in such arrangements? 
 Ontario’s Class Proceedings Act rejects any escheatment of unclaimed or 
undistributed funds to the state. This provision precludes the diversion of settlement funds 
away from the substantive interests of class members; that is, escheatment to the state does 
not ensure that the escheated funds will be deployed for socially beneficial purposes 
aligned with the substantive objectives of the action (i.e. clean air promotion). Without the 
option of diverting unclaimed or undistributed funds to the state, the objective of ensuring 
total cost internalization by defendants largely rests on selecting third parties that may 
receive the funds to satisfy the ‘as near as possible’ criterion of cy-prés distributions. These 
parties are typically civil society actors, such as charities, NGOs, but also law schools, 
research institutes, and similar organizations that can be viewed as advancing the 
substantive goals of any given action. Kalajdzic has developed a clarifying taxonomy that 
categorizes cy-prés distributions in class actions into two scenarios: 
1.   Residual Cy-Prés – when settlement funds have not been exhausted by class members, in which 
case cy-prés distributions generally ensure that remaining funds do not revert back to 
wrongdoers; 
2.   Fixed Cy-Prés – when settlement funds are inaccessible to class members, which typically 
occurs when class members are unidentifiable or the costs of distribution to individual members 
outweigh the value of the distributable funds.731  
                                                        
731 Jasminka Kalajdzic, “Access to a Just Result: Revisiting Settlement Standards and Cy Pres 
Distributions,” Canadian Class Action Review 6, no. 1 (2010): 215-51. 
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The first scenario applies to cases of unclaimed funds, whereas the second scenario applies 
to cases of unclaimable funds. Although both scenarios involve discretionary decision-
making on the part of Private Attorneys General as it pertains to the third party 
beneficiaries, the two scenarios differ in their implications for access to justice. In the first 
scenario, the pursuit of cy-prés distributions is preferable to the reversion of funds to 
wrongdoers. Although greater efforts should be undertaken to ensure direct compensation 
for collective claims-makers, when confronted with a choice of reverting unclaimed or 
undistributed settlement funds to wrongdoers as opposed to diverting such funds to third 
parties according to the ‘as near as possible’ principle, the latter option is certainly 
preferable in light of the secondary policy objective of behaviour modification, which may 
be promoted by total cost internalization of wrongdoers. 
The second scenario is not as straightforward. References to cy-prés distributions 
in the OLRC Report appear to be focused on residual cy-prés, with repeated references to 
the ‘residue’ of settlement funds and citations of unclaimed funds, as opposed to 
unclaimable funds; that is, to funds that have not yet been distributed, which logically 
implies that some funds have been distributed and cy-prés applies to the remainder; in other 
words, residual cy-prés.732 A host of difficulties are present in cases where the settlement 
fund is inaccessible to class members, including the implications of reorienting the 
primarily compensatory function of civil justice in favour of deterrence, as well as 
potentially questionable economic calculations involved in determining costs of 
distribution. These interrelated concerns will be examined in the following sections. 
                                                        
732 Kalajdzic, “The ‘Illusion of Compensation’,” 180. 
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Although both scenarios legitimate the usage of cy-prés in class action settlements, 
the former scenario principally aims towards the fulfillment of the primary policy objective 
of access to justice (conceptualized as achieving compensation for class members) and 
recourses to cy-prés distribution when this compensatory function has reached its limit, 
whereas the latter scenario articulates the secondary policy objective of behaviour 
modification as an independently justifiable objective.  
 
B. DETERRENCE & COMPENSATION 
The major point of criticism for applying cy-prés to class action settlements is the 
reprioritization of the policy objectives of the Class Proceedings Act. Class action policy 
in Ontario posits access to justice and judicial economy as primary policy objectives, 
whereas behaviour modification is a secondary objective. From a critical policy 
perspective, the emergence of cy-prés distributions effectively reorients this secondary 
objective to primary status. As the Superior Court observed in 2016 in Lozanski v The 
Home Depot, Inc.: 
[I]deally or optimally, if the access to justice goals of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 and 
other class action statutes across the country are to be achieved, the judgment or the 
settlement funds should be distributed to the class members and not be refunded to the 
defendant or distributed cy près, which achieves behaviour modification but not access to 
justice for individual class members. A fundamental policy factor underlying class action 
statutes across the country is the goal that class members should have access to justice and 
defendants should not get away with perpetrating small harms to many victims who as 
individuals would not sensibly incur the costs and risks of litigating for their individual 
claims. In other words, the ideal distribution scheme for a class action gets the 
compensation into the hands of the class members.733   
 
                                                        
733 Eidoo v Infineon Technologies AG, 2015 ONSC 5493 (CanLII) at 26-7. 
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However, the Superior Court continued by recognizing the empirical realities of extremely 
low take-up rates in Ontario’s class action regime: 
Ironically, achieving this can be frustrated by class members not taking up the recovery 
available to them. The practical realities of human nature are such that historically, take up 
rates of class action settlements have been poor where amounts to be distributed to 
individual class members are small...734  
 
The importance of the preceding aspects of Ontario’s class action regime—adequate notice 
provisioning, take-up rates—is premised upon a traditional understanding of multilayer 
access to justice of preserving a compensatory function for class members. In this 
traditional account, the objective of class actions is the attainment of compensation for 
those who have been harmed by the illegal conduct of the wrongdoer. To the extent that 
substantive justice entails compensation for class members, the preceding sections on 
notice provisioning and take-up rates take centre stage in access to justice evaluations.  
 This compensationalist focus aligns with the economic interests of entrepreneurial 
Private Attorneys General (and, if applicable, third party litigation financiers) who 
prioritize monetary recoveries. However, this prioritization neglects the multi-
dimensionality of recoveries sought by environmental claims-makers, including clean-up 
of contaminated sites, public apologies, de-toxification, and other non-monetary forms of 
justice. Needless to say, such restrictions may be acceptable to claims-makers provided 
that sufficient compensation is achieved. In a recent panel discussion, Ward Branch posited 
that claims-makers prefer a cy-prés distribution over a one-dollar cheque by questioning 
the audience who voted in favour of the former in this scenario.735 The question as posed, 
                                                        
734 Ibid., 26-7. 
735 Michael Rosenberg, “The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly: Report on a Panel Discussion of Class Actions 
Past and Future,” Canadian Business Law Journal 51 (2011): 101. 
 
 281 
however, contains a compensationalist assumption leading to a false choice between cy-
prés and a miniscule recovery. One could reasonably inquire whether harmed parties might 
not prefer a public apology over a one-dollar-cheque, or other types of non-monetary 
justice. In such situations, Private Attorneys General economically benefit from 
settlements by extracting their respective fees, whereas claims-makers do not receive any 
compensation. The distribution of the remainder of settlement funds post-fee withdrawals 
are an economic externality for Private Attorneys General. This effectively obviates any 
access to justice benefits of harnessing market forces by incentivizing private enforcement; 
in other words, with this economic externality, Private Attorneys General are no longer 
economically incentivized to promote access to justice by compensating claims-makers for 
their incurred harms. The misalignment of economic interests is perhaps most palpable in 
such situations given the reduction of class member interests to the status of an economic 
externality.  
More to the point, the applicability and usage of cy-prés distributions strongly 
favours the economic interests of Private Attorneys General to the extent that prospects for 
actions without identifiable class members (and therefore without the possibility of 
compensation for harmed individuals or collectives) to attain certification may be improved 
with the availability of cy-prés distributions.736 Insofar as private regulatory enforcement 
through class actions was justified according to the market logic of permitting private 
                                                        
736 As Redish et al observe: “Plaintiff class attorneys may have even stronger motivations for use of cy pres 
[sic] relief. As already noted, in a number of situations individual claims of absent class members will be 
too small, too difficult to prove, or too expensive or difficult to distribute. Thus, in many cases it will not be 
all that difficult for a certifying court to determine at the outset that it is highly unlikely that resolution of 
the suit would result in significant transfer of damages from defendant to its victims. If the only practical 
alternative are reversion to defendant or escheat to the state, a certifying court may well be unwilling to 
certify the class. The availability of a possible cy pres [sic] award to a worthy charity might well alter the 
situation sufficiently, in the court’s mind, to justify certification.” Redish et al, “Cy Pres Relief and the 
Pathologies of the Modern Class Action,” 640-41. 
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actors to wield the coercive power of the state in the pursuit of public goals, this imbalanced 
outcome caused by the misalignment of economic interests structurally disadvantages 
collective claims-makers, particularly in negative value claims, such as many 
environmental class actions in which harmed individuals or collectives have neither the 
incentive nor expertise to actively pursue or effectively monitor their claims. 
 The normative critique of cy-prés in class action settlements is straightforward: the 
perversion of the compensatory function in favour of deterrence. To the extent that ‘access 
to justice’ is traditionally perceived as compensation for harmed individuals or collectives, 
this development effectively prioritizes deterrence (or behaviour modification) over access 
to justice. However, this emphasis has been critiqued by Miriam Gilles and Gary B. 
Friedman as the “compensationalist hegemony”737 in class action policy, which unduly 
prioritizes direct compensation to class members over other social benefits, including 
deterring future misconduct. A broader understanding of access to justice as entailing non-
monetary recoveries, including the deterrence of future misconduct by wrongdoers, which 
has historically been a major objective of environmental claims-makers, can potentially be 
viewed as mitigating the negative implications of this prioritization. In this understanding, 
a type of justice can be achieved without direct compensation in the form of deterring future 
misconduct. 
 Nevertheless, by reorienting the basic remedial structure in favour of deterrence, 
the usage of cy-prés serves to transform the compensatory framework of civil justice into 
a civil fine framework.738 This could be viewed as the logical culmination of the 
                                                        
737 Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, “Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The social utility 
of entrepreneurial lawyers,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 155 (2006): 108. 
738 Redish et al., 641. See also, John J. Chapman & Patti Shedden, “Class Proceedings, Gains-Based 
Claims, and Deterrence,” Canadian Class Action Review 4, no. 1 (2007) 47-82. 
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privatization of regulatory enforcement and the transformation of entrepreneurial legal 
actors into Private Attorneys General. The deterrence objective of cy-prés actions is largely 
rooted in the forfeiture of unjust enrichment by wrongdoers, irrespective of the 
impracticability of returning those monies to the individuals or collectives originally 
harmed by the wrongful conduct that produced the enrichment. The distribution of such 
recoveries to third parties, typically charities, contrasts with the traditional civil fine 
framework in which a state receives the fined sums, as well as the adversarial bilateral 
process of civil justice by introducing a third party that has not been harmed by the 
wrongful conduct. 
For critics, this ‘trilateralization of the bilateral adjudicatory process’ is 
objectionable given its promotion of a “redistribution of wealth for social good” rather than 
the adjudication of a private dispute in a bilateral process.739 In this critique, the recipient 
charity has not incurred any legal wrongs and should therefore not receive any recoveries 
for any such violations. Accordingly, whether the recipient of recoveries is the state or a 
third party such as a charity is largely irrelevant, since both a traditional civil fine model 
and a cy-prés civil fine model are substantively distinct from the remedial model of civil 
justice requiring compensation for victims of incurred harms.740 Whether and to what extent 
the relevant third party is connected to the substantive cause of action is similarly irrelevant 
in this critique; that is, it does not matter whether the charity is an organization that 
promotes clean air, for example, or a charity benefiting homeless shelters. The point at 
stake is the illegitimacy of a third party benefiting from an action in which it has not been 
                                                        
739 Ibid., 642. The authors posit that cy-prés is indefensible as it violates both American constitutional law 
and liberal democratic theory. Moreover, in Ontario, escheatment to the state is explicitly prohibited under 
the Class Proceedings Act.   
740 Ibid., 646. 
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harmed in any way. The social good of wrongdoers forfeiting their unjust enrichment and 
the distribution of this enrichment to worthy charities are perceived as justifiable casualties 
in such a critique. 
 This critique applies across both scenarios described above. Firstly, in the scenario 
in which the settlement fund is inaccessible to class members—for example, in cases where 
class members are not identifiable or the costs of distribution to individual victims 
outweighs the value of the settlement—this critique posits that the proceedings should 
simply not be certified. In other words, denying procedural access to justice is preferable 
to a cy-prés distribution. Secondly, in the scenario in which the settlement fund has not 
been exhausted by class members—that is, in cases of unclaimed funds remaining of the 
settlement—this critique posits that any remainders should revert back to wrongdoers.741 
Simply put, the extremist critique of cy-prés denies procedural access to justice in the 
former case and advocates in favour of wrongdoers keeping their unjust enrichment over 
the distribution of this enrichment to worthy charities in the latter case. This project rejects 
both options as contrary to public policy in Ontario. 
Firstly, the standpoint that procedural access to justice should be denied on the basis 
of the illegitimacy of cy-prés distributions flatly contradicts the primary policy objective 
of access to justice. Moreover, this produces strong incentives for potential wrongdoers to 
diffuse harms in ways conducive to non-identification of harmed parties as corporate 
strategies in order to ensure legal protection from any class action sanctioning. This is 
particularly consequential in the political economy of pollution given the non-
identificatory diffusiveness of harms associated with toxic production and consumption, 
                                                        
741 Ibid., 665. 
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with deleterious implications for processes of social reproduction. Secondly, the reversion 
of unclaimed funds to wrongdoers is contrary to the secondary policy objective of 
behaviour modification to the extent that wrongdoers do not internalize the total costs of 
their illegal activities.742 
 Finally, one of the major underexplored areas of class action policy in Ontario has 
been the efficacy of deterrence as a secondary policy objective. Although it is beyond the 
scope of this analysis to examine the complexities of evaluating the extent to which 
deterrence is actually achieved in class actions, it should be recognized that insurance 
protection that indemnifies defendants must be considered as a mitigating factor in 
deterrence promotion.743 Needless to say, a staple feature of corporate governance in 
Canada has been the endemic usage of insurance schemas; this feature can be viewed as 
effectively precluding total cost internalization. It is becoming increasingly apparent that 
insurance companies are providing the funds for class action settlements. The extent to 
which insurance pay-outs can be considered ‘cost internalization’ by corporate wrongdoers 
leaves much to be desired from a deterrence perspective. Although insurance premiums 
may increase as a consequence, this is a pale consolation for those seeking behaviour 
modification—a civil fine surrenders its sanctioning force when paid by a third party. Cost 
internalization can be circumvented through other strategies as well, which further 
undermine the deterrence function. For example, a corporation can simply download 
settlement costs to the general public (or strictly paying consumers) by increasing prices 
                                                        
742 Not only will wrongdoers fail to fully internalize the total costs of their illegal activities, wrongdoers 
will be incentivized to produce conditions averse to the collection of settlement funds by harmed parties 
(i.e. claims processes that are difficult to navigate).   
743 Such an evaluative analysis is exceedingly difficult (if not impossible) in most cases. In my discussions 
with the Law Commission of Ontario concerning the forthcoming Class Action Project, the difficulties (and 




for products or services as a counterbalancing strategy. Ultimately, the difficulties of 
ensuring deterrence indicate that elevating behaviour modification to the status of a 
primary policy objective that independently justifies class actions may be a shortsighted 
development. 
 
C. ECONOMIC PROHIBITIONS ON DISTRIBUTING FUNDS 
In cases where fixed cy-prés is proposed by Private Attorneys General as the best choice 
for settlement distributions, the justifying rationale is premised on the impracticability or 
infeasibility of direct compensation of class members. First and foremost, the doctrinal 
term of ‘impracticability’ in Canadian jurisprudence should not be conflated with 
‘impossibility’. A course of action that is impracticable is not a course of action that is 
impossible, but simply a course of action that is difficult or cost prohibitive. This contrasts 
with everyday parlance in which ‘impracticability’ refers to impossible actions, whereas 
‘impractical’ refers to difficult or cost prohibitive actions. In the context of class action 
settlements involving cy-prés, an impracticable distribution plan refers to a course of action 
in which the distribution of settlement funds is difficult or cost prohibitive. 
When proposing fixed cy-prés distributions, Private Attorneys General typically 
argue that direct compensation for class members is cost prohibitive based on their own 
economic calculations. As explored in previous sections, however, courts do not have the 
resources or capacities to adequately interrogate such propositions, resulting in the general 
acceptance of the ‘impracticability’ of distributing funds to class members as posited by 
Private Attorneys General. This judicial passivity has combined with the absence of any 
objective criterion to evaluate the ‘impracticability’ of direct compensation to class 
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members to produce a class action settlement culture in which Private Attorneys General 
are largely able to dictate the form of distribution.744 This strengthened position is not 
unrelated to the misalignment of economic interests. Producing robust notice programs and 
actively pursuing the identification and direct compensation of class members involves 
time investments and cost expenditures that can be expediently foregone with a cy-prés 
distribution.745 Without adequate interrogation of the economic logistics of pursuing direct 
compensation, any determination of the ‘impracticability’ of a direct compensation 
program is marked by this misalignment of economic interests to the detriment of class 
members.  
 Interestingly, the economic calculations that ostensibly preclude the distribution of 
settlement funds to class members through the rationale that the costs of distribution 
outweigh the value of available funds speak to an intrinsic facet of class actions. To recall: 
the traditional procedural justification for class actions as promoting access to justice is 
that the vehicles make it economical for the collective pursuit of claims that would 
otherwise be individually non-viable. That is, the claims are not individually viable in terms 
of the costs of litigation versus the potential recoveries (i.e. negative value claims). In 
economic calculations on the relative distribution costs of direct compensation and the 
impracticability of distributing funds to class members, the individual non-viability (i.e. 
the low value of individual claims) features as a factor justifying fixed cy-prés distributions. 
That is to say, the value of the settlement fund is not sufficiently high to justify the costs 
of distribution. For example, in a case with thousands of potential claimants with claims 
                                                        
744 Kalajdzic, “The ‘Illusion of Compensation’,” 181. 
745 These often only involves determining appropriate charities or organizations (with some loose 
connection to the substantive objectives of the action). 
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worth a few dollars, the total settlement fund may not be sufficiently high to justify 
identifying and directly compensating every individual claimant. However, individually 
low-value claims are an intrinsic factor of the rationale justifying class actions on 
procedural access to justice grounds. To mobilize the individually low-value of claims as 
a means to circumvent compensating class members is a rather paradoxical inversion of 
the justifying rationale for class actions. 
Alternatively, this economical rationale may be indicative of the compatibility of 
cy-prés to class actions, particularly when the rejection of cy-prés would effectively 
counteract the access to justice benefits of individually low-value claims. In other words, 
the prohibition of cy-prés would create a baseline threshold for the value of claims, 
whereby claims must be worth more than the cost of their distribution to class members—
and conceivably higher by a certain margin in order to justify the action on judicial 
economy grounds—in order to proceed as actions, and claims worth less than the cost of 
their direct distribution would effectively be denied access to justice.  
 
D. BENEFICIARIES OF CY-PRÉS 
As it pertains to the beneficiaries of cy-prés distributions, the justifying rationale holds that 
it allows for ‘indirect benefit’ to collective claims-makers in cases where direct 
compensation is impracticable or infeasible.746 The hypothetical scenario above concerning 
the diversion of unclaimed or unclaimable funds to an organization engaged in clear air 
promotion illustrates the concept of ‘indirect benefit’. A correlativity must exist between 
the direct beneficiaries of a cy-prés distribution (i.e. organization promoting clean air) and 
                                                        
746 Kalajdzic, “The ‘Illusion of Compensation’,” 186. 
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the substantive objective of the action (i.e. environmental claim over airborne toxicants).747 
In other words, a clear nexus should be identifiable between the remedy and the underlying 
purpose of the action. This clear nexus indicates that the compensatory function of class 
actions cannot be suspended in favour of a strictly deterrence function; that is to say, if 
behaviour modification was independently a justificatory basis for class actions, then the 
directness of the benefit to class members would largely be irrelevant given that the 
objective would primarily be total cost internalization by the defendant. The fact that a 
clear nexus must exist in cy-prés distributions between recipients and the statutory 
objectives of class actions suggests that the compensatory function remains an important 
factor (however indirect this ‘compensation’ may be). 
An empirical examination of cy-prés in Ontario’s regime suggests that this 
correlativity should not be taken for granted. Third party beneficiaries of cy-prés 
distributions have not universally been related to the underlying purposes of the violated 
statute. This raises serious questions about the extent to which such beneficiaries are 
legitimate recipients of settlement funds. That is, whether and to what extent such 
beneficiaries satisfy the ‘as near as possible’ criterion that legitimates the usage of cy-prés. 
Where such beneficiaries do not satisfy this criterion, a class action involving cy-prés 
amounts to a capital-accumulative vehicle for entrepreneurial Private Attorneys General 
with neither direct nor indirect benefit for class members apart from the speculative 
possibility of behaviour modification. The “[u]nprincipled payments to third parties with 
no connection to the class members or the issues at the heart of the class action risk 
                                                        
747 Although the viability of this logic of ‘indirect benefit’ appears fairly straightforward, critics of cy-prés 
have problematized this logic, as Richard Posner plainly contends: “There is no indirect benefit to the class 
from the defendant’s giving the money to someone else.” Luiz Arthur Bihari, “Saving the Law’s Soul: A 
Normative Perspective on the Cy Prés Doctrine,” Canadian Class Action Review 7, no. 2 (2011): 305. 
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converting private litigation into civil penalties,”748 which recalls Redish’s critique. In such 
cases, the compensatory function of class actions is effectively circumvented.749 Moreover, 
such a civil fine framework reinforces the legitimacy of a private enforcement regime in 
Ontario by elevating deterrence as an independently justificatory objective of class actions.  
First and foremost, therefore, the selection criteria for such third party beneficiaries 
must be examined.750 Such critiques have predominantly occurred in the United States, 
however, Canadian commentators have increasingly taken critical stances on the usage of 
cy-prés, largely through reform-oriented approaches rather than wholesale rejections of the 
concept. Jeff Berryman has demonstrated that in numerous class actions in Ontario, the 
nexus between third party beneficiaries and class members is “extremely tenuous, if not 
non-existent.”751 For example, an action against the Bank of Nova Scotia over foreign 
currency charges resulted in a cy-prés distribution to cancer research, the Law Society of 
Upper Canada’s Feed the Hungry initiative, and the Class Proceedings Fund.752 As worthy 
as these beneficiaries may be, it remains a logical stretch to view any of these parties as 
connected either directly or indirectly to the substantive objective of the action. In point of 
fact, the biggest cy-prés distribution in Ontario exhibited precisely such a questionable 
                                                        
748 An overview of a principled approach can be found in Christina Sgro, “The Doctrine of Cy Prés in 
Ontario Class Actions: Toward A Consistent, Principled, and Transparent Approach,” Canadian Class 
Action Review 7, no. 2 (2011): 267-92; Kalajdzic, “The ‘Illusion of Compensation’,” 198.  
749 And the primary beneficiaries of cy-prés distributions reveal themselves to be Private Attorneys General 
and their favoured third parties (i.e. preferred charities; alma mater law schools; etc.) 
750 American commentaries have led the way in such critiques of cy-prés aimed towards the improvement 
of its usage as opposed to the wholesale rejection (as Martin Redish advocates). See, e.g., Chris J. Chasin, 
“Modernizing Class Action Cy Pres Through Democratic Inputs: A Return to Cy Pres Comme Possible,” 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 163 (2015): 1463-95; Kevin M. Forde, “What Can a Court Do with 
Leftover Class Action Funds? Almost Anything!” The Judges’ Journal 35, no. 3 (1996): 1-12. 
751 Jeff Berryman, “Nudge, Nudge, Wink, Wink: Behaviour Modification, Cy-Prés Distributions and Class 
actions,” Supreme Court Law Review 53 (2011): 162. See also, Jeff Berryman, “Class Actions 
(Representative Proceedings) and the Exercise of Cy-Pres Doctrine: Time for Improved Scrutiny,” in Jeff 





receiver of funds: in Cassano v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, a $28 million settlement was 
approved with $14 million distributed to the Law Foundation of Ontario with the purpose 
of establishing the Access to Justice Fund—this is the first national fund in Canada 
dedicated for this purpose and it has since received several other cy-prés awards, including 
Skopit v. BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc., Smith Estate v.  National Money Mart, Wein v. Rogers 
Cable Communications Inc., Markson v. MNBA, and Carom v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd.753 The 
difficulties in assessing this type of cy-prés distribution from an access to justice 
perspective are self-evident: clearly, the Access to Justice Fund is an important 
organization that contributes to promoting access to justice across Canada, with a focus on 
vulnerable members of society (i.e. indigenous peoples; victims of family violence who 
are predominantly women and children; self-represented litigants); however, the class 
members who were harmed by the wrongdoing that prompted the class action in the first 
place do not specifically benefit from the distribution. In other words, the Access to Justice 
Fund can be viewed as generally promoting access to justice without specifically 
promoting access to justice for the harmed class members.754 The prevalence of such 
distributions leads Berryman to conclude that for many cases, considerations apart from 
the benefit of class members “appear to account for the selection of cy-prés distribution 
recipients, particularly the idiosyncrasies of legal counsel and the charities they wish to 
benefit.”755  
                                                        
753 Skopit v. BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc., 2010 ONSC 6039; Smith Estate v.  National Money Mart 2010 ONSC 
1334; Wein v. Rogers Cable Communications Inc., 2011 ONSC 7290;  Markson v. MNBA, 2012 ONSC 
5891; Carom v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd. 2014 ONSC 2507.  
754 Kalajdzic, “‘The Illusion of Compensation’,” 184.  
755 Ibid., 37. 
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Although such arbitrary usage of cy-prés distributions nevertheless ensure that 
undistributed funds do not revert back to defendants, the non-correlativity between 
beneficiaries and class members gives rise to serious concerns. This is compounded in 
situations where it is Private Attorneys General who indirectly benefit from cy-prés 
distributions (where third party beneficiaries have relationships with Private Attorneys 
General). The reverse situation is similarly problematic—that is, in cases where defendants 
benefit from cy-prés distributions; for example, when defendants are able to present cy-
prés distributions to worthy charities as donations that they have chosen to bestow for a 
particular cause rather than as punishments for wrongful conduct.756 A recent example of 
such conflicts of interest occurred in Sorensen v. easyhome Ltd. in which the court rejected 
the proposed cy-prés distribution plan on the grounds that improper linkages were present 
between the intended third party beneficiary and class counsel, ultimately noting:  
Cy prés relief should attempt to serve the objectives of the particular case and the interests 
of class members. It should not be forgotten that the class action was brought on behalf of 
the class members and a cy-prés distribution is meant to be an indirect benefit for the class 
members and an approximation of remedial compensation for them. However well 
meaning, the prospect of a cy-prés distribution should not be used by Class Counsel, 
defense counsel, the defendant, or a judge as an opportunity to benefit charities with which 
they may be associated or which they may favour. To maintain the integrity of the class 
action regime, the indirect benefits of the class action should be exclusively for the class 
members.757 
In the present situation in which the usage of cy-prés and the beneficiaries of cy-prés are 
both privately determined by Private Attorneys General to the exclusion of class members 
who have the strongest claim to the distributable funds, serious questions must be raised 
                                                        
756 This would similarly apply to defense counsel who may have relationships with third party beneficiaries 
or who may, in some way, benefit from a cy-prés distribution. 
757 Sorenson v. easyhome Ltd., 2013 ONSC 4017 (CanLII) at 30. See also, O’Neil v Sunopta, 2015 ONSC 
6213 (CanLII).  
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about the “policy implications of this privatized form of distributive justice,”758 including 
the legitimacy of financializing the justiciable problems of collective claims-makers and 
the private distribution of subsequent proceeds without any class member participation. 
The prevalence of this type of private distributive justice raises legitimate concerns about 
the extent to which collective claims-makers are actually benefiting from class actions in 
Ontario’s regime.  
 
E. CY-PRÉS & POLLUTION 
Clearly there are serious access to justice concerns about legitimizing cy-prés distributions. 
In cases where settlement funds are inaccessible to class members (i.e. fixed cy-prés), 
objections about circumventing compensation in favour of deterrence are increasingly 
posited by critics of class actions. Such cases arise for reasons of non-identifiability or 
prohibitive costs of distribution. Although greater efforts should be undertaken to improve 
direct compensation for class members, the wholesale rejection of cy-prés effectively 
signals to potential wrongdoers that it is advantageous to distribute harms in ways 
conducive to non-identification or by diffusing harms to ensure cost prohibitiveness, 
thereby insulating a vast range of harmful activities from the purview of private 
enforcement. To the extent that class actions operate as policy instruments in private 
enforcement regimes, this produces systemic under-protection for a range of social 
reproduction activities.  
 The political economy of pollution is significantly implicated in such retrenchment 
given the prevalence of non-identifiability and the diffusiveness of low-value harms 
                                                        
758 Kalajdzic, “The ‘Illusion of Compensation’,” 191. 
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associated with toxic production and consumption, with uneven distribution along social 
locations burdening racialized and low-income people with strong gendered impacts. Such 
non-identifiability is prevalent in cases involving plaintiff indeterminacy (Chapter 4) which 
arise, for example, where wrongdoers expose vulnerable people to toxicants, but 
identifying the exposed parties is not possible. Without fixed cy-prés distributions, such 
actions would be categorically rejected.759 As environmental health researchers have 
repeatedly emphasized, the ‘routes of exposure’ of toxic contamination are often circuitous 
and dispersed across spatial and temporal contexts, producing situations of non-
identifiability of harmed parties.760 This is especially evident in chronic low-level toxic 
consumption.  
Such routes of exposure are discernible across the political economy of pollution, 
including trace chemicals in water, land, and air consumption, genetically modified 
organisms and pesticide usage, and a host of other contaminating pathways conducive to 
non-identifiability. The diffusiveness of such harms contributes to this non-identifiability, 
although spatio-temporally concentrated harms may be similarly implicated, such as in 
cases of occupational health-related harms and exploitative labour conditions, which 
typically do not involve diffusiveness. In such cases, the precariousness of workers may 
contribute to non-identifiability; for example, foreign domestic workers whose social 
reproductive activities involve constant chemical exposures (i.e. household cleaning 
products), but whose precarious employment and transitory residential status may make 
identification for class action purposes exceedingly difficult or impossible. This is similarly 
                                                        
759 Notwithstanding the likelihood of rejection by Private Attorneys General according to their qualification 
criteria for case selection.  
760 See, e.g., Rob Nixon, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2011). 
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evident at the production-consumption nexus; for example, migrant farmland workers 
exposed to pesticides.761 The detrimental social impacts of such harms often transcend 
national borders via global care chains. Although direct compensation may be difficult or 
impossible in such cases, cy-prés distributions that benefit aligned interests (i.e. toxicity 
research) may contribute to preventing similar future harms (as well as promoting 
behaviour modification in wrongdoers).  
 A developing tension is evident in this discussion: on one hand, the legitimization 
of cy-prés effectively elevates deterrence as an independently justificatory objective 
pursuant to the privatization of regulatory enforcement; on the other hand, its 
delegitimization removes a range of harmful activities from the purview of class actions, 
subverting their ‘power potentials’ as instruments of social protection on issues of power, 
production, and social reproduction in the contemporary period of disciplinary neo-
liberalism in which state restructuring has curtailed public regulatory enforcement in 
favour of privatizing governance strategies.762 Stronger environmental health standards and 
principles (i.e. Precautionary Principle) in conjunction with increased state expenditures 
for greater regulatory capacities of public agencies largely obviates overreliance on private 
vehicles such as class actions for strictly deterrence objectives (which, by extension, 
mitigates justification of fixed cy-prés distributions), preserving the primacy of access to 
justice as a policy objective.763 
 
                                                        
761 Adrian A. Smith and Alexandra Stiver, “Power and Control at the Production-Consumption Nexus: 
Migrant Women Farmworkers and Pesticides,” in ed., Dayna Nadine Scott, Our Chemical Selves: Gender, 
Toxics, and Environmental Health (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2015), 364-86. 
762 Bakker and Gill, eds., Power, Production, and Social Reproduction, 25. 
763 See Chapter 2 for a discussion on the question of ‘regulatory capture’ and the need to maintain private 




This chapter has sought to critically analyze the problematic dynamics of substantive 
justice accessibility in Ontario’s class action regime. In so doing, several pivotal areas of 
concern have been examined as operating against the interests of collective claims-makers. 
The starting point for substantive analyses remains the strong judicial and public policy 
preference for privately negotiated settlements pursuant to the principles of economic 
efficiency. Although such privatization is endemic across the Canadian civil justice system, 
the structural flaws of class action settlements indicate that the social and democratic 
ramifications are particularly relevant in this context. To the extent that class actions are 
‘crucial instruments’ of social protection for vulnerable people, the ways in which these 
structural flaws operate to substantively disadvantage collective claims-makers to the 
economic benefit of Private Attorneys General and defendant corporations and 
governments is cause for concern. Perhaps the predictable outcome of permitting market 
forces to determine access to justice priorities is that the major beneficiaries of class actions 
have consistently been Private Attorneys General rather than the vulnerable people whose 
social reproduction is threatened with destabilization in advanced capitalist societies. 
Among these flaws, the most critical is the adversarial void during approval hearings, 
which fundamentally transforms the institutional structure of the common law tradition. In 
the absence of a mandatory amicus curiae (external counsel who is not party to the case to 
advise the court and provide adversarial opposition where necessary), the primary actors 
to ensure a semblance of adversariality are class objectors, whose formal role in the 
settlement approval processes borders on futility.  
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As consistently maintained throughout this critical policy analysis, the 
misalignment of economic interests operates to privilege Private Attorneys General and 
defendant parties against the interests of collective claims-makers, yet the privatization of 
dispute resolution in the form of privately negotiated settlements does little to temper the 
ramifications of this misalignment, despite the statutory requirement of public approval. 
Moreover, the finality of approved settlements effectively closes the door to future claims-
makers, giving rise to the apposite description of class action settlements as operating to 
deny (even as they purport to provide) access to justice. This is especially apparent in the 
context of environmental health-impairment claims in light of the long latency periods of 
various toxicants.  
Finally, the complexities of cy-prés distributions gives rise to a series of difficult 
questions without straightforward answers. As it pertains to the politics of class actions, 
the problematics of prioritizing strictly deterrence over compensation—when 
compensation is a viable alternative that subsumes deterrence764—remains a legitimate 
concern moving forward, particularly for progressive critics of Ontario’s emerging private 
enforcement regime. These difficult questions are perhaps especially prominent when 
considering the Access to Justice Fund, which promotes access to justice in Canada 
generally, but not specifically for the class members whose incurred harms have prompted 
the class action in the first place.  In this context, the legitimization (or delegitimization) 
of a civil fine model for Private Attorneys General may serve to reinforce a private 
enforcement regime in Ontario by elevating deterrence as an independently justificatory 
                                                        
764 That is to say, compensation for class members also satisfies the policy objective of behaviour 
modification or deterrence interpreted as total cost internalization by wrongdoers, whereas strictly 
deterrence in the form of fixed cy-prés only satisfies the cost internalization objective without 
compensating class members for their incurred harms.  
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objective of class actions—a logical culmination of the privatization of regulatory 
enforcement.  
To bring this chapter to a close, the cumulative outcome of the shortcomings 
identified above is a sober verdict for the substantive justice that is achieved or achievable 
in Ontario’s class action regime at present, particularly for environmental claims. Whether 
and to what extent justice stakeholders will address these shortcomings remains to be seen. 
Although the issues raised in this chapter warrant further consideration, these shortcomings 
should not come as a surprise for researchers examining class actions from an access to 
justice perspective. Low take-up rates, the adversarial void, the futility of class objectors, 
the possibility of collusion and the misalignment of economic interests, and the myriad 
difficulties involved with accessing funds for class members, in addition to the various 
problems associated with cy-prés distributions—all of these issues pose serious challenges 
for justice stakeholders seeking to improve Ontario’s class action regime. In light of the 
recognition that access to justice in the early twenty-first century must incorporate both 
procedural and substantive considerations, this chapter has sought to identify and explicate 











The early promise of class actions was to allow relatively powerless individuals and 
collectives to band together against powerful adversaries to access justice. Environmental 
class actions were envisaged as paradigmatic of this type of legal resistance since such 
actions typically involve negative value claims with diffuse harms across vast spatial and 
temporal contexts with acute power imbalances between victims and perpetrators. The 
negligible public enforcement of environmental regulations further contributes to the 
standpoint that class actions are necessary as instruments of social protection in the political 
economy of pollution. Through a critical policy analysis, this project has empirically 
evaluated the extent to which the early promise has actualized in Ontario’s class action 
regime for environmental claims. Although the promotive benefits of class actions from an 
access to justice perspective vary across sectors, the findings of this study indicate that for 
environmental claims, class actions have not fulfilled their early promise.  
 To this end, I have sought to critically explore Ontario’s class action regime for 
environmental claims by considering various contextual variables that are not commonly 
addressed in the established literature. Existing research on access to justice tends to focus 
on individuals rather than collectives, whereas class action research is largely 
proceduralistic with select high-profile cases garnering isolated attention. At the same time, 
environmental justice research in Canada generally posits class actions as available 
vehicles for environmental justice-seeking without fully considering the exclusionary 
dynamics as uncovered in this study. This project has contributed to the under-explored 
cross-section of these interrelated fields of research. By exploring the exclusionary 
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dynamics that operate to impede multilayer access to environmental justice in light of the 
power, production, and social reproduction associated with toxic exposures, this study has 
expanded the ambit of environmental class actions beyond the traditional confines to the 
broader political economy of pollution. In so doing, this study has incorporated descriptive 
and normative aspects of traditional access to justice research with explanatory 
argumentation for an integrated approach to evaluating multilayer access to environmental 
justice in Ontario. This contextual approach reveals a more complicated and socially 
reflective picture of environmental class actions in Ontario than has heretofore been 
available in extant scholarship.    
 First and foremost, it must be noted that despite the prevailing anemic class action 
regime in Ontario that has been documented in this analysis, this project does not support 
the retrenchment or delegitimization of class actions, as advocated by conservative critics. 
Amid the ‘intensifying contradiction’ between the power of capital and its accumulative 
logic and the destabilizing ramifications for social reproduction, class actions retain their 
status as ‘power potentials’. Few terrains are more straightforwardly implicated in this 
central contradiction of capitalist societies than the political economy of pollution in which 
the capacities of vulnerable people to socially reproduce is directly at stake. As class action 
scholar Deborah Hensler has observed, class actions possess the “potential to disrupt the 
power structure” and the “fear that collective procedures will disrupt the economic, 
political and social status quo powers much of the opposition”765 to class actions. This 
indispensable fact testifies to the urgency of examining class actions through a political 
                                                        
765 Deborah Hensler, “Class actions in context,” in ed., Deborah Hensler, Class Actions in Context: How 




economy approach—a methodological framing that had not been previously undertaken in 
Canada before this study. Far from delegitimizing class actions, therefore, I have argued 
that such retrenchment initiatives are forms of de-democratization (to borrow Wendy 
Brown’s concept) that prevent vulnerable people from accessing justice. However, this is 
not tantamount to unconditional deference to the present functioning of class actions in 
Ontario (or elsewhere). It remains instructive to consider the extent to which class actions 
as ‘power potentials’ have actually fulfilled this potential, as well as identifying and 
contextualizing the dynamics that impact this empirical reality, thereby allowing for greater 
clarity of the limitations of class actions moving forward. 
With this in mind, I have identified a central paradox between class actions as 
crucial instruments of social protection and class actions as policy instruments in private 
enforcement regimes by tracing the ways in which the neo-liberalization of civil justice 
serves to undermine social protection and human security. This paradox can be articulated 
through the analytical schema of complementation and co-optation: to the extent that class 
actions operate as collective claims-making vehicles that complement public agency 
enforcement, they are crucial instruments in promoting multilayer access to environmental 
justice, especially in cases where states are recalcitrant to enforce regulations; however, 
the shift towards a co-optative role of class actions as vehicles that replace rather than 
support public agencies serves to destabilize the very processes of social reproduction that 
class actions in their complementary role can be mobilized to protect. One of the distinctive 
facets of this development is the reversal of the traditional recruitment process in class 
action regimes: attorneys recruit clients as opposed to clients recruiting attorneys. In this 
paradigm, the conditions of recruitment acquire the characteristics of barriers based on 
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profitability and predictability as dictated by Private Attorneys General. The racial 
hierarchies and gender orders that produce and reproduce social injustices are compounded 
by the prioritization of profitability over social and democratic principles, with claims 
involving environmental harms, exploitative labour conditions, discrimination, human 
rights, and similar causes of action that disproportionately affect women, racial and ethnic 
minorities, and other vulnerable people, generally failing to attract these gatekeepers of 
justice. At root, proponents of the privatization of regulatory enforcement typically cite the 
supposedly neutral and value-free dictates of markets as a chief good to the extent that any 
particular interest is not directly served. As we have seen, however, allowing market forces 
to overdetermine enforcement priorities privileges certain types of actors and interests over 
others. In class actions, securities actions are prioritized over environmental health-based 
claims—this prioritization has strong socio-demographic characteristics to the extent that 
relatively privileged actors are affected by securities disputes, whereas largely low-income 
and racialized people are affected by environmental health-impairment with strong 
gendered outcomes. The alleged neutrality of this type of privatization exhibits a “strategic 
silence”766 about the racial hierarchies and gender orders constituted by the marketization 
of civil justice. 
This marketization of civil justice is compounded by the emerging litigation finance 
industry in Ontario which reconceptualizes class actions as ‘investment commodities’ for 
global financial capital. The theoretical insularity of courtrooms from the instabilities and 
fluctuations of the global political economy has contributed to the growing appeal of 
litigation finance in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis. Such investments are 
                                                        
766 Isabella Bakker, The Strategic Silence: Gender and Economic Policy (New York: Zed Books, 1994). 
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portrayed to potential investors as a strategic form of portfolio diversification while 
simultaneously portrayed to lawmakers and the general public as promoting access to 
justice.  The nascent industry in Ontario has been prompted by the dual factors of (1) risk 
aversion and (2) budget constraints on the part of Private Attorneys General. The typically 
percentage-based returns on litigation investments are withdrawn from the portion of the 
recovery that would otherwise have been distributed to class members, which gives rise to 
concerns that litigation financing is a form of buying access at the expense of justice; that 
is to say, promoting procedural access through the diminishment of substantive justice. The 
growing consensus that the creation of a securities market is an inevitable outcome of 
litigation finance has precipitated the recognition by even ardent proponents that such a 
probabilistic development would effectively “turn litigation into a stock market.”767 
Importantly, the fact that there is currently no statutory framework for regulating third party 
litigation financing in Ontario has effectively permitted market forces to dictate the 
parameters of the emerging industry with scant judicial (or legislative) oversight. 
A major concern that we have raised throughout this project about the deeper 
penetration of market forces and rationalities into civil justice has been the misalignment 
of economic interests of Private Attorneys General. This misalignment manifests in several 
ways, including the dominant preferences of financial investors and Private Attorneys 
General for short-term gains resulting in early (lower-value) settlements that disadvantage 
class members. Moreover, the financialization of civil justice effectively prioritizes the 
monetization of multilayer access to justice since financial investors are principally 
                                                        
767 Peter Senkpiel, “Three’s a Crowd: Third-Party Litigation Funding of Class Actions in Canada”, 
Canadian Class Action Review 5, no. 2 (2009): 314. 
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motived by profit maximization rather than access to justice. Such a prioritization of 
monetary recoveries over other forms of substantive justice is particularly worrisome in 
the environmental context, which often involves non-monetary interests and societal calls 
for restoration of polluted land, air, and water, as well as myriad other forms of redress, 
including de-toxification, medical and educational programs, and public apologies. As the 
financialization of the global political economy extends into material life, the dictates of 
financial capital accumulation take precedence over sustainable conditions of social 
reproduction, such as maintenance over the biological and ecological foundation upon 
which human health is dependent. This is reflected in the incongruity of monetizing 
imperatives with the non-monetary forms of substantive justice typically sought by 
environmental claimants.  
This monetary paradigm dictates the substantive justice that is currently achieved 
(or achievable) in a class action regime in Ontario that is determined by a dominant 
settlement culture and its associated dynamics, including the adversarial void, extremely 
low take-up rates, insufficient notice practices, and the inefficacy of objectors. To the 
extent that class actions facilitate a form of redistributive justice, the widespread usage of 
cy-près programs in which settlement funds are not directly distributed to class members 
raises legitimate concerns about the primary beneficiaries of class actions. The divergence 
of economic interests directly compromises the basic policy rationale of Private Attorneys 
General as economic drivers of multilayer access to justice. To what extent can 
compensatory justice for class members be a priority when it is reduced to an economic 
externality for Private Attorneys General? Martin Redish has referred to class actions as 
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“capitalistic socialism”768 given that Private Attorneys General engage in entrepreneurial 
capitalization of mass harms with redistributive outcomes from economically powerful 
actors to vulnerable people; however, the widespread usage of cy-près removes this 
redistribution towards vulnerable people—effectively obviating the ‘socialistic’ facet and 
remodeling class actions as ‘capitalistic’ vehicles for entrepreneurial actors. 
As we have observed, the development of environmental class actions in Ontario 
has privileged private property rights over other types of harms, notably health-impairment 
claims. This privileging has occurred for several reasons, including scientific uncertainty, 
toxic knowledge production, toxic causation requirements, and broader procedural 
problems that occur at the certification stage. In light of these exclusionary dynamics, 
environmental health class actions continue to flounder in Ontario. As a policy instrument 
in a private enforcement regime, this floundering is indicative of a regulatory enforcement 
gap that must be addressed with greater public enforcement, as well as stronger 
environmental regulations, including comprehensive adoption of the Precautionary 
Principle in environmental governance frameworks. Ultimately, the bleak reality of 
multilayer access to justice in environmental health-impairment points towards the 
limitations in the type of ex post facto justice that is achieved or achievable in Ontario’s 
class action regime. Given this situation, increased efforts should be undertaken to promote 
preventative measures, which aligns with Fourth Wave conceptualizations of access to 
justice. A fence at the top of the cliff is certainly preferable to an ambulance at the base, 
particularly when the ambulance does not address health-impairment. It goes without 
                                                        
768 Martin Redish, “Rethinking the Theory of the Class Action: The Risks and Rewards of Capitalistic 
Socialism in the Litigation Process,” Emory Law Journal 64 (2014): 113. 
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saying that these critical findings do not obviate the need for collective redress in the 
environmental context. Compensation for incurred harms remains a pillar of the 
Environmental Justice paradigm. Rather, this analysis can be viewed as a ‘friendly’ critique 
of class actions in the environmental context, recognizing their ‘power potentials’ as 
instruments of legal resistance and social protection against powerful adversaries, while 
striving to objectively document their shortcomings from an access to justice perspective. 
Certainly access to justice discourse and reforms have progressed beyond strictly legal 
channels to encompass non-legal avenues of justice-seeking; however, this does not 
diminish the importance of the former pathway. As this study has maintained throughout, 
there remains an important place for class actions as vehicles of collective redress in access 
to justice discourse and reforms moving forward.  
A recurring theme in this project has been the dearth of empirical data, which 
extends across virtually every aspect of Ontario’s regime. This can be conceptualized as 
an agnotological outcome in the passive production of ignorance. In the broader socio-
political context, Janine Brodie has identified a problematic aspect of Canadian governance 
(particularly under Stephen Harper) as the “active production of ignorance” as evidenced 
by (for example) the cancellation of the mandatory long-form census.769 This broadly refers 
to governing bodies actively operating to delimit the scope of available knowledge to the 
Canadian public. Employing this agnotological framing, it may be possible to describe 
situations in which such processes are not actively produced, but are rather outcomes of 
passivity in knowledge production. This would refer to critical areas in which governing 
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bodies display reluctance to adequately collect information to construct knowledge bases. 
In this light, the systemic failures to collect empirical data on the basic functioning of 
Ontario’s class action regime can be described as outcomes of the passive production of 
ignorance, particularly since demands for greater state intervention in empirical data 
collection have remained largely unheeded for several years.770 Without such 
comprehensive data, evaluating multilayer access to justice in Ontario is practically 
impossible apart from ad hoc initiatives by independent researchers who do not possess 
sufficient resource capacities to comprehensively evaluate access to justice across the 
province or by NGOs engaging in curated research. The systemic unavailability of baseline 
empirical data relevant to evaluations of Ontario’s class action regime is truly startling 
from an access to justice perspective. This systemic dearth must inform future empirical 
research moving forward. This has been a long-standing concern among justice 
stakeholders for many years. To raise the obvious questions: What type of state does not 
consider it a priority to gather basic information about the workings of its own civil justice 
system? What are the potentials for empirically-informed policies to bolster access to 
justice for vulnerable people when such data is unavailable to policy-makers and 
researchers?  
This dearth of empirical data is particularly apparent in environmental claims. As 
we have seen, the assessment and management of chemical substances that pose a potential 
threat to human health and the natural environment are not comprehensively covered by 
                                                        
770 See, e.g., Deborah Hensler, “Empirical and Theoretical Approaches to Measuring Access to Justice,” in 
Jasminka Kalajdzic, ed., Accessing Justice: Appraising Class Actions Ten Years After Dutton, Hollick and 
Rumley (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2011). Michael Molavi, “Beyond the Courtroom: Access to Justice, 
Privatization, and the Future of Class Action Research,” Canadian Class Action Review 10, no. 1-2 (2015): 
8-31. The Law Commission of Ontario has recently undertaken a Class Action Project aimed at evaluating 
the Class Proceedings Act, although it has been placed on hold (at time of writing). 
 
 308 
prevailing environmental governance frameworks in Canada. For example, a major 
framework is constituted by the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA) which is 
limited in scope: the assessment and evaluation of potentially harmful chemicals is limited 
to the testing of new chemicals that were introduced post-1988 into Canada (approximately 
2,000 chemicals per year) without simultaneously testing the estimated 23,000 chemicals 
already in circulation. Although the Chemical Management Plan (2006) has sought to 
identify a subset of 1,550 high-priority chemicals for assessment, budgetary constraints of 
regulatory bodies and associated research institutes have precluded comprehensive 
assessment of roughly 20,000 chemicals currently in use in Canada. Such budgetary 
constraints are produced by prevailing fiscal policies with adverse impacts on social 
reproduction with gendered, racialized, and class-based dimensions. By declining to 
adequately research substances to which communities are exposed, the Canadian state 
effectively (re)privatizes social reproduction771 by downloading the responsibilities for 
chemical consumption and toxic exposures to households largely through the promotion of 
‘precautionary consumption’, a gendered practice operating as a form of “self-protection 
in response to insufficient regulatory protection”772 that disproportionately burdens women 
and domestic workers.773 Moreover, without sufficient extant research, Private Attorneys 
General are strongly disincentivized to pursue environmental class actions. In interviews 
undertaken for this project, not a single participant would consider an environmental 
                                                        
771 Bakker pioneered the thesis of the “reprivatization of social reproduction.” See, e.g., Isabella Bakker, 
“Neo-liberal Governance and the Reprivatization of Social Reproduction: Social Provisioning and Shifting 
Gender Orders,” in ed., Bakker and Stephen Gill, Power, Production and Social Reproduction (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 66-82.  
772 Scott et al, “The Production of Pollution and Consumption of Chemicals in Canada,” 18.  
773 Norah MacKendrick, “Protecting Ourselves from Chemicals: A Study of Gender and Precautionary 
Consumption,” in ed., Scott, Our Chemical Selves: Gender, Toxics, and Environmental Health (Vancouver: 




health-impairment claim without significant extant empirical research—the potential of 
independently undertaking such research was viewed as practically inconceivable. Simply 
put, the dearth of empirical data on environmental harms directly impacts the capacities of 
vulnerable people to pursue multilayer access to environmental justice. 
Another recurring theme has been the insufficiency of state expenditures impacting 
public enforcement capacities, settlement preferences, civil justice budgeting, toxic 
knowledge production, and other critical areas for multilayer access to environmental 
justice. One of the most illuminating revelations about the origins of class actions in 
Ontario has been that the legal vehicle was introduced as part of a private enforcement 
regime, thereby alleviating financial pressures on insufficiently funded public agencies. 
The standpoint that increasing the budgets of such agencies to facilitate their proper 
functioning in regulatory enforcement is viewed as beyond the realm of possibility under 
neo-liberalism, or to borrow Richard Falk’s terminology, beyond the “horizon of 
feasibility.”774 The budgetary constraints imposed by prevailing macro-economic 
policies—articulated through features such as balanced budgeting imperatives, deficit 
reduction, and regressive taxation schemes—are structured by the new constitutionalism 
of disciplinary neo-liberalism which constrains democratic controls over economic policy-
making.775 The ‘locking in’ of commitments to disciplinary neo-liberalism effectively 
delimits the bounds of political possibility for social and democratic expenditures. 
Although calls for increasing expenditures for access to justice are often dismissed as 
                                                        
774 Richard Falk as quoted by Stephen Gill and A. Claire Cutler, “New Constitutionalism and World 
Order,” 19. 
775 Isabella Bakker and Stephen Gill, eds., Power, Production, and Social Reproduction (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Stephen Gill and Claire A. Cutler eds., New Constitutionalism and World 
Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
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idealistic, these budgetary constraints should not be accepted as presumptively legitimate, 
particularly when these negatively impact the capacities of vulnerable people to access 
justice. This does not suggest that access to justice can only be served through public 
means; as repeatedly observed, class actions are particularly well-suited as crucial 
instruments of social protection in cases where states are relcalcitrant to enforce or where 
‘regulatory capture’ is a political reality.  
The globalization of class actions in the early twenty-first century indicates that the 
various dynamics and developments examined in this project have potentially far-reaching 
implications. Despite the myriad shortcomings, class actions nevertheless constitute 
‘power potentials’ as collectivist instruments of social protection. The mere availability of 
class actions can have the practical effect of deterring misconduct by powerful economic 
actors (which is one of the reasons why corporate interests have sought their retrenchment 
as part of de-democratization strategies). In the political economy of pollution, a 
complementary form of this collectivist resistance vehicle remains a pivotal (although 
independently insufficient) aspect of environmental justice-seeking.  
At the same time, the co-optative role of class actions as policy instruments in the 
privatization of regulatory enforcement demands greater scrutiny. The global proliferation 
of private enforcement regimes concurrent with the globalization of class actions deepens 
the extent to which market forces impact the capacities of vulnerable people to socially 
reproduce. A private enforcement regime constitutes a structural reconfiguration of state 
forms, which indicates that contemporary processes of privatization extend beyond state 
assets and services to include the basic functioning of state agencies. Relatedly, the 
emergence of litigation finance indicates that the financialization of the political economy 
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in the current historical conjuncture extends to fundamental democratic institutions such 
as civil justice, exposing these to the dictates of financial capital. This latter development 
is a fertile field for research moving forward. To what extent has litigation finance 
promoted multilayer access to justice? What type of access and what type of justice, and 
for whom? What is the distribution across sectors? To what extent can litigation finance 
address access to justice problems beyond the class action context?  
From a broader political economy perspective, the relationship between 
financialization and the political-ecological dimension of social reproduction is similarly 
unexplored at present. A recent pathway of analysis has been developed by Adrienne 
Roberts who expresses the relationship between everyday household capacities and global 
finance as the “financialization of social reproduction,” which impairs sustainable 
conditions of social reproduction through the “financial expropriation” of households.776 
This focus on households can be expanded to include the environmental foundation upon 
which all reproduction rests, in light of Cindi Katz’s seminal theorization of social 
reproduction which explicitly identifies the importance of the political-ecological 
dimension. Targeted environmental racism that focuses on vulnerable communities who 
cannot access justice against such encroachments and the ways in which financialization 
reinforces the disadvantaging of such environmental claims, particularly health-
impairment claims, are underexplored areas of future research. In Canada, this type of 
environmental racism has disproportionately impacted Indigenous peoples—a vulnerable 
                                                        
776 Adrienne Roberts, “Household Debt and the Financialization of Social Reproduction: Theorizing the UK 
Housing and Hunger Crises,” in ed., Susanne Soederberg, Risking Capitalism (Research in Political 
Economy, Vol. 31) (Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing, 2016), 135-164; see also, Gerald A. Epstein, ed., 




subset of the population with historically negative experiences with the Canadian state 
resulting in differential legal consciousness, lower legal empowerment, and mistrust of the 
justice system. A ‘bottom-up’ analysis based in the specific social context of Indigenous 
struggles to access justice in environmental matters could be a beneficial contribution to 
the broader research topic of multilayer access to environmental justice. The increasing 
role of financial capital in mediating everyday life and relations of social reproduction 
demands greater attention, as well as the transformation of pensions, mortgages, student 
debts, auto loans, even justiciable problems and mass litigation into investment products, 
with pervasive social impacts, including increased inequality along familiar social 
gradients of gender, race, class, and ability. Such political economy analyses can provide 
greater contextual breadth by speaking to the heart of the progressive critique of class 
actions, namely, that collective harms are being capitalized by entrepreneurial actors with 
minimal benefits to the former and significant benefits to the latter.   
Throughout this project, several areas of potential reform have been identified as 
worthwhile to examine further. These include the potential abolishment of the English Rule 
(‘loser pays’) for class actions to mitigate the risk exposures that negatively impact the 
access to justice benefits of class actions and the inclusion of an amicus curiae during 
settlement approval hearings to address the adversarial void, as well as broader reforms 
that address the significant knowledge gaps in both class actions and the environmental 
context. These reforms may contribute to improving the bleak reality of environmental 
class actions in the future. For now, it is difficult to envisage significant change to the 
present functioning of Ontario’s class action regime for environmental claims. It goes 
without saying that this project has focused on environmental claims and its conclusions 
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do not necessarily extend to other sectors of Ontario’s regime (notwithstanding the fact 
that some of the reforms affect all class actions). In light of the global proliferation of class 
actions, the concerns raised about the shortcomings of environmental claims warrant 
consideration in jurisdictions that seek to mobilize class actions as policy instruments in 
the privatization of enforcement. Although class actions as crucial instruments of social 
protection should likely be welcome legal transplants in jurisdictions around the world that 
do not already possess collective redress mechanisms, sector-by-sector analyses may be 
necessary to be able to determine their potential strengths and weaknesses in different 
contexts.  
Through a critical policy analysis, this project has identified and contextualized the 
limitations of class actions in the political economy of pollution. In so doing, I have sought 
to provide greater clarity about the type of environmental justice that is presently achieved 
and achievable in Ontario’s regime by exploring the relevant exclusionary dynamics. This 
explication of the limitations of class actions may serve to inform the tactical usages of this 
instrument of social protection. Notably, it must be recognized that social relations and 
problems cannot be diverted into strictly legalistic channels pursuant to the juridification 
of politics and class actions cannot replace broader collective action; rather, class actions 
constitute an available legal recourse for such action. The myriad limitations of 
environmental class actions that have been uncovered in this study testify to the validity of 
the multidimensional progression of access to justice in later discursive waves; that is to 
say, multilayer access to environmental justice must move beyond formal court procedures 
by incorporating both legal and non-legal pathways to justice. As such, class actions are 
pivotal (but not independently sufficient) facets of social protective programs. If nothing 
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else, this project has documented the inadequacy of overreliance on legal vehicles such as 
class actions for the pursuit of social objectives. As we have observed, the nascent history 
of class actions in Ontario (and Canada, more broadly) has restricted the range of available 
empirical data for critical analyses. It is my hope that the forerunning status of this study 
on multilayer access to environmental justice has contributed to addressing this knowledge 
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW PROCESS & METHOD 
The principal objective of the data collected during the interview process has been as a 
primary source that informs the interpretative analysis of this project by guiding thematic 
selection, structuring the analysis, and contributing to greater comprehension of complex 
topics, rather than assuming a central status through usage of direct quotations or 
representational paraphrases. This holistic project has included this form of data collection 
as one form among others, including purposive case study analysis, archival research, 
theoretical and empirical texts bearing on the substance of the topic, governmental and 
non-governmental reports, and relevant jurisprudence. 
Interviews with 21 class and defense attorneys were conducted from April 2015 to 
March 2016. This time period includes the completion of action research cycles and 
member checks for maximum accuracy and transferability of collected data. It was my 
determination that a data saturation point was achieved with this number of qualitative 
participants with strong factual confluence. This is within the parameters of the typical 
point of saturation beyond which qualitative data collection yields ‘diminishing returns’, 
with some investigations yielding such points much earlier, depending on the type of 
investigation.777 The confidential interviews ranged from 15 minutes to 2.5 hours with a 
median length of 30 minutes. I originally sought to conduct interviews in person, but given 
participant time constraints and work schedules, 11 interviews were conducted over 
                                                        
777 See, e.g., Barbara DiCicco-Bloom and Benjamin F. Crabtree, “The Qualitative Research Interview,” in 
Medical Education, Vol. 40, No. 4 (2006): 314-321; Greg Guest, Arwen Bunce, and Laura Johnson, “How 
many interviews are enough? An experiment with data saturation and variability,” in Fields Methods, Vol. 
18, No. 1 (2006): 59-82; Jane Ritchie and Jane Lewis, eds., Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for 
Social Science Students and Researchers (London: Sage Publications, 2003). 
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telephone and 10 were conducted in person. The distribution of participants was 14 class 
attorneys and 7 defense attorneys; 17 Ontario-based attorneys, 2 Quebec-based attorneys, 
and 2 British Columbia-based attorneys. A full list of participants identified by date of 
interview, province of employment, and class/defense categorization is included in 
Appendix B. Although interviews had conversational adaptability, interactions were 
guided by a series of predetermined themes and areas of focus permitting standardized yet 
open-ended interviews. A sample template of guide-based interview questions is provided 
in Appendix C (all questions are not applicable to both defense and class attorneys nor 
were all questions posed to all participants given time constraints). Initial participants were 
purposively selected based on experience, relevance, and availability, including this 
researcher’s contacts formed over years of seminar and conference participation, with 
subsequent non-random participants recruited using a chain-referral sampling technique 
(‘snowball sampling’) which effectively expanded the breadth of participants and 
permitted greater access via introductions to previously inaccessible participants.  
One of the strengths and weaknesses of this project has been its focus on class and 
defense attorneys as participants given their role as pivotal actors in Ontario’s class action 
regime. This is particularly important in light of the reversed recruitment paradigm and the 
gatekeeping role played by class attorneys in facilitating multilayer access to 
environmental justice. Defense attorneys are also ideally situated to provide instructive and 
critical perspectives on the largely class attorney-driven nature of class actions. The 
selection of participants was undertaken on the basis that both class and defense attorney 
perspectives could contribute to a more holistic and multidimensional understanding of 
Ontario’s class action regime. That said, given the resource constraints of a doctoral project 
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in terms of time and financial expenditures, as well as various logistical impediments in 
data collection on a mass scale, empirical data collection from past and present class 
members has not been included in this study. The exceedingly high number of class 
members involved in past and present actions requires extensive resource expenditures in 
order to satisfy basic methodological requirements. This knowledge gap is a promising 
area for future research. This could take multiple forms, including concentrated qualitative 
interviews of class members involved in a single case or a large-scale survey involving 
hundreds or thousands of class members encompassing multiple class actions. Similarly, 
this research could have been strengthened with the inclusion of judges as research 
participants. Although this inclusion was considered at the outset of this project, the 
inaccessibility of such participants was ultimately a prohibitive and deciding criterion for 
focusing exclusively on class and defense attorneys. This is also a fertile area of future 
research as the inclusion of the perspective of judges would improve the holistic nature of 
this analysis and contribute to a greater understanding of the issues facing justice-seekers 
in Ontario’s class action regime.  
 
Research Ethics 
This project obtained research ethics approval in March 2015 by the Human Participants 
Review Sub-Committee of York University’s Office of Research Ethics with full 
compliance with the Tri-Council Policy Statement on Research Involving Human 
Participants. All collected data was encrypted and securely stored in an external hard drive 
locked in a filing cabinet in a locked office pursuant to the Data Security Guidelines of 
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York University’s Human Participant Review Committee for Research Involving Human 
Participants. As per the Tri-Council Policy Statement and the conditions of approval for 
research ethics, all collected data maintains strict confidentiality, which includes my ethical 
duty as sole researcher to protect collected data from “access, use, disclosure, modification, 
loss or theft” by others in order to preserve “the integrity of the research project.”778 All 
participants were assured and instructed that their identities would not be disclosed to any 
individual apart from this researcher during any point of this project as part of their consent 
agreements for participation as interviewed subjects. After collection, data was de-
identified and coded with numerical assignations. I have attempted to de-identify the 
collected data to ensure strict confidentiality, with full recognition that ‘blanket 
anonymization’ is often a practical impossibility as it pertains to ‘indirectly identifying 
information’. Where such data is directly cited or paraphrased, I have sought to present it 
in a general and objective manner to prevent any such potential identification. I have also 
refrained from identifying research locations in this study to prevent site-based 
identification pursuant to the principles outlined in the Tri-Council Policy Statement on 
Research Involving Humans. The only extant pathway to research location identification 
may be the dates of certain interviews which coincide with notable dates in the calendars 
of class action practitioners and scholars in Canada. Where applicable, this was 
transparently relayed to participants prior to interviews. The non-vulnerable and legally 
competent status of participants (re: attorneys) contributed to the timely approval process—
research ethics was sought in February 2015 and was obtained in March 2015.  
                                                        
778 Tri-Council Policy Statement, Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans (2014): 58. 
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APPENDIX B: LIST OF INTERVIEWS 
 
1.   Class Attorney, Ontario Law Firm 
Date: 24 April 2015 
 
2.   Class Attorney, Ontario Law Firm 
Date: 24 April 2015 
 
3.   Class Attorney, Ontario Law Firm 
Date: 24 April 2015 
 
4.   Class Attorney, Quebec Law Firm 
Date: 24 April 2015 
 
5.   Class Attorney, Ontario Law Firm 
Date: 24 April 2015 
 
6.   Class Attorney, Ontario Law Firm 
Date: 25 April 2015 
 
7.   Class Attorney, Ontario Law Firm 
Date: 29 April 2015 
 
8.   Defense Attorney, Ontario Law Firm 
Date: 1 May 2015 
 
9.   Class Attorney, Ontario Law Firm 
Date: 6 May 2015 
 
10.  Defense Attorney, Ontario Law Firm 
Date: 17 May 2015 
 
11.  Defense Attorney, Ontario Law Firm 
Date: 17 May 2015 
 
12.  Defense Attorney, Ontario Law Firm 
Date: 17 May 2015 
 
13.  Class Attorney, Ontario Law Firm 
Date: 27 May 2015 
 
14.  Class Attorney, British Columbia Law Firm 




15.  Defense Attorney, British Columbia Law Firm 
Date: 7 June 2015 
 
16.  Class Attorney, Ontario Law Firm 
Date: 28 June 2015 
 
17.  Defense Attorney, Ontario Law Firm 
Date: 2 August 2015 
 
18.  Class Attorney, Ontario Law Firm 
Date: 29 August 2015 
 
19.  Class Attorney, Quebec Law Firm 
Date: 14 September 2015 
 
20.  Defense Attorney, Ontario Law Firm 
Date: 29 November 2015 
 
21.  Class Attorney, Ontario Law Firm 

















APPENDIX C: SAMPLE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
1.   How many years have you practiced class action litigation (in Ontario)? 
2.   How many actions have you represented/defended?  
3.   How are class proceedings initiated at your firm? 
4.   What are the case selection criteria you/your firm employ(s)? 
5.   Is there an order of priority among these criteria? If so, identify and explain. 
6.   Is there a minimum monetary threshold in case selection? If so, identify and 
explain. 
7.   Are there particular types of claims that are privileged over others? If so, identify 
and explain. 
8.   What types of actions are most commonly pursued? 
9.   What types of actions are least commonly pursued? 
10.  What is your experience with environmental claims? 
11.  In your experience, what are the merits and shortcomings of environmental 
claims? 
12.  What are the prospects for environmental claims? 
13.  What are the impediments to environmental claims? 
14.  Would you undertake independent empirical data collection for an environmental 
claim? 
15.  Would you represent an environmental claim in which independent empirical data 
collection is required? 
16.  What has been the impact of third party litigation financing (in Ontario)? 
17.  What has been the impact of public financing (re: Class Proceedings Fund)? 
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18.  Do you/does your firm indemnify representative plaintiffs? 
19.  Do you agree with the application of the English Rule in class actions? 
20.  What are the merits and shortcomings of private enforcement? 
21.  Is the “Private Attorney General” a viable concept? 
22.  What is your view on “entrepreneurial litigation”?  
23.  How would you define “access to justice”? 
24.  To what extent have class actions fulfilled their originary promise of increasing 
access to justice? 
25.  Who are the primary beneficiaries of class actions? 
26.  How do you respond to the critique of the misalignment of economic incentives 
between class members and class counsel? 
27.  How effective have objectors been at settlement approval hearings? 
28.  How do you view the adversarial void at the settlement stage? 
29.  Should an amicus curiae be appointed? If so, how should this be funded? 
30.  What are the take-up rates in actions you have been involved with? 
31.  Should merits be considered at the certification stage? 
32.  Are class actions collectivist vehicles and/or aggregative vehicles? 
33.  What is the future trajectory for Ontario’s class action regime?  
34.  Is a secondary market for litigation financing inevitable? Explain. 
35.  How does litigation financing impact multilayer access to justice? 
36.  Do you have any proposed reforms to improve multilayer access to justice? 
37.  How would you describe Ontario’s class action regime?  
 
